Military Professionalism - United States Air Force Academy

Messenger, Robert. “Theirs But To Do and Die.” The Weekly Standard 15.48 (Sept.
13, 2010).
http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/theirs-do-and-die
Marcel Bigeard, who died on June 18 at the age of 94, was a paragon of a new type of
professional warrior that arose during the Cold War. For while the United States and the
Soviet Union (and their many allies) built large-scale militaries for an eventual hot war,
what came instead were proxy wars in places like Vietnam and the Congo. These did not
require the technology-laden and discipline-heavy units prepared to fight in the Fulda
Gap, but instead small, mobile units of soldiers dedicated to an intense operational tempo.
And they required resourceful officers, able to adapt the methods of guerrillas and willing
to lead by example. Bigeard, who rose from the ranks to four-star general, was such a
soldier: emphasizing physical fitness and endurance, preferring to live rough with his
men, and a master of the topography of battlegrounds. He refused to carry a weapon into
combat, feeling his job was to lead not to fight. (In the U.S. Army, men like Charlie
Beckwith, the founder of Delta Force, and Richard Meadows, leader of the Son Tay
Raiders, had similar careers and maintain similar legends.)
Milburn, Andrew R. “Breaking Ranks: Dissent and the Military Professional.” Joint
Force Quarterly 59 (4 th quarter 2010): 101-107.
http://www.ndu.edu/press/breaking-ranks.html
When faced with a moral dilemma, the military officer not only has grounds for dissent,
but also, if his code of ethics and oath of office so guide, has a duty to disobey. He is
obligated to exercise moral autonomy, and in so doing, must use his professional ethics to
guide him down a path that is by no means clearly defined. Just as civilian leaders have
an obligation to challenge military leaders if the latter appear to be pursuing a strategy
that undermines policy, military leaders are committed to challenge their civilian masters
if the policy appears to be unconstitutional, immoral, or otherwise detrimental to the
military institution. Civilian control of the military does not obviate this obligation and
should not be viewed simply as a unilateral and hierarchical relationship with clear
boundaries. This is especially important now in this era of complex operations that blur
the boundaries between military strategy and policy.
Mileham, Patrick. “Amateurs, Conscripts, Citizens, Professionals. How Do Armed
Forces Measure Up?” Defense and Security Analysis (2005): 213-216.
The professionalism of a military force should be judged based on objective control,
military doctrines, force design, relationship with other national institutions, technical
expertise, level of education and training personnel receive, relationship with the civil
population, voluntary service, institutional ethos, internal reciprocal relationships, and the
standards of military ethics. NATO and the EU should strive to raise professional
military standards.
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