Making it Work - Control Arms

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3Reporting, informationexchangeand transparencyIN ORDER TO DEMONSTRATE that they are meeting their obligations under an ATT,states will need to engage in a variety of reporting and information exchange activities.They will need to do so in a transparent manner that provides accountability at thenational level (with regard to parliaments and the public) and at international level(with regard to other states parties and international institutions). As such, decisionsregarding the nature and extent of reporting obligations, transparency provisions andinformation exchanges among states parties will have far reaching implications notonly for the effectiveness of the regime but also as to how it is perceived publicly.It is important to reiterate, however, that the transparent fulfilment of reporting andinformation exchange obligations by states parties under an ATT may well requirededicated resources and support from states in a position to offer help, as well as thedevelopment or adaptation of international institutions.3.1 Reportingunder an ArmsTrade TreatyAs with many other international instruments, states parties will need to provideinformation on ATT implementation. In terms of reporting requirements, statesparties will need to provide detailed information on the following aspects of Treatyimplementation:■ International arms transfers that fall within the scope of the Treaty;■ Progress at national level on steps taken to implement the Treaty; and■ Assistance given or received with the aim of assisting national implementation of theTreaty.The modalities of reporting under an ATT, including the frequency of reports and thenature and level of detail to be provided, are discussed below. While it would be usefulto establish the scope of such reporting early on, a decision regarding its exact formand content could, if necessary, be deferred until the first meeting of states parties toconsider implementation of the Treaty (providing that this meeting was held soonafter the Treaty entered into force, see section 4.2.1 below). Thereafter, agreementamongst states parties on these issues should be clearly set out in an Annex to the
6 MAKING IT WORK: MONITORING AND VERIFYING IMPLEMENTATION OF AN ARMS TRADE TREATYTreaty, along with reporting templates that would assist states in meeting their reportingobligations under an ATT. It will be important, however, for subsequent meetingsof states parties to retain the capability to make further improvements to the reportingsystem. Ultimately, the report that each state provides should also be the basis for anannual public report on national implementation of an ATT (see Section 3.3 below).3.1.1 Reporting oninternational armstransfersStates will not be in a position to show that they are in full compliance with theirobligations under an ATT unless they provide full and accurate information concerningthose international arms transfer activities that fall within the scope of the Treaty.It will thus be important for an ATT to include clear commitments on the provision ofnational reporting on international arms transfers.Reporting on international transfers of controlled commodities has taken place undera number of arms control and non-proliferation regimes, including those aimed atcurtailing the proliferation of conventional arms 6 as well as weapons of massdestruction. 7 However, the experience that is of greatest relevance to an ATT is foundwithin the context of international arms transfer control regimes (such as theWassenaar Arrangement, EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports and several OSCEmechanisms) and the UN Register of Conventional Arms, all of which includecommitments to some form of reporting on conventional arms transfers.The scope of reporting on international arms transfersWithin the aforementioned regimes, the exact form and substance of reportingobligations vary significantly. Under the Wassenaar Arrangement, for example, statesparties exchange information on deliveries of conventional arms to non-members; theEU Code, on the other hand involves the exchange of information on all types ofinternational arms transfers including exports, brokered transactions and transitlicences granted to all states, including member states; while under the OSCEDocument on Small Arms states are supposed to disclose information on SALWexports to and imports from other OSCE members. Finally, the UN Register ofConventional Arms – as yet the only global mechanism for reporting on internationalarms transfers – includes information submitted by states on their exports andimports of conventional weapons. 8Were all 193 states to participate in an ATT it might be argued that reporting onimports as well as exports of arms would be unnecessary. However, addressing bothaspects could serve as an important means for cross-checking the data, thereby assistingin the verification of compliance. 9 Indeed, the possibility should also be consideredof tasking a Treaty Institution with reviewing the data on international arms transfersthat is provided by states parties in order to identify any discrepancies. This wouldenable those matters of a procedural nature to be identified and acknowledged 10 whilealso freeing up time and resources for any more substantive problems to be addressed.Such a data review process would represent an important means of monitoringcompliance with Treaty obligations, thereby helping to build confidence in theeffective functioning of an ATT (See Section 4.1 below).6 See, for example, the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and 1997 Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention. TheCFE Treaty remains in force despite the recent decision by Russia to suspend its participation. However, in practical terms, arange of inspections and transparency measures intended to bolster mutual military trust will be suspended.7 See, for example, the reporting requirements under the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).8 The UN Register has been cited by several states as a possible basis for ATT information exchange provisions. See The GlobalArms Trade Treaty: What States Want pp 36–37 and Analysis of States’ Views on an Arms Trade Treaty p 13.9 Aside from the UN Register on Conventional Arms, which records data on exports and imports of arms, similar practices canbe found elsewhere. For example, under the 1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES),detection of possible illegal trade in endangered species is undertaken, in part, by identifying discrepancies betweenreported imports and exports. See ‘Verification mechanisms in CITES’, Rosalind Reeve, Verification Yearbook 2001, Vertic,London, 2001.10 Differences in reporting on the part of states that are involved in the transfer of arms may arise owing to procedural ortemporal issues. For example, a transfer may be reported as an export by one state within the context of one reportingperiod but may not be reported upon as an import by the recipient state until the next.
Page 1 and 2: REPORTMaking it work:Monitoring and
Page 3 and 4: AcknowledgementsThis report was wri
Page 5 and 6: ForewordIN RECENT YEARS there has b
Page 7 and 8: ivMAKING IT WORK: MONITORING AND VE
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Page 16 and 17: SAFERWORLD 7Ultimately, however, it
Page 18 and 19: SAFERWORLD 9ConclusionIn order for
Page 20 and 21: SAFERWORLD 11mechanism to facilitat
Page 22 and 23: SAFERWORLD 13participated three or
Page 24 and 25: SAFERWORLD 15■agreements with sta
Page 26 and 27: SAFERWORLD 17■ Regular meetings o
Page 28 and 29: SAFERWORLD 19While the experience o
Page 30 and 31: SAFERWORLD 21General; the state par
Page 32 and 33: SAFERWORLD 23emissions target. The
Page 34 and 35: SAFERWORLD 25providing a definitive
Page 36 and 37: SAFERWORLD 27under the Treaty. Howe
Page 38 and 39: ANNEX 1: UN Register of Conventiona

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