Overlooked - Liberty
Overlooked - Liberty
Overlooked - Liberty
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<strong>Overlooked</strong>: Surveillance and personal privacy in modern Britain 81<br />
Other Ways to Protect Privacy<br />
It may be possible to utilise other causes of action to protect privacy in certain situations. A<br />
complainant might be able to bring claims in public or private nuisance (the former perhaps only in<br />
very limited circumstances) or for trespass to land and/or to the person. Malicious falsehood and<br />
defamation might also be relevant in redressing invasions of privacy, however, neither will be<br />
appropriate if information that is revealed about the complainant is not false.<br />
Where information that is revealed through an invasion of privacy is false, but not defamatory or<br />
injurious, how could a claimant seek redress If it was not possible to institute “false privacy” claims<br />
in this situation, a complainant would have less protection if the information revealed was false, than<br />
if it were true.<br />
A Stand-alone Tort of Breach of Privacy<br />
The protection of privacy in the UK has come about largely through the development of case law,<br />
rather than by legislative or regulatory means. It is helpful to consider how this protection has<br />
evolved by analysis of the relevant case law in this area.<br />
In Kaye v Robertson and Another 154 the Court of Appeal confirmed that in English law there was<br />
at this time (prior to the HRA) no right to privacy, and hence no right of action for breach of privacy.<br />
In this case a famous actor sought to prevent The Sunday Sport from publishing an “interview”<br />
and photographs taken while he was recovering from a road accident in intensive care, after a<br />
journalist and photographer gained access to his hospital room. He had not been fit to consent,<br />
and had not consented, to the interview. Having no specific right to privacy, Kaye could rely only<br />
on claims for malicious falsehood and passing off. Ruefully, the Court of Appeal perceived their illfitting<br />
nature and commented that it was now desirable for Parliament to consider how to protect<br />
an individual’s right to privacy.<br />
Ten years later in Secretary of State for Home Department v Wainwright 155 , the Court of Appeal and<br />
House of Lords confirmed the absence of a specific tort of invasion of privacy and reiterated that it<br />
was for Parliament, and not the courts, to delineate the “proper ambit” of protection in this area. The<br />
case concerned a mother and her son who were subjected to a humiliating strip search when they<br />
went to visit a member of their family in prison. They both experienced emotional distress and the<br />
son suffered from post traumatic stress disorder. The incident took place before the HRA had come<br />
into force. This meant that the Wainwrights could not rely on the provisions of the HRA that would<br />
have allowed them to bring proceedings in the domestic courts against the Home Office in respect<br />
of the breach of their Convention right to privacy. The matter progressed to the House of Lords<br />
where it was reiterated that there existed no general cause of action in English law for an invasion<br />
of privacy, capable of providing the Wainwrights with a remedy under English law. The Wainwrights<br />
eventually succeeded in Strasbourg, where the ECtHR held in September 2006 156 that there had<br />
been a violation of Article 8 (privacy) and Article 13 (effective remedy).<br />
154<br />
[1991] FSR 62.<br />
155<br />
[2002] QB 1334 (CA) and [2004] 2 AC 406 (HL).<br />
156<br />
Application No. 12350/04.