The Sino-Indian Border Dispute Section 2: 1959-61 - The Black Vault

I
I
The Chinese indicated no desire to resume border -.
talks until July, when the Burmese press began another
major propaganda campaign, charging that Peipdng was
clearly stalling and guilty of bad faith. Again, as in
summer 1956, the press campaign compelled the Chinese
leaders to re8ume top-level talks. Chen Yi told the Burmese
tipbassador at a banquet on 31 July that a letter
soon to be sent from Choa En-lai to Premier U Nu would
t*eliminatel' the argument of the Burmese press that the
Chinese are unwilling to negotiate. Chen declared: ltIf
we go on discussing, nobody will be able to make up
storieslw--an undiplomat ic bit of outspokenness which led
Hla Yaung to report that Chen, who had revealed that the
primary alm of the Chinese in resuming border talks was to
i
keep Burmese newspapers "muzzled up,'' was "not so sharptw
< ,
as Chou. ,At ithe same bgnquet, Chou took the line that the
.= *
.e
prevailing no-settlement $ttuaaion favored Rangoon. Chou
told Hila Maung that the present indefinite border wgymgement
mo'tnote continued from page 30)
and work toward rebuilding a degree of voluntary responsiveness
to PLA border personnel and CCP cadres. New Delhi's
effort to capitalize on the revolt and turn the loyalties
of these peoples toward India became a source bf considerable
concern, as many in Tibetan areas near the border who
continued to cross over to the Indian side, bringing firsthand
accounts of PLA suppression, provided Indian news
media with effective anti-Chinese matekial. In order to
stem the flow and to regain some degree of influence, the
Chinese leaders apparently directed the CCP-mtA author it ies
in Lhasa to draw up a policy guideline for all cadres. The
poliay, appearing In one part of a larger document on troop
indoctrinaDion issued in November 1960 for border forces,
concentrated on displays of moderation:
(1) permitting
borderland peoples to continue seasonal moves across the
border, (3) handling disputes with tribal peoples by local
proxy, and (3) indoctrinating these peoples in CCP nationalities
policy, while stressing to cadres the need for using
"patience to dissuade" ahem from fleeing. However, because
the Tibetan rebels remained active inside and outside
Tibet, Chinese policy in Tibet and along the border was
hampered by the continued Tibet-Han (Chinese) dichotomy in
the clashes.
- 31 -
I
I
I