Making it Work - Control Arms

SAFERWORLD 23emissions target. The Enforcement Branch of the Compliance Committee determinescases of parties’ compliance with emissions targets, monitoring and reporting requirementsand eligibility to participate in the emissions trading mechanisms. TheCommittee’s procedures are triggered when it receives ‘questions of implementation’,either in reports by the ERTs, or from a party with respect to itself or from any partywith respect to another party, as long as it has corroborating information.Under CITES the Secretariat can conduct missions to parties undergoing implementationproblems in order to collate relevant information, evaluate problems and provideadvice to relevant authorities. Secretariat missions are also used to assess progresswhere implementing conditions have been set down with regard to the lifting of tradesanctions. Missions are only conducted with the approval of the state party concerned.Another type of mission involving technical experts, organised by the Secretariat andthe Standing Committee, has frequently been tasked with investigating problems concerningthe illegal trade in endangered species, particularly rhinos and tigers. Thesehave been followed by high-level political delegations that report their conclusions tothe Standing Committee and the CoP. 33ConclusionThe establishment of some form of verification measures under an ATT could play animportant part in efforts to build confidence in the effectiveness of the regime and topromote full compliance. Indeed, to this end, a number of states responding to the UNSecretary General called for the establishment of a mechanism for overseeing ATTcompliance. 34While representing a substantial commitment by states parties, provisions for incountrymonitoring and verification can help build confidence in the effective implementationof a treaty. Indeed, the experience of the CWC indicates that if suchprovisions are used early on within the lifetime of a treaty regime, and are targetedtowards resolving low-level compliance issues, then the mechanism in question ismore likely to function effectively thereafter. Confidence is increased where there arereview mechanisms that include a capacity-building function to help parties improvetheir monitoring and reporting procedures, as is the case under the UNFCCC/KyotoProtocol review process.While monitoring and verification mechanisms are typically not implemented to theoptimal extent, experience under the CFE Treaty, the CWC, CITES and the UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol suggests that such mechanisms are a valuable tool, especially as part ofa package of compliance measures. Thus, the establishment of regular monitoringefforts under an ATT could contribute to the development of an effective regime andcould conceivably include verification activities. To enhance accountability in theinternational arms transfer chain, these monitoring and verification measures couldapply not only to arms exporting and importing states but also to transit and transhipmentstates, as well as those providing a base for the operation of international armsbrokers. Such measures could include, for example, inspections of transfer licensingrecords and of procedures and records kept at exit and entry points for armsshipments. In addition to assisting in the detection of compliance problems, suchprovisions could be useful in highlighting cases whereby, for example, data retrieval,management and storage or a lack of capacity, resources or relevant expertise arepreventing states from fulfilling their obligations under the Treaty. With such informationto hand co-operative efforts could be undertaken and assistance provided so as toresolve such matters.33 Rosalind Reeve, Ibid. According to Rosalind Reeve, technical missions – the composition of which is decided by the chair ofthe Standing Committee – typically consist of one or more Secretariat staff, accompanied by experts drawn from the IUCNand TRAFFIC. Accompanied by representatives of the host government, they examine records, conduct interviews and visitrelevant sites.34 The Global Arms Trade Treaty: What States Want, Ibid p 37 and Analysis of States’ Views on an Arms Trade Treaty, pp 11–12.