Amani Labda - Peace Maybe Joint Evaluation of Conflict - Channel ...

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JOINT EVALUATION OF CONFLICT PREVENTION AND PEACE BUILDING IN DRCVOLUME 1elections). For drivers susceptible to influence, it is possible to identify the criticalconditions that underpin them.Unresolved land issues: Unresolved issues create a very volatile context in manyparts of eastern DRC. One such issue is the distribution of land. In South andNorth Kivu, the return of Tutsi landowners who left for Rwanda in the earlystages of the war is leading to severe tension. These landowners are reclaimingtheir land, but face resistance from new occupants who settled there during thewar. This latter group relies on counter-claims that these Tutsi are not returneesbut in fact new arrivals 43 .In Ituri, struggles over land remain an important source of instability. Thesources of such clashes include disputes over user rights and the attribution ofland ownership. The main reasons for the rise in violence are inequality of accessto land between ethnic communities, increased demographic pressure (mostnotably from large-scale population displacements), the absence of aninstitutional framework and the weak performance of the administration andjustice system in the reconciliation and arbitration of land disputes 44 .Unequal pressure facing mining companies: In Ituri and the Kivu provinces, rivalryfor control over artisanal mining activities and trading networks was a frequentsource of ension between local and regional elites. During the war, armed groupsincreasingly gained control over this resource sector and introduced new securityand taxation structures. Control over mining sites became a crucial part ofmilitary strategies, and armed confrontation was often concentrated in miningareas.The peace process has not been able to reverse this dynamic. Instead, it hasfavored the creation of sophisticated parallel structures for resource extractionsuch as gold, cassiterite, wolframite and coltan. In a bid to assure themselvessecurity, these structures often involve close cooperation between armycommanders, and territorial administrators.Such complex pockets of power, bringing together economics, military andpolitics, hingers the emergence of an economic of peace and access tointernational investment for the mining sector. They continually risk turning theCongolese army into a coalition of semi-autonomous military-economicstructures 45 .43 An overview of land-related conflict issues is offered by: Vlassenroot, K. and C. Huggins, Land, Migrationand Conflict, in: Huggins, C. and J. Clover, eds., From the Ground Up: Land Rights, Conflict and Peace inSub-Saharan Africa, Pretoria, ISS, 2005, pp. 115-194; Vlassenroot, K., Land tenure, conflict and householdstrategies in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, Alinovi, L., Hemrich, G., Russo, L. (eds.), BeyondRelief. Food security in protracted crises, Practical Action Publishing, FAO, 2008.44 See IKV Pax Christi (2010) and RCN Justice et Démocratie (2009).45 Garrett et al. (2009).
JOINT EVALUATION OF CONFLICT PREVENTION AND PEACE BUILDING IN DRCVOLUME 1Paradoxically, by discouraging foreign investment, which perceives great riskfrom these informal network towards its own reputation, the DRC is missing outon an important opportunity for development—a type of development throughemployment that would respond to the needs of ex-combatants, for instance.Whereas large-scale industrial mining may not lend itself sufficiently to the scaleof employment necessary in eastern Congo, it can be encouraged to allow forsocial investments of a more sustainable nature than aid projects that only have ashort time horizon.The control of mine sites and the trade chains associated with it continues to bedenounced as one of the principal drivers to on-going armed group mobilisationin North and South Kivu.Rupture in political dialogue: Great hopes were placed in the peace process as thepath towards greater stability, democratic rule and the improvement of livingconditions. Few of these expectations have been met, affecting a population thatremains nonetheless profoundly patriotic. Since the start of the various peaceinitiatives for eastern Congo, state services have not contributed to a reduction inviolence nor have they supported efforts for development, peacebuilding andreconciliation.Since 2003, the progressive return of the state has not seen the dissipation of rentseekingpractices 46 . Beyond confirming the existence of a central state (which isaccepted by the vast majority of Congolese), national elections had a limitedimpact on governance. In North and South Kivu, political dialogue at theprovincial level is absent. Provincial assemblies suffer from members’ lowcapacity and high corruption levels.Since 2003 in Ituri, attempts were made to restore the administrative apparatusand improve the justice system, but in the absence of competencies and resources,this administration has not met its principal objectives. At the local level, theadministration is largely absent and incapable of responding to population needs,with a glaring lack of resources; in contrast, administrative positions are soughtto increase personal benefit.Another problem in Ituri, a district and not a province, is the decentralisationprocess. Whereas at the provincial level decentralisation entails a transfer ofpower, responsibilities and resources to the “chefferie”, the districts remain “deconcentrated”administrative entities with limited financial autonomy. Suchunequal distributions of powers cause tensions between the various levels ofbureaucracy. The new 2006 constitution envisages that Ituri will become its ownprovince as part of the decentralisation process, yet the current administrative46 See also Raeymaekers, T., Sharing the spoils : the reinvigoration of Congo’s political system, Politorbis,2007.
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