Overlooked - Liberty

Overlooked: Surveillance and personal privacy in modern Britain 53
of Commons with little alteration but ran into concerted and sustained opposition in the House of
Lords principally led by the Liberal Democrat Peer, Lord Phillips of Sudbury. This eventually led to
the compromise described earlier, in which there could be no compulsion of any group without
further legislation (although compulsion would still take place when obtaining a new passport). In the
end, however, the Government effectively got its way. Many Peers had clearly become increasingly
uncomfortable with continually blocking Government legislation. Meanwhile in the Commons, many
Labour MPs had recently voted against the Government causing defeats in the Terrorism Bill and
the Racial and Religious Hatred Bill passing though Parliament at the same time. Perhaps
understandably, many were unwilling to further defy the party whip and thus the Bill received Royal
Assent and became an Act.
The Act
The Identity Cards Act 2006 is not a particularly lengthy piece of legislation. It contains 44
Sections and two Schedules. Considering its name, the Act contains remarkably few clauses
about identity cards themselves. Liberty has maintained since the draft ID card Bill was published
that the Government’s plans were more concerned with the creation of the NIR than about the
cards themselves, which are essentially a by-product of registration. This is borne out by the
Contents page of the Act, which makes 11 references to the register but only five to ID cards
themselves.
As no ID card has yet been produced and the NIR has not yet come into existence, comments
about privacy repercussions must be based on the legislative framework creating the scheme. The
purpose of this study is not to provide a detailed clause-by-clause analysis of the IDCA. This has
been provided elsewhere by Liberty and others 116 . Rather, it will focus on the way in which the main
provisions could impact upon privacy. This will not be limited to informational privacy, but also the
impact that the fully operational scheme could have on individual privacy by, for example,
potentially becoming a tool of internal immigration control. It is not possible to make an accurate
prediction as to the full impact on individual privacy. What this work will attempt to do is draw
attention to possible areas of future concern. As both the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats
have pledged to scrap the scheme if elected it may be that the scheme never moves to full
compulsion. Similarly, technical and procurement problems or cost issues may make the scheme
unviable 117 . However, we are assuming that things progress according to the legislation passed
and the stated intentions of the Government.
It should be emphasised that most comments will relate to the initial scope of the Act. Nearly every
definition is attached to a power to amend by parliamentary order.
The Register
At the heart of the Act is the NIR. The first five clauses set up the NIR and create the framework for
registration. The two specific purposes of the NIR are to create a means for people to establish their
identity and to allow a means for that identity to be checked when necessary in the public interest. This
116
Liberty’s briefings are available at www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk
117
See the Sixth Report of the Parliamentary Science and Technology Committee
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmsctech/1032/103202.htm