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SAFERWORLD 23emissions target. The Enforcement Branch of the Compliance Committee determinescases of parties’ compliance with emissions targets, monitoring and reporting requirementsand eligibility to participate in the emissions trading mechanisms. TheCommittee’s procedures are triggered when it receives ‘questions of implementation’,either in reports by the ERTs, or from a party with respect to itself or from any partywith respect to another party, as long as it has corroborating information.Under CITES the Secretariat can conduct missions to parties undergoing implementationproblems in order to collate relevant information, evaluate problems and provideadvice to relevant authorities. Secretariat missions are also used to assess progresswhere implementing conditions have been set down with regard to the lifting of tradesanctions. Missions are only conducted with the approval of the state party concerned.Another type of mission involving technical experts, organised by the Secretariat andthe Standing Committee, has frequently been tasked with investigating problems concerningthe illegal trade in endangered species, particularly rhinos and tigers. Thesehave been followed by high-level political delegations that report their conclusions tothe Standing Committee and the CoP. 33ConclusionThe establishment of some form of verification measures under an ATT could play animportant part in efforts to build confidence in the effectiveness of the regime and topromote full compliance. Indeed, to this end, a number of states responding to the UNSecretary General called for the establishment of a mechanism for overseeing ATTcompliance. 34While representing a substantial commitment by states parties, provisions for incountrymonitoring and verification can help build confidence in the effective implementationof a treaty. Indeed, the experience of the CWC indicates that if suchprovisions are used early on within the lifetime of a treaty regime, and are targetedtowards resolving low-level compliance issues, then the mechanism in question ismore likely to function effectively thereafter. Confidence is increased where there arereview mechanisms that include a capacity-building function to help parties improvetheir monitoring and reporting procedures, as is the case under the UNFCCC/KyotoProtocol review process.While monitoring and verification mechanisms are typically not implemented to theoptimal extent, experience under the CFE Treaty, the CWC, CITES and the UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol suggests that such mechanisms are a valuable tool, especially as part ofa package of compliance measures. Thus, the establishment of regular monitoringefforts under an ATT could contribute to the development of an effective regime andcould conceivably include verification activities. To enhance accountability in theinternational arms transfer chain, these monitoring and verification measures couldapply not only to arms exporting and importing states but also to transit and transhipmentstates, as well as those providing a base for the operation of international armsbrokers. Such measures could include, for example, inspections of transfer licensingrecords and of procedures and records kept at exit and entry points for armsshipments. In addition to assisting in the detection of compliance problems, suchprovisions could be useful in highlighting cases whereby, for example, data retrieval,management and storage or a lack of capacity, resources or relevant expertise arepreventing states from fulfilling their obligations under the Treaty. With such informationto hand co-operative efforts could be undertaken and assistance provided so as toresolve such matters.33 Rosalind Reeve, Ibid. According to Rosalind Reeve, technical missions – the composition of which is decided by the chair ofthe Standing Committee – typically consist of one or more Secretariat staff, accompanied by experts drawn from the IUCNand TRAFFIC. Accompanied by representatives of the host government, they examine records, conduct interviews and visitrelevant sites.34 The Global Arms Trade Treaty: What States Want, Ibid p 37 and Analysis of States’ Views on an Arms Trade Treaty, pp 11–12.
24 MAKING IT WORK: MONITORING AND VERIFYING IMPLEMENTATION OF AN ARMS TRADE TREATYThe frequency and extent of such in-country review/verification activities would be amatter for discussion and agreement by states parties and could be codified in thetreaty itself or as part of a protocol on monitoring and inspections. For example, statescould be required to accept a certain number and type of inspections per year – eitherrandomly or at specified intervals – by an authorised inspection team.Finally, it is also conceivable that states parties may wish to agree verification proceduresthat could be invoked with a view to resolving specific instances of suspectednon-compliance. Provisions of this nature have been adopted – in the form ofchallenge inspections – by other international regimes, most notably under the CWC.Invariably, more politically charged and difficult to manage, examples of their effectiveemployment are limited. Nevertheless, this remains an option for consideration underan ATT.5.3Adjudication,disputesettlementprovisions andsanctions5.3.1 AdjudicationIt is possible that despite the invoking of consultation mechanisms and monitoringand verification provisions under an ATT concerns may persist regarding compliancewith Treaty obligations on the part of one or more states parties. Accordingly, theeffectiveness and credibility of the regime will be best served through the agreement offormal procedures for adjudication and dispute settlement along with recourse to theimposition of sanctions in the event of a clear and established breach.It is important to clarify that there are at least three types of circumstances underwhich a breach of an ATT could occur – the first two of which could be considered‘technical’ and the third ‘substantive’. In the first instance, a state party could be consideredto be in breach of its Treaty obligations if it fails to establish the requisitenational laws, regulations and administrative procedures that are required under anATT; where they are identified such breaches should be met with offers of appropriateassistance. Additionally, a state party that fails to fulfil its reporting requirementsadequately and in a timely fashion could also be considered in breach; again suchoccurrences should be met with offers of support and assistance. Thirdly, and mostseriously, a state party could be considered in breach of its treaty obligations by licensingan international arms transfer in contravention of the terms of the Treaty. Whiletransfers of this nature could conceivably take place as the result of a lack of capacity,resources and/or expertise, the possibility of wilful neglect would also need to beconsidered. In this regard, the precise circumstances surrounding, and nature of, suchbreaches would need to be formally established, ideally by means of the monitoringand verification provisions that are established under an ATT.With regard to a substantive breach, it is crucial to recognise that an ATT will differfrom other arms control and non-proliferation regimes in that proving that a particularinternational arms transfer has taken place will not necessarily be sufficient toestablish that a breach in compliance has taken place. This is because the adjudicationprocess will necessarily involve assessing a ‘suspect’ arms transfer against the objectivecriteria that lie at the heart of the Treaty. Accordingly, the process of establishing that aviolation of the Treaty has taken place will necessarily involve two distinct components.In the first instance, a specified Treaty body (possibly an ATT Secretariat, an executiveinstitution, or a Group of Experts appointed by a designated Treaty institution) wouldneed to establish beyond doubt that a particular international arms transfer ofconcern has, in fact, taken place. As noted above, the monitoring and verificationprovisions of the Treaty could be a critical source of information in this respect. Onceit were established that a ‘transfer of concern’ had taken place and the circumstancessurrounding the transfer had been clarified, it would need to be fully assessed by anappropriate Treaty institution (for example a Meeting of States Parties) with a view to
Page 1 and 2: REPORTMaking it work:Monitoring and
Page 3 and 4: AcknowledgementsThis report was wri
Page 5 and 6: ForewordIN RECENT YEARS there has b
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Page 14 and 15: 3Reporting, informationexchangeand
Page 16 and 17: SAFERWORLD 7Ultimately, however, it
Page 18 and 19: SAFERWORLD 9ConclusionIn order for
Page 20 and 21: SAFERWORLD 11mechanism to facilitat
Page 22 and 23: SAFERWORLD 13participated three or
Page 24 and 25: SAFERWORLD 15■agreements with sta
Page 26 and 27: SAFERWORLD 17■ Regular meetings o
Page 28 and 29: SAFERWORLD 19While the experience o
Page 30 and 31: SAFERWORLD 21General; the state par
Page 34 and 35: SAFERWORLD 25providing a definitive
Page 36 and 37: SAFERWORLD 27under the Treaty. Howe
Page 38 and 39: ANNEX 1: UN Register of Conventiona

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