VOL 71 No4 - Navy League of Australia

SHOKAKU was badly damaged. The Australian/
American task force, including the cruisers
HMAS AUSTRALIA and HOBART, was attacked
by Japanese aircraft, (and then by US Army
aircraft from Queensland), but no ships were hit
and the route to Port Moresby remained barred.
While suffering heavier losses, it was a
strategic victory for the allies, for the Japanese
were forced to withdraw and never again
attempted to enter the Coral Sea in force. This
not only enabled the defence of New Guinea but
removed the possibility of a Japanese assault
on our east coast.
In July the Japanese began advancing in New
Guinea and also landed troops and labourers
on Guadalcanal Island in the Solomons where
they began the construction of an airfield. As
the operation of land-based planes from that
The USN carrier USS LEXINGTON on fire and sinking after
the Battle of the Coral Sea.
island would have immediately imperilled US
control of the New Hebrides (Vanuatu) and
New Caledonia, and thus communications to
Australia, the Americans had to eject them.
The Americans threw huge naval forces into
the area. Great losses were suffered by both
sides in a year-long struggle which included ten
major naval engagements, some of the greatest
battles of the war. During WW II the US Navy
lost four of it's largest aircraft -carriers. Three
of these were lost in the Solomons area. They
lost 1 0 cruisers worldwide of which no less
than eight were sunk in the Solomons. Nearly
6,000 sailors and 2,000 marines were killedmore
men than Australia lost in the whole New
Guinea campaign. We owe a huge debt to the
USN for our security in WW II.
The Japanese lost a similar number of major
warships as the Americans (about 30), including
two aircraft carriers and two battleships and
their famous ADMIRAL YAMAMOTO.
Australian losses there were the heavy cruiser
HMAS CANBERRA and heavy damage to the
cruiser HMAS HOBART. which was torpedoed.
The victory of the USN, with some help from
our navy, including the brave and invaluable
coastwatchers, and our air force, in the Coral
Sea and the Solomons ensured the safety of
Australia and it's development as a major base.
Together with the Battle of Midway and the
most successful U.S. and British submarine
campaigns, it so weakened the Japanese
fleet that the allies cou ld move steadily to the
offensive and eventually drive to the very shores
of Japan. ·
It is to be hoped that this perspective will receive
some attention as the nation remembers
"The Battle for Australia".
As to the future, geography to a large extent
controls the possibilities for military strategy,
and doesn't change. Both world wars would
seem to hold major lessons in this regard. From
1788 until1942, as an island, albeit a large
one, we depended on the control of the oceans
by Britain's Royal Navy, under whose shield
we were able to explore, develop and unite
as one nation. Since 1942 we have depended
largely on the might of the United States and
particularly it's most powerful navy.
But the world is changing. Within a few decades
the U.S. may no longer be the only super-power.
Wars still take place, there are many areas of
tension, and there is now a major increase of
military power in Asia, particularly maritime.
While clearly today emphasis must be on our
contributions overseas in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
other hot spots, many would caution that. as a
sparsely-populated nation at the centre of the
world's ocean's, we should now build up our
maritime capability, in all it's elements, as part
of our national insurance.
In the meantime, perhaps still of relevance and
interest to a modern island nation, over 95% of
whose people live within missile range of the
sea, is the famous Greek historian Thucidides's
report of the speech of the officials of the island
of Corcyra (Corfu) to the Athenians in 433B.C:
"And then it is quite a different matter for
you if you reject alliance with a naval power
than if you do the same thing with a land
power. Your aim, no doubt, should be, if
it were possible, to prevent anyone else
having a navy at all: the next best thing is
to have on your side the strongest navy that
there is. "
Today many wou ld argue that for islands,
though technology has altered weapons,
tactics, and capabilities, little needs changing in
this philosophy---except to add "an air force. "
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