Making it Work - Control Arms

More documents

Recommendations

Info

SAFERWORLD 27under the Treaty. However, in the event that this fails to provide for the resolution ofan issue, it may be necessary to consider establishing clear dispute settlementprocedures with the roles and responsibilities of different institutions clearly specified.An interesting example in this regard is found under the 1982 UN Convention on theLaw of the Sea (UNCLOS), whereby an independent tribunal has been established inorder to address disputes among states parties. 39 Moreover, while the detailedinvestigation of any compliance issue could be undertaken in private, in order toensure confidence is maintained in the operation of the regime it will be vital that theresolution of any concern is made public.Finally, the experience of the CWC and various multilateral environmental agreementssuggests that compliance with a Treaty can be encouraged inter alia by includingtrade incentives as well as technical and financial assistance as a benefit of membership.Accordingly, the architects of an ATT should consider whether there is thepossibility of constructing a regime whereby particular benefits can accrue to statesparties that are in full compliance with their obligations under the treaty and otherrelevant international law. However, where a state is confirmed as being in persistentand flagrant violation of an ATT (possibly by the Conference of States Parties), thereshould be recourse to the imposition of sanctions against the offender by statesparties – including the potential imposition of an arms embargo. While the optionwould always remain that a particularly serious matter arising under an ATT could bereferred to the UNSC, problems could arise in the event that a state party underinvestigation is represented (particularly as a permanent member) on the UNSC.Under such circumstances the potential for this body to arbitrate in an impartialmanner would have to be called into question.39 Under Article 287 of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea states parties are provided with a choice of means forthe settlement of disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention, one of which is the InternationalTribunal for the Law of the Sea, established in accordance with Annex VI.http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm
6Establishing an effectiveArms Trade TreatyIDEALLY, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF EFFECTIVE REPORTING, informationexchange, transparency, institutional, verification and compliance provisions will beachieved at the outset of an ATT. However, if agreement on the details of suchmechanisms proves problematic to the extent that it threatens to derail negotiation ofa Treaty, then the initial text should establish the basic elements of such procedures.A Treaty should explicitly reference effective reporting, information exchange,transparency, monitoring and verification procedures and call for subsequent furtherdevelopment of these mechanisms. In this regard, great care should be taken that theprovisions in the initial Treaty text are fully capable of being built on to establishnecessary and effective institutions and mechanisms.At the same time, the establishment of such provisions also depends on the level ofunderstanding and experience of the issue being tackled. Agreement on the principlesand details of implementation and verification procedures will only be possible ifsufficient research and analysis has been carried out, and if the experiences andpractices in similar international arrangements are learned from.In conclusion, to be effective and credible an ATT will need to adopt provisionsrelating to all of the areas discussed above: reporting, information exchange andpublic transparency in international arms transfers; capacity building and assistanceprogrammes; appropriate institutional capacity and infrastructure; monitoring,verification and compliance procedures; and adjudication, dispute settlement andsanctions. The exact nature and modalities of these provisions will undoubtedly be amatter for considerable debate. However, it is important to recognise that effectivemechanisms do not need to be cumbersome or bureaucratic and that a considerableamount can be achieved through the establishment of focussed and transparentpermanent or ad hoc mechanisms that are tailored to achieving particular objectives.While an ATT will in some ways be a unique agreement, much can be learned from theexperiences under other international regimes – particularly those that are focussedon regulating trade in particular commodities. Accordingly, by drawing upon theexperience of existing agreements, states should be in a position to develop a transparent,accountable and effective international arms transfer control regime that isrooted in international law.
Page 1 and 2: REPORTMaking it work:Monitoring and
Page 3 and 4: AcknowledgementsThis report was wri
Page 5 and 6: ForewordIN RECENT YEARS there has b
Page 7 and 8: ivMAKING IT WORK: MONITORING AND VE
Page 9 and 10: viMAKING IT WORK: MONITORING AND VE
Page 11 and 12: 2 MAKING IT WORK: MONITORING AND VE
Page 14 and 15: 3Reporting, informationexchangeand
Page 16 and 17: SAFERWORLD 7Ultimately, however, it
Page 18 and 19: SAFERWORLD 9ConclusionIn order for
Page 20 and 21: SAFERWORLD 11mechanism to facilitat
Page 22 and 23: SAFERWORLD 13participated three or
Page 24 and 25: SAFERWORLD 15■agreements with sta
Page 26 and 27: SAFERWORLD 17■ Regular meetings o
Page 28 and 29: SAFERWORLD 19While the experience o
Page 30 and 31: SAFERWORLD 21General; the state par
Page 32 and 33: SAFERWORLD 23emissions target. The
Page 34 and 35: SAFERWORLD 25providing a definitive
Page 38 and 39: ANNEX 1: UN Register of Conventiona

Making it Work - Control Arms

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?