The Economist - 19_25 April 2014

The Economist April 19th 2014 Books and arts 692 who knew him the longest. His first-handaccount of Philby’s life from childhood,when the two first met, was blocked frompublication by MI6 some 35 years ago. Butthat restriction has since been lifted and,though Milne died in 2010, his family releasedhis story. It is disjointed, as Milnemoved in and out of Philby’s life. Andwhile his detailed observations are attimes intriguing, they are too often irrelevant—forexample, Philby had an aversionto apples. Even red ones, apparently.Elliott’s is the more captivating friendship,and it provides a fitting denouementto Philby’s treason. When MI6 finally settledon his guilt in 1962, Elliott insisted onconfronting the traitor. Even then, said anofficial, Philby “should be treated as a gentleman”.And so he was: sitting in a Beirutflat, Elliott and Philby “courteously” lied toone another, writes Mr Macintyre. In theend, Elliott left with a confession, andPhilby snuck off to Moscow. It is still notclear if Elliott hoped he would defect. “Icannot help thinking that perhaps youwanted me to do a fade,” wrote Philby toElliott a short time later, as if the two werestill friends. 7America in AfghanistanMisjudgmentsThe Wrong Enemy: America in Afghanistan,2001-2014. By Carlotta Gall. HoughtonMifflin Harcourt; 329 pages; $28FEW observers are better placed thanCarlotta Gall to judge what has gone sobadly wrong in Pakistan and Afghanistansince 2001. She spent more than a decadereporting for the New York Times in bothcountries, often from remote corners. Shehas a family connection, too: her father,Sandy Gall, is a British television journalistwho covered Afghanistan for many years,notably during the war ofthe 1980s.In “The Wrong Enemy” Ms Gall offers aprovocative and compelling thesis: thatAmerica and its allies are leaving Afghanistanas a weakened state, plagued byviolence and vulnerable to ambitions ofits neighbours. That is despite the deaths ofperhaps 70,000 Afghans, 3,400 foreignsoldiers and a trillion-dollar bill. Yet theoutcome was probably inevitable, sincethe West’s efforts were badly misdirected.In the words of America’s late specialenvoy to the region, Richard Holbrooke:“We may be fighting the wrong enemy inthe wrong country.”Ms Gall argues that since the Islamistmovement is “rotting at the core”, the Talibanalone could have been crushed or accommodatedlong ago. It survived becauseit serves as a front for the far stronger Pakistaniarmy, in particular the “S Directorate”of its spy network, the Inter-Services Intelligence(ISI). Pakistan uses the Taliban toproject military power across the border.The author shows how the ISI provideshavens for the Taliban and directs them toattack Western forces. In Pakistan they developsuicide-bombing techniques andraise soldiers from madrassas. Each schoolhas a talent-spotter paid to recruit studentsfor militant outfits, who are referred toderisively by Pakistan’s army as “potatosoldiers”. At crucial moments Pakistanisthemselves have directly overseen operations,like the bombing in 2008 of India’sembassy in Kabul, which was “sanctionedand monitored by the most senior officialsin Pakistani intelligence”.More controversially, Ms Gall gathersevidence that senior elements of the Pakistaniarmy collaborated with al-Qaeda,even as it drew billions of dollars fromAmerica to fight the militant Islamistgroup. Afghan intelligence sources “becomeconvinced” early on of the relationship,she says, describing how in February2006 the Afghan president, Hamid Karzai,and his spy chief personally handed a fileto Pakistan’s dictator, Pervez Musharraf,giving evidence of al-Qaeda operativeshidden in safe houses in Abbottabad, amilitary town north of Islamabad. MrMusharraflooked anxious, but did not act.Five years on American special forceskilled Osama bin Laden, also in Abbottabad.The natural question was whetherPakistan’s army had been sheltering himall along. Ms Gall says the Americansquickly concluded that it had, and that thehead of the ISI, Ahmad Shuja Pasha, andpossibly the army chief, Ashfaq ParvezKayani, as well were aware of bin Laden’spresence. Ms Gall implies that Mr Musharrafprobably also knew, though her evidencefor this is weak. She says that the ISIhad a desk dedicated to looking after al-Qaeda’s leader, while correspondenceTime to declarefound in his house showed that he andaides had discussed doinga deal with Pakistanto refrain from terrorism in the countryin return for protection.Other evidence also points to a relationship.Mobile phones are routinelymonitored in Pakistan, yet officials choseto ignore the fact that calls were beingmade to Saudi Arabia from mobiles insidebin Laden’s home. And even though thehouse was in a high-security area policedid not check on it, suggesting that someonein the ISI vouched for the occupants.That bin Laden’s house had little protectionalso pointed to his reliance on othersto guard him.The book asks many of the right questionsabout the affair, and history may wellprove Ms Gall’s answers to be right. Why,for example, would the American governmentnot make public its conclusion aboutPakistan’s complicity with al-Qaeda? MsGall suggests it cared more about trying topreserve its relations with a nuclear-armedally. She may also turn out to be correct insuggesting that Mr Musharraf and tensenior generals knew of militants’ plans tokill Benazir Bhutto in 2007, but chose not toprotect her. He is now on trial fortreason inIslamabad in a separate case.Ms Gall’s narrative would have beenstronger if she had balanced what shelearned from Afghan intelligence sources,who are famously hostile (if for good reason)towards Pakistan’s army, with otherviews. Abettersense ofcontextwould alsohave made her argument more powerful.Why did the West choose not to confrontthe ISI, Ms Gall’s “right” enemy, despiteabundant evidence of its wrongdoing?Was it fear of instability and the rise ofIslamistgroupsacrossSouth Asia, the needfor Pakistan’s help in promoting counterterrorismin the West or anxiety about China’sgrowing influence? “The Wrong Enemy”is a strong, well-crafted account by aninformed observer. It could have beeneven stronger. 7