Where Now for European Social Democracy? - Policy Network

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MARISOL TOURAINE 97that everyone could expect to benefit in the same proportion from thesystem. This is no longer the case, and the impression that there areprofiteers, even if it is without statistical foundation, illustrates amarked decoupling between expectations of the Welfare State, andthe benefit that one subjectively receives.The need for collective regulationFor all the above-mentioned reasons, the social compromise set up atthe close of the Second World War is in crisis. Even if this itself affectsdifferent European countries in a variety of ways, the questions ofthe legitimacy of welfare, of its efficiency and its cost are posedeverywhere. Before considering the paths to a new social compromise,it would be useful to step back from this for a moment and recap.The dysfunctionalism of the state is explained in a large measureby the emergence of an increasingly more individualistic society. Thediverse paths followed by professionals today are part of our desiresand aspirations, and our wish to be understood for what we are. Theopening up of developed economies and the acceleration ofglobalization have prompted liberals to point to the end of the WelfareState and call for a return to private insurance for businesses andfamilies. Employers have analysed the concept of welfare as anunnatural creation unique to the post-war years, which must now bediscarded. Under the cover of the rhetoric of individual responsibility,employers are trying to limit social protection in the name of keepingthe freedom to innovate. Their remedy for the French Welfare State isminimal state protection, complemented by private insurance.This analysis is both erroneous and dangerous. It is erroneousbecause it is based on the false hypothesis that individuals take morerisks when they have less protection to fall back on. It is dangerousbecause it aims to permanently institutionalise a large category ofsocially excluded people, who would have to be contented withminimal protection. The democratic cost – national cohesion – and thematerial cost – civil insecurity – would be heavy. The state is and mustremain the central actor of social regulation, particularly because it isthe guarantor of the general security of society. The major role of the
98WHERE NOW FOR EUROPEAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY?state does not mean that it should be the sole actor, or even theprincipal force behind social policy.Conversely, an augmentation of existing social protection withoutlooking at its foundations is no gauge of efficiency. A part of the Leftfinds itself paradoxically in the position of defending the status quo,as if the extension of existing benefits could protect the populationfrom the new risks we are encountering. When it comes to pensions,health insurance, or unemployment, an increase in social spending isnot enough in itself to provide better social guarantees. Moreover, thisapproach places statutes over people. The perverse effects of thisprotection linked principally to employment are well known: the losersin the system pay for the protection of the winners.Five principles for a new social compromiseThe task is heavy, but is quite simple to spell out: how can we definea social pact which ensures collective guarantees in an age of mobility,individualism and of diversification of risk? This article proposes fivemain principles:First principle: distinguish the risks. The diversification of risksdoes not mean that they should all be treated with the samemechanisms. Since the 1970s, Giddens and Beck, along with others, 5have pointed to the appearance of new risks: medical, ecological andindustrial ... These do not tally with classic social risks. Some haveread this analysis as a diversionary tactic, which marginalises socialrisks by identifying risks as a whole.We have the tendency to underestimate the role of these new risksin the feeling of insecurity which is growing in our societies. This doesnot mean that we should treat all risks identically. It seems essentialthat structures of public prevention should be put in place against thenew risks, which could be arranged thorough mutual funds run by thesectors concerned, such as polluting industries or the pharmaceuticalindustry. Only social risks should be the concern of the social state.Second principle: differentiate forms of protection to ensure thecontinuity of rights. Since professional careers are so diverse, theconsideration of individual circumstances and particular life-courses is
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Where Now forEuropeanSocial Democra
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Published in 2004 by Policy Network
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AcknowledgementsThis collection of
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Notes on the ContributorsTony Blair
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PrefaceTONY BLAIRI welcome this pub
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6WHERE NOW FOR EUROPEAN SOCIAL DEMO
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What is a just society?For a radica
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GrowthandProsperity
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