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simulation of torsion moment at the wheel set of the railway vehicle ...

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REVIEWRadomir Brkic – Zivoslav Adamovic *THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SAFETY AND RELIABILITY OF DATATRANSMISSION IN RAILWAY SIGNALLIZATION SYSTEMSThe focus <strong>of</strong> this paper is <strong>the</strong> safety and reliability <strong>of</strong> d<strong>at</strong>a transmission in <strong>railway</strong> systems <strong>at</strong> increased and high train speeds by means<strong>of</strong> technological devices <strong>of</strong> new gener<strong>at</strong>ion. Routes in <strong>railway</strong> traffic are protected with new microprocessing signalling devices, <strong>the</strong> reliabilityand availability <strong>of</strong> which, thanks to new techology, may be projected to a necessary, i. e. desired value.Key words: ETCS, autom<strong>at</strong>ic control, autom<strong>at</strong>ic guidance, safety, reliability, availability.1. IntroductionSo far, <strong>the</strong> conventional signalling system th<strong>at</strong> involves fixeddistances between <strong>the</strong> main signals and pre-signals makes <strong>the</strong> giventask harder and limits <strong>the</strong> existing riding power <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> rail. Contraryto this, <strong>the</strong> ETCS (European Train Control System) – supportedline train leading – is independent <strong>of</strong> dividing <strong>the</strong> railroadinto track sections and it provides <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> viewing <strong>the</strong>actual condition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> railroad ahead and with no limits.Although mixed traffic railroads would require keeping <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>conventional signals in <strong>the</strong> initial period – because <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> lowerspeed freight trains – as emergency and lower hierarchy level incase <strong>of</strong> a main system failure, <strong>the</strong> main autom<strong>at</strong>ic leading systemworks as an ‘overlay-system’ representing <strong>the</strong> first safety systemcontrolled by s<strong>of</strong>tware.2. Concept <strong>of</strong> an electronic signal boxVery important advantages <strong>of</strong> electronic signal boxes lie in <strong>the</strong>possibilities <strong>of</strong>fered by a system-specific applic<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> modernprocessing technology. O<strong>the</strong>r than this, <strong>the</strong>se advantages include:1. Lower purchasing value <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> device;2. Considerably reduced construction requirements and fixedequipment;3. Minimized scope <strong>of</strong> maintenance;4. Ensured unific<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> work places for <strong>the</strong> train disp<strong>at</strong>chers –independent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> equipment supplier – and high level ergonometricequipment in <strong>the</strong> work places <strong>of</strong> disp<strong>at</strong>chers and <strong>the</strong>oper<strong>at</strong>ive center disp<strong>at</strong>chers;5. Simple integr<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> additional autom<strong>at</strong>iz<strong>at</strong>ion and disponingfunctions; standardiz<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> interface for computersystems higher up in <strong>the</strong> hierarchy;6. Cre<strong>at</strong>ing conditions necessary for an integr<strong>at</strong>ed system <strong>of</strong> autom<strong>at</strong>icleading.1.1. Starting points for <strong>the</strong> safety microcomputermodulePossible places <strong>of</strong> applic<strong>at</strong>ion for <strong>the</strong> safety microprocessormodule – safety microcomputer – are:• <strong>the</strong> electronic signal box, <strong>the</strong> vital ETCS computer• <strong>the</strong> terminal computer for handling signals and branches• <strong>the</strong> vital element <strong>of</strong> every module and <strong>the</strong> main element in <strong>the</strong>safe signal transmission and crypto communic<strong>at</strong>ion.All <strong>the</strong>se places in <strong>the</strong> signal structure differ very much in <strong>the</strong>quantity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> hardware necessary for <strong>the</strong> main module, s<strong>of</strong>twarenecessary in rel<strong>at</strong>ion to <strong>the</strong> function it performs, factors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>environment, necessary reliability, etc.Therefore, a global developing aim can be defined as follows:• To develop a microprocessor module for those applic<strong>at</strong>ion placesin <strong>the</strong> field <strong>of</strong> rail signalliz<strong>at</strong>ion where <strong>the</strong> systems i.e. subsystemsmust be fail-safe;• To construct a ‘hard core’ th<strong>at</strong> can be programmed by <strong>the</strong> ‘mainprogram’ to work fail-safe invariably, regardless <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> loc<strong>at</strong>ion<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> applic<strong>at</strong>ion places;• To compose <strong>the</strong> module from reliable components <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> leadingworld producers;• To achieve an MTBF ‘reasonably’ longer than 1 year, th<strong>at</strong> isbetween 10,000–15,000 hours.Unlike <strong>the</strong> so far safety signalling systems based on relays,<strong>the</strong>re are nei<strong>the</strong>r electronic components, nor systems th<strong>at</strong> can befound on <strong>the</strong> market which show <strong>the</strong> necessary ‘fail-safe’ behavior.Since <strong>the</strong> processor itself has no inherent safety, an adequ<strong>at</strong>econcept must be found to guarantee fail-safe behavior using ‘redundancy’– which in fact means <strong>the</strong> management and control <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>managing hardware with one special unit capable <strong>of</strong> detecting allfunctional mistakes th<strong>at</strong> may cause danger to <strong>the</strong> process.* Radomir Brkic 1 , Zivoslav Adamovic 21 Railway College Belgrade,E-mail: rbrkic@drenik.net2 Technical Faculty, Zrenjanin, SerbiaCOMMUNICATIONS 3/2008 ●57

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