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TACTICAL THOUGHT
2014 September 29 th
This leads to a need to adapt the intelligence function. Different models for focused
analysis are mentioned to facilitate the categorization of Insurgency, such as Dr. John
MacKinlay's model with five different types of insurgencies. 563 Understanding of "the
Human Terrain" is emphasized as a basis for understanding the uprisings 564 . A detailed
description on integrating intelligence with the work in general emphasizes the
importance of the tactical level, time, training and continuity. 565 The importance of
intelligence and having such a capability at the tactical level as the instrument for the
analysis is clear. References to systems thinking are not included.
The concept of centre of gravity (COG) is described as more complex (compared to in
Regular Warfare), but important to use. 566 As an example of an "Operational COG",
"Population optimism about their future” 567 is mentioned. The description of how
insurgents must be understood is characterized by emphasis on adaption of the
intelligence function and work needed to be integrated throughout the whole staff work
structure, and this will be built up over time. Accurate descriptions of how and why this
is required are included. The Intelligence and Security functions and work are
emphasized as an integral part of the entire planning and implementation process, as
well as important for education of officers in general. HUMINT specifically is
mentioned, as well as analysis and research. 568 The intelligence function is placed at the
top of the summary of experience 569 to develop. Intelligence, the intelligence staff,
ISTAR and problem areas have 14 pages devoted to them. 570 . Understanding of "the
Human Terrain" is emphasized as crucial; only understanding the enemy is not viewed
sufficiently. 571
Summary answer U.S. 572 ; descriptions of insurgencies to be analysed and understood
are frequent, down to the company level. 573 Effective analysis is viewed to require
knowledge of the Insurgency strategically, its operational and tactical objectives, which
can be both physical and non-physical. 574 . Descriptions are characterized by pervasive
system thinking. Descriptions of centre of gravity (COG) do not occur (the dictionary
indicates COG as a joint description). The COIN environment is said to consist of a
"system of systems" (inter-connected systems). 575 A clear structure and concept for the
analysis is described. Eight operational variables are used (the so-called PMESII-PT;
the political, military, environment, social, information, infrastructure, physical
environment and time aspects).
563 UK Ministry of Defence, British Army Field Manual, Volume 10, Part 10, Combined Arms
Operations, Countering Insurgency (2009), Annex A to Chapter 2.
564 Ibid. Chapter 3. section 3-12 – 16.
565 Ibid. Chapter 3. section 3-33 – 37.
566 Ibid. Chapter 7. section 7-8 Planning Concept.
567 Ibid. Chapter 7. figure 7-2.
568 Ibid. Chapter 3. section 3-37 and 3-44.
569 Ibid. Chapter 4. section 4-51.
570 Ibid. Chapter 5. section 5-1 – 42.
571 Ibid. Chapter 5. section 5-1.
572 U.S. Department of the Army, Headquarters, Tactics in Counterinsurgency, Field Manual 3-24.2,
April 2009.
573 Ibid. Chapter 2.
574 Ibid. p. 45.
575 Ibid. p. 251.
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