simulation of torsion moment at the wheel set of the railway vehicle ...

More documents

Recommendations

Info

REVIEWThe processing results from the two systems are comparedand in case they are not identical, the comparing function itselfand the next safety action must redirect the system into a safe-sideposition. This concept is possible with the configurations ‘2 out of2’ and ‘2 out of 3’.These are the main problems that every system must solveand the ‘internal mechanisms’ that must achieve the above failsafebehavior:• Every single failure must be identified and must result in a safetyreaction of the system;• Double or multiple failures cannot happen if the safety conceptof the system enables full comparison of results (during theentire course of the processing, and not only at its end) andcondition of both channels, including memories;• Not a single failure in one channel can have a similar effecton the other channel. The channels must be independent fromeach other;• Both channels and the whole module must be completely testedand with no mistakes in either hardware or software beforereleasing the system into work. In other words, the systemmust be guaranteed as mistake-free before starting up thesystem.So, this obviously shows that the work of both processors andall the activities that are related to further process operation arecontrolled in the earliest phase of every tact.This early control, as an internal mechanism for identifyingmistakes even in the earliest phase, is supported by a special additionalchecking program, which periodically checks the completestatus of the system. Also, all the inside data, before their entryinto the memory, are subject to automatic comparison and correction.It is clear that this kind of safety concept assumes safety functionsof the tact-giver and the comparator, implying that they mustbe ‘fail-safe’ designed, i.e. that every mistake on one of the elementsof these modules must be reflected in the ultimate instancein the content of the BUS signal.Fig. 1 shows an illustrative example of a basic two-channelconfiguration of the safety microcomputer by Siemens Company.This configuration is safe-designed so that the two identical microcomputerswork in synchrony with their:• Central processing units CPU 1 and CPU 2;• Belonging memories for entering and reading of the RAM 1and RAM 2 data;• Memories which are programmed for fixed values that can bereprogrammed as needed, EPROM 1 and EPROM 2;• The configuration contains common ingoing and outgoingmodules;• Reception (1) and Release (2) which establish connection withthe exterior elements; the system has one common tact-giverto synchronize the work of the two identical channels.The system checks if the signals from both channels are identicalin every tact step, in the following way: the tact-giver turns onboth processors (TACT 1 and TACT 2) and a comparator (‘C’ signal– control in Fig. 1) The comparator checks the content of the collectorsin both microcomputers (BUS 1 and BUS 2) and comparesthem. Only in case that the comparator (in every tact)establishes the identical status of both channels, it generates thesignals “OK” (no mistake) on its exit, which triggers the nextworking cycle of the tact-giver.Otherwise, in case there is any discrepancy in the signalscoming from Channel 1 and Channel 2, which is transparentlyshown on BUS 1 and BUS 2, or in case of any mistake on thecomparator, the comparator ‘chokes’ the ‘OK’ (no mistake) signaldriving the tact-giver into rest, which ultimately means stoppingthe process: the whole configuration (module) stops its work directingthe system to the ‘safe side’.Fig. 1 Basic structure of the two-channel safety microcomputer2. Principles of safety in the railway signalling systemsThe signalling systems are not immune from failure and,therefore, due to their specific role, they must be designed andconstructed so that even in case of disturbance and failure they donot endanger the safety of the traffic, which implies that they mustbe signal-safe and technically-safe.This ‘fail-safe’ behavior is achieved by implementation of thesignalling principles and safety criteria and using highly reliabledevices regardless of the technology.As a defined measure of safety, the international railway organizationUIC, i.e. its committee ORE, has defined in its recommendationson the basis of so far experience and the achievedlevel of technical development ‘the mean time between two dangerousfailures’ – ‘MTBF’, as a reliability measure in between two58 ● COMMUNICATIONS 3/2008
REVIEWfailures. For example, for an electronic signal box this means,respectively:• That the mean time between two dangerous failures (MTBF)must not be closer than 100 years;• That the mean time between two failures (MTBF) must not becloser than 4 months (2880 hours).2.1. The purpose and the functioning principle of thesignalling/safety devicesFig. 2 illustrates the role of the system of railway signallizationwith modalities of implementation of the safety principles.Fig. 2 The role of the railway signallization system with modalities of implementation of the safety principlesCOMMUNICATIONS 3/2008 ●59
Page 5 and 6: Mt = k$ Di(12) 4. Torsion moment at
Page 7: References[1] JOVANOVIC, R.: Tensio
Page 10 and 11: Fig. 3 Geometrical parameters of ch
Page 12 and 13: Fig. 13 10. eigenvector when the ei
Page 14 and 15: and D R _ y,wi=0 if y 0 (12) Dampe
Page 16 and 17: Fig. 22 Comfort for passengers for
Page 18 and 19: 3. Intermodal trainsIntermodal trai
Page 20 and 21: Fig. 2 Consignment reloading proces
Page 22 and 23: attached to individual tracks shown
Page 24 and 25: Juraj Gerlici - Tomas Lack *MODIFIE
Page 26 and 27: After the insertion of the previous
Page 28 and 29: where:k - is the basic spring stiff
Page 30 and 31: [2] GERLICI, J., LACK, T.: Methods
Page 32 and 33: Resulting from experience the degre
Page 34 and 35: Upon this strengthening of pretensi
Page 36 and 37: attained the 6th position of the be
Page 38 and 39: Jozef Jandacka - Stefan Papucik - V
Page 40 and 41: spacing of the fan from the measuri
Page 42 and 43: 5. ConclusionFrom the results prese
Page 44 and 45: REVIEWlines with numerous curves th
Page 46 and 47: REVIEWmeters from the point of view
Page 48 and 49: REVIEWBojan Cene - Aleksandar Rados
Page 50: REVIEWthe year 2006 in Slovenia sta
Page 53 and 54: REVIEWthat the GPS does not recogni
Page 55: REVIEWRadomir Brkic - Zivoslav Adam
Page 59 and 60: REVIEWJan Krmela *COMPUTATIONAL MOD
Page 61 and 62: REVIEWFor this reason tyres and whe
Page 63 and 64: REVIEWFig. 6 Computational model
Page 65 and 66: REVIEW- guarantee that the messages
Page 67 and 68: REVIEWIvana Olivkova *PASSENGER INF
Page 69 and 70: REVIEWLike the other information sy
Page 71 and 72: REVIEWFig. 1 Revolution of the poin
Page 73 and 74: REVIEWFig. 4 Transformation of the
Page 75 and 76: BOOK REVIEWKavicka, A., Klima, V.,

simulation of torsion moment at the wheel set of the railway vehicle ...

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?