The Sino-Indian Border Dispute Section 2: 1959-61 - The Black Vault

,
I
I
area in Ladakh. In the latter area, Indian troops would
withdraw south and west to the line which Peiping claimed
on its 1936 maps, and Chinese troops would withdraw north
and east of the line claimed by India on its maps. In
effect, Nehru's stipulation would be tantamount to a Chinese
withdrawal from the Akssi Plain and the Sinkiang-Tibet road,
and the Chinese said as much. Chou En-hi's reply of 17
December went right to the point of real olitik, arguing
from actual Chinese possession, comp r-d-ai- a n ng at Nehru's
concession would be only "theoretical" as India had no personnel
there to withdraw, and insfrsting on the areaos importance
for 'lit has been a traffic artery linking up the vaat
regions of Sinkiang and Tibet." The Indian leaders indicated
some sensitivity on Chou's additional point that New
Delhi was "utterly unaware" of Chinese roadbuilding in the, ~
area until September 1958--11p~oving1' cont inuaus Chinese '
jurisdiction-and inforlged their embassies to take the line
that intrusions cannot give a neighboring country any legal
right to an area %erely because such intrusions were not
resisted by us or had not come to our notice earlier.1t
Turning a conciliatory side, Chou in this 17 December letter
stated tha& following the 21 October 1959 clash Peiping
had stopped sending out patrols, and he requested a personal
meeting with Nehru to establish "principles" for negotiating
the dispute. Chou then hinted that Peiping would be
willing to exchange its claim to the area south of the McMahon
line for New Delhi's claim to the Aksai Plain. Nehru was
reluctant to meet personally with Ozaou, and persisted in
this attitude until January 1960, when, on the advice of
his ambassadors and certain cabinet members, he agreed to
drop his pre-condit ions.
In this period, Khrushchev made several public statements
in which he deplored the border dispute, clearly implying
that Chinese military actions were jeopardiaing
MoaCQW'S relations with New Delhi, In November, he described
the dispute as a "sad and stupid story1*--a remark which
angered the Chinese leaders=-and hinted that he favored a
compromise. Soviet officials tried to create the Impression
among Indian diplomats that Khrushchev had intervened directly
with Peiping on New Delhi's behalf, but, when pressed for
explicit proof, scaled down their remark6 to suggest that
the Russians had merely urged talks on Peiping as soon as
- ii -