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<strong>Overlooked</strong>: Surveillance and personal privacy in modern Britain 47 Introduction Mass data retention: Identity Cards and the Children index The holding of mass information though large scale databases is one of the most significant societal changes with privacy implications in recent years. The practice of targeted surveillance has been around for as long as there have been undercover operatives and basic surveillance devices. The use of CCTV is a more recent fixture but has been part and parcel of life since making such a dramatic impact upon the nation’s consciousness following the murder of Jamie Bulger in 1993. Mass informational databases have also been around for decades. However, it is only in the last few years that their existence has synergised with everyday life. Fifteen to twenty years ago mass databases were generally the preserve of the police 104 or had specific purposes such as internal cataloguing systems used in libraries. Daily contact with mass informational databases was rare. This has changed to such an extent that we experience on a daily basis the accessing of personal details though little more than the provision of our postcode. There is an inherent assumption that anyone providing a public or private service will have immediate access to relevant information via computerised access to a database. The regular use of Google and other search engines allows us to instantly access information about people and subjects that would have required hours of research only a decade or so ago. Such changes mean that the passing of legislation allowing mass informational retention and dissemination with society wide impact has not always impacted upon the public consciousness. The Identity Card legislation was frequently in the news but, apart from those who were directly involved in debate, did not regularly feature as an issue of fundamental importance to the majority of the electorate. The Children’s Index created by the Children Act 2004 attracted far less attention than this even though it introduced a mass informational programme of data accumulation and dissemination affecting every child in the United Kingdom and therefore, by extension, a good 104 The Mark 1 Police National Computer (PNC) operated until 1992 and was then superseded by the PNC Mark 2.
48 <strong>Overlooked</strong>: Surveillance and personal privacy in modern Britain proportion of the adults. Collectively these two databases will be relevant to every person in the United Kingdom who is here for longer than a temporary visit 105 . They will create a birth to death register of every person and allow for widespread access to this register. They are not the only two mass informational databases in the UK but they are likely to be both the most significant and controversial. The majority of this section will focus on the National Identity Register before a shorter consideration of the Children Index. The National Identity Register and Identity Card scheme On 30 March 2006 the Identity Card Act 2006 (IDCA) received Royal Assent. The Government had taken four years, published two bills, spent millions of pounds and used countless hours of Home Office, Parliamentary and Committee time to pass legislation that will require the registration of everyone resident in the UK for more than three months 106 . At the heart of the Government’s proposals is the creation of a National Identity Register (NIR). It is the NIR, rather than the ID card itself, that will have the most profound impact upon individual privacy. Indeed the card is more a by-product of registration. Focus on the card rather than the register has meant that public expressions of concern over the implications of introducing ID cards have been muted. Any waning of public support for the scheme can be linked more to concerns over cost and a growing awareness that the card will not provide the magic bullet solution to the problems the Government has claimed for it than to concerns over privacy. Most people are aware that many other countries have identity card schemes. Consequently there has been a presumption that the UK’s proposals do not present any significant privacy concerns. There are two main reasons why such an assessment would be misleading. First, no other common law country in the world has an ID card scheme 107 . A common law country is one where an individual’s actions are lawful unless positively prohibited by law and where the courts are responsible for interpreting law. This contrasts with civil law countries (most European countries) which have codified legal systems. This is not in itself an argument against identity cards. However, it is worth noting that civil law countries tend to have far stronger codified privacy laws than the UK, which act as a balance against state intrusion into individual privacy. Second, it is wrong to presume that all compulsory identification schemes are similar. The scope of the information sharing and dissemination powers contained in the Act goes far beyond those of other countries. The Act is also riddled with reserved powers allowing the Secretary of State to extend the scope of the scheme by Parliamentary order. This means that whatever the limitations imposed in the Act concerning what information is contained on the NIR entry, who is entitled to access that information and so on, these can increase dramatically over time. It is easy to see how such ‘function creep’ could be tempting. Following the conviction of Ian Huntley for the murders of Holly Wells and Jessica Chapman, the Bichard Inquiry was set up to investigate ways of ensuring that those who were unsuitable were not able to work with children or vulnerable people 108 . One of Sir Michael 105 The Children Index will hold information on every person up to the age of 16 while the National Identity Register is planned to hold details of everyone above 16 resident in the United Kingdom for more than 3 months. 106 Three months being the period the government has stated it intends to require registration. 107 With the possible exception of Cyprus, which the Home Office argues is a common law jurisdiction. 108 http://www.bichardinquiry.org.uk/
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