The Sino-Indian Border Dispute Section 2: 1959-61 - The Black Vault

means of friendly negotiations."* He was less cautious at
a Kremlin reception on 7 November, and after reiterating
the remarks he had made to the Supreme Soviet, he made the
following amplifications, according to a correspondent *s
account (published in New Age, 15 November 1959):
--
After a pause, he added that it was a sad
and stupid story. Nobody knew where the
border was, he declared, and agreed with
my remark that practically no one lived in
that area. Continuing, Khrushchev recalled
that the Soviet Union had amicably settled
differences over the border with Iran. "We
gave up more than we gained," he said and
added, "What were a few kilometers for a
the Soviet Union?" /-s
These remarks suggested that Khrushchev in November 1959
favored a Chinese concession, presumably in the form of a
partial withdrawal from the -ai Plain, and that he wanted
New Delhi to be informed of his view. His agreement with
the observation that the border area was sparsely populated
-
. .
*ai nese communist publications did not carry these remarks,
merely reporting on 31 October that "Khrushchev"
had discussed "the current international situation and the
foreign policy of the Soviet Union."
**The Chinese explicit1 y charged Khrushchev with having
made these remarks after Ma0 personally had explained the
Chinese position t o m i n October 1959. According to the
CCP letter of 10 September 1960, the September 1959 TASS
at atement was
... a clear condemnation of the CCP. Mao
Tse-tung explained this to Khrushchev,
but on 7 November 1959, in an interview
given to an Indian Communist newspaper,
Khrushchev said that the incident was
"deplorable and s tup id '*
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r* . ,
.