Overlooked - Liberty

More documents

Recommendations

Info

<strong>Overlooked</strong>: Surveillance and personal privacy in modern Britain 113 CCTV 1) CCTV is more prevalent in the United Kingdom than any other country with an estimated 4.2 million cameras in 2006. New technologies are allowing for techniques such as subject identification, behavioural recognition and subject tracking. Meanwhile CCTV remains poorly regulated, primarily as a consequence of the inherent limitations of the DPA. The logistical ability of the ICO to provide effective oversight of million of systems is also limited. 2) The case for CCTV proving to be a significant crime detection or prevention tool has not been made out. At best it can be shown to have some crime detection benefits when used in conjunction with other crime reduction tools and agencies. Advances in technology do mean that there is potential for CCTV to become a more effective tool of crime detection. Furthermore, it is possible that developments such as subject tracking and sound-enabled systems might potentially result in CCTV having a greater crime prevention impact. However such development also brings the potential for even greater intrusion into personal privacy. Mass Data Retention 1) There is a general public acceptance that mass data retention and dissemination might seem an essential aspect of life in 2007. This acceptance is partly due to the necessity of instant availability of information. It is also due to a belief that the holding of information by agents of the state is a necessary prerequisite for the operation of national security. The latter reason is not quite as compelling in 2007 as in the previous five years. While public opinion still appears marginally in favour of mass data retention schemes such as the National Identity Register, support has diminished. This appears to be consequential to ongoing concerns over cost and effectiveness. An inherent trust from a majority of the public in the desirability of mass data retention schemes can no longer be taken for granted. 2) The practicality of mass information schemes still remains untested. Both the National Identity Register and the Children Index remain creatures of statute in that they exist only insofar as determined by their respective Acts of Parliament. The Biometric Identification Document proposed in the UK Borders Bill, which will be used for initial rollout of national compulsory identification has not yet completed passage through Parliament. The NHS centralised health record spine will not require an Act of Parliament as it deals with information already retained on patient health records. However, it is also still some way off coming into operation. While preparatory plans for rollout of these databases are underway 218 , there is still some way to go. The next two to three years will be instrumental in determining the full implementation of mass informational databases. As both main opposition parties remain hostile to the NIR the next General Election is likely to determine the NIR’s eventual fate. 3) The scope of mass informational databases might need to increase in order to achieve the benefit they have been sold on. This particularly relates to the NIR in combating terrorism or crime. Unless increased levels of information are introduced to the NIR, an individual entry will not contain as much information as will be held by law enforcement agencies. The only way that the NIR could be of greater assistance is if sufficient information is contained to allow a general 218 Such as by the registration of biometrics with passport application.
114 <strong>Overlooked</strong>: Surveillance and personal privacy in modern Britain level of risk assessment to take place. However, this will effectively amount to profiling of entries. This is a development that would require parliamentary approval (by increasing information contained on the register). It would also raise significant privacy and race relations concerns. 4) The Schedule to the IDCA creates the potential for a detailed audit trail of each person entered on the NIR to be created. The greater the rollout into the private sector the more detailed this will become. 5) The accuracy of entries on the NIR could be improved by improved auditing capability. The IDCA does not contain much detail on self-auditing entries. This is something that might be developed though good practice and guidance. 7) The experience of a compulsory national identity scheme during the Second World War suggests that the range of uses to which the Identity Card will be put is likely to expand over time. 8) The role of the National Identity Scheme Commissioner is limited and does not allow for assessment of the effectiveness and impact of the scheme as a whole. 9) The Children Index has the potential to be a useful tool in identifying children at risk. However, it also has the potential to undermine child protection though excessive entry onto the index resulting in at-risk children being overlooked. It could also have a disproportionate and unjustified impact upon the privacy of children and their families. Again, this might have adverse consequences if it undermines the trust and confidence of relationships between children and health or other service providers. 10) The role and guidance provided by the Information Commissioner’s Office will be crucial in determining the effectiveness of the Children Index. In more general terms, the role of the Information Commissioner’s Office is of increasing relevance to the operation of mass informational data programmes. Legislation provides the framework but not the operational detail that is crucial in determining both effectiveness and privacy impact. DNA 1) A far greater proportion of the United Kingdom’s population have their DNA permanently retained on the national DNA database than is the case in any other country. This is due to the grounds for retention being extremely broad and permanent retention being permitted following arrest for a recordable offence whether or not prosecution or conviction follow. 2) A national DNA database is a useful tool for assisting detection of certain types of crime. In particular, it can assist with the detection of offences of violence or involving sexual assault. However, as these only represent a very small proportion of total offending in the United Kingdom, the database has a small impact upon crime detection rates. Extension of the database has not proved to have had a significant impact upon crime detection rates. 3) It has proved difficult to frame debate about the desirability or effectiveness of the National DNA database in privacy and human rights terms. The impact of an advance in DNA resulting in a conviction for a serious historic crime is difficult to compare to the societal change resulting from extension of the database. As a consequence there has been little public debate about the desirability of database implementation.
Page 1 and 2:
Overlooked: Surveillance and person
Page 3 and 4:
Acknowledgements I would like to th
Page 5 and 6:
II Overlooked: Surveillance and per
Page 7 and 8:
iv Overlooked: Surveillance and per
Page 9 and 10:
2 Overlooked: Surveillance and pers
Page 11 and 12:
Page 13 and 14:
Page 15 and 16:
Page 17 and 18:
10 Overlooked: Surveillance and per
Page 19 and 20:
Page 21 and 22:
Page 23 and 24:
Page 25 and 26:
Page 27 and 28:
Page 29 and 30:
Page 31 and 32:
Page 33 and 34:
Page 35 and 36:
Page 37 and 38:
Page 39 and 40:
Page 41 and 42:
Page 43 and 44:
Page 45 and 46:
Page 47 and 48:
Page 49 and 50:
Page 51 and 52:
Page 53 and 54:
Page 55 and 56:
Page 57 and 58:
Page 59 and 60:
Page 61 and 62:
Page 63 and 64:
Page 65 and 66:
Page 67 and 68:
Page 69 and 70: 62 Overlooked: Surveillance and per
Page 107 and 108: 100 Overlooked: Surveillance and pe
Page 119: 112 Overlooked: Surveillance and pe
show all

Overlooked - Liberty

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?