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Young v. Saanich Police Department, 2003 BCSC 926 (CanLII).

Young v. Saanich Police Department, 2003 BCSC 926 (CanLII).

Young v. Saanich Police Department, 2003 BCSC 926 (CanLII).

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<strong>Young</strong> v. <strong>Saanich</strong> <strong>Police</strong> <strong>Department</strong>, et al Page 66<br />

the arbitrators' task under the legislation to<br />

determine large numbers of disputes between<br />

landlords and tenants, it seems likely that<br />

arbitrators have expertise in determining when a<br />

landlord's safety or other lawful right or interest<br />

has been seriously impaired by an act or omission of<br />

the tenant. Third, the purpose of the arbitration<br />

scheme in the Act must be to provide for dispute<br />

resolution between landlords and tenants<br />

inexpensively and expeditiously. Consistent with<br />

this would be a deferential approach when the<br />

arbitrators are determining questions of law or<br />

mixed fact and law within their jurisdiction. The<br />

question here, that is, whether the "safety or other<br />

lawful right or interest of the landlord" has been<br />

"seriously impaired by an act or omission of the<br />

tenant", is a question of mixed fact and law.<br />

Fourth, the decision affects the interests of the<br />

particular tenants and landlord, and is not complex,<br />

polycentric, or policy-intensive. This latter<br />

factor points toward less rather than more<br />

deference. However, considering the legislative<br />

scheme and nature of the decision at issue here, as<br />

well as the previously-decided cases on the standard<br />

of review under the Act, I conclude that the<br />

standard of review should be patent<br />

unreasonableness.<br />

<strong>2003</strong> <strong>BCSC</strong> <strong>926</strong> (<strong>CanLII</strong>)<br />

In more direct terms, I accept the CRHC contention that I must<br />

not interfere with the decision of the arbitrator so long as<br />

there was some evidence before him logically and reasonably<br />

capable of supporting his factual conclusions. I have no<br />

power to interfere even if I might have reached a different<br />

conclusion on the same evidence.<br />

[138] The standard of review to be applied to the decision<br />

of Arbitrator Katz is less deferential. In conducting a<br />

review of another arbitrator’s decision, Arbitrator Katz took

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