The Sino-Indian Border Dispute Section 2: 1959-61 - The Black Vault

.. Chou En-lai sought to blur the strong impression in
Burma and elswwhere that Peiping was stalling. He told the
National People's Congress (NPC) on 9 July 1957 that "a
good - start" had been made with U Nu for settlement of the
dispute and that a "general agreement of views1' had been
reached. He added significantly, however, that a "comprehensive,
fair, and reasonable settlement" would be reached
when the views of both countries were brought into accord
"through cont inued negotiations" on concrete "problems.
Chou's statements were resented in Rangoon, as U Nu had
told the press earlier that Chou was expected to submit
the general agreement to the NPC for final approval prior
to intergovernmental accords. On 22 the usually
opt imiat ic Ambassador Hla Maung in Peiping
had become convinced that the Chinise "are now
ck on all of their words" in connection with the
tentative border agreement reached between Chou and U Nu
in November 1956. Hla Maung cited Chou's apparent questioning
of the Burmese version of the northern sector of
the boundary as the latest of a number of incidents which
had led him to this conclusion. He commented sarcastically
that on this portion of the border the Chinese had now
challenged Burmese claims to land in the north and the east
and that he "would not be surprised if they also mentioned
the west, were there any land to the west."
U Nu received Chou En-lai's long-awaited letter containing
Peiping's formal border proposals in late July and,
acdording to the American embassy in Rangoon, they included
a new demand for the cession of some 70 square miles of
territory in the Lufang area of the Wa States. Taken together
with a demand for more territory in the Hpimaw area,
the new Chinese position on Lufang indicated to the American
embassy a Chinese effort to create maximum problems for
the Burmese government with various border peoples while
still maintaining a pose of friendship and desire to reach
a settlement. Thus while avoiding a settlement, Chou made
it difficult for the Burmese leaders to accuaePeiping publicly
of outright intransigence. After they dispatched Chief
Justice U Myint Thein to China in the hope of ending Chinese
stalling, Chou told Myint Thein on 28 September that
he would have to take time to study the new Burmese proposals
and that although the "1941 line" was "unjust," Peiping
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