Making it Work - Control Arms

viMAKING IT WORK: MONITORING AND VERIFYING IMPLEMENTATION OF AN ARMS TRADE TREATYestablished that a ‘transfer of concern’ had taken place and the circumstancessurrounding the transfer had been clarified, it would need to be fully assessed by anappropriate Treaty institution (for example a Meeting of States Parties) with a view toproviding a definitive judgement on the nature and scope of the Treaty breach and anyremedial steps to be taken. It is argued that establishing procedures of this type will beimportant in terms of boosting an ATT’s effectiveness and credibility.Dispute settlement: The paper further notes that more general disputes may ariseover Treaty implementation or the application of its provisions. Every effort should bemade to resolve differences among states parties by means of the consultation mechanismsand other compliance provisions that are established under the Treaty. However,the possibility that intractable disputes will occur necessitates the establishment ofclear dispute settlement procedures with the roles and responsibilities of differentinstitutions clearly specified. While the detailed investigation of any compliance issuemay well be undertaken in private, in order to maintain confidence in the regime theresolution of disputes should be made public.Sanctions: Despite containing provisions for verification and dispute settlement, fewarms control and non-proliferation regimes specify any sanctions in the event that atreaty breach is recognised. In such cases the majority of regimes that specify anyfurther recourse simply refer the matter to the UN Security Council and/or GeneralAssembly. The paper argues that where a state is established by a Meeting of StatesParties to be in persistent and flagrant violation of an ATT there should be recourse tothe possible imposition of sanctions against the offending state party – including thepotential imposition of an arms embargo.An effective Arms Trade Treaty: Ideally, the establishment of effective reporting,information exchange, transparency, institutional, verification and complianceprovisions will be achieved at the outset of an ATT. However, if agreement on thedetails of such mechanisms proves problematic to the extent that it threatens to derailnegotiation of the Treaty, then the initial text should establish the basic elements ofsuch provisions and call for their subsequent further development. Great care shouldbe taken to ensure that the provisions in the initial treaty text are fully capable of beingbuilt on to establish necessary and effective institutions and mechanisms. While anATT will in some ways be a unique agreement, much can be learned from theexperiences of other international regimes. By drawing upon this experience, statesshould be in a position to develop a transparent, accountable and effective internationalarms transfer control regime that is rooted in international law.