The Sino-Indian Border Dispute Section 2: 1959-61 - The Black Vault

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! Off. Ser. No. 2 .. . ._ SECTION I I. (1959-1961) Tm SINO-INDIAN BORDER DISPUTE' . . . . This is the second in a aeries of three working papers on the Sino-Indian border qispute. This Section 11 deals with the period from late 1959 to early 1961. Section I11 will cover the remainder of 1961 and most of 1962, through the Chinese attack of 20 October. Useful oomente by P. D. Davis and H. G. Hagerty of OCI have been incorporated. The DDI/RS would welcome comment, addressed either to the Chief or to the writer, Arthur qqy?B, -1 I I ,.
SECTION II. (1959-1961) Summary 'A . .. . . , . . . By fall 1959 the Chinese leaders were convinced of the need for negotiations with Nehru, in order to prevent thee international prest ige-including. their posktion in the world Communist movement-from deteriorating. Shortly after the August 1959 clashes they also recognized, or were made aware by Indian party boss Ghosh, that Nehru's advisers might use these skirmishes to push him and the entire government further to the "right"--i.e. towards a militant ant i-China policy and a. willingness to accept some degree of Amerioan support in this policy. The practical strategic danger such a development posed w a that ~ the arc of U.S. bases "encirclingf* China would be extended through India. They continued to see Nehru as still having a 'Igood side" (anti-Western) as well ad a *'bad side" (anti-Chinese) and therefore as possibly still amenable to persuasion througs personal diplomacy on the matter of a border settlement. This meshed well with their new-found concern with preventing the establishment of a military government in New Delhi. As they moved toward negotiations, however, they took an irrational act ion which temporarily clouded the atmosphere for talks in New Delhi. The Chinese physically and mentally coerced the leader of a small Indian police party they had captured during a clash in October 1959, in order to secure a "confession" that the Indians had sparked the incident. When it became publia knowledge that the Indian prisoner had been manipulated by Maoist methods used in forced confession, popular and oifiaial Indian resentment caused a reaction which hurt Peiping more than the charge that Chinese troops had fired first. Having learned the lesson, the Chinese have since made a special point of their *vbrotherlgl' concern for Indian prisoners., By late fall, Chou began to press Nehru hard to begin talks with him. During an exchange of ministerial letters, Nehru raised certain pre-condit ions for talks, stipulating on 10 November the requirement that the Chinese withdraw from LongJu and that both sides withdraw from the disputed I". ; I I
Page 2 and 3: EO 12958 3..3(b) 3.3(b) (6)>25Yrs (
Page 6 and 7: , I I area in Ladakh. In the latter
Page 8 and 9: .. "to meet" anybody, anywhere. It
Page 10 and 11: I _I when British-educated, first-c
Page 12 and 13: _- -TO 1 THE SINO-INDIAN BORDER DIS
Page 14 and 15: Indian military figures such as Thi
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Page 20 and 21: .' (3) Personal talks with Chou En-
Page 22 and 23: concerted Opposition attack on Defe
Page 24 and 25: I -=0 I Chou made two pyoposals whi
Page 26 and 27: on the facts. Presumably, low-level
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Page 30 and 31: . . rejection, virtually ignoring t
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Page 34 and 35: level talks without Chinese withdra
Page 36 and 37: I 1 ' ' 1 Prior to October 1959, th
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Page 40 and 41: .. Chou En-lai sought to blur the s
Page 42 and 43: I I The Chinese indicated no desire
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Page 46 and 47: Prime Minister had maintained that
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. . established a joint commission
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. . I watershed--and Nehru expresse
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. . 1 . , I I . . " . - anticipated
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I I 1 . . ,, I examine, check, and
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might provoke border incidents. I I
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I ~ I I no boundary markings, makin
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1 .. . . . . .. ' i ~ , . . 1 to aw
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- Repeatedly, it stressed that a re
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.& , . . I .. . of Chinese lvcarele
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.C . 1 I Chinese posts, but also di
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In the early days of April 1960, th
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. . 6. In order to ensure tranquili
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' '. .. , . By 5 Ootober, the date
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.. conflicting claims in Ladakh wer
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.- with the same vigor as they argu
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. . case had proven to be strong-st
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areas the Chinese claimed on their
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I ..- . . The Chinese desire for so
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-- . . warned diplomatic personnel
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Chinese Claim ' Lines' of 1956 and
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The Sino-Indian Border Dispute Section 2: 1959-61 - The Black Vault

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