Where Now for European Social Democracy? - Policy Network

58WHERE NOW FOR EUROPEAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY?political programme. However, 11 of the 15 Heads of Government whoagreed it were of the Left. When the European Council meets inDublin, in a month’s time, to review progress in implementing theLisbon strategy, only three of those centre-left leaders will still bepresent: Blair, Persson and Schröder. Lisbon nevertheless has gainedthe status of the economic reform benchmark. It still represents themost comprehensive attempt to devise a governing programme foreconomic and social modernisation in Europe.As a programme of reform, Lisbon has so far brought limitedresults. The European Commission’s report to this year’s Spring Councilwarns of “still much to do” and “major problems which need to betackled urgently” 1 . However, my argument is that Lisbon representsmore than a ‘what matters is what works’ consensus among policymakers. Rather it has real potential as a distinctive model of politicaleconomy for the progressive left. For social democrats, our failure tograsp Lisbon represents a great missed opportunity. We should useLisbon to modernise domestic party programmes, as a point ofideological differentiation with the Right and to demonstrate thepotential of the European project to achieve social democratic goalsthat are no longer within reach of nation states alone.Why Lisbon is right on economic reformSome on the Left take issue with the premise on which Lisbon isbased: that the European model of social market capitalism facesfundamental challenges. Caution about the evidential basis forEuropessimism is certainly justified. The impact of the shock ofGerman unification on the core of the European economy has beenprolonged, but in terms of international competitiveness, Germany isvery far from being the ‘basket case’ of Eurosceptic myth. Statisticalcomparisons between EU and US performance can be simplistic. HigherUS growth rates in part reflect an expanding workforce: USperformance is less impressive by comparison with Europe on a percapita basis. Similarly, higher US productivity growth is in part theresult of longer hours worked; and, arguably, most Europeans, otherthan the British, have a perfectly reasonable preference for leisure.