Are China's Financial Reforms Leaving the Poor Behind - Harvard ...

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Specification (2) includes dummy variable for bank type only.42
Table 9Governance by Income QuartilesGovernance in 1997 Change in Governance, 1994-1997Income QuartilesIncome QuartilesVariable I II III IV I II III IVLoan9.64 0.83 1.82 0.93 5.00 0.31 -0.83 -1.21AuthorizationBonus Incentive 0.56 0.48 0.47 0.63 * * -.09 0.34Collateral 49.6 53.1 62.3 38.7 33.2 31.1 16.1 7.2Gov’t Pressure 3.71 3.58 3.88 3.45 1.2 1.1 1.5 0.28Rep. Require. 0 -.6 -.1 0Time to End 4.71 4.35 5.49 1.98 * * * *Lawsuit (months)Number of Obs 14 24 26 20Notes: Loan authorization limits are reported in 10,000 RMB. Bonus incentives measure the exantebonus in event of target fulfillment as a percentage of the base wage. Collateral is thepercentage of loans to TVEs secured with collateral. Government pressure is measured on adecreasing scale from 1-6.Table 10Governance and Non-Performing Loans in Township BranchesChange in Non-Performing LoansNon-PerformingLoans in 1997Income, 1994 -0.102(-2.70)-0.128(-3.28)-0.127(-3.76)-0.120(-4.92)Income 1997 -0.102(-5.05-0.111(-5.82)-0.110(-5.66)-0.105(-4.55)Loan Authorization,1994-0.001(-0.21)-0.008(-1.49)-0.014(-2.39)Loan Authorization,1997-0.001(-0.41)-0.016(-1.78)-0.012(-2.24)Bonus Incentive,1997-0.080(-1.46)-0.112(-2.02)-0.063(-0.98)Authorization*Bonus 0.041(1.85)Loans w/ Collateral,1997-0.002(-2.70)-0.002(-2.57)-0.002(-2.16)Gov’t Intervention,1994-0.024(-1.54)-0.044(-2.96)-0.040(-2.85)Gov’t Intervention,1997-0.029(-2.01)-0.032(-2.16)-0.022(-1.37)Rep. Requirements,1994-0.077(-2.77)-0.090(-3.27)Rep. Requirements,1997-0.051(-0.89)Time to End Lawsuit 0.010(2.69)0.010(2.97)0.010(3.20)Non-PerformingLoans, 1994-0.485(-3.06)Number of Obs. 59 59 46 46 84 84 5743
Page 2 and 3: Draft August 2001Are China’s Fina
Page 6: analyze changes in the degree of fi
Page 10 and 11: which is of great interest to those
Page 12 and 13: deposits of surplus funds in higher
Page 14 and 15: time. This is not to say that house
Page 16 and 17: We find that from 1994 to 1997 the
Page 18 and 19: survey found an average overdue rat
Page 20 and 21: different provinces, both conducted
Page 22 and 23: of banks to provide new loans. The
Page 24 and 25: We also examine the components of i
Page 26 and 27: decisions that increase branch prof
Page 28 and 29: anches. Note that our sample size d
Page 30 and 31: What are then the implications of o
Page 32: greater scope for reforms that can
Page 35 and 36: Naughton, Barry. 1995. Growing Out
Page 37 and 38: Table 2Financial Intermediation Ind
Page 39 and 40: Table 4Loan-Deposit Ratios, 1994 an
Page 41: Table 7Decomposition of Changes in
Page 45 and 46: Table 11Changes in Governance betwe

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