Young v. Saanich Police Department, 2003 BCSC 926 (CanLII).

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Young v. Saanich Police Department, et al Page 42 or promoting the view that he is less capable or worthy of recognition or value as a human being or as a member of Canadian society, equally deserving of concern, respect, and consideration. [89] The s. 15 prohibition on adverse effect discrimination is not, however, absolute. The Supreme Court of Canada has held that a law that is prima facie discriminatory may nonetheless 2003 BCSC 926 (CanLII) be justifiable under s. 1. In Eldridge, the court confirmed that the test for justifying adverse effect discrimination under s. 1 is that set out in R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103. In Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, Iacobucci J. summarized that test as follows at para. 182: ... First, the objective of the legislation must be pressing and substantial. Second, the means chosen to attain this legislative end must be reasonable and demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society. In order to satisfy the second requirement, three criteria must be satisfied: (1) the rights violation must be rationally connected to the aim of the legislation; (2) the impugned provision must minimally impair the Charter guarantee; and (3) there must be a proportionality between the effect of the measure and its objective so that the attainment of the legislative goal is not outweighed by the abridgement of the right. In all s. 1 cases the burden of proof is with the government to show on a balance of probabilities that the violation is justifiable.
Young v. Saanich Police Department, et al Page 43 It seems to me that the CRHC has easily established that the objective of their policy, to ensure that all tenants can peacefully enjoy their residences, is pressing and substantial. It is also apparent that a policy of prohibiting offensive odours is rationally connected to that objective. [90] On the issues of minimal impairment and proportionality, unique considerations come into play in the context of adverse 2003 BCSC 926 (CanLII) effect discrimination. At para. 79 of Eldridge, La Forest J. explained as follows: It is also a cornerstone of human rights jurisprudence, of course, that the duty to take positive action to ensure that members of disadvantaged groups benefit equally from services offered to the general public is subject to the principle of reasonable accommodation. The obligation to make reasonable accommodation for those adversely affected by a facially neutral policy or rule extends only to the point of "undue hardship"; see Simpsons-Sears, supra, and Central Alberta Dairy Pool, supra. In my view, in s. 15(1) cases this principle is best addressed as a component of the s. 1 analysis. Reasonable accommodation, in this context, is generally equivalent to the concept of "reasonable limits". It should not be employed to restrict the ambit of s. 15(1). [91] Similar tests were suggested in Ayangma v. Prince Edward Island, [2001] P.E.I.J. No. 105 (S.C. A.D.), leave to appeal refused [2001] S.C.C.A. No. 653, where McQuaid J.A. wrote as follows regarding the decision in Ontario v. Simpsons-Sears:
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Young v. Saanich Police Department, 2003 BCSC 926 (CanLII).

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