Making it Work - Control Arms

SAFERWORLD 17■ Regular meetings of states parties and review conferences;■ A permanent or semi-permanent ‘executive type’ institution; and■ A role for civil society.4.2.1Meetings/conferencesof states parties andreview conferencesOne of the most fundamental requirements under any international regime is forstates parties to have the opportunity to meet regularly to discuss issues relating to theimplementation of a treaty. However, beyond the creation of a ‘talking shop’, regularmeetings or conferences of states parties often play a crucial role in overseeing compliancewith Treaty obligations. For example, under the Mine Ban Convention a Meetingof States Parties is held every year for the purpose of considering any matter regardingthe application or implementation of the Convention. Similarly, under the CWC anannual Conference of States Parties is the principal organ for overseeing implementationof the agreement. The CFE Treaty embodies a slightly different approach in thatmeetings of states parties take place twice yearly under the rubric of a Joint ConsultativeGroup (JCG). Established to promote the objectives and implementation of theTreaty, the JCG is empowered, inter alia, to address questions of Treaty compliance, towork out measures that would improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treatyregime, to standardise implementation practices, and to help resolve disputes regardingimplementation. However, any matter falling within the scope of the Treaty can bebrought to the attention of the JCG. In the environmental sphere, under CITES theConference of States Parties is the supreme decision-making body and meets everytwo-and-a-half years; the Conference of Parties (CoP) to the UNFCCC meetsannually, along with the Meeting of Parties (MoP) to the Kyoto Protocol.Since states parties are ultimately accountable to each other for their implementationof an agreement, meetings or conferences of states parties often serve as the primarydecision-making and ultimate adjudication body under a treaty. In this regard anumber of agreements contain provisions for states to request the convening of specialor extraordinary sessions with a view to facilitating and clarifying compliance issues.Thus, while meetings or conferences of states parties do provide an opportunity forstates parties to discuss and take decisions regarding the implementation of a treaty,they also provide a forum where states parties may take decisions regarding allegationsor specific evidence of non-compliance (see section 5.3 below).Under some international regimes, including the CWC, meetings of states parties canalso be mandated, periodically, to undertake a formal review of an agreement. Otherregimes, however, make provision for a special review conference to be held separatefrom periodic meetings or conferences of states parties. For example, under the MineBan Convention the UN Secretary General is tasked with convening a ReviewConference at intervals of not less than five years. The CFE Treaty also provides for afive-yearly Review Conference, while a Treaty Amendment Conference can also beheld if requested by three or more states parties.In terms of an ATT, provision for an Annual Conference or Meeting of States Partieswould seem a minimum requirement in order to consider technical and proceduralchanges in operating practice; for example, in relation to the provision of informationon international arms transfers or on the operation of verification mechanisms (as isthe case under the CWC and Mine Ban Convention). Such a Meeting could also serveas the forum within which decisions are taken concerning allegations or specificevidence of non-compliance. In addition, there should be provision for periodicreview of an ATT through a five-yearly Review Conference. These could both reviewimplementation and consider possible substantive amendments to the Treaty; in thisregard, the need for some form of follow-up or review mechanism was supported by anumber of states in their submissions to the UN Secretary General. 2525 The Global Arms Trade Treaty: What States Want, p 37 and Analysis of States’ Views on an Arms Trade Treaty, pp 12–13.