Amani Labda - Peace Maybe Joint Evaluation of Conflict - Channel ...

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JOINT EVALUATION OF CONFLICT PREVENTION AND PEACE BUILDING IN DRCVOLUME 1Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR)program.The national Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) plan,launched in 2003, gave combatants the choice of either returning to civilian life orjoining the army. Those that opted to join the newly formed Armed Forces of theDemocratic Republic of Congo (FARDC in the French acronym) underwent“brassage”, a process bringing together different groups in the Congolese armedforces and combining command structures.In addition, The DRC is a member of several sub-regional cooperation structures,notably the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), theEconomic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (Communauté économiquedes pays des Grands Lacs, or CEPGL) and the Southern African DevelopmentCommunity (SADC). However, these entities have not proved adequate orequipped to address regional security problems as they relate to the DRC.The Amani peace process, launched at the beginning of 2008 in Goma, aimed todefine the necessary requirements for an inclusive peace, including notably thedemobilisation of Kivu militias. However, absence of progress in the DDRprocess and further difficulties in integrating former rebel commanders into theCongolese army (FARDC) command chain, resulted in renewed mobilisation ofmilitias, and at the end of 2010, the revival of militias that had been ‘dormant’.This phenomenon was reinforced by the terms of the agreements that pushe torecognise any person who could mobilise an armed force as a potentialnegotiator.New military solutions, supported by the UN, were sought. At the beginning of2009, the negotiations between Rwanda and the DRC from the end of 2008culminated in a joint military offensive launched against the FDLR, the RwandanHutu rebel group established in eastern Congo following the genocide. Theoperation, called Umoja Wetu (literally “our unity”), was launched at the end ofJanuary 2009, but limited to North Kivu. By the end of March, a subsequentoperation, Kimia II, composed of FARDC and combatants from former militia,assumed responsibility until the end of 2009, without clear outcomes; it has nowbeen replaced by the operation Amani Leo launched in early 2010 with a minimallevel of support from MONUC.All these efforts have not prevented frequent clashes between armed groups,often a result of the absence of progress in security sector reform or fromcompeting interests. These disconnections were also support by cultural, physicaland information divides, which fracture even more here than in other parts of theworld the terrain of fluid armed movements.Since the signing of the peace accord, the conditions around conflict in easternDRC have not considerably improved, with episodes of recurring violence. Large
JOINT EVALUATION OF CONFLICT PREVENTION AND PEACE BUILDING IN DRCVOLUME 1parts of the Kivu provinces, certain parts of Ituri, and parts of Maniema province,remain in the hands of foreign or local armed groups, independent of the state.A map of the conflict in the eastern DRC, drawn up by MONUC in 2009,represents the situation described above:Priority axes Stability Plan1. Sake-Masisi2. Rutshuru-Ishasha3. Bukavu-Homb o4. Bukavu-Shabunda5. Bunia-Boga6. Fizi-Minembwe7. Mambasa bridge75BogaLUBEROKANYABAYONGAISHASHA4RUTSHURUMASISI1SakeHombo23MinembweUVIRA6Hotspots are illegal armedgroupsGrey arrows are FDLRcorridorsFIZI-BARAKAThis map shows the consolidation of international efforts coordinated by the UN,in addition to the corridors used by armed groups. By basing their operationsmostly outside the main towns, these armed groups are capable of blocking andhampering transport along the major traditional transport routes. This mapillustrates the extent of their activities and the challenges they pose tointernational aid operations. To operate effectively, organisations need to bemobile and well coordinated across an extremely difficult terrain, and remain inpermanent contact with local populations.1.2 Scope of the EvaluationAt first glance, the general conditions of national stability and its development, asdescribed above, could call into question the idea that conflict prevention andpeacebuilding has had any effect. However such a judgement would ignore thekey questions that justify a detailed evaluation: how significant were thecontributions of international actors? Without them, would the situation havebeen worse? Up until which point were these actors effective? Finally, whatlessons can be gleaned from their initiatives?These questions constitute the heart of international policies in the DRC. Theyforce the observer to measure the influence in reduction of violence, as a policyobjective, on the conflict.
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