Jul and Oct 1982 - Navy League of Australia

HMS HEMMBS Sailing for the South Atlantic. I Photo
and Cambodia until the US bombed their Cambodian bases, but
bv then time was running out.
fortunately there was no political limitation on attacks on
ihe Port Stanley airstrip, and the RAF was able to put it out of
action with runway cralchng bombs This vulnerability of fixed
land bases rendering them useless, and the aircraft trapped on
them ineffective, seems to have excited little interest But, 1
suggesi it is a significant reply to those who persist in harping on
the vulnerability of ships and playing down the vulnerability of
fixed land bases
The British had to perform perhaps the most difficult task
there is for surface maritime forces -- power projection — and
with weapons and systems designed with other objectives
dominating their selection INVINCIBl I and HERMES arc Sea
Control Ships, with a primary function of anti-submarine
warfare and a limited air defence capability Hence they were
used as strike carriers providing both air defence and ground
support, while their helicopters had to be used for both antisubmarine
defence and troop carrying Between ihcm. the two
light carriers could only muster «.ome 20 Sea Harrier fightcts to
defend the force against some 100 to 200 Argentine aircraft —
odds betwen 5-lOto I.
And. in the air defence role they were severely restricted by the
lack of naval airborne early warning aircraft which the Ark Royal
had carried. To offset this deficiency the British, after the loss of
the Sheffield, called in (he RAFs big land based AEW Nimrods.
but even with inflight refuelling (he Nimrods would have been
unable to maintain a 24 hour patrol and when the Nimrods were
not on station, the Harriers would have been limited to their own
air intercept radars io delect intruders. No doubt it will come out
eventually but I suggest that the Argentine air attacks mostly took
place when iheie was no AFVv aircraft on task Fvcn so, the Sea
Harriers accounted for at least M) Mirages and Sky hawks,
together with Canberra bombers, Pucara strike aircraft. Hercules
transports and helicopters. In the air combat role they took out
all those Argentine aircraft and lost none, not one. to emeny
aircraft.
It was. I suggesi. one of the most impressive air defence
operations ever mounted. The success of the Royal Navy pilots
and their aircraft against such overwhelming odds by an enemy
who pressed home his attacks with suicidal courage should go
into history as one of the legendary stones of the British armed
force*.
As for the other surface warships, most of the British escorts
were ships configured for anti-submarine warfare to protect
R\)
Nonh Atlantic convoys under the protection of a comprehensive
air defence system. Two m particular which were sunk, Ardent
and Antelope, were cheap fast frigates with virtually no air defence
of their own. hut armed with Fxocct surface to surface missiles.
I hesc two ships had to be employed in the demanding role of
static defence around the beachhead at Port San Carlos
providing naval gunfire support to the ground forces ashore.
It is hardly surprising that they suffered casualties, but the
Royai Navy has a long tradition of staying by the Army despite its
own losses. During the evacuation of Crete in World War II, for
example, Admiral Cunningham was being urged by his own staff
and even the Army commanders io leave the troops on the island
to their fate because of the Navy's heavy losses from German
aircraft attacks. Cunningham is said to have replied "It takes 300
years to build a tradition: it takes three years to build a ship. The
evacuation will continue". 1 suggest that the RN's stoic
acceptance of its losses and its unwavering support of the Army
and Marines ashore were in the same tradition. And. far from
pointing out the losses with such evident satisfaction as some
Australian commeniators have done, »c should rather look at the
task they discharged so faithfully with inadequate resources, and
only admire the resolution and couiage which sustained them.
I should also like to point out that fast corvettes or frigates,
like the Ardent aud Antelope, armed with surface to surface
missiles are what some politicians h.r