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All-hazards can also be less formally defined to include any incident caused by terrorism, natural disasters, equipment failures or any chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or explosive accident. Such incidents can require a multi-jurisdictional and multi-functional response and recovery effort. Using the all-hazards approach gives local jurisdictions the capacity to respond effectively to energy supply disruptions from any of a range of emergencies, including fires, floods, earthquakes, tornados, blizzards, or any number of non-natural disasters such as a cyber attack. An all-hazards approach will also include preparation and response plans for electromagnetic disturbances, such as electromagnetic pulse, also known as “EMP.” EMP can be a burst of electromagnetic radiation that results from an explosion, especially a nuclear explosion, or a suddenly fluctuating magnetic field. EMP can also be a high intensity, short duration burst of electromagnetic energy. The resulting electric and magnetic fields can interfere with electrical and electronic systems to produce damaging current and voltage surges. 2 All-hazards planning is a unifying approach to dealing with emergencies. Since local jurisdictions cannot predict where or when an emergency might surface or how it will affect their critical infrastructure and essential services, it makes sense to adopt this multi-disciplinary approach. It is abundantly more efficient to have—to the extent possible—a single approach and plan for all emergency situations in terms of their origin (natural or man-made) and their impacts (e.g., the energy sector, telecommunications, and water supply) than a separate plan for each type of emergency. There are numerous common attributes across and among emergencies that make a unifying all-hazards plan possible and practical. For example, plans for hurricane emergencies have been on the books for most impacted coastal regions for decades. Yet aspects of these same plans, with minor adjustments in many cases, can also serve the same jurisdiction for an energy emergency wherein, for example, a major transmission line fails. Moreover, the plans have the potential for use by other jurisdictions that may be prone to flooding. Thus, not only is it possible that a single unit of local government might expand the reach of its existing emergency plan, but it is also quite probable that local governments can share lessons learned and portions of their EAPs, thereby decreasing the time and cost burden associated with plan preparation. It is important to note that energy assurance planning must be tailored to a local jurisdiction’s specific location and circumstances. Although it is always advisable to learn from other local governments, a successful EAP requires a unique, detailed review and analysis of the particular community energy situation. In many cases, however, lessons learned from response and recovery can be transferred from one government to another, especially within the same State, where there is a higher likelihood that the local authority issues might be similar (see Section 3.3). 2.3 Identifying Energy Infrastructure Interdependencies The energy sector consists of thousands of electricity, oil, natural gas, and renewable energy assets that are geographically dispersed and connected by systems and networks. Energy infrastructure needs to be operating properly in order for other critical infrastructures, such as transportation, communications, finance and governmental systems to perform as needed. These other critical infrastructures are dependent on the energy sector to maintain functionality, and vice versa—that is, they are interdependent. For example, coal shipments for electric power plants are highly dependent on rail. There are also dependencies within the energy infrastructure itself, notably the dependency of petroleum refineries and pipeline pumping stations on a reliable electricity supply, and of backup generators and utility maintenance vehicles on diesel and gasoline fuel. 3 2 http://www.nerc.com/files/GMD_Guideline_v2_clean.pdf. 3 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Energy, Energy: Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Sector-Specific Plan as input to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, page 17, May 2007. 8 | 2 – Issues to Consider When Developing a Local Energy Assurance Plan
Although the concept of interdependencies may not be new or novel to some, additional thoughtful consideration is needed as to how it applies to energy and other sectors of the economy. Even as early as 1997, a report from the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection noted that energy is the lifeblood of our interdependent infrastructures, and routine disturbances can cascade into a regional outage. That Commission also noted that technical complexities may permit vulnerabilities to go unrecognized until a major failure occurs. The August 2003 blackout in the Midwest and Northeastern United States and Canada was triggered by just such a disturbance. 4 A series of incidents started by a power line sagging into a tree in Cleveland, Ohio, cascaded across critical infrastructures, resulting in significant loss or degradation of essential services in numerous States. Table 2 illustrates three types of infrastructure interdependency failure. Table 2. Types of Infrastructure Interdependency Failure Failure Type Cascading Escalating Common Cause Description A disruption in one infrastructure causes a disruption in a second infrastructure; for example, a loss of energy causes a wastewater treatment plant to shut down. A disruption in one infrastructure exacerbates an independent disruption of a second infrastructure; for example, the time it takes for restoring banking services is prolonged because telecommunications lines and signals are not available. A disruption of two or more infrastructures at the same time is the result of a common cause; for example, a tornado simultaneously adversely impacts the availability of electric power, petroleum, clean water and telecommunications. Source: James P. Peerenboom, Ronald E. Fisher, “Analyzing Cross-Sector Interdependencies,”40th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS’07), 2007 http://www.computer.org/portal/web/csdl/doi?doc=doi/10.1109/HICSS.2007.78. There are four general categories of infrastructure interdependency: 5 physical, cyber, geographic, and logical. These categories are described in Figure 1. These infrastructure interdependencies vary in scale and complexity, ranging from local linkages (municipal water supply services and local emergency services) to regional linkages (electric power coordinating councils), to national linkages (interstate natural gas and transportation systems) and to international linkages (telecommunications and banking and finance systems). Figure 1. Categories of Infrastructure Interdependency Physical Material output of one infrastructure is used by another Cyber Infrastructures utilize electronic information and control systems One of the first steps in developing an EAP, and thereby mitigating the possible consequences of an energy emergency, is to understand the dependent relationships among energy infrastructures, key local services and valued community assets. Geographic Infrastructures are co-located in a common corridor Logical Infrastructures are linked through financial markets 4 James P. Peerenboom, Ronald E. Fisher, “Analyzing Cross-Sector Interdependencies,”40th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS’07), 2007 http://www.computer.org/portal/web/csdl/doi?doc=doi/10.1109/HICSS.2007.78. 5 Rinaldi, Peerenboom and Kelly, “Identifying, Understanding and Analyzing Critical Infrastructure Interdependencies,” IEEE Control Systems Magazine, 2001. Local Government Energy Assurance Guidelines – Version 2.0 | 9
Page 1: Local Government Energy Assurance G
Page 4 and 5: Copyright © 2011 Public Technology
Page 7 and 8: Contents Acknowledgements..........
Page 9 and 10: Acknowledgements The U.S. Departmen
Page 11 and 12: 1 Introduction 1.1 Purpose of the G
Page 13 and 14: Local Government Energy Assurance P
Page 15: 2 Issues to Consider When Developin
Page 19 and 20: 2.4 Understanding Continuity of Ope
Page 21 and 22: complementary efforts can actually
Page 23 and 24: 3. Economic impact information: Thi
Page 25 and 26: Case Study 1. PV Supporting Emergen
Page 27 and 28: Wind Energy Options Developing and
Page 29 and 30: Energy Efficiency Efficient energy
Page 31 and 32: CHP is acknowledged as a proven, va
Page 33 and 34: Case Study 4. 30-Kilowatt Natural G
Page 35 and 36: Direct Threats The most obvious cyb
Page 37 and 38: 3 How to Develop or Enhance a Local
Page 39 and 40: The coordinator should be a consens
Page 41 and 42: Every local government has differen
Page 43 and 44: Local Voices Portland, Oregon “Th
Page 45 and 46: Figure 3. Public and Private Energy
Page 47 and 48: Key Questions …in Knowing Emergen
Page 49 and 50: involve private sector energy emerg
Page 51 and 52: The National Response Framework (NR
Page 53 and 54: 3.5 Step Four: Know the Local Gover
Page 55 and 56: Local Voices Asheville, North Carol
Page 57 and 58: Working with an Investor Owned Util
Page 59 and 60: Key Questions …in Identifying Loc
Page 61 and 62: The sections below reference NASEO
Page 63 and 64: Energy Supplier Contacts Section 3.
Page 65 and 66: Local Voices Casper, Wyoming From o
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Figure 6. Critical Facilities, Serv
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■ ■ Length of time before the o
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3.9.1 Internal Protocols/Message Co
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The Energy Assurance Coordinator’
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3.10 Step Nine: Develop Additional
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State Government ■ ■ Emergency
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Local Voices The Salvation Army The
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Include a Budget for the Plan Updat
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developing these tabletop exercises
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within the local government. Where
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Appendix A. Glossary of Key Terms T
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Key Assets Local Government Metropo
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Appendix B. Local Government Energy
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Appendix C. Federal Energy Assuranc
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C.3 National Infrastructure Protect
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energy emergency coordinators may a
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Appendix D. Related PTI Guidance In
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Appendix E. Additional Agencies and
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■■ ■■ The North American El
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Appendix F. Bibliography “A Check
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Published by Public Technology Inst
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