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2008 - 2009 - Pinsent Masons Water Yearbook 2012 - 2013

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APPENDIX 2: PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION<br />

O&M and lease contracts<br />

The next step up involves awarding O&M or lease contracts. Operations & Maintenance (O&M)<br />

contracts usually operate on a fixed fee basis. Lease contracts typically involve asset operation and<br />

tariffs, but not capital expenditure. These two types of contract do not delegate full financial<br />

responsibility to the private operator, especially with regards to private capital investments.<br />

Concessions<br />

Concessions involve the private sector operation of assets in order to pay for new facilities and<br />

upgrading work. Build-own-operate (BOO) and build-operate-transfer (BOT) contracts sell specific<br />

services to the municipality in relation to a specific programme of capital improvements, while the full<br />

utility concession contract embraces all aspects of service provision and capital spending. These<br />

contracts require a much more specific regulatory environment so as to account for the elements of<br />

risk involved. Other varieties sometimes seen are BOTT (build, operate, train and transfer) and<br />

DFBOT (design, finance, build, operate and transfer) contracts.<br />

A BOO/BOT project’s cash flow is usually contractually pre-determined, often with government<br />

backing. There is an element of construction risk, but the absence of market risk means that the<br />

project can have more debt loaded in than in a full utility privatisation. A project’s construction risk can<br />

be mitigated whereby a facility already generating cash flow gets taken over for expansion by the<br />

private sector. Therefore BOT/BOO projects are an effective means of rapidly organising private<br />

capital and management towards a narrow range of services. However, some of the simpler projectoriented<br />

contracts do not affect the utility’s management and operation, thus underlying problems such<br />

as leakage (and illegal interception), over-staffing and poor tariff collection may not be addressed. In<br />

these cases, the underlying utility remains uncreditworthy, and it can be argued that a BOO/BOT<br />

contract may therefore in fact delay system-wide improvements.<br />

In full utility concessions, existing revenues can be used immediately to service debt, thereby<br />

mitigating construction risk. Over a period of time, a utility can benefit from a steady flow of revenues<br />

from a diversified customer base and, if it integrates horizontally, from a diversified asset base. A more<br />

robust balance sheet can be created, allowing for internal finance as well as the use of capital markets<br />

to sell long term debt.<br />

Asset sale<br />

The most dramatic and politically contentious form of privatisation is the outright sale of the utility’s<br />

assets. To date this has been used in the 1989 sale of the English and Welsh water and sewage<br />

companies (WASCs), in two examples in the Czech Republic, in one in Belize (subsequently bought<br />

back) and in Chile up to 2000. While the assets are in private hands, the licence to operate them can<br />

be subject to renewal. In the case of the UK WASCs, a 30 year operating licence was awarded to<br />

each entity in 1989. It is evident that the assets carry no value unless one can operate them, while the<br />

cost of building a duplicate network would be prohibitive.<br />

The problem with losing stakeholder participation in utility services is that it can erode the customers’<br />

sense of civic duty. During the 1976 drought, water consumption in England and Wales fell and<br />

standpipes and supplies brought in by tankers were accepted stoically. "Share a bath with a friend"<br />

suggested Dennis Howell, the then Minister for Drought. In contrast, during the 1995 drought,<br />

consumption rose amidst intense bitterness even at the possibility of water restrictions being imposed.<br />

They were not, but it was evident that an unexpectedly large element of the public’s goodwill was<br />

unintentionally divested in 1989. In contrast, Aguas de Barcelona (Agbar) experienced a significant<br />

drop in consumption during the 1994-96 drought in Spain. Agbar is a private sector operator of<br />

municipally owned assets on a concession basis.<br />

424<br />

<strong>Pinsent</strong> <strong>Masons</strong> <strong>Water</strong> <strong>Yearbook</strong> <strong>2008</strong>-<strong>2009</strong>

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