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TACTICAL THOUGHT
2014 September 29 th
Appendix 8. Results from a tactical COIN doctrine study
The following appendix presents results from a study delivered to the Swedish Ground
Forces Combat School in 2011. A study of several questions was decided in June 2011.
The study was done with the same textual analysis approach as for the literature study.
The study was labelled “Tactics in COIN – On the Western front, Different news”.
Results from four, of the total ten questions are presented in the following.
Question 2; What characterizes the descriptions of how to analyse and understand the
Insurgency movements
Summary answer Canada 549 ; descriptions of how to analyse and understand Insurgency
movements occur frequently through the doctrine down to company levels with
characteristics described. 550 It is argued to be important to understand the causes and
characteristics of the specific and general in a given situation and culture. 551 The vital
importance of the intelligence function and requirements for development and adaption
is underlined. 552 Six different forms of insurgency are defined to support analysis and
understanding. 553 The people (in the area, as in the home country) are viewed as the
strategic centre of gravity. 554 The concept of centre of gravity is used (according to the
NATO view) and described in several places. 555 These centres of gravity are said to be
complex at lower levels. 556 The descriptions do not include references to systems
thinking.
Summary answer Britain 557 ; the section "Fundamentals" highlights the importance of
intelligence 558 . Intelligence is said to depend as much on the tactical level pattern of life
in each area of operation as it does on the top-down feed of intelligence from
operational and strategic levels. 559 Also, it is emphasized that the intelligence, including
analysis, must be integrated at every level of management, as well as across and
between "agencies engaged in Counterinsurgency". 560 A variety of characters of
insurgencies are described that challenges the search for root causes. 561 The start for the
Insurgency is viewed vital in order to correctly identify the nature of the problem that
exists. 562
549 National Defence Headquarters, Counterinsurgency Operations, B-GL-322-004/FP-003, Ottawa,
Ontario, December 2008.
550 Ibid. Chapter 2.
551 Ibid. p. 45.
552 Ibid. section 306, p. 73.
553 Ibid. p. 50.
554 Ibid. p. 48.
555 Ibid. p. 107. section 5-11, pp. 107-108. and 115.
556 Ibid. pp. 89. and 125.
557 UK Ministry of Defence, British Army Field Manual, Volume 10, Part 10, Combined Arms
Operations, Countering Insurgency, October 2009.
558 Ibid. Chapter 1. Fundamentals.
559 Ibid. Chapter 1. section 1-2.
560 Ibid. Chapter 1. section 1-2.
561 Ibid. Chapter 1. section 1-10.
562 Ibid. Chapter 2. section 2-1.
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