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LONG-RUN ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION’S EASTERN ENLARGEMENT3.3.2 INDICATORS OF THE KIND OF COMPLIANCE REMEDIES APPLIEDAgain, two sets of indicators can be distinguished. The first compliance remedy isjudicial enforcement, which can be termed the litigative route. This enforcementcan take place both on the national and on the European level. The national levelprovides the following options.• national court action relying on case-law;• national court action based on a request for a preliminary ruling by the ECJ;• ECJ appeal ruling (appeal, after national ruling).The possibilities of enforcement at the European level are more abundant.• complaints (by business, consumers as well as MEPs. The MEPs can put forwardquestions and petitions);• infringement procedures in stages (these stages are as follows: (1) informalconsultations, (2) formal notice, (3) reasoned opinion, (4) referral to the ECJ,and (5) ECJ ruling);• legal action before the ECJ between Member States (this action is hardly everundertaken: a total of four cases for the ECSC and the EC together, between1953 and 1998 1 . Complaints are the preferred route);• penalties (in case of non-compliance with an ECJ ruling).62In the 1990s the national route has been strengthened for two reasons. First, anon-transposed directive may still confer rights to economic agents (for example, adamage claim for lost business). Secondly, non-notification of national laws (otherthan transposed directives) on product regulation 2 is not only an infringement ofEC law but may render technical specifications legally meaningless and void. It is amatter of judgement whether these developments have much of a deterrence effecton national administrations in the EU -15. The Dutch regulatory crisis in 1997 involvingthe non-notification of hundreds of laws and administrative decrees under(the then) directive 83/189 seems to suggest that the deterrence effect is considerable.In other words, on this score, erosion is likely to be permanently lower.Whether the threat of damage claims in case of non-transposition has proved to bean effective deterrent, is hard to establish (see also below).For the purpose of this study, however, the issue is whether this strengthening ofthe national route of (judicial) compliance would work equally well in the accessioncountries, once they would be EU Member States. The answer to this queryhinges on a judgement of the effectiveness of their national judicial systems and of(low-cost, rapid) access to justice. Such a judgement can be inferred from otherWRR-studies 3 .It is fair to say that the EC-level route to (judicial) compliance enforcement has alsoimproved. The Commission has increased its efforts of detection and has introduceda series of internal reforms to enhance the speed and credibility of thisroute. In addition, the worst kind of infringement in the light of the credibility of
EROSION OF THE INTERNAL MARKETthe internal market (and other aspects of Community law) is non-compliance withECJ rulings. Since 1997, daily penalties are imposed on Member States failing tocomply and it would seem that this method has already proved to be highly effective.Obviously, this is critical for the erosion issue after enlargement, becausethere is no reason to expect this discipline not to work equally effectively in theaccession countries.The second set of indicators in terms of compliance remedies encapsulatescompliance through co-operation. The two indicators are:• intensified administrative co-operation. Rather than the litigative route on acase-by-case basis, the Commission and Member States have since 1992engaged in a range of co-operative approaches to fight erosion. Examplesinclude (1) ‘package meetings’ with individual Member States (but across allareas of Community law), (2) national contact points for the effective channellingof queries, (3) the Karolus and Mattheus programmes for the exchangebetween Member States of officials working on internal market issues, and (4)greater efforts to upgrade EC law knowledge of judges and other members ofthe legal profession;• better mutual recognition in actual practice. Largely invisible but highlysignificant is the work of the 98/34 Committee (formerly known as the83/189 Committee). The Committee ensures (1) that national laws withproduct specifications (that fall outside EC directives) do not contain actual orpotential regulatory barriers to trade, (2) that mutual recognition or equivalenceclauses are explicitly incorporated. If both (1) and (2) fail becausethere is no ‘equivalence’, the Commission will propose an approximationdirective. Hence, free movement of goods is protected effectively, almostalways without adding new EC regulatory measures and usually withoutlitigative measures.633.4 IM EROSION WITHOUT ENLARGEMENTHow fragile or robust is today’s internal market acquis? Is it possible to operationalisethe notion of erosion by studying indicators of the internal market inrecent years? The present section provides empirical evidence for the years 1994-1998. As mentioned earlier, it focuses on formal indicators.3.4.1 INDICATORS OF THE NATURE OF NON-COMPLIANCEIt is important to distinguish the overall ‘detection rate’ of infringements from therates reflecting indicators of non-compliance, after the Commission has been ininformal contact with the relevant Member State. The overall detection rate, includingall non-communication instances is high for the EU -15 (the large majorityof these relate to IM areas): it went from 1711 (in 1995), via 2155 (1996), and 1978
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WORKING DOCUMENTS W 109LONG-RUN ECO
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CONTENTSCONTENTSPreface 3Summary 91
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CONTENTSAnnexes1 The Balassa-Samuel
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LONG-RUN ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE EU
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Page 15 and 16: INTRODUCTION1 INTRODUCTIONThe Europ
Page 17 and 18: INTRODUCTION4 To what extent do the
Page 19 and 20: INTRODUCTIONefficiency-based (first
Page 21 and 22: INTRODUCTIONThe exercise is not so
Page 23 and 24: INTRODUCTIONsome suggestions to min
Page 25 and 26: PROBLEMS OF ACCESSION TO THE INTERN
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Page 99 and 100: EMU, EURO AND ENLARGEMENT6 EMU, THE
Page 101 and 102: EMU, EURO AND ENLARGEMENTTable 6.1
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Page 105 and 106: EMU, EURO AND ENLARGEMENTEmployment
Page 107 and 108: EMU, EURO AND ENLARGEMENTwhich is s
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Page 111 and 112: EMU, EURO AND ENLARGEMENTenues. Mea
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EMU, EURO AND ENLARGEMENTany ‘cle
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EMU, EURO AND ENLARGEMENTTable 6.6D
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EMU, EURO AND ENLARGEMENTDeposit mo
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EMU, EURO AND ENLARGEMENTIf the ECB
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EMU, EURO AND ENLARGEMENTBox 6.1The
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EMU, EURO AND ENLARGEMENTexchange r
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EMU, EURO AND ENLARGEMENTvariabilit
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EMU, EURO AND ENLARGEMENTFigure 6.1
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EMU, EURO AND ENLARGEMENT• The lo
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EMU, EURO AND ENLARGEMENTwill remai
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EMU, EURO AND ENLARGEMENTadopting t
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BUDGETARY TRANSFERS IN AN ENLARGED
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LITERATURELITERATUREAlberolo-Ila, E
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LITERATURECommission (1998i) Twenty
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LITERATURETornell, A. and A. Velasc
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ANNEXESANNEX 2WHY IT PAYS TO JOIN T
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ANNEXESThe key item in equation (4)
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ANNEXEScommon reserve pool of the E
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ANNEXESThe day Estonia joins EMU th
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ANNEXESANNEX 3THE VARIABILITY OF TH
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ANNEXESTable A4Correlation coeffici
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ANNEXESVariability of relative CPIM
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ANNEXESANNEX 4AVERAGE FARM NET VALU
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ANNEXESANNEX 5EU BUDGET 1997 COMPAR
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ANNEXESTable A10Estimated expenditu
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ANNEXESANNEX 6 EFFECTS OF THE BERLI
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ANNEXESTable A17Estimated expenditu
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ANNEXESANNEX 8TECHNICAL ASPECTS AND
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ANNEXESreasons the Commission (1998
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ANNEXESOwn resourcesThe amount reta
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