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TACTICAL THOUGHT 2014 September 29 th The pattern of the communist Insurgency is outlined by Galula as; 1. Creation of a party 2. Unified front 3. Guerrilla Warfare (mostly to organize the population – not military aim) 4. Movement Warfare (not fixed defence operations) 5. Annihilation Campaign The situation of overwhelming superiority in forces for the governmental side is noted. 308 The political primacy of this kind of war is underlined and “politics becomes an active instrument of operations”. 309 The gradual transition from peace to war is noted 310 as the “fluidity of the insurgent, rigidity of the counterinsurgent” 311 as characteristics. Another characteristic is that the insurgents operate clandestinely although their actions other than subversion are overt. 312 Galula deals thoroughly with the area of propaganda, both for the insurgent and for the counterinsurgent. Galula states; “The military efforts need to be supplemented by an intensive psychological offensive against the guerrillas; the trump card here is an amnesty offer”. 313 Galula also maintains that Revolutionary War never reverts to a conventional form; creation of a regular army does not end subversion and guerrilla activity, instead these methods are combined for synergy. 314 The vital role of the police organization and forces is clearly stated. 315 Galula’s view of having an adapted military force, also with the aspect of moral issues (if the Counterinsurgents’ forces develop feelings for the insurgents’ stated cause) is discussed. 316 Galula underlines the role of the counterinsurgents’ leader’s knowledge of Counterinsurgency Warfare and his resoluteness and addresses his role as paramount. 317 As for the subject of Guerrilla Warfare, Galula spends time on discussion principles. He states the attrition of the enemy military forces is merely a by-product here, and not the essential goal, which Galula states is the impact on the people. 318 A strategy when turning to “Movement Warfare” is described where in occupied areas, clandestine structures will still be existing in order to resume the struggle, if the enemy re-takes the area. 319 Galula discusses two forms of Counterinsurgency; in Cold Revolutionary War (legal and not violent Insurgency actions) and in Hot Revolutionary War (openly illegal and violent insurgent actions). 320 308 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, Theory and Practice (1965), p. 3. 309 Ibid. pp. 4-5. 310 Ibid. pp. 5-6. 311 Ibid. p. 7. 312 Ibid. p. 49. 313 Ibid. p. 94. 314 Ibid. p. 9. 315 Ibid. p. 20. 316 Ibid. p. 21. 317 Ibid. p. 17. 318 Ibid. p. 35. 319 Ibid. p. 39. 320 Ibid. p. 49. 35
TACTICAL THOUGHT 2014 September 29 th Galula advocates not adopting the insurgent style of warfare (Guerrilla Warfare, for example) as the main form of Counterinsurgency Warfare. 321 Command and control of the people is vital and the “irreversibility” occurs when leaders emerge from the people. 322 Territorial control and an adaption of mind-set of the Counterinsurgents’ forces are crucial (politics are central to the struggle). 323 Important aspects “from strategy to tactics” are single direction, political primacy, coordination, territorial command, and adaption of the forces to Counterinsurgency Warfare and adaption of minds. 324 Galula describes tactics for operations as “simple in essence” and consisting of mobile units and earmarked units to stay in the area, in order to reinforce whatever static units were originally there, or are suddenly concentrated around the area. They start operations from the outside in, aiming at containing the guerrilla in a ring. At the same time, units garrisoning the adjoining areas are ordered to intensify their activity on the periphery of the selected area. The sweep is next conducted from the inside out, aiming at least at expelling the guerrillas. The over-all operation is finally broken down to several small-scale ones. All the static units, the original ones as well as the new ones, are assigned to their permanent sectors. A part of the mobile units operate as a body. Centrally controlled; the rest are allocated to the sector. All the forces work on what is left of the guerrillas after the two earlier sweeps. 325 Galula is clear in his view regarding the need for a Counterinsurgency doctrine in order to unite both civilian/political and military actions. 326 Result and conclusions The descriptions are of an explanatory character. The potential of explaining content covers aspects of strategy but focuses on operational art and tactics. The political aspect is however underlined throughout the book. Fighting power factors are covered as are physical factors with a focus on conceptual factors. Moral factors are dealt with. The descriptions cover characteristics of subversion, mainly overt insurgencies and even the necessity of considering personal characteristics when dealing with Counterinsurgency Warfare. Attitude aspects are included. Participating actors are described both from the attacker and defender position. The description focuses primarily on military activities in the phenomena, although police work is stated as vital. The description does not demand an understanding of sub-terms as Galula clearly explains them as they occur. The description is clear and has good potentiality of being understood easily. 321 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, Theory and Practice (1965). p. 51. 322 Ibid. p. 57. 323 Ibid. p. 66. 324 Ibid. pp. 66-67. 325 Ibid. p. 76. 326 Ibid. p. 65. 36
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