Amani Labda - Peace Maybe Joint Evaluation of Conflict - Channel ...

More documents

Recommendations

Info

JOINT EVALUATION OF CONFLICT PREVENTION AND PEACE BUILDING IN DRCVOLUME 1Economic and political opportunities captured by politicalentrepreneurs who mobilise armed groups. These groups oftensplinter, and slow down the demobilisation processes and armyintegration or in society.The emergence of parallel structures for resource exploitation, suchas the control of mineral resources by smugglers, armed groups andother criminal networks.Of course, other significant factors engender instability in the East of DRChowever it is on these above that the analysis was able to confidently rest upon,with the aim to verify whether they were well managed or neglected.DonorPoliciesInternational development funding in DRC has benefited from remarkablecontinuity throughout the evaluation period, representing an average of US$1.5billion 3 annually. The projects followed the rhythm of key events in the politicaldevelopment of the country, with increases corresponding in particular to theSun City Agreement of 2002, national elections in 2006, and the 2008 Goma peacenegotiations between the DRC government and the armed rebel groups.According to the evaluation’s observations, donors are not attentive to theaccelerators of peace and conflict in the East of the country, and their strategiesare blurred and compartmentalized.Coordination, best in the domain of humanitarian aid and to a lesser extent indevelopment assistance, has no forum for conflict management. The mainstrategy, the International Security and Stabilisation Support Strategy (ISSSS),that is coordinated under STAREC 4 , as well as priority areas such as the miningsector and land conflicts, appear to have held donor attention only at the end ofthe evaluation period.The difficulty of a limited state presence impacts aid agencies, unable to establishstrong relationships with local authorities. This translates into an inability toengage over the long-term.Donors did not turn away from conflict prevention and peacebuilding, thoughthey did put in place a multiplicity of strategic frameworks and policy initiatives,funding sources, programming guidelines, complex projects, which has resultedin a scattering of efforts 5 .3 Source: OECD Development Aid Committee.4 Program with the objective of stabilisation « Stabilisation and Reconstruction Plan for War Affected Areas».5 These frameworks include, on the donors’ side, the Country Assistance Framework (CAF), and on thegovernment side the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), the Priority Action Plan (PAP), the Pacte deGouvernance, the “5 Chantiers” of the President, the Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for War Affected
JOINT EVALUATION OF CONFLICT PREVENTION AND PEACE BUILDING IN DRCVOLUME 1HumanitarianAidandAssistancetoSGBVAdmittedly, interventions designed to reduce the suffering of population, linked toconflict, are often close to the ground and effective, but they are not specificallydesigned for conflict prevention and peacebuilding. The lack of attention to theindirect effects on the conflict reduces their positive impact. For example, in orderto better address sexual violence within the context of conflict, it would have beenmore effective to work not only with victims but equally to organise awarenesswith those who commit these crimes.In addition, the assistance is implemented by a mediation of organisations thatprogressively sub-contract their activities. This cascade of contracts is not welljustified, and renders even more difficult a real strategic approach, as it combinesseveral sources of financing, and complicates the return of information. It does notfavour local partners, who have limited visibility regarding decisions.JusticeIn the DRC, the grave humanitarian and human rights violations has led to aprofound culture of impunity, that in turn exacerbates conflicts within localcommunities and increases the lack of confidence in the judicial systems.Donors have certainly participated in a more coordinated fashion regarding thereconstruction of the judicial sector in the country’s regions of the East. Theevaluation, however, highlights the limited involvement of the localadministrations in judicial matters and their incapacity to put in place recoverystrategies. The evaluation of projects under the theme of justice reveal a relativedisinterest in the face of gaps regarding land administration and property rights,even though these remain an important conflict driver.DDRandSecuritySectorReformAssistance towards Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) andSecurity Sector Reform (SSR) is pertinent yet limited, even if the donors over thecourse of the year have overcome their reticence to intervene in a domain toooften considered politically sensitive. The needs of this sector exceed theimportant resources it has received to date.Projects are correctly designed to eliminate all links between on the one hand thearmy or rebel groups, and on the other ethnic or economic interests underpinningthe conflict. They are supported by strong implementation mechanisms amongstmany actors (including two EU civilian missions, and UN peacekeeping forces).The high political risks linked to DDR and SSR were well managed.Areas (STAREC), as well as sector-specific strategies such as the Security Sector Reform strategy and theNational Strategy on Combating Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV).
Page 2: JOINT EVALUATION OF CONFLICT PREVEN
Page 5 and 6: TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
Page 7 and 8: LIST OF ACRONYMS11.11.11 Belgian NG
Page 9 and 10: ICGLR International Conference for
Page 11 and 12: USAIDWBWFPZFDUnited States Agency f
Page 13 and 14: JOINT EVALUATION OF CONFLICT PREVEN
Page 53 and 54: Conflict driversConflictMappingwork
Page 55 and 56: Lack of military capacity/ lack of
Page 67 and 68:
JOINT EVALUATION OF CONFLICT PREVEN
Page 69 and 70:
Page 71 and 72:
Page 73 and 74:
Page 75 and 76:
Page 77 and 78:
Page 79 and 80:
Page 81 and 82:
Page 83 and 84:
Page 85 and 86:
Page 87 and 88:
Page 89 and 90:
Page 91 and 92:
Page 93 and 94:
Page 95 and 96:
Page 97 and 98:
Page 99 and 100:
Page 101 and 102:
Page 103 and 104:
Page 105 and 106:
Page 107 and 108:
Page 109 and 110:
Page 111 and 112:
Page 113 and 114:
Page 115 and 116:
Page 117 and 118:
Page 119 and 120:
Page 121 and 122:
Page 123 and 124:
Page 125 and 126:
Page 127 and 128:
Page 129 and 130:
Page 131 and 132:
Page 133 and 134:
Page 136 and 137:
Page 138 and 139:
Page 140 and 141:
Page 142 and 143:
Page 144 and 145:
Page 146 and 147:
Page 148 and 149:
Page 150 and 151:
Page 152 and 153:
Page 154 and 155:
Page 156 and 157:
Page 158 and 159:
Page 160 and 161:
Page 162 and 163:
Page 164 and 165:
Page 166 and 167:
Page 168 and 169:
Page 170 and 171:
Page 172:
show all

Amani Labda - Peace Maybe Joint Evaluation of Conflict - Channel ...

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?