The Sino-Indian Border Dispute Section 2: 1959-61 - The Black Vault

provide them with an important propaganda instrument for
promoting discussions with New Delhi.* Chinese anxiety
in early 1960 to arrange a Chou-Nehru meeting and Nehru's
taotioal decision of late January not to appear intransigent
prepared the way for ministerial-level talks. Ambassador
Parthaaarathy left for Peiping on 9 February, c
ing a carefully drafted Indian note replying to the Chinese
note of 26 December as well 85 Hehru's letter to Chou.
the Indian note was drafte Lhl
n sucn a way as to: inaicate hat New Delhi was not opposed
to a Chou-Nehru meeting. The note did not mention the
earlier pre-conditions of Chinese withdrawal from Ladakh
and explicit acceptance of the McMahon line. Nehru's 5
February letter to Chou also significantly omitaed these
stipulations.
i
i, ' >
Constantly under pressure from Parliament and the
press not to take a soft line with Peiping, Nehru was compelled
to make even an agreement "to meet" with Chou appear
as par*;,68 ai-haad; hnti-China pblicy. Prior to 8urfacing
his invitation to Chou, Nehru on 12 February responded
to opponents in Parliament in such a way as to
create the impression that he was against even meeting
with Chou. Actually, he had been careful to reject only
'hegot iat ionsN but not a face-to-face meeting:
I see no ground whatever at present, no
bridge beaween the Chinese posit ion and
ours...,There is nothing to negotiate at
present. Whether that will arise later
I cannoO say.
These remarks, carrying a hard tone and indicating a firm
1 ine of no negotiations, brought cheers from Par1 iament .
However, parliamentary and press tempers were rekindled on
15 February, when the government released the texts of
*Thus the Pedple's Daily on 1 February stated that:
"Surely what has happernetween China and Burma can
take place between China and other countries. (*
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