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TACTICAL THOUGHT
2014 September 29 th
Colin S. Gray
In Chapter 6 in Colin Gray’s book, Another Bloody Century, Future Warfare, Irregular
Warfare and Terrorism are discussed 419 . Gray argues that terrorism is a mode of
Irregular Warfare, which in turn is warfare, thus defining terrorists as soldiers. 420 Gray
disagrees with Kiras’ definition of terrorism, and leans on Bruce Hoffman’s (“the
deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in
the pursuit of political change”). According to Gray, Kiras distinguishes between
terrorism and Irregular Warfare. Gray defines Irregular Warfare as “warfare between
regulars and irregulars” and that is warfare between a state and a non-state adversary.
The legal status of the rival belligerents is the key, not the character of fighting,
according to Gray.
The weak use Guerrilla Warfare and terrorism but later on develop regular war-fighting
capabilities (as Mao). Warfare of all kinds, other than that between states, can be seen as
Irregular Warfare. The ability to turn the opponent’s strengths to his weakness and one’s
own weaknesses (material) to strengths…..a paradox…..a character of Irregular
Warfare. 421 The Irregular warrior needs to behave covertly with stealth, be highly
motivated, possess excellent intelligence and have territorial sanctuary and support,
according to Gray.
“Post-modern Terrorism” (Al Quaida) is, according to Gray, not new, it is terrorism;
Irregular Warfare and warfare. 422 Regular and Irregular Warfare have always coexisted.
423 Gray gives historical examples. A typical trait is said to be that Irregular
Warfare almost invariably makes the regular belligerent use terror against the civilian
populace, who provide, or might provide recruits or support for the guerrillas. The
problem of elusive guerrillas is described. 424 Gray argues for the result potentiality of
harsh means, although it is ethically wrong according to western standards….. ”given
doubt to more half-measured hearts-minds actions”, ”a brutal war” 425 Gray claims the
only new thing is, that the latest technology will permit both irregulars and regulars to
perform their bloody deeds either in new ways or more efficiently in old ways. 426
Referring to Callwell, who “explained for all times”, the key problem of conducting
Irregular Warfare is “the difficulty of persuading or coercing an irregular enemy to
home out and fight so that he could be duly slathered in satisfactorily large
numbers”. 427
419 Colin S. Gray, Another Bloody Century, Future Warfare, (London: Wiedenfeld & Nicolson, 2005), pp.
212-254.
420 Ibid. p. 213.
421 Ibid. p. 215.
422 Ibid. p. 219.
423 Ibid. p. 222.
424 Ibid. p. 223.
425 Ibid. pp. 223-224.
426 Ibid. p. 224.
427 Ibid. p. 224.
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