The Sino-Indian Border Dispute Section 2: 1959-61 - The Black Vault

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on the facts. Presumably, low-level talks, too, could not begin u w t h e Chinese showed a willingness at least to withdraw from Longju. Nehru ' s uncompromising off ic ial posit ion had been reached in large part as a result of cabinet, Opposition, and publdc pressure, and it apparently was difficult for him to abandon this stand and simultaneously satisfy public opinion. He nevertheless ruled out military action and left the door open for future negotiations. When chided by an opponent in Parliament on 21 December regarding the desirability of any negotiations with the Chinese, Nehru angrily replied that .there were only two choices, "war or - negotiation." "1 will always negotiate, negotiate, negotiate, right to the bitter end." On 22 December, he expresse surprise in Parliament at th6 idea of Itpolice act ion, (( which, he insisted, is possible only against a very weak adversary. "Little wars," Nehru continued, do not take place between two great countries and any kind of warlike development would mean "indefinite" war because neither India nor China would ever give in and neither could conque* the other. I 1 . (rootnote continued from page 14) countries. In its 21 December circular message, New Delhi informed its embassies that Chou "must have known that the Prime Minister muld not proceed to Rangoon on a week's not ice. " Chou was indeed trying to convince neutrals of Peiping's sincerity in seeking immediate talks (he w88 also trying to counter Soviet arguments), but he clearly desired those talks, and apparently hoped Nehru would consent without too much delay. Prime Minister Ne Win told the American ambassador on 21 December that the Chingse had asked him whether \ he would agree to have the Sino-Indian talks take place in Rangoon, and, in his 17 December letter to Nehru, Chou had indicated he would consider "any other date" Nehru might suggest. The Indian ambassador to Peiping later reported that Chou beyond doubt was anxious to get talks started quickly. I - 15 - . .. I -n I
I, During the deadlock, the Chinese continually tried to draw Nehru into a meeting with Chou. They seemed to believe that if such a meeting could be arranged without delay and Nehru were to agree (1) to the ''principle'* that the border was not delimited and (2) afterward, to subcommittee meetings of experts, the hard details of contradictory border claims could be argued over in the privacy of the conference room. In his letter of X.7 December, Chou had left unanswered questions on details of border claims which the Indians had raised in Nehru's 26 September 'letter and New Delhi's 4 Novem5er note. The Indians persisted, asking for a Chinese answer on the matter of substantive claim. It was An response to these repeated requests that the Chinese Foreign Ministry sent its note of 26 December, declaring the Peipring "feels sorry" that it must go into detail, but it 'appears that lfsome arguing cannot be helped." The 26 December note referred to "the forthcoming meeting" between Chou and Nehru almost as though the Indians had already agreed to it. It suggested that the Chinese concern with first of all having the prime ministers meet reflected their aim of first obtaining the "necessary" acknolwedgment in principle that the border had not been delimited, and that it is therefore "yet to be settled through negotiations . In tone, the Chinese note waa moderate. A special effort was made to allay the fears of all neighbor countries about alleged Chinese expansionism. It is "impossible', improper, and unnecessary" for China to aggress against countries on its borders. The note pointed to Chinese domestic problems and to Peiping's need for peace to obtain goals, of 81peacef ul construct ion. It then pointed to Pelping's record of trying to avoid provocation and border incidents with India, placing the blame for the August and October 1959 clashes entirely on New Delhi. Finally, it linked Indian territorial claims to the British policy of "aggression and expansion, '* making the Indian argument deem in effect a continuation of British imperialism in Tibek The note then touched on Bhutan and Sikkim. Regarding Bhutan, it made the first formal Chinese statemen't regarding this sector of the border, claiming that there is I" .- . VI.. - 16 - I
Page 2 and 3: EO 12958 3..3(b) 3.3(b) (6)>25Yrs (
Page 4 and 5: ! Off. Ser. No. 2 .. . ._ SECTION I
Page 6 and 7: , I I area in Ladakh. In the latter
Page 8 and 9: .. "to meet" anybody, anywhere. It
Page 10 and 11: I _I when British-educated, first-c
Page 12 and 13: _- -TO 1 THE SINO-INDIAN BORDER DIS
Page 14 and 15: Indian military figures such as Thi
Page 16 and 17: . . 1 asserted, was merely an exten
Page 18 and 19: (footnote continued from page 0) ,-
Page 20 and 21: .' (3) Personal talks with Chou En-
Page 22 and 23: concerted Opposition attack on Defe
Page 24 and 25: I -=0 I Chou made two pyoposals whi
Page 28 and 29: , 'A. , ' i I .. , , '.. . .. "a ce
Page 30 and 31: . . rejection, virtually ignoring t
Page 32 and 33: means of friendly negotiations."* H
Page 34 and 35: level talks without Chinese withdra
Page 36 and 37: I 1 ' ' 1 Prior to October 1959, th
Page 38 and 39: ..' .1' , . ' I-' . ! , . . ' . .I
Page 40 and 41: .. Chou En-lai sought to blur the s
Page 42 and 43: I I The Chinese indicated no desire
Page 44 and 45: I . The August and October 1959 cla
Page 46 and 47: Prime Minister had maintained that
Page 48 and 49: provide them with an important prop
Page 50 and 51: I I .1 ' probe Chinese long-term in
Page 52 and 53: .. . . I, v impression that the Ind
Page 54 and 55: . . established a joint commission
Page 56 and 57: . . I watershed--and Nehru expresse
Page 58 and 59: . . 1 . , I I . . " . - anticipated
Page 60 and 61: I I 1 . . ,, I examine, check, and
Page 62 and 63: might provoke border incidents. I I
Page 64 and 65: I ~ I I no boundary markings, makin
Page 66 and 67: 1 .. . . . . .. ' i ~ , . . 1 to aw
Page 68 and 69: - Repeatedly, it stressed that a re
Page 70 and 71: .& , . . I .. . of Chinese lvcarele
Page 72 and 73: .C . 1 I Chinese posts, but also di
Page 74 and 75: In the early days of April 1960, th
Page 76 and 77:
. . 6. In order to ensure tranquili
Page 78 and 79:
' '. .. , . By 5 Ootober, the date
Page 80 and 81:
.. conflicting claims in Ladakh wer
Page 82 and 83:
.- with the same vigor as they argu
Page 84 and 85:
. . case had proven to be strong-st
Page 86 and 87:
areas the Chinese claimed on their
Page 88 and 89:
I ..- . . The Chinese desire for so
Page 90 and 91:
-- . . warned diplomatic personnel
Page 92 and 93:
Chinese Claim ' Lines' of 1956 and
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The Sino-Indian Border Dispute Section 2: 1959-61 - The Black Vault

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