Are China's Financial Reforms Leaving the Poor Behind - Harvard ...

Table 9Governance by Income QuartilesGovernance in 1997 Change in Governance, 1994-1997Income QuartilesIncome QuartilesVariable I II III IV I II III IVLoan9.64 0.83 1.82 0.93 5.00 0.31 -0.83 -1.21AuthorizationBonus Incentive 0.56 0.48 0.47 0.63 * * -.09 0.34Collateral 49.6 53.1 62.3 38.7 33.2 31.1 16.1 7.2Gov’t Pressure 3.71 3.58 3.88 3.45 1.2 1.1 1.5 0.28Rep. Require. 0 -.6 -.1 0Time to End 4.71 4.35 5.49 1.98 * * * *Lawsuit (months)Number of Obs 14 24 26 20Notes: Loan authorization limits are reported in 10,000 RMB. Bonus incentives measure the exantebonus in event of target fulfillment as a percentage of the base wage. Collateral is thepercentage of loans to TVEs secured with collateral. Government pressure is measured on adecreasing scale from 1-6.Table 10Governance and Non-Performing Loans in Township BranchesChange in Non-Performing LoansNon-PerformingLoans in 1997Income, 1994 -0.102(-2.70)-0.128(-3.28)-0.127(-3.76)-0.120(-4.92)Income 1997 -0.102(-5.05-0.111(-5.82)-0.110(-5.66)-0.105(-4.55)Loan Authorization,1994-0.001(-0.21)-0.008(-1.49)-0.014(-2.39)Loan Authorization,1997-0.001(-0.41)-0.016(-1.78)-0.012(-2.24)Bonus Incentive,1997-0.080(-1.46)-0.112(-2.02)-0.063(-0.98)Authorization*Bonus 0.041(1.85)Loans w/ Collateral,1997-0.002(-2.70)-0.002(-2.57)-0.002(-2.16)Gov’t Intervention,1994-0.024(-1.54)-0.044(-2.96)-0.040(-2.85)Gov’t Intervention,1997-0.029(-2.01)-0.032(-2.16)-0.022(-1.37)Rep. Requirements,1994-0.077(-2.77)-0.090(-3.27)Rep. Requirements,1997-0.051(-0.89)Time to End Lawsuit 0.010(2.69)0.010(2.97)0.010(3.20)Non-PerformingLoans, 1994-0.485(-3.06)Number of Obs. 59 59 46 46 84 84 5743