Making it Work - Control Arms

1IntroductionTHIS REPORT EXPLORES AND ASSESSES the various potential operativeprovisions for a future Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). In order to ‘make it work’, an ATT islikely to need:■ effective reporting, information exchange and transparency provisions;■ efficient institutional arrangements;■ workable monitoring and verification mechanisms; and■ appropriate adjudication, dispute settlement and sanctions provisions.By examining the approaches taken by various other international regimes, includingthose relating to international arms transfer control and non-proliferation, the aim isto illustrate the range of options that are open to states when they consider thedevelopment of such provisions for an ATT. However, where there are clear minimumrequirements for the establishment of an effective regime then these are identified.When the UN Secretary General sought views on the feasibility, scope and draftparameters of an ATT, more than half of the states that responded had questions asto how a Treaty would operate in practice and what provisions would be necessary tomonitor and verify its implementation. A significant number of states raised therequirement for information exchange and transparency mechanisms – includingreporting on international arms transfers – together with the need for an appropriateinstitutional capacity and verification provisions. 1 Other issues raised included thepossibility of exchanging information on international arms transfer denials and onthe need for a Treaty review mechanism or follow-up provisions. 2 The process ofestablishing an effective ATT will thus require consideration of a range of reporting,institutional, monitoring and verification options. Agreement on substantivemechanisms relating to monitoring and verification, in particular, will be a crucial partof ensuring the effective functioning of the regime and in building confidence in itsoperation.Ideally, the establishment of effective reporting, information exchange, transparency,verification and compliance provisions under an ATT will be achieved at the outset.However, if agreement on the details of these mechanisms proves problematic to theextent that it threatens to derail negotiation of the Treaty then, at a minimum, anyinitial Treaty text should establish the basic elements of such procedures. This shouldinclude provision for an appropriate institutional infrastructure and call for the1 See The Global Arms Trade Treaty: What States Want compiled by Clare da Silva for the Arms Trade Treaty NGO SteeringCommittee, October 2007, pp 36–37. http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGPOL340042007; and Analysis of States’Views on an Arms Trade Treaty, Sarah Parker, UNIDIR, October 2007, pp 11–12.http://www.unidir.org/pdf/UNIDIR_Analysis_States_Views_on_an_ATT_18OCT2007.pdf2 The Global Arms Trade Treaty: What States Want, p 37; Analysis of States’ Views on an Arms Trade Treaty, p 12