WAVLD Symposium Handbook_V4.indd - csiro

World Association of Veterinary Laboratory Diagnosticians – 13 th International Symposium, Melbourne, Australia, 11-14 November 2007
0815 - 1000 Plenary Sessions - Preparing for the Future
LABS OF THE FUTURE
Dr. Martyn Jeggo
Director, Australian Animal Health Laboratory, Geelong, Victoria,
Australia
Today, veterinary laboratories are faced with a range of challenges that constantly threaten their resource
base, yet globally the need for veterinary diagnostic services and the underpinning research activities has
never been greater. The occurrence and risks from infectious diseases has steadily been increasing during
the past 20 years. Whilst many endemic production diseases have been on the wane, infectious disease e.g.
avian influenza, foot and mouth disease, West Nile, bluetongue continues to threaten livestock and in a
growing number of cases, man.
How best can veterinary laboratories utilize current and new technologies to provide an effective diagnostic
service and do so in a growing regulatory environment that makes the delivery of these services evermore
complex and resource hungry?
During the past few years, the development of molecular technologies based around the polymerase chain
reaction (PCR) offer a quantum leap in diagnostic levels of sensitivity and specificity, in a timely and
increasingly, quality assured manner. But where will this take us in the next ten years and can we genuinely
equate the presence of genetic material with that of an infectious agent? Can the laboratory of the future
dispense with causative agent isolation and characterization and rely on these newer gene based
approaches? On the one hand, the promises of multiplex assays for multiple agent detection in a single test
provides an opportunity to check for an enormously wide range of potential pathogens, whilst at the other
end of the spectrum, the development of pen-side assays offers the opportunity to dispense with the need to
even submit samples to a laboratory. How will these contrasting approaches impinge on activities
undertaken by a veterinary laboratory in ten year time?
In considering the regulatory and operating environment that laboratories now find themselves, a wide range
of health, safety and environmental priorities must be taken into account for every activity undertaken.
Invariably processes involving gene based technologies are now carefully regulated and activities involving
the use of animals overseen by welfare and ethic committees. But beyond this, a new biosecurity regulatory
environment is being created for anyone working with a range of pathogens, and increasingly this deals not
only with biosafety and bio-containment but the potential element of bioterrorism. This increasing regulation
of the operational environment of a veterinary laboratory must lead to changes in the way they operate, but
what is the likely outcome?
The biggest challenge though, maybe in the area of bio-informatics, information exchange and the decision
making processes that this will underpin. The technologies embraced today have an ability to generate large
amounts of data, that need to be collated, processed and re-organized to assist the veterinary diagnostician
and the disease management services he supports. What will be the impact of the continuing information
technology explosion on the activities of the veterinary laboratory in the future?
This paper attempts to answer the questions posed above, taking examples from a number of recent disease
outbreaks both in Australia and elsewhere, illustrating trends taking place today, that are likely to shape the
veterinary laboratory of the future.
Wed 14 November
Wed 14 November
World Association of Veterinary Laboratory Diagnosticians – 13 th International Symposium, Melbourne, Australia, 11-14 November 2007
Biosafety and Biosecurity Concerns Of High Security Animal Pathogen Laboratories
Luis L. Rodriguez, D.V.M., Ph.D.
Overview:
In response to the global spread of emerging infectious diseases and the threat of bioterrorism, highcontainment
biosafety laboratories (BSL)--specifically biosafety level (BSL)-3 and BSL-4--have been
proliferating in the United States as well as throughout the world. Specific incidents such as the anthrax
terrorist attacks in the USA in 2001; the emergence of SARS and the infection of humans with H5N1 Avian
influenza in Asia generated great concern and interest in around the world and in particular in the USA. A
new industry; biodefense has emerged with academia, government and industry adapting and responding to
this new niche for biodefense-related research, diagnostics, laboratory equipment, high-containment
construction and pharmaceuticals. This multi-billion dollar industry ($5.24 billion in 2007 in the US alone)
places great demand for BL3 and BL4 labs in government, academia and private sector.
High-consequence human and animal pathogens, which traditionally have been studied in Public Health or
Agriculture government laboratories, have become potential targets for bioterrorists. For example, foreign
animal diseases such as Foot-and-Mouth Disease were determined to be high threats for US agriculture and
food security. This increased concern for protecting an infrastructure critical to national security resulted in
the transfer of the Administration and Operations of the Plum Island Animal Disease Center facility from the
US Department of Agriculture (USDA) to the newly created Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in
2003, while maintaining the research and diagnostics mission in USDA. Laws were revised and or created
in 2002 to ensure the proper handling, storage and tracking of high consequence agents for both human and
animal health.
Although investment in biodefense research has been significant over the last 5 years, particularly in the
area of human health, some of the critical infrastructure in animal health has lagged behind and only recently
have plans been made to replace or renovate high-containment laboratories such as the Pirbright laboratory
in the UK and the Plum Island laboratory in the US. These aging facilities have come under close scrutiny
after a recent FMD outbreak was linked to the Pirbright site. This incident as well as recent incidents in US
labs handling select agents motivated ongoing investigations at the congressional level. Similar inquiries are
likely to follow in the UK as well as other countries with high-security laboratories.
This lecture will present an overview of the current biosafety and biosecurity concerns, including the real as
well as perceived risks from the construction and operation of high-security animal disease laboratories.