THE UNIVERSITY OF LEIPZIG
THE UNIVERSITY OF LEIPZIG
THE UNIVERSITY OF LEIPZIG
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INSTITUTIONAL DILEMMAS IN TROPICAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT<br />
A CASE STUDY <strong>OF</strong> KAKAMEGA FOREST, KENYA<br />
Der Fakultät für Geschichte, Kunst- und Orientwissenschaften<br />
der Universität Leipzig<br />
eingereichte<br />
DISSERTATION<br />
zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades<br />
DOCTOR PHILOSOPHIAE<br />
(Dr. phil.)<br />
vorgelegt<br />
von FREDRICK KISEKKA–NTALE<br />
geboren am 27. Juli 1976 in Mengo, Uganda<br />
Gutachter: Prof. Dr. Ulf Engel<br />
Prof. Dr. Robert Kappel<br />
Prof. Dr. Siegmar Schmidt<br />
Tag der Verteidgung: den 22. Januar 2008
Abstract<br />
The study examines the institutional dilemmas in the management of tropical resources.<br />
Specifically, this study is interested in forest biodiversity as the resource in question. The<br />
main objective of this study is to establish and ascertain whether there are conflicting notions<br />
of biodiversity in Kenya and if there are, we are interested in finding out how such conflicting<br />
positions are institutionalised. In pursuit of the above objective, the study uses a case study of<br />
Kakamega forest.<br />
The study primarily used institutional mapping methods in generating and collecting data at<br />
the national and regional and local levels. The findings reveal that forest biodiversity in a<br />
tropical country like Kenya is associated with a number of benefits and these are central in the<br />
framing and/or shaping of the institutions at both the national, regional and local levels.<br />
Because these are structurally different, in most cases they represent the cause of institutional<br />
conflict. What is most intriguing however, is that the Kakamega scenario demonstrates that<br />
one of the biggest challenges in the management of tropical resources lies in the absence of<br />
institutional mediation mechanisms at both national/regional and local levels. The analysis<br />
from this study has revealed that this is the central cause of institutional dysfunctioning in<br />
tropical resource management. This also illuminates the dilemmas that bedevil many natural<br />
resource rich countries especially in the tropics.<br />
In that regard, institutional options especially those targeting forest biodiversity management<br />
should be locally adapted and therefore centrally/regionally mediated, because of the role<br />
local forest resources play in the lives of local communities around the forest. In the same<br />
respect institutionalised participation and mediation in the decision-making/taking is a<br />
necessary prerequisite.<br />
II
Dedication<br />
This work is dedicated it to my dear Mother. Your advice has been a great inspiration to me.<br />
III
Table of Contents<br />
LIST <strong>OF</strong> ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................................................. VI<br />
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ................................................................................................................................VIII<br />
1 INTRODUCTION, BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM STATEMENT ................................................. 1<br />
1.1 INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................................................................... 1<br />
1.2 INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT <strong>OF</strong> INSTITUTIONALISM, BIODIVERSITY AND RESOURCE CONSERVATION ........ 3<br />
1.3 A BRIEF OVERVIEW ABOUT KENYA........................................................................................................... 5<br />
1.4 PROBLEM STATEMENT............................................................................................................................ 12<br />
1.5 OBJECTIVES <strong>OF</strong> STUDY.......................................................................................................................... 13<br />
1.6 DEFINITION <strong>OF</strong> CENTRAL CONCEPTS ...................................................................................................... 14<br />
1.7 BIODIVERSITY: AN INSIGHT INTO <strong>THE</strong> CONTEMPORARY DEBATES AND NOTIONS................................. 16<br />
1.8 METHODOLOGY....................................................................................................................................... 25<br />
1.9 ORGANISATION <strong>OF</strong> <strong>THE</strong> STUDY............................................................................................................... 29<br />
2 <strong>THE</strong>ORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS.................................................................................................... 31<br />
2.1 INSTITUTIONS AND INSTITUTIONALISM .................................................................................................... 31<br />
2.2 INSTITUTIONS DEFINED........................................................................................................................... 31<br />
2.3 UNPACKING INSTITUTIONALISM .............................................................................................................. 35<br />
3 PERCEIVING BIODIVERSITY AND NATURAL RESOURCE REGIMES IN KENYA .................. 52<br />
3.1 BIODIVERSITY AS NARURAL RESOURCE CAPITAL........................................................................... 52<br />
3.2 AN ANALYSIS <strong>OF</strong> NATIONAL RESOURCES REGIMES IN KENYA.............................................................. 60<br />
3.3 BIODIVERSITY GOVERNANCE: BETWEEN RESTORATION AND PRESERVATION ..................................... 61<br />
3.4 RESOURCE ACTORS, AND LOCAL PERSPECTIVES ON BIODIVERSITY IN KENYA ..................................... 68<br />
4 BIODIVERSITY, LOCAL DECENTRALISATION AND <strong>THE</strong> POLITICS <strong>OF</strong> NEO-<br />
PATRIMONIALISM IN KENYA................................................................................................................... 73<br />
4.1 BIODIVERSITY AND <strong>THE</strong> POLITICS <strong>OF</strong> NEO-PATRIMONIALISM IN KENYA................................................. 73<br />
4.2 INSTITUTIONALISM, LOCAL DECENTRALISATION AND BIODIVERSITY RESOURCE USAGE IN KAKAMEGA .81<br />
4.3 INSTITUTIONALISM AND BIOETHICS IN BIODIVERSITY RESOURCES MANAGEMENT ............................... 87<br />
4.4 MAPPING AN INSTITUTIONALIST, SOCIAL COGNITIVE-DIMENSION FOR BIODIVERSITY MANAGEMENT IN<br />
KENYA ..................................................................................................................................................... 92<br />
5 NATIONAL AND SUB-NATIONAL LEVEL MAPPING...................................................................... 98<br />
5.1 INSTITUTIONAL MAPPING <strong>OF</strong> <strong>THE</strong> BIODIVERSITY SECTOR IN KENYA ..................................................... 98<br />
5.2 BIODIVERSITY IN <strong>THE</strong> KENYAN CONSTITUTION..................................................................................... 100<br />
5.3 <strong>THE</strong> OWNERSHIP AND USAGE <strong>OF</strong> BIODIVERSITY IN <strong>THE</strong> KENYAN CONTEXT....................................... 102<br />
5.4 EVOLUTION <strong>OF</strong> LEGAL REGIMES AND LEGAL REFORMS RELATING TO BIODIVERSITY........................ 106<br />
5.5 CURRENT LEGAL AND POLICY REGIMES IN CONSERVATION <strong>OF</strong> BIODIVERSITY .................................. 110<br />
5.6 FORMAL RULE DESIGN AND MEDIATION: BETWEEN <strong>THE</strong> NATIONAL AND LOCAL INTERESTS ............. 119<br />
5.7 <strong>THE</strong> ROLE <strong>OF</strong> INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS IN BIODIVERSITY RESTORATION IN KENYA ...................... 121<br />
5.8 BIODIVERSITY AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS IN KENYA: A SHIFT TOWARDS A DEMAND<br />
RESPONSIVE APPROACH?............................................................................................................... 124<br />
6 INSTITUTIONAL MAPPING AT <strong>THE</strong> LOCAL LEVEL..................................................................... 126<br />
6.1 SAMPLE SIZE DETERMINATION AND IDENTIFICATION <strong>OF</strong> CLUSTERS .................................................... 126<br />
6.2 LOCAL PERCEPTIONS <strong>OF</strong> BIODIVERSITY IN KAKAMEGA........................................................................ 130<br />
6.3 GEOGRAPHY AND CLIMATE <strong>OF</strong> KAKAMEGA DISTRICT AND WESTERN KENYA ..................................... 136<br />
6.4 BIODIVERSITY AND RESOURCE USAGE IN KAKAMEGA FOREST .......................................................... 138<br />
6.5 <strong>THE</strong> PEOPLE <strong>OF</strong> KAKAMEGA ................................................................................................................. 140<br />
6.6 LOCAL INSTITUTIONS AND FARMING SYSTEMS IN KAKAMEGA DISTRICT ............................................. 144<br />
6.7 LOCAL KNOWLEDGE AND BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION: <strong>THE</strong> INTERFACE............................................ 150<br />
7 HISTORICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL INSTITUTIONS IN KAKAMEGA DISTRICT.................... 155<br />
7.1 INSTITUTIONALISM AND CUSTOMARY LAW ........................................................................................... 155<br />
7.2 LOCAL ECOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE AND LOCAL PERCEPTION <strong>OF</strong> NATIONAL BIODIVERSITY LAWS........ 161<br />
7.3 FOREST BIODIVERSITY AND CULTURAL HERITAGE IN KAKAMEGA ........................................................ 164<br />
IV
7.4 COLLECTIVE COMMUNITY ACTION AND BIODIVERSITY IN KAKAMEGA................................................... 169<br />
7.5 BIODIVERSITY AND PROPERTY RIGHTS IN KAKAMEGA.......................................................................... 171<br />
8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ...................................................................................................... 177<br />
8.1 RECAP <strong>OF</strong> FINDINGS: LINKING RESEARCH QUESTIONS TO STUDY FINDINGS ....................................... 177<br />
8.2 TOWARDS INSTITUTIONALISED PARTICIPATION AND LOCAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE IN KAKAMEGA 182<br />
8.3 RE-VISITING AND RE-CONCEPTUALIZING INSTITUTIONALISM AND PARTICIPATION IN KAKAMEGA ...... 184<br />
8.4 INSTITUTIONALISM AND PARTICIPATION IN KAKAMEGA: AN OUT LOOK TO FUTURE............................. 188<br />
8.5 SUMMARY.............................................................................................................................................. 197<br />
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................................................. 201<br />
LIST <strong>OF</strong> TABLES ............................................................................................................................................ 222<br />
LIST <strong>OF</strong> FIGURES AND MAPS .................................................................................................................... 223<br />
APPENDICES................................................................................................................................................... 224<br />
CURRICULUM VITAE..................................................................................................................................... 240<br />
VERSICHERUNG ............................................................................................................................................ 241<br />
V
List of Abbreviations<br />
ATC Africa Technology Centre<br />
ABSM Access Benefiting and Sharing Mechanism<br />
BPC Bio Prospecting Contracts<br />
CBD Convention for Biological Biodiversity<br />
CBS Central Bureau of Statistics<br />
CITES Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species<br />
COP Conference of Parties<br />
DFID Department For International Development<br />
EA East Africa<br />
EAC East Africa Community<br />
EMCA Environmental Management and Co-ordination Act<br />
FAO Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations<br />
FD Forest Department<br />
FRM Forest Reserve Management<br />
FS Forest Services<br />
GDP Gross Domestic Product<br />
GEF Global Environmental Facility<br />
GTZ German Technical Service<br />
GOK Government of Kenya<br />
G8 Group of Eight<br />
IMF International Monetary Fund<br />
INRS Integrated Natural Resource Society<br />
IUCN World Conservation Union<br />
INCRAF International Centre For Research In Agro forestry<br />
IPR Intellectual Property Rights<br />
KANU Kenya African National Union<br />
KENRIK Kenyan Resource Centre for Indigenous Knowledge<br />
KI Key Informant Interview<br />
KFS Kenya Forestry Society<br />
KM Kilometre<br />
KWS Kenya Wildlife Services<br />
LVEMP Lake Victoria Environmental Management Project<br />
LR Licensing Regimes<br />
MNC Multi National Corporation<br />
MOU Memorandum of Understanding<br />
MTA Multilateral Trading Agreement<br />
NBI Nile Basin Initiative<br />
NEAP National Environmental Action Plan<br />
NEMA National Environmental Management Authority<br />
NEMP National Environmental Management Policy<br />
NES National Environmental Services<br />
NASSEP National Sample Survey Evaluation Programme<br />
NGO Non Governmental Organization<br />
NMK National Museums of Kenya<br />
NSAP National Biodiversity Action Plan<br />
OAU Organisation of African Unity<br />
PSP Principle Sampling Point<br />
RCI Rational Choice Institutionalism<br />
RSA Republic of South Africa<br />
SOP Standard Operation Procedures<br />
VI
UNDP United Nations Development Programme<br />
UNEP United Nations Environmental Programme<br />
UNECD United Nations Conference on Climate and Development<br />
WAC World Agro Forestry Centre<br />
WWF World Wildlife Fund<br />
VII
Acknowledgement<br />
Accomplishing a task of this magnitude is no mean feat. This work is a product of<br />
cooperation, guidance and support of many partners, institutions and individuals. I therefore<br />
take the opportunity to thank all those who facilitated the eventual completion of this<br />
assignment. To begin with, my work benefited from the wisdom and advice of many<br />
distinguished scholars. I am particularly indebted to my immediate advisor, Prof. Dr. Ulf<br />
Engel of the Institute of African Studies, University of Leipzig. I drank deep, from his wealth<br />
of knowledge. I was also a beneficiary of his unfettering support and advice. His steady<br />
supervision enabled me accomplish the task in record time. (You are the kind of supervisor<br />
any student should love to have). I am equally glad to have been guided by Prof. Dr. Robert<br />
Kappel of the German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA), and Dr. Ute Reitdorf of<br />
the SEPT programme, University of Leipzig. In the same regard, I am grateful to the<br />
assistance rendered to me by Mr. Abdilatif Abdalla whose interest and insight in this work<br />
was such a motivation on my part. Most specifically, I thank him for having accepted to proof<br />
read my original manuscript. I am deeply thankful to the spirit of comradeship that I received<br />
from other members of the Institute of African Studies, particularly, Ms Monika Große for<br />
making my working at the institute comfortable and Prof. Dr. A. Jones, Prof. Dr. E. Wolf, Dr.<br />
A. Agwana. All of you in your respective capacities, made my stay at the Institute exciting<br />
and memorable.<br />
I was able to undertake my PhD studies in Germany because of the financial assistance<br />
rendered to me by the Catholic Academic Exchange Service (KAAD). Specifically, I am<br />
grateful to Dr.Thomas Scheidtweiler and Ms Simone Saure of the Africa Department, for their<br />
varied support. Similarly, I am glad to have taken part in the BIOTA programme funded by<br />
the German Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF). My stay in Germany enabled me to<br />
make numerous friends. I am grateful and thankful to C. Bruno, S. Khulmann, K. Grabs, K.<br />
Guhr, M. Nambula, J. Mullei, C, Muma, J. Kuhlmann, H, Kinya J.Tsuwi, and V, Nanga. The<br />
support you rendered to me will forever be treasured.<br />
I must also mention this work was a product of field research done in Kenya. While in Kenya,<br />
I benefited from the cooperation and assistance of many individuals and institutions such as<br />
the Kenya Wildlife Services, National Museums of Kenya, Ministries of Agriculture,<br />
Environment and Natural Resources, the Forest Services, National Environmental<br />
Management Authority and INCRAF among others. I also visited many other organisations<br />
that agreed to take part in field study and I am grateful to all of them. In the same spirit I am<br />
also thankful to the Key informants at Kakamega District and the Western Kenya Provincial<br />
Administration. To my field Research Assistants M. Barasa, N. Alwodi, G. Anyango and M.<br />
Adongo, I am thankful.<br />
Lastly, I am also greateful to my family for having been patient for all this time. I am<br />
eternally indebted to you for your encouragement and support. To you all, I say; Mwebale nyo<br />
mwebalire ddala!<br />
VIII
1 Introduction<br />
1.1 Introduction<br />
Kenya is currently facing a biodiversity crisis and the country’s environmental management<br />
body, the National Environmental Management Authority (NEMA), has embarked on every<br />
effort to arrest the declining levels of biodiversity resources. 1 Currently, many forests are<br />
under threat, not to mention Kakamega and Mountain Kenya forests. There is a great loss of<br />
biodiversity especially in forests where people are using land for settlement and agriculture or<br />
other activities. Increased interest in the restoration of national biodiversity in Kenya, is<br />
among other factors driven by global calls for linking development to environmental<br />
conservation. 2 This is based on the fact that the environment plays a significant role in<br />
development. It is imperative to note that; biodiversity is the leading resource in most of the<br />
tropical and agrarian countries. 3 The value of biodiversity to mankind needs no recount.<br />
However, there are numerous factors such as the existence of incompatible institutions that<br />
curtail the attainment of desired conservation and development goals. Kenya is one of the 170<br />
key parties which ratified the 1992 Rio de Janeiro Treaty. The parties set 2010 as the year in<br />
which loss of biodiversity will be significantly reduced. This success however depends on<br />
how effective such parties will be in their endeavours to protect biodiversity spots such as<br />
forests, where most of the fauna and flora is found. 4<br />
The central proposition of this study is that, the existence of different and parallel forms of<br />
institutions as well as different forms of land use practices in Kakamega, clearly impact on the<br />
current and future forest/biodiversity conservation efforts. The central research question of<br />
this study is; what constitutes locally relevant biodiversity notions in Kakamega vis-à-vis the<br />
national regimes and how are such perceptions institutionalised and mediated? This study is<br />
grounded in institutional theory because of the significant role institutions play in regulating<br />
natural resource usage and control. These institutions act as instruments of control, by<br />
regulating and prescribing behaviour patterns in respect to common resources. 5<br />
It is imperative to note that if well examined and analyzed, institutions form a firm foundation<br />
for promoting participation and indirectly enhancing sustainable management of forest<br />
biodiversity. 6 Institutions are analyzed at the national, sub-national and local levels in order<br />
1 NEMA. 2001. Biodiversity for All. Nairobi:Government Printer.<br />
2 Mwenya, A.N. 1993. Redefining Conservation in African Terms. In voices From Africa: Local Perspectives on<br />
Conservation, edited by D. Lewis and and N. Carter. Nairobi: World Wildlife Fund.<br />
3 Carswell, G. 2001. Environmental Threats and Opportunities Assessment for Uganda: Biodiversity<br />
Report. Washington, D.C: USAID.<br />
4 Kevin .M and G.A, Schreiber. 1991. Revising the Spiral: The Population, Agriculture and Environment Nexus<br />
in Sub-Saharan Africa. Washington D.C: The World Bank Publications.<br />
5 Nuitjen. M. 1992. Local Organization as Organising Practices: Rethinking Rural Institutions. In The<br />
interlocking of Theory and Practice in Social Research and Development: Battle fields of Knowledge, edited<br />
by Long .N and A. Long , 189-207. London: Routledge.<br />
6 Solomon, M. 2003. Traditional Lifestyles and Biodiversity Use Regional Report: Pacific, Composite Report on<br />
the Status and Trends Regarding the Knowledge, Innovations and Practices of indigenous and Local<br />
Communities. Prepared for the Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Montreal.<br />
1
to illustrate the current dilemmas that characterize Kenya’s forestry resources management. It<br />
is worth noting that conflicts between traditional norms, behaviours, perceptions, values and<br />
state thinking regarding forest biodiversity conservation are very discernible in Kakamega.<br />
There is need to mitigate the state-society thinking in order to have a successful forest<br />
resource conservation regime.<br />
The country is in a process of revising all its legal frameworks relating to biodiversity, as a<br />
measure to arrest the situation by 2010. In the interest of this study, we ask; with only three<br />
years to 2010, to what extent have such efforts been implemented? Will the revised acts work<br />
to undo the existing mismatch in the current legal frameworks governing biodiversity in the<br />
country? We ought to mention that any efforts to reverse further degradation of biodiversity<br />
in Kenya, should be able to reconcile community social and economic needs through<br />
development of holistic and well reaching institutions for ensuring sustainable land use<br />
activities.<br />
In Kenya, most of the legal rules were formulated on the basis of neo-classical models which<br />
sometimes fail to recognize the crucial actors during the framing of rights at different levels.<br />
Some times the rights’ holders may not be the best people to protect the resources which they<br />
have been entrusted to protect. 7 Currently there are efforts geared towards enlisting local<br />
community involvement in appreciation of biodiversity in Kenya, but efforts in studying the<br />
institutionalisation of community perceptions regarding biodiversity are still limited. There<br />
exist complex local institutions which are unsupported by existing formal institutional<br />
frameworks. These institutional frameworks sometimes fail to reconcile community attributes<br />
related to biodiversity. The transfer of authority over common resources from the realm of<br />
communal rules to individuals and states created conditions for overexploitation due to the<br />
sweeping aside of traditional structures that regulate use. 8<br />
The 1992 Rio conference established a new agenda regarding the control of biological<br />
resources. It has attracted cooperation among different states in an attempt to prevent further<br />
destruction. This has become a subject of common concern over the decades. Management of<br />
biodiversity can be accomplished through either in-situ or ex -situ measures. Of the two, insitu<br />
conservation remains most common. However, one important component of in-situ<br />
management is the biocultural knowledge, comprising of traditional knowledge which resides<br />
in traditional groups. This traditional knowledge used by the local and indigenous<br />
communities to preserve and conserve biological resources, is less utilized and less<br />
documented. 9 The purview of biodiversity within a broader context has yielded the need to<br />
reformulate institutions and systems that can take into account multiple users and actors. it<br />
was in the interest of this study to investigate how such multiple interests and multiple actors<br />
7 Pimbert, M and J. Pretty. 1995. Parks, People and Professionals: Putting Participation into Protected Area<br />
Management. UNRISD Discussion Paper No. 57. Geneva: UNRISED.<br />
8 Scott, W. R. 1995. Institutions and Organizations. Thousand Oaks: Sage.<br />
9 GOK. 2001. The East African Cross border Biodiversity. Nairobi: Government Printer.<br />
2
are mediated into the national policy and legal regimes, dealing with the usage of forestry<br />
biodiversity as a resource.<br />
Generally speaking, resources in Kenyan traditional societies are used according to set<br />
communal rules. These emphasize elements of sustainability and preservation for the future<br />
generation. Collective arrangement, decision and guiding principles are usually made at the<br />
communal level to regulate access and use of such resources. The organization of the<br />
community revolves around parties linked to each other by kinship or reciprocation. 10 The<br />
rights of control over resources are vested in the political authority of the community and<br />
derive directly from their sovereignty over a given resource area. This rather traditional notion<br />
of resource ownership and conservation depicts a more organized and institutionalized way of<br />
natural resource management. However, with the collapse of traditional resource ownership<br />
and with the changed land tenure system, resource ownership was put under the state notion<br />
of resource management.<br />
1.2 International context of institutionalism, biodiversity and resource conservation<br />
One of the most difficult challenges that has continued to dog international resource<br />
conservation efforts over the years, has been how best to preserve and protect forest<br />
biodiversity, especially in tropical developing countries. 11 People manage most of the World’s<br />
forests, using them for domestic grazing, tree girdling and tree cutting to provide habitats and<br />
agricultural areas. Concerns in the first few centuries rotated around the shortage of wood,<br />
erosion and the dangers of forest fires. However, because of the numerous dilemmas<br />
emanating from the increased loss of the world’s biological resources, a number of<br />
international undertakings aimed at recovering from this loss have been echoed. 12 Efforts to<br />
arrest continuous depletion of renewable natural resources, particularly forests, wetlands and<br />
marine resources in Africa, have been enormous and have taken a centre stage in national and<br />
international development agendas. Biodiversity decline in many of these countries is a<br />
product of two factors, namely: the pressure of poverty and the institutional inadequacies<br />
which fail to guarantee collective learning processes in the governance of biodiversity. 13 In<br />
the same rubric, many governments in Tropical Africa are taking up measures to ensure<br />
biodiversity recovery in some of the worst cases of deterioration.<br />
Whereas there are different definitions of biodiversity, this study will define biodiversity as<br />
the summation of genes, individuals, meta and mega populations, species, ecosystems and the<br />
10 Heltberg, R. 2001. Determinants and Impacts of Institutions for Common Resource Management. Journal of<br />
Enviroment and Development Economics 6:183-208.<br />
11 Agrawal, A and J.C, Ribot. 1999. Accountability in Decentralisation: Framework with references from Asia<br />
and West African Cases. Journal of Developing Areas 33: 47-502.<br />
12 Herman, E and J.B, Cobb. 1989. From the common Good:Redirecting the Economy towards the Community,<br />
the Environment and a Sustainable Future. Boston: Beacon Press.<br />
13 Ribot . C, J. 2003. Democratic Decentralisation of Natural Resources: Institutional Choice and Discretionary<br />
Power Transfers in Sub-Saharan Africa. Washington: World Resources Institute.<br />
3
interactions between these entities. 14 Biological diversity, simply stated, is the diversity of<br />
life. Biodiversity sums up the full range of variety and variability within and among living<br />
organisms and the ecological complexes in which they occur. It also encompasses community<br />
diversity, species diversity, and genetic diversity. In studying biological diversity, we<br />
undertake to understand the variety of life and its processes; and it includes the variety of<br />
living organisms, the genetic differences among them, and the communities and ecosystems<br />
in which they occur. 15 More broadly, this entails understanding specie richness and<br />
interactions in a particular ecological zone. Bearing in mind that, in principle biodiversity is a<br />
biological issue, we ought to note that it overflows beyond the boundaries of the science<br />
world. It is increasingly drifting into the social sciences, because of the complex social and<br />
demographic factors, making this debate to take another interesting twist. One such factor is<br />
the continuing interest in understanding what shapes peoples’ interests, intentions and<br />
attributes while using forest biodiversity related resources. Therefore, in this study, it is<br />
imperative to point out that there are often diverse and conflicting values regarding resource<br />
use priorities rather than conventionally known attributes and interests. As we strive to get a<br />
clear understanding of the relationships regarding biodiversity usage in a tropical country like<br />
Kenya, it is important to note that, communities cannot be treated as static and rule bound<br />
wholes, because they actively monitor, interpret and shape the biodiversity world around them<br />
differently. 16<br />
In order to get a clear picture of the complexities involved in the biodiversity debate, it is<br />
important to focus our lenses on the multiple categories of actors, with different and often<br />
competing interests in the entire spectrum of natural resource management. We can attain this,<br />
when we critically look at regimes governing forest biodiversity at the national, sub-national<br />
and more importantly at local levels. Through this analysis, we can carefully understand how<br />
repeated actions among communities reproduce knowledge and institutions, leading to varied<br />
notions and perceptions in understanding biodiversity at these different levels. As a result,<br />
limitations regarding the concept of biodiversity do emerge. Biodiversity primarily reflects<br />
the values attributed by the scientists. It is used predominantly as a scientific concept and<br />
significantly reflects the existence of natural species. 17 On the other hand, local communities<br />
surrounding protected and unprotected natural resource areas, also assign values to the<br />
diversity of species found in a natural resource environment. However, in most cases these are<br />
social values and sometimes, such values don’t reflect direct use values since they are usually<br />
cultural and spiritual values. In response to such values, communities living around<br />
biodiversity hotspots have actively maintained biodiversity knowingly or unknowingly. 18<br />
14<br />
Leach, M and R, Mearns. 1996. The Lie of the Land: Challenging Received Wisdom on the African<br />
Environment. Oxford: James Curry.<br />
15<br />
Jensen, D.B., M. Torn, and J, Harte. 1990. In Our Own Hands: A Strategy for Conserving Biological<br />
Diversity in California. California.<br />
16<br />
Leach, M and R, Mearns. 1996. Opcit.<br />
17<br />
Pandey, S and M, Wells. 1997. Ecodevelopment planning at India’s Himalayan National Park for Biodiversity<br />
Consevation and Participatory Rural Development. Biodiversity and Conservation. 6:1277-92.<br />
18<br />
Toner, A and T, Franks. 2006. Putting livelihoods Thinking into Practice:Implications for Development and<br />
Mangement. Public Administration and Development. 26: 81-92.<br />
4
Giddens notes that linking agency and structures emphasizes how structures, rules and norms<br />
emerge as products of peoples’ practices and interactions with their environments, both<br />
intended and unintended. 19 However, such interactions and values are rarely articulated to<br />
give an insight into the social, and other related processes, underlying the varied<br />
manifestations of biodiversity in either the natural or the human influenced environments.<br />
These limitations, therefore, demonstrate the need to re-asses the conceptual meaning of<br />
biodiversity, focusing on the local peoples’ knowledge, understanding and perceptions. We<br />
also wish to investigate how such knowledge shapes informal regimes relating to biodiversity<br />
conservation. Such re-assessment is of profound relevance, since it will help us in<br />
understanding what happens when local ecological thinking and formal conservation policies<br />
meet. The foundation for this assessment lies not only in the social and biological<br />
intermarriage, but the likely variations and conflicts that may emerge and as a result warrant<br />
mediation. We ought to mention that the desired balance between human activity, national<br />
development, and environmental protection requires sharing of responsibilities, which must<br />
be equitable and clearly defined. This must be done in reference to consumption and human<br />
behaviour towards the environment and natural resources. 20 This also implies integration of<br />
local peoples’ ecological behaviours and choices into the formulation of sectoral decisions. It<br />
also manifests effective dialogue and concerted action among partners who may have<br />
differing short-term priorities and perceptions. 21 Therefore, it is in the interest of this study to<br />
establish broader perceptions of biodiversity, and locate these perceptions in Kenya’s resource<br />
management regime. The research will use Kakamega Forest, perceived to be one of the<br />
leading biodiversity hotspots in Kenya. The study will be articulated at the backdrop of the<br />
escalation of natural resources deconstruction, punctuated by varied ecological interests.<br />
1.3 A Brief overview about Kenya<br />
Kenya is one of the five countries that form the East African sub-continent, others being<br />
Tanzania and Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda. Bisected by the Equator, the total area of the<br />
Republic of Kenya is 587,900 sq km (224,081 sq. miles) of which 576,700 sq km are covered<br />
by the land surface while 11,200sq kms are covered by water excluding inland waters mostly<br />
Lake Turkana and part of Lake Victoria as well as the great rift valley lakes like Baringo,<br />
Naivasha and Magadi.<br />
Kenya’s biodiversity is closely linked to the country’s unique topography. The most<br />
noticeable physical feature is the East African Rift Valley which runs from the Lake Turkana<br />
in the north to Lake Natron at the Tanzania border. These landforms substantially influence<br />
19<br />
Giddens,A. 1999. The constitution of Society :An outline of the theory of Structuration. Cambridge: polity<br />
press.<br />
20<br />
Peluso, N.L. 1992. Rich Forest, Poor People: Resorce Control and Resistance in Java. Berkely/California:<br />
University Press.<br />
21<br />
WCED. 1987. Our Common Future . Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development.<br />
Oxford: University Press.<br />
5
the climatic patterns, with inland rainfall generally relating to changes in altitude. 22 High<br />
rainfalls are normally associated with the Indian Ocean coastal belt, the central highlands, and<br />
the areas near the north and east of Lake Victoria. The physical basis of the country is its<br />
extensive erosional plains that cut across ancient crystalline rocks of precambrian age. These<br />
physical features are more vivid along the rift valley. The height of the Kenya Highlands has<br />
been greatly augmented by outpourings of tertiary lavas, leaving plateaux at 2,500-3,000m<br />
and with isolated extinct volcanoes like Mt Kenya (5,199m) and Mt Elgon (4,321m).<br />
The Great East African Rift Valley bisects the country from north to south. This rift valley is<br />
dotted with lakes and volcanoes which are inactive, but generally associated with steam vents<br />
and hot springs. Westwards, the plains incline beneath the waters of Lake Victoria and<br />
eastwards they have been down-warped beneath a sediment-filled basin, signifying the impact<br />
of warping. Forests are largely located in the rainy upper levels of the Kenyan highlands,<br />
where they are supplied with abundant rainfall. East and west of the highlands, forests give<br />
way to low trees scattered through an even cover of short grass. 23 Semi-desert regions below<br />
3,000 feet, give rise to baobab trees. In drier areas of the north, desert scrub occurs, exposing<br />
the bare ground. The vegetation of the coastal region is basically savannah with patches of<br />
residual forests. While the northern coast still bears remnants of forests, years of human<br />
occupation in the south have virtually destroyed most of the forests in this part of the<br />
country. 24<br />
In terms of economic and political governance, Kenya, formally a British settlers’colony,<br />
attained independence from Britain in 1963 and later became a republic. The Country<br />
currently has a total population of 36,987,000 people of which 66% are residing in the<br />
countryside. 25 This indicates intense competition for arable land and thus creating a lot of land<br />
conflicts. Tourism is essential to the economy, and Kenya being one of Africa's major tourist<br />
destinations, tourism is essential to the economy. 26<br />
After independence, Kenya promoted rapid economic growth through public investment,<br />
encouragement of smallholder agricultural production, and incentives for private (often<br />
foreign) industrial investment. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew at an annual average of<br />
6.6% from 1963 to 1973. Agricultural production grew by 4.7% annually during the same<br />
period. This was stimulated by redistributing estates, diffusing new crop strains, and opening<br />
new areas to cultivation. Between 1974 and 1990, however, Kenya's economic performance<br />
declined. Inappropriate agricultural policies and poor international terms of trade contributed<br />
to the decline in agriculture. Kenya's inward-looking policy of import substitution and rising<br />
oil prices made Kenya's manufacturing sector uncompetitive. The government began a<br />
massive intrusion in the private sector. Lack of export incentives, tight import controls, and<br />
22 Buckle, C. 1992. Physical Geography of East Africa. Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau.<br />
23 Mistu News. Reservation of Permanet Forest Estate in East Africa, September 2004.<br />
24 Katuu, S. 2002. Kenya Resource Database: A Preliminary Review. Sage Publications. 18(2):107-110.<br />
25 GOK.1995. Statistical Abstract. Nairobi: Government Printer.<br />
26 GOK. 1999. Population and Human Development Planning Report. Nairobi: Government Printer.<br />
6
foreign exchange controls made the domestic environment for investment even less<br />
attractive. 27<br />
From 1991 to 1993, Kenya had its worst economic performance since independence. Growth<br />
in GDP stagnated, and agricultural production shrank at an annual rate of 3.9%. Inflation<br />
reached a record 100% in August 1993, and the government's budget deficit was over 10% of<br />
GDP. As a result of these combined problems, bilateral and multilateral donors suspended aid<br />
to Kenya in 1991. 28 In 1993, the Government of Kenya began a major program of economic<br />
reform and liberalization. A new minister of finance and a new governor of the central bank<br />
undertook a series of economic measures with the assistance of the World Bank (WB) and the<br />
International Monetary Fund (IMF). As part of this program, the government eliminated price<br />
controls and import licensing, removed foreign exchange controls, privatised a range of<br />
publicly owned companies, reduced the number of civil servants, and introduced conservative<br />
fiscal and monetary policies. From 1994-1996, Kenya's GDP growth rate averaged just over<br />
4% a year. 29 In 1997, however, the economy entered a period of slowing or stagnant growth,<br />
due in part to adverse weather conditions and reduced economic activity prior to general<br />
elections in December 1997. In 2000, GDP growth was negative, but improved slightly in<br />
2001. Economic growth continued to improve slightly in 2002 and reached 1.4% in 2003 and<br />
it reached 4.3% in 2004. 30 In terms of international standing, Kenya is one of the few reputed<br />
African countries, and hosts a number of international organisations and different foreign<br />
missions in its capital Nairobi. It is the only African Country which hosts many United<br />
Nations Departments, such as the United Nations Environment Department (UNEP)<br />
headquarters.<br />
Geographical location of Kakamega Forest<br />
Kakamega forest is located in the Western Province of Kenya, lying between latitudes<br />
00°08’30.5’’ N (41 236 in UTM 36 N) and 00°22’12.5’’ N (15 984) and longitudes<br />
34°46’08.0’’ E (696 777) and 34°57’26.5’’ E (717 761) at an altitude of about 1500 to 1700m<br />
(Map. 1). From the 150 km remote Rift Valley it is separated by highlands like the Cherangan<br />
in the north, and the Mau Escarpment in the south. The distance to Kisumu from Lake<br />
Victoria is about 43 km (Map.1). Kakamega town on the western side of the forest is located<br />
about 7.5 km to the nearest point of the main forest block. 31 Kakamega forest is about 66 km<br />
from the border to Uganda and about 94 km to Mt. Elgon. It is one of the few tropical forests<br />
remaining in Kenya. It also acts as a habitat to a great number of plant and animal species, yet<br />
27 IMF. 1995. Kenya and the IMF. Washington:International Monetary Fund.<br />
28 GOK. 1997. The Statistical Abstract .Nairobi:Government Printer.<br />
29 GOK. 2005. Background o the Budget. Nairobi:Government Printer.<br />
30 GOK. 2006. Population and Human Development Planning Report. Nairobi: Government Printer.<br />
31 KIFCON. 1994. Kakamega Forest - The official guide, Kenya Indigenous Forest Conservation Programme.<br />
Nairobi: Kenya.<br />
7
at the same time ranked as one of Africa’s most densely populated forests. 32 The area under<br />
forest is 28,199.72 hectares, and is currently gazetted, though still facing biodiversity threats.<br />
The forest is located at an altitude of 1,500-1700 meter and receives between 1,500 and<br />
2,300mm of precipitation per year. 33 Kakamega district has a total population of 643,457<br />
people which is projected to rise to 730,373 people by the year 2008. 34 However, the total<br />
number of those living around and in the forest is not known. Agriculture is the major<br />
important activity and accounts for 62% of incomes in the households. The area is also<br />
characterized by migrant labourers.<br />
The regimes of access to resources such as biodiversity are still not well defined. The forest<br />
which is almost the only one of its kind remaining in Kenya plays a critical role in regulating<br />
the rainfall regime and is one of the catchment areas of the East African region. The district<br />
has varying topography with altitudes ranging from 1250-2000 meters above sea level. The<br />
district has two major rivers, Yala and Nzoia. Though there are numerous forest communities,<br />
it is not known how many communities they are in number. However, in this study we are<br />
interested in investigating the institutional practices and perceptions of communities that have<br />
been staying around the forest for a greater part of their life as opposed to those who are<br />
simply migrant labourers in the district such as the agrarian workers.<br />
Management of Kakamega Forest<br />
Early accounts of colonial administrations in Kenya show that the survey of Kenya was done<br />
at the dawn of the 19 th Century. This resulted into the current mapping of forest lands.<br />
Subsequently, the same survey also saw the expansion of forested belts especially in the<br />
countryside, resulting into the current survey of vegetation and forest cover in Kenya. The<br />
current map regarding vegetation and forest cover shows that at one time Malava and Kisere<br />
forests were separated. The two forests were only drawn in as groups of trees. Betterstill,<br />
Isecheno, Ikuywa and Yala regions were connected to each other and to the south Nandi<br />
forest system. Up to 1931, Kakamega forest was managed by local people, with authority in<br />
the hands of the village elders. It was then brought under the control of the then Forest<br />
Department (FD) which gazetted the forest as Trust Forest in 1933. 35<br />
First plantations with the exotic tree species like Cypress and Eucalyptus from Australia were<br />
established between 1936 and 1938. 36 After the forest was declared a Central Government<br />
Forest in 1964, three small nature reserves in Isecheno (295 ha), Yala (460 ha) and Kisere<br />
were officially created in 1967. The motivation was to protect these areas from exploitation<br />
32 Pender, J, F. Place and S. Ehui. 2006. Sustainable Land Management. Lessons from East African Highlands.<br />
Washington D.C: IFPRI Publications.<br />
33 GOK. 2005. Kakamega District Strategic Plan 2002-2005. Nairobi: Government Printer.<br />
34 Ibid.<br />
35 Mitchell, P. 1947. The Kenya Colony and Protectorate of 1947. Report on the Agrarian Problem in Kenya.<br />
Nairobi: Government Printer.<br />
36 Graham, R.M. 1945. Notes on the Growing of Cypress timber on Farms. East African Agricultural Journal<br />
1:132-139.<br />
8
and to preserve the different forest types of Kakamega. Kisere forest and part of the northern<br />
Kakamega forest, formed part of our study area. A total of 18 forest fragments, were declared<br />
as Buyangu National Reserve in 1986 and fell under the management of the Kenya Wildlife<br />
Service (KWS). The Buyangu National Reserve covers an area of about 4,270 ha, of which<br />
Kisere covers 458 ha and the Buyangu area 3,812 ha. But the main part is still a forest<br />
Reserve under the control of the FD with legal use of the forest inventory. 37<br />
The areas outside the nature reserves of the FD are reserved for afforestation. Here trees are<br />
planted because of their economic values. In areas managed by KWS, strict rules to conserve<br />
the forest are enforced. Any use of the forest under the control of KWS is forbidden. The<br />
government thinking is that tourism is the long-term source of income for the KWS and the<br />
local people. In addition direct benefits for the locals lie in employments as field guides or<br />
field assistants for several research projects on the unique wildlife flora and fauna in<br />
Kakamega Forest. In a nutshell, Kakamega forest is governed by two different formal<br />
management regimes and enforced by two different agencies; the FD and the KWS. These<br />
two agencies have different protection priorities. For, instance, the Buyangu National Reserve<br />
under the control of KWS, is regularly patrolled by game rangers to enforce the conservation<br />
and protection of the wildlife resources, while the nature reserves at Issecheno and Yala are<br />
controlled by the FD to prevent local communities from harvesting forest resources.<br />
37 Njuguna, P, M. Mbegera and D. Mbithi. 1999. Reconnaissance Report on Survey of Forest Blocks in the West<br />
and East of the Rift Valley. Permanent Presidential Commission on Soil Conservation and Afforestation.<br />
Nairobi: Government Printer.<br />
9
Map.1: Map of Kenya<br />
Source: African Studies Centre, University of Pennsylvania.<br />
10
Map 2: Landsat ETM+ (7) satellite image<br />
(05 Feb 2001, spectral bands 5/4/3, (contrast enhanced) of Kakamega Forest, its peripheral<br />
fragments and the Nandi Forests<br />
Source: BIOTA-E02, G. Schaab, FH Karlsruhe<br />
11
1.4 Problem statement<br />
East African rain forests suffer large over- exploitation by humans and belong to the most<br />
threatened and least explored ecosystems on earth. 38 Only about 0.1 % (about 10,000 km²) of<br />
the estimated 10 million km² of tropical rainforest in the world are found in Eastern Africa.<br />
Unlike the vast West and Central African forests, the forests of Eastern Africa are highly<br />
fragmented-discrete islands surrounded by comparatively arid woodland. 39<br />
Tropical rain forests like Kakamega are not only centres for high biodiversity, but are also<br />
known to be homes to many people, many of whom though asset poor, are rich in enterprise<br />
and extractive skills. Land use systems range from the extensive use of natural forest<br />
vegetations, subsistence production, and market intensive peri-urban production systems. 40<br />
The use of this forest in Kakamega, shows that there is declining biodiversity, punctuated by<br />
continued ecological loss. High biological diversity in this rain forest presents a breadth of<br />
potentially useful resources to the people living around Kakamega forest. The forest therefore<br />
presents multiple agrarian and social roles and they include; source of subsistence products,<br />
medicine, wood resources as well as pasture for grazing animals. 41<br />
Formal institutions dealing with forest resource conservation in Kenya and specifically around<br />
Kakamega forest tend to assume that local communities around the forest are homogeneous.<br />
This thinking is based on the apparent homogeneity of livelihood strategies of forest user<br />
communities. 42 This profound assumption often gives rise to broad based and un-integrated<br />
formal institutional initiatives regarding sustainable use of forest resources. Often, the policies<br />
in this regard are a mere listing of rights without much relationship to enforceable<br />
entitlements. This is more so in the case of marginalized and vulnerable communities such as<br />
forest-based communities. 43<br />
The analysis regarding formal institutional efficiency in the management of natural resource<br />
commons indicates that formal institutional regimes must cut across multiple resource users’<br />
rights and attributes. 44 This is done in order to evaluate and understand the varied resource<br />
users’ knowledge and perceptions. 45 The institutional arrangement resulting from such<br />
knowledge related attributes can some times be stronger than a country’s formal institutional<br />
38 Köhler, J. 2004. Biodiversity in conversion: The Influence of Fragmentation and Disturbance on the<br />
Biodiversity of East African highland rain forests, in: BIOTA East Africa. Final report phase I: 2001 – 2004.<br />
39 Lovett, J.C. and Wasser, S. 1993. Biogeography and Ecology of the Rainforests of Eastern Africa. Cambridge:<br />
Cambridge University Press.<br />
40 Mwangi, E. P. Ongugo and J, Njuguna. 2000. Decentralising Institutions for Forest Conservation in Kenya: A<br />
Comperative Analysis of Resource Conservation. Nairobi: IFRI.<br />
41 Guthiga, P, J.Mburu and S.Wambu. 2006. Extraction of Direct Forest Products and its driving factors. The<br />
Case of Kakamega Forest. A paper presented at that GIGA Workshop; Hamburg, March 2006.<br />
42 Brown, D. 1999. Principles and Practices of Forest Co-Management: Evidence form West-Central Africa.<br />
European Union Tropical Forest Paper 2. Overseas Development Institute.<br />
43 Chambers, R. 1998. Forward. In Whose voice: Participatory Research and Policy Change, edited by J.<br />
Holland and J. Blackburn, 44-54. London: Intermediate Technology Publications.<br />
44 Swallow, B and D.W.Bromley. 1995. Institutions, Governance and incentives in Common Property Regimes<br />
for African Rangelands. Environment and Resources Economics 5: 1-20.<br />
45 Ibid.<br />
12
egimes. 46 Yet national regimes governing and regulating biodiversity usage in Kenya and<br />
more particularly in Kakamega, are often in conflict with local institutions and practices, a<br />
situation which leads to institutional conflict. This situation is borne out of the fact that, the<br />
people around Kakamega forest have a myriad of social institutions (cultural attributes)<br />
towards the forest. They incorporate these practices/attributes in their livelihood strategies and<br />
this influences the way they perceive forest biodiversity and resource use priorities.<br />
Persson and Tabellini put it that social institutions evolve as a means of understanding<br />
systems that may result from a stream of benefits, derived from a resource regime. 47 For<br />
instance, society has a distinct way it shapes individual knowledge in a given resource system.<br />
This means that individuals in such a society carry with them specific ecological knowledge,<br />
values, norms as well as other beliefs that originate from their society. 48 Therefore, based on<br />
institutional theory, empirical inquiry and investigation, this study wishes to aid our<br />
understanding on how local thinking shapes and structures biodiversity perceptions of the<br />
people living around Kakamega forest. Similarly, we wanted to find out what happens when<br />
such local thinking and state thinking interact.<br />
1.5 Objectives of the study<br />
With respect to the above sighted literature, it is expected that the respective thinking<br />
regarding biodiversity at different levels is bound to differ. The difference in mindsets<br />
regarding the forest resource usage is likely to produce varied ideas. Thus the general<br />
objective of this study is to establish and ascertain whether there are conflicting notions of<br />
biodiversity in Kenya and if there are, we are interested in finding out how such conflicting<br />
positions are institutionalised.<br />
The existence of a natural resource like Kakamega forest is associated with a lot of benefits. It<br />
provides a high quality habitat for varied kinds of key ecological species, and it provides<br />
social and economic opportunities for local communities living around the forest. In that<br />
regard we want to investigate what constitutes locally relevant biodiversity notions in<br />
Kakamega vis-à-vis the national biodiversity regimes.<br />
Furthermore, we wish to point out that the usage of forest resources by local communities<br />
normally produces several perceptions. Such perceptions are sometimes too powerful that<br />
they are transformed into teachings, local rules, oral history, norms and beliefs. Therefore in<br />
line with the above and more so in respect to Kakamega forest, we are interested in<br />
46<br />
Scott, W. R. 1995. Institutions and Organizations. Thousand Oaks: CA, Sage.<br />
47<br />
Persson, T. and G., Tabellini. 1995. Double Edged Incentives: Institutions and Policy Coordination. In a<br />
Handbook of International Economics Vol 3, edited by G. Grossman and K. Rogoff, 1397-1444. Amsterdam:<br />
North-Holland.<br />
48<br />
Oliver, C. 1991. Strategic Responses to Institutional Processes, Academy of Management Review 16:145-<br />
179.<br />
13
understanding how such perceptions are framed. Additionally, we are interested in unearthing<br />
the actors involved in the framing of such perceptions.<br />
Still in relation to the above, we do note that the management of a natural resource common<br />
like Kakamega forest would not work without a requisite authority system that makes it<br />
certain that, specific rights, duties and entitlements are adhered to. These rights, duties and<br />
entitlements are informally postulated and in most cases constitute the local rules governing<br />
forest resources. On the other hand we are aware that at the national level there are formally<br />
legislated rules that govern national biodiversity. In lieu of that, our third objective is to<br />
ascertain how locally designed rules are mediated with formally deigned rules.<br />
Embedding the research questions<br />
In an attempt to meet the above stated objectives, the study will be guided by the following<br />
research questions. To begin with, what are the different notions relating to biodiversity? The<br />
other question is; are there provisions for local biodiversity notions in the planning for<br />
national biodiversity regimes? The third question aims at finding out what institutions are in<br />
place to manage the forest biodiversity resources in Kenya. In the fourth research question we<br />
are interested in finding out the national and local actors involved in the management of the<br />
country’s biodiversity resources. Our quest in the fifth research question is; what is the role of<br />
donors and international actors in the current biodiversity restoration in Kenya?<br />
1.6 Definition of central concepts<br />
Biodiversity: Biological diversity is the variety and variability among living organisms and<br />
the ecological complexes in which they occur. Diversity can be defined as the number of<br />
different items and their relative frequency. 49 Therefore, biological diversity, seeks to look at<br />
items that are organized at many levels, ranging from complete ecosystems to the chemical<br />
structures that are the molecular basis of heredity. 50 Thus, the term encompasses different<br />
ecosystems, species, genes, and their relative abundance. In short, the term biodiversity<br />
encompasses all activities related to life in all its forms, all habitants of living species like<br />
forests, lakes oceans meadows and lagoons. It also looks at species richness and distribution. 51<br />
In this study, we are not interested in the range of genetic variation among individual species<br />
within a habitat, nor are we interested in the number of different native species and<br />
individuals in a habitat or geographical area; but we are interested in understanding the<br />
variety of interactions that occur between people and different species in Kakamega forest and<br />
how the people perceive and relate to these species.<br />
49<br />
Gaston, K. J. 1996. Biodiversity: A biology of numbers and difference. Oxford: Blackwell.<br />
50<br />
Ibid.<br />
51<br />
World Resources Institute, World Conservation Union, and United Nations Environment Programme, "Global<br />
Biodiversity Strategy," 1992.<br />
14
Institutions and Institutionalism: Institutions refer to the existing rules formally or<br />
informally applied within particular environmental settings. Previous theories held that<br />
institutions can influence individuals to act in one of two ways: they can cause individuals<br />
within institutions to maximize benefits, which we shall call regulative institutions. 52 These<br />
are derived from rational choice theory, that is, the ability to act out of duty and awareness. 53<br />
Other than regulative institutions, we can also define institutions as rules that emanate from<br />
history, in what is termed as path dependency. In this we refer to paths designed by an<br />
institutional enviroment and that tend to be followed throughout the institutions’<br />
development. 54 Institutionalism on the other hand examines the ways in which institutions<br />
structure social and political behaviour. Institutionalism recognizes that institutions operate in<br />
an environment consisting of other institutions, called the institutional environment. 55 Every<br />
institution is influenced by the broader environment. In this institutional environment, the<br />
main goal of organizations is to survive. 56 In this regard, the study will investigate institutions<br />
with a view of finding out how institutionalism deals with the pervasive influence of<br />
institutions on human behavior through rules, norms, and other frameworks. 57<br />
Resource Management: This relates directly to conservation concerns by capturing the<br />
amount of critical/scarce resources to the rate at which they are demanded and extracted from<br />
the resource area. Resource management also refers to the power centres with in a given<br />
resource environment. This can be a forest, shrub, grazing land or a marine environment. 58 It<br />
also refers to the regulatory frameworks which grant decision-making authority to actors who<br />
have little or no ability to guide or control the behaviour of those who are nominally subject to<br />
their authority. 59 Further, it also locates where management derives its authority regarding<br />
regulation of the interrelationships which emerge during the use of given resources in an<br />
existing resource environment. Such authority regarding a resource regime may come from<br />
international, mostly bilateral agreements, national/sub-national or local agreements. 60<br />
Resource Regime: Resource regimes refer to the social institutions that serve to order the<br />
actions of those in the use of natural resources. 61 A resource regime includes a system of<br />
52 Weingast, B. 2002. Rational Choice Institutionalism. In Political Science: State of the Discipline, edited by I.<br />
Katznelson and H. Milner,1-26. New York: Norton.<br />
53 Campbell, L. John. and K. O, Pedersen. 2001. The Rise of Neo-Liberalism and Institutional Analysis.<br />
Princeton: Princeton University Press.<br />
54 Pierson, P and T. Skocpol. 2002. Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science. In Political<br />
Science: State of the discipline Katznelson and Milner, 693-721. Newyork: Norton.<br />
55 Ibid.<br />
56 Thelen, K. 2003. How Institutions Evolve: Insights from Comparative Historical Analysis. In Comparative<br />
Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences, edited by J. Mahoney and D. Rueschmeyer, 208-240. Cambridge:<br />
Cambridge University Press.<br />
57 Greif, A and D. Laitin. 2004. An Endogenous Theory of Institutional Change. American Political Science<br />
Review 98(4): 633-52.<br />
58 Gibson, C and F. Lehoucq. 2003. The local politics of decentralized environmental policy. Journal of<br />
Environment and Development 12:28-49.<br />
59 March, J. G and J. P, Olsen. 1998. The institutional dynamics of international political orders. International<br />
Organization 52:943-969.<br />
60 Young, O. R. 1982. Resource regimes: natural resources and social institutions. Berkeley: University of<br />
California. Press.<br />
61 Vitousek, P., H. Mooney, J. Lubchenko, and J. Melillo. 1997. Human domination of Earth's ecosystems.<br />
15
ights and rules defining the range of impacts and opportunities available to actors. It also<br />
looks at the procedures for settling disputes and adjusting the system of rights and rules for<br />
compliance. Regimes may arise spontaneously as a product of uncoordinated efforts of many<br />
individuals. 62 Regimes may also be negotiated by some general principles or by some general<br />
purpose authority. Hence a resource regime refers to the management and administration<br />
structures in place to regulate resources usage for instance a water authority, an environmental<br />
management authority or a forestry authority. 63<br />
1.7 Biodiversity: An insight into the contemporary debates and notions<br />
In the following sub-section, we discuss the contending debates and notions relating to<br />
biodiversity management and governance. These shall be discussed in light of the current<br />
policies and procedures that obtain in Kenya’s biodiversity resource regimes. The following<br />
notions will also be articulated alongside the views and opinions collected from national level<br />
respondents through a national level institutional mapping exercise.<br />
The Globalcentric notion<br />
This is the most dominant view arising from the international level perspectives on<br />
biodiversity. It emphasizes resources management and is a brainchild of dominant<br />
international institutions particularly the World Bank and the major Northern Environmental<br />
Conservation Organizations such as the World Conservation Union (ICUN) and the World<br />
Wildlife Fund (WWF). These are backed by the weight of the Group of Eight rich nations<br />
(G8). The globalcentric notion is based on the particular representation of the threats to<br />
biodiversity that emphasize loss of habitats, species reduction and fragmentation due to<br />
habitat reduction rather than underlying causes. 64 This notion offers a set of prescriptions for<br />
the conservation and sustainable use of resources at the international, national and the local<br />
levels. As a result, it suggests appropriate mechanisms for biodiversity management,<br />
including the in-situ and ex-situ conservation in the national biodiversity planning processes.<br />
It calls for the establishment of appropriate mechanisms for compensation and economic use<br />
of biodiversity, chiefly through intellectual property rights. However, the dilemmas that<br />
surround the entire scheme of property rights and bio-prospecting need no recapitulation.<br />
Dedeurwaerder notes with pain that this process has been a reap-off on the side of the local<br />
communities. 65 He notes that many of the access and benefit sharing agreements have been<br />
signed but are largely bilateral contractual arrangements between the rich countries and poor<br />
countries and are not based on the principle of informed consent. It is further agonizing to<br />
Science 277:494-499.<br />
62<br />
Berkes, F. 2002. Cross-scale institutional linkages: perspectives from the bottom up. In The drama of the<br />
Commons edited by E. Ostrom et al.,293-321. Washington: National Academy Press.<br />
63<br />
Friedheim, R. L. 2001. Toward a sustainable whaling regime. Washington: University of Washington Press.<br />
64<br />
Brush, S. 1998. Prospecting for the Public Domain. Center for Latin America Studies, University of Chicago.<br />
65<br />
Morris, M.L et al. 1999. Genetic Change in Farmer Recycled Maize Seed : A review of Evidence. CMMYT.<br />
Economics working Paper No- 99.<br />
16
learn that in practice, the definition of property rights on which the benefit sharing contracts<br />
are based, is not well defined. 66 Morris et al. make another observation, but in form of an<br />
intricate question: How can the contribution of poor communities to biodiversity preservation<br />
be assessed if classification of species takes centuries? This submission is strengthened by<br />
Laid one of the leading scholars on the subject of bio-prospecting contracts. She notes that<br />
Biodiversity Prospecting Contracts (BPCs) are the most common and most frequently used<br />
tools in the establishment of formal and legally binding relationships between providers and<br />
users of genetic resources at the local level. Such agreements take different forms and shapes.<br />
These agreements may be formally concluded in written documents or acknowledged by a<br />
shake of hands. These contracts may take varying forms including contracts for the sale of<br />
raw materials, Material Transfer Agreements (MTA), Licensing Regimes (LR), and<br />
Memorandums of Understanding (MOU). 67 Indigenous people may use agreements over<br />
traditional knowledge as a means to exercise control over biological resources considered to<br />
be of national patrimony. But observers such as Tobin note that, BPCs are merely a tool for<br />
bio-piracy, simply providing a cloak of respectability to arrangements viewed as inherently<br />
inequitable. This is due to the disappropriate negotiating strength of Multinational<br />
Corporations (MNCs).<br />
Furthermore, MNCs use these BPCs as a tool for misappropriation and monopolization of<br />
common goods through utilization of intellectual property rights regimes. At the national<br />
level, BPCs can also act as a disincentive to legislators in developing national Access and<br />
Benefit Sharing Measures (ABSM). However, the negotiations of highly visible BPCs have<br />
tended to raise public concerns on issues surrounding biodiversity prospecting. For example,<br />
research on biodiversity and traditional knowledge is funded by northern partner agencies and<br />
channeled through northern partner institutions. This sometimes breeds inequitable<br />
relationships with the owners of traditional local knowledge. The inequitable participation of<br />
local communities in such agreements has led to renewed discontency towards research in<br />
traditional knowledge. 68 On the other hand, it has also led to increased activity, public interest<br />
and national debate. In Kenya for instance, interest and concerns about the activities of the<br />
National Institute of Biodiversity (inBio) helped to format a participatory national debate that<br />
culminated into the adoption of a comprehensive National Biodiversity Strategy and Action<br />
Plan in 2000. It also helped in enlisting the importance of biodiversity in the current Forest<br />
Act. The strategic plan puts it clearly that Kenya has a considerable volume of indigenous<br />
systems and knowledge relevant to biodiversity. However, what is disappointing is that little<br />
of this knowledge has been documented or integrated within national programs or institutions.<br />
66<br />
Cracraft, J and F.T, Grifo. 1999. The living Planet in a Crisis: Biodiversity and Science and Policy. New<br />
York: Colombia University Press.<br />
67<br />
Laird, S. 2002. Biodiversity and Traditional Knowledge: Equitable Partnerships in Practice. London: Earth<br />
scan Publishers Limited.<br />
68<br />
Tobin, B. 1997. Biodiversity Prospecting Contracts: The search for Equitable Partnerships. London: Earth<br />
scan Publishers Limited.<br />
17
The issue of protection of indigenous and traditional intellectual property rights is of<br />
relevance and as a result, local communities must not be exposed to exploitation. 69 The same<br />
sentiments were echoed during an interview with Dr. Matanga, one of the key informants. He<br />
agreed that indigenous and local knowledge on biodiversity is important for biodiversity<br />
preservation but such knowledge has been thinly documented by current institutional regimes<br />
dealing with biodiversity. He further mentioned that there is continued exploitation of local<br />
communities through bio-prospecting contracts. He therefore noted that, there ought to be a<br />
balance between the commercial interests of the bio-prospecting companies and the wider<br />
social and national economic interets. 70<br />
The Sovereignty notion<br />
The dominant globalcentric notion is partly challenged by most of the Third World national<br />
governments which without questioning, is a fundamental way to re-negotiate the terms of<br />
biodiversity treaties and strategies. The issue of genetic resources has rekindled the interest of<br />
the third world in the negotiations. Although there is a great variation in the position opted by<br />
the Third World governments, they tend to emphasize specific issues of sovereignty,<br />
particularly at the national level. Some of these countries have opposed the policies favoured<br />
by the industrialized nations.<br />
The proponents of this school of thought argue that such policies include unfair international<br />
regimes like the intellectual property rights. Others castigate the rich countries particularly the<br />
US, for their unwillingness to negotiate key issues such as technology transfer and bio-safety<br />
protocols. However, the sovereignty position doesn’t amount to the dominant biodiversity<br />
perspective. Mugabe et al. note that while there is a significant debate focusing on the<br />
development of legislation to protect traditional knowledge and rights, the Kenyan<br />
government has not, for example, highlighted the shortfalls involved. There are legal pitfalls<br />
that must be overcome in order to come up with measures that respond to indigenous and<br />
local community priorities. 71 The first Kenyan National Report to the Conference of Parties<br />
(COP) in 1998 indicated that national governments through their policies should send a clear<br />
message to international and private sector negotiators regarding what is expected of<br />
contractual arrangements for access to benefits and sharing. 72 Further to the afore mentioned,<br />
it is imperative to point out that in some countries, such as the Andean Pact countries, national<br />
authorities take an active role in the preparation, negotiation and implementation of controls<br />
and contracts. In others like Cameroon, there is a policy limiting involvement of bioprospecting<br />
companies in drafting of bio-prospecting contracts. 73<br />
69<br />
GOK. 2000. The National Biodiversity strategic Action Plan. Nairobi: Government Printer.<br />
70<br />
Key Informant Interview with Dr. Matanga, Director KENRIK. 20 August 2005.<br />
71<br />
Mugabe, J et. al. 1996. Managing Access to Genetic Resources: Towards Strategies for Benefit Sharing.<br />
Nairobi: Acts Press.<br />
72<br />
GOK.2001. The First Kenyan National Report to the Conference of Parties.<br />
73<br />
Caillax, M and K. Ruir. 1998. Benefit Sharing Case Studies. Secretariat for the Convention for Biodiversity.<br />
Montreal.<br />
18
The above revelations show the discontencies and suspicions that are contained in the poor<br />
nations’ perceptions of bio-prospecting multinational corporations. As a result, the proponents<br />
of the sovereignty notion have demanded that, in order to revisit this inequality, bioprospecting<br />
corporations have to strengthen the source-country capacities. This is envisioned<br />
as a move to add value to resources extracted in these countries. On the whole, sourcecountries<br />
advocate for improved local capacity through pharmaceutical production,<br />
conservation of biological diversity, and enhancing of local community development of<br />
diversity. 74 On the other hand, countries that subscribe to this notion, have appreciated that<br />
part of the problem lies in their national biodiversity management systems. 75 There are no<br />
laws relating to biodiversity and this makes them vulnerable to the unscrupulous international<br />
contractual relationships. The Convention for Biodiversity recognizes the sovereign rights of<br />
states to determine and define access to resources. 76 As a result many of the countries,<br />
especially those from the resource rich south, have undertaken various strategies for managing<br />
their biological resources. As far as laws are concerned, different countries have undertaken<br />
different interventions. These include; enacting of guiding environmental principles in their<br />
constitutions, use of anti- pollution laws and creation of laws, on the use of natural resources<br />
and biodiversity. 77<br />
Therefore, arising from the view that there ought to be streamlined procedures followed in the<br />
usage of biodiversity, especially in the realm of bio-trading and bio-cooperation, many<br />
countries have come up with legal frameworks for managing and regulating biodiversity<br />
usage. Many countries have developed laws in relation to biodiversity on a sectoral basis. In<br />
Kenya for instance, there is a continued debate regarding the sectoral usage of biodiversity<br />
and a call for increased legal enforcement. The sectoral framework laws often incorporate<br />
general principles of environmental management, inherently providing an institutional<br />
framework for the management of biodiversity. 78 Arising from the sovereignty notion, states<br />
have put in place diverse mechanisms to implement broader objectives of their national<br />
policies. Most states have based their management policies on the control of biological<br />
resources in the interest of the public. Many countries have undertaken to establish protected<br />
areas’ management framework as a method for managing in-situ conservation. They have also<br />
set up trade measures such as permits for the usage of ex-situ biodiversity. In other instances<br />
74<br />
Posey, D.A. 1996. Traditional Resource Rights: International Instruments for Protection and Compensation of<br />
Indigenous People and Local communities. Gland: IUCN<br />
75<br />
BIOTA. 2004. www.biota-africa.org. 25.10.2006<br />
76<br />
Newman, D.J and S. A Laird. 1999. The Influence of Natural Products on the 1997 Pharmaceutical Sales<br />
Figures. In The commercial Use of Biodiversity: cess to Genetic Resources and Benefit Sharing, edited by K.<br />
Kate and S. A Laird, 333-335. London: Earth scan.<br />
77<br />
Lal, D. 1998. Unintended Consequences: The Impact of Factor Endowments, Culture and Politics on<br />
Economic Performance in the Long run. The Ohlin Lectures. Cambridge Mass: MIT Press.<br />
78<br />
Calestous, J. 1991. Managing Biological Diversity in Kenya. In Gaining Ground: Institutional Innovations in<br />
Landuse Management in Kenya, edited by A Kiriro and C. Juma, 27-38 Nairobi: African Centre for<br />
Technology Studies.<br />
19
ans have been slammed on those species that are thought to be threatened by the bio-<br />
trading. 79<br />
Other trade measures used to foster conservation efforts include export restrictions and<br />
quarantines to regulate the outflow of species. Penal sanctions have also been devised as<br />
measures that can achieve this feat. Such penal sanctions include use of fines for the wasteful<br />
use of natural resources, illegal trafficking of banned animal and other biodiversity species. 80<br />
In Kenya for instance, the Kenya Wildlife Authority outlawed the trade in a number of<br />
biodiversity species. It slapped a ban on the trade in ivory and rhino horns among other<br />
items. 81 However, the reliance on penal sanctions has proved somewhat an ineffective tool to<br />
ensure compliance with standards put in place. Specific sanctions have failed to achieve the<br />
desired goals. Paradoxically, the same countries have adopted some of the international<br />
instruments that they once denounced. Kenya Wildlife Authority, for instance, adopted the<br />
provisions of Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), by banning<br />
all game hunting and revoking all licenses to trade in wildlife products. 82<br />
The African notion<br />
The African notion on biodiversity emanates from the 1968 Convention on Biodiversity. This<br />
was after the independence wave that swept across the African continent in the 1960s. Many<br />
of the African countries felt the need for new conservation initiatives to provide a basis for<br />
national legislations as well as to coordinate conservation across frontiers. The 1968 African<br />
convention was negotiated under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). 83<br />
African Countries under the then OAU referred to the old colonial regimes relating to<br />
biodiversity as predatory arrangements for privatization of natural resources. The framers of<br />
the African notion grounded their argument in the fact that colonial laws relating to<br />
biodiversity conservation were crafted basing on western conservation ethics that did not<br />
focus on integrated management principles. The colonial laws failed to recognize the varying<br />
needs of the people living in, or near the protected areas. 84<br />
The OAU called for the adoption of an African convention harmonizing these actions herein<br />
referred to as the African notion for biodiversity. The essence was to develop a model of<br />
legislation on community rights and access to biological resources to ensure the continuing<br />
control, by local communities, of their natural resources, knowledge, and technologies. 85 It<br />
was envisioned that local communities keep regenerating natural resources, knowledge and<br />
79 Bourgasser,K.S. 2000. Bio-Prospecting on Public Lands: Should Private companies Compensate<br />
Governments for Use of Public Land Resources. Journal of Law and Policy 8: 481-541.<br />
80 RSA. 1997. White Paper on the conservation and sustainable use of South African Biodiversity. Government<br />
Gazette 385 No.18163.<br />
81 The Kenya Wildlife Conservation and Management Act, Cap 37 of the Laws of Kenya.<br />
82 Ibid.<br />
83 The OAU 1968 African Convention. Article II.<br />
84 The OAU 1968 African Convention. Article X(I).<br />
85 Kamari-Mbote, P. 2002. Biological Diversity Management in Africa in the Run-up to the WSSD. Oxford:<br />
Blackwell Publishers Limited.<br />
20
technologies. This kind of thinking is embedded in the old age traditions relating to natural<br />
resource usage that most of African communities treasured. In fact, most of the provisions in<br />
the African legal regimes governing biodiversity have important clauses of the African<br />
convention.<br />
In regard to the above, the convention provided a framework for many environmental laws in<br />
African countries. However, although the African notion moved away from the globalcentric<br />
notion in an effort to recognize the community and access right in protected areas, many of<br />
the African institutions relating to biodiversity continued to work within their old frameworks<br />
punctuated by the colonial legacies imbedded in the 1900 and 1933 London Conventions on<br />
Biodiversity. 86 In summary, the thinking in the African notion is African, while much of the<br />
practice is Eurocentric. It is also worth noting that, the international treaties have influenced<br />
the development of most of the biodiversity policies and laws in African countries over the<br />
decades. Most of these treaties call for setting aside large tracks of land to keep the flora and<br />
fauna in one place.<br />
This has predicated a move towards conservation ethics that don’t focus primarily on the<br />
integrated management of resource commons principles, based on the recognition of the needs<br />
and perspectives of the local populations living in or near the resource commons. 87 It has also<br />
formed a basis for most wildlife policies in Africa. The other important international treaty<br />
that has become a hallmark for most of the African policies governing biodiversity is the<br />
convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). 88<br />
The current Kenya Wildlife Act which was amended in 1989 is a case in point. The act<br />
banned the trade and hunting of wild game in an effort to conserve and manage rare species of<br />
animals. 89 Generally speaking, the African convention on Biodiversity which forms the<br />
backbone for the African biodiversity conservation continues to be influenced by the<br />
international norms and international biodiversity funding agencies. The African notion was<br />
initially rooted in the heart of community and customary tenureship, but was later derailed<br />
due to the influence of the 1933 London Convention as well as international actors such as the<br />
International Conservation Union. 90<br />
This fact is well collaborated with responses from one key informant, Dr.Sam Kasiki. He<br />
noted that, “the influence of donor agencies is so immense and they continue to play a<br />
significant role in the institutional framing processes in many African countries and Kenya is<br />
no isolated case”. 91 Further still, in reference to the Kenyan Wildlife Act and the Forest Act,<br />
we note that the two acts restrict access to natural resource regimes, such as forests and<br />
national parks. Accordingly, free access to the natural domains under these legal regimes, is<br />
86<br />
Marroquin, M. 1995. Wildlife Utilization: A New International Mechanism for the protection of Biological<br />
Diversity. Law and Policy International Bussiness 26:318-363.<br />
87<br />
The OAU 1968 African Convention Article X (1).<br />
88<br />
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora. Washington, March 1973.<br />
89<br />
The Kenya Wildlife and Conservation Act, amendment 1989.<br />
90<br />
The Kenyan Gazette, 1977/1978.<br />
91<br />
Key Informant Interview with Dr. Kasiki, Kenya Wildlife Services. 27 Aug 2006.<br />
21
considered illegal. Those found contravening the laws, are charged with intent to exploit<br />
forest and wildlife resources. Individuals and organizations have no right to extract wildlife<br />
and any other forest products without seeking authority from the national agency. The two<br />
acts require that any person or organization seeking to access wildlife or parts thereof, must<br />
seek permission and authority from the relevant authorities. The national agency in this case,<br />
is the Minister of Natural Resources or the Chief Conservator of Forests. 92<br />
The African notion admittedly and extendedly provided for common resource benefit sharing<br />
aimed at community resource utilization and that is why it was rooted in the customary<br />
system of policing. However, a critical look at the current Kenya Wildlife and Forest Acts<br />
indicates that the two legal regimes are elusive and have no provisions related to the economic<br />
and other instruments of benefits sharing. The question that arises is, can this in anyway<br />
explain the negative attitude that the local communities have towards wildlife and other<br />
protected natural resources? Partly yes, since they do view these as products of the state<br />
thinking rather than their own. 93 This kind of phenomenon is not linked to Kenya alone. It cuts<br />
across all the Afro-Tropical legal regimes, given that as many as 47 African countries have<br />
been parties and signatories to these different treaties. The Zimbabwe, Uganda, Ghana, South<br />
Africa and the Ethiopian Wildlife and Environmental Acts, afford glowing examples. 94<br />
The Social movements notion<br />
This notion holds that, the real power to undo the existing inadequacies and inequities to<br />
biodiversity management lies in the growing number of social movements and Non-<br />
Governmental organizations. The NGOs in this category constitute sub-networks at national<br />
and transnational levels. They are a prime example of the emerging set of transactional<br />
practices and identities that link place based modes of activism. The proponents of this notion<br />
argue that, they are advocating against the dominant globalcentric biodiversity notion, which<br />
they maintain is a form of bio-imperialism. 95<br />
Furthermore, they mention that this form of bio-imperialism has its long-term roots in the<br />
colonial legacy which involved removal of large tracts of land from peoples’ control without<br />
taking into account the fact that commonly owned land was part of an integrated effective<br />
form of resource management. Such a legacy transpired into the present day national resource<br />
management regimes, which led to the closure of common resource areas, previously<br />
managed by communities. They argue that, removing such areas from community control, led<br />
to privatization of natural resources rights which resulted into reduced access and<br />
conservation. 96<br />
92 The Kenya Forest Act 1982.<br />
93 Key informant Interview with Joseph Masinde, NEMA 22 Aug 2006.<br />
94 Harland, D. 1994. Killing Game: International Law and the African Elephant. London: Praeger.<br />
95 Powell., E and F. DiMaggio. 1991. The Social Construction of Cultural Models. Oxford: Blackwell.<br />
96 Nazarea,V. 1998. Cultural Memory and Biodiversity. Tucson: University of Arizona Press.<br />
22
The social movement’s notion articulates a rare view relating to biodiversity in form of bio-<br />
democracy. They begin by enumerating the threats to bio-democracy and putting emphasis on<br />
habitat destruction. They argue that habitat destruction is a product of grandiose development<br />
projects, monocultures of minds, and agriculture promoted by the capitalistic and reductionist<br />
science of the North. These bio–democracy advocates shift attention from South to North as<br />
the source of the contemporary biodiversity crisis. 97 At the same time, they suggest a radical<br />
re-definition of production away from the logic of uniformity towards the logic of diversity.<br />
Their proposal for bio-diplomacy and bio-democracy is articulated based on a series of<br />
requirements regarding local control of natural resources. 98 They are in support of practices<br />
relying on the logic of diversity, including recognition of the cultural basis of biological<br />
diversity. In addition, these critics of western capitalism are opposed to bio-technology as a<br />
main tool of maintaining biodiversity, but call for the adoption of intellectual property rights<br />
as the mechanism for the protection of local knowledge and resources. 99 They further<br />
advocate for all forms of collective rights and shared character of knowledge and resources.<br />
These movements explicitly construct a political strategy for the defence of territory, culture<br />
and identity. While having many points in common with the African notion, this perspective<br />
is conceptually distinct, and politically occupies a different role in the biodiversity enterprise.<br />
Aware that biodiversity is a hegemonic construct; the activists acknowledge that, this<br />
discourse opens up a space for defence of their project in the realm of biotic resources. On<br />
many accounts, concerns regarding biodiversity have followed from broader struggles for<br />
territorial control. This view contests the most cherished views and constructs of modernity<br />
such as positivist science, the market, and individual property. 100<br />
Social movementists, however, don’t develop their premises in isolation, but in consonant<br />
with two important factors. One is the dominant vision of biodiversity conservation, while the<br />
other is in defence of local cultures, ecologies and territories. The social movements’ political<br />
strategy which began to emerge in the 1990s, has increasingly taken a leading position at both<br />
the national and international arenas. This notion’s movers have created a political ecology<br />
framework through their interactions with the community, state, NGOs and academic sectors.<br />
Within this framework, the territory is seen to be the most fundamental and most multidimensional<br />
space for the creation of ecological, economic and cultural practices of the<br />
community. 101<br />
The territory is perceived in terms of patterns of settlement, use of spaces, and use of<br />
resources. These systems are geared mostly to local consumption than the market, capital or<br />
wealth accumulation. It is for this reason that traditional practices have been sustained for this<br />
long. Among the practices to highlight are; low intensity exploitation, shifting use of<br />
97 Escobar, A. 1999. Gender, Place and Networks. A political Economy of Cyber culture. In Creating New<br />
Cultures in Cyberspace, edited by W.Harcourt, 31-54. London: Zed Books.<br />
98 Ibid.<br />
99 Restrepo, E and D. Del Valle. 1996. Renacientes del Guandal.Bogota: Universidad Nacional.<br />
100 Escobar, A. 1996. Cultural Politics and Biological Diversity: State, Capital and Social Movements in the<br />
Pacific Coast of Colombia. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.<br />
101 Brush, E et al. 1998. Valuing Local Knowledge. Washington: Washington Island Press.<br />
23
productive space and different ecological areas, manifold and diverse agricultural and<br />
extractive activities, family and kinships based labour practices and horticulture. 102 This<br />
notion seems to do away with modern tenets preached by contemporary conservation models.<br />
It denounces capital accumulation and the pressure of market forces. It is rather located more<br />
into the traditional and egalitarian production systems, closely related to territory and culture.<br />
The struggle for territory is above all a cultural struggle for autonomy and self determination.<br />
Hence, ecological and cultural units are laboriously constructed through the daily practices of<br />
the community. 103<br />
The social movements’ notion also validates recent debates in social anthropology that<br />
analyse the hegemony of western views of intellectual property based on notions of<br />
possessive individualism, fully commercialised and commodatised social relations as well as<br />
market transactions. Like Strathern points out, biodiversity discussions need to be<br />
reconstituted in order to harmonise the divisions between Europe, North America, Asia with<br />
other cultures especially in Latin America and Africa. 104<br />
In reference to the above contemporary debates, we have examined four different notions<br />
relating to biodiversity. However, it is imperative to point out that there is no single notion<br />
that can be used to define Kenya’s biodiversity regimes. In Kenya, there obtains a multiplicity<br />
of notions. The globalcentric, the African notion as well as the sovereignity orientations are<br />
some of the varied and variegated facets that suffuse the biodiversity management regimes in<br />
Kenya. The preponderance of these varied notions is replicated in the various formal regimes<br />
relating to biodiversity management in the country. For instance, we note that the first three<br />
notions are spread in the formal national regimes. While the last notion, (the social<br />
movements), contains some features which relate to some aspects of the local communities.<br />
These variations will aid our understanding of the different view points that obtain in Kenya’s<br />
biodiversity enterprise. In a large measure, the variegated notions replicated in the national<br />
institutional processes, form part of the building blocks that explain institutional dilemmas in<br />
the management of the country’s natural resources. These shall be highlight in the subsequent<br />
chapters of this work.<br />
102<br />
Seidman, A and F. Anang. 1992. 21st Century Africa: Towards a New Vision of Self-Sustainable<br />
Development. Antalanta: Africa. In 21st century Africa: Towards a New Vision of Self-Sustainable<br />
Development, edited by A. Seidman & F. Anang , 1-21. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press.<br />
103<br />
Blackwell, J. 1991. Environment and Development in Africa: Selected Case studies. Washington: World<br />
Bank Publications.<br />
104<br />
Strathern, M. 2000. Environments within: An Ethnographic Commentary on Scale'. In Culture, Landscape<br />
and the Environment: The 1997 Linacre Lectures, edited by K, Flint and H, Morphy, 72-110. Oxford: Oxford<br />
University Press.<br />
24
1.8 Methodology<br />
The choice of research method<br />
The research method used in this study consists of questionnaire and interview techniques of<br />
data collection. Key informant interviews were used as a technique for gathering data from<br />
the different key informants in the realm of national level institutions. The different national<br />
level stake holders involved in this exercise included: the Forest Department, the National<br />
Museums of Kenya (NMK), the Kenya Wildlife Services (KWS), the Kenya Resource Centre<br />
for Indigenous Knowledge (KENRIK), Ministry of Environment and Natural<br />
Resources,(MENR), the National Environmental Management Authority (NEMA) and Non<br />
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) such as the Kenya Forestry Association (KFS), the<br />
Integrated Natural Resources Society (INRS) and the World Agro Forestry Centre (WAC).<br />
These organisations were chosen purposively, based on the nature of their work that deeply<br />
involves them in the area of biodiversity. Key informant interviews were held with the<br />
identified respondents’ central to issues regarding biodiversity and the institutional<br />
frameworks within the respective organisations or agencies.<br />
The key informant interviews were based on a standardized questionnaire that was used in the<br />
process of data collection. This choice was found very relevant because officials and<br />
individuals with detailed knowledge regarding this subject matter are usually found within<br />
specialised institutions dealing with the broader area of biodiversity. Personal interviews<br />
made it possible to get further contacts of individuals known to have extensive knowledge in<br />
this area. This also made it easy for the researcher to access some of the drafted periodicals,<br />
bills, policies and information construed to be confidential in terms of reports and discussion<br />
on mission statements. All these had the effect of increasing reliability of the provided data.<br />
At the sub-national level the key informant interviews were found at the district and<br />
provincial levels. A total of 18 key informant interviews were administered for this survey.<br />
Overall, the research was done at two levels; at the national /sub-national mapping, and at the<br />
local level.<br />
The local level mapping survey<br />
A local mapping survey based on individual households was carried out between the months<br />
of July and September 2006. The total number of households studied was 220. These were<br />
located in Kakamega District, Western Kenya. Specifically, the study included all<br />
administrative divisions that make up Kakamega, apart from the Municipality division. These<br />
included: Shinyalu, Ikolomani, Ileho, and Lurambi. The principal sampling point was the<br />
location which is the lowest administrative unit of the decentralization structure in Kenya.<br />
Households visited were arranged into clusters. A total of 11 clusters, were sampled from the<br />
26 district clusters. These clusters also fall under the sampling frame used by Kenya Central<br />
Bureau of Statistics (CBS). Out of the 26 clusters obtained from the District Statistical Office<br />
(DSO) in Kakamega, the researcher was able to identify eligible enumeration areas. It is<br />
important to point out that each cluster contained 168 households. The above clusters are<br />
25
known to represent the different geographical areas of the district. However, these same<br />
clusters also take into consideration different other aspects such as semi-urban/rural<br />
stratifications, economic and social differentiations, as well as livelihood zonations. From<br />
these, 11 clusters were identified for the survey. These clusters eventually provided the<br />
principle sampling points, the locations, also know as a village. In total 220 households were<br />
sampled. The sample size for the house holds to be covered in the local mapping survey was<br />
statistically determined based on a precision of 5% and a confidence level of 95%. 105 On top<br />
of data collected from the individual household respondents, 11 focus group discussions were<br />
held to augment the quantitative data.<br />
A local institutional mapping questionnaire (see appendix A) was used to administer the<br />
household interviews. This was augmented by eleven focus group discussions which were<br />
held in each of the clusters. The focus group discussions brought together opinion leaders<br />
known to have lived in these places for a relatively longer period of time. These were in most<br />
cases clan leaders, village elders, and tribal chiefs among others. To avoid misinterpretation<br />
of the required data, four assistant local researchers were recruited and trained in detail<br />
regarding the meaning and intentions of the research. To enhance consistency and reduce<br />
misunderstandings, the interviews were conducted in the local language. To minimise the bias<br />
that can be caused by working with different assistants, the questionnaire was maintained in<br />
English but conducted in Swahili, the national language ably understood by all nationals. This<br />
version was further discussed and internalised by the assistant researchers. This made it<br />
possible to stimulate answers to the questions and generate more details for the study. It also<br />
helped to ensure that questions were asked and answered as perceived and intended.<br />
As part of the research protocol and procedure, the questionnaire was tested by conducting 22<br />
pre-test interviews in the different, but carefully selected, areas of Kakamega. This provided<br />
an opportunity for rephrasing the unclear questions and rearrangement of questions so as to<br />
achieve consistency and a chronological flow of the interviews. It is believed that the validity<br />
of the research was enhanced at this level. The first 22 filled pre-tested questionnaires were<br />
examined to identify discrepancies from the expected results and to ensure further<br />
understanding and reliability of data to be collected. On the whole the questionnaire had five<br />
sections. These included a section on household demographics, biodiversity perceptions,<br />
usage or management of biodiversity species, community usage of forest environment,<br />
management of local knowledge and land for biodiversity as well as knowledge of formal<br />
rules governing biodiversity.<br />
105 Bartllett, J. E, J. W, Kotrlik and C. Higgins. 2001. Organizational Research: Determining Appropriate Sample Size in<br />
Survey Research. Information Technology Leraning Journal 19(1): 43-50.<br />
26
Sources of data<br />
Data for this study was obtained using two sources. Primary data on specific NGOs dealing<br />
with biodiversity as a natural resource was obtained by using key informant interviews. Key<br />
informant interviews were conducted with the principal actors in various organizations.<br />
Information on NGOs working in the area of biological diversity resources was obtained<br />
using questionnaire and discussions with several persons in these organizations. Such people<br />
were designated to have adequate data relating to the subject of biodiversity and institutions.<br />
Other data was obtained during discussions with officials attending a one day biodiversity<br />
workshop in Nairobi and another one in Kakamega. Secondary data was collected from<br />
several sources. These included the various national Acts, Bills and Policies relating to natural<br />
resources and biodiversity. The following table shows the list of key legal documents and<br />
policy papers reviewed during the course of the study.<br />
Table 1.1 Summary of legal documents and policy papers reviewed<br />
Number Document Title Category of Document<br />
1 The Forestry Policy. Policy Document<br />
2 Kakamega District Strategic Plan on Environment Development Plan<br />
3 NEMA Annual reports for The year 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005 Annual Reports<br />
4 The Forest Act, Cap 385 1982 Laws of Kenya<br />
5 The District Working Paper on Environment and Development Working Paper/Debated<br />
6 The Wildlife Conservation and Management Act Cap 376 Laws of Kenya/legal act<br />
7 The Agricultural Act Cap 318 Laws of Kenya/Legal act<br />
8 The Timber Act Cap 386 Laws of Kenya/Legal Act<br />
9 The Wildlife Conservation and Management Act Cap 37 (Amm) Laws of Kenya/Legal Act/<br />
Amendments<br />
10 The New Forest Bill Bill<br />
The Forest Act , 2005 (Amm) Laws of Kenya<br />
12 The Environment Coordination and Management Act Laws of Kenya<br />
13 Sessional Paper No 6 on Environment and Development Sessional Paper under debate<br />
14 The Constitution of the Republic of Kenya National Constitution<br />
15 The local Government Act Laws of Kenya/Legal act<br />
16 The Antiquities & Monuments Act, Cap. 215 of 1984 Laws of Kenya/Legal act<br />
17 The Registered Land Act, Cap. 300 of 1985 (revised 1989) Laws of Kenya/Legal act<br />
18 The Trespass Act, Cap 294 of 1963 (revised 1982) Laws of Kenya/Legal act<br />
19 The Water Resources Act Laws of Kenya/ Legal Act<br />
20 The Land (Group Representatives) Act (Cap. 287) of 1968 (revised<br />
1970)<br />
Laws of Kenya/Legal act<br />
21 The Land Adjudication Act Cap. 284 of 1968 (revised 1977),<br />
Laws of Kenya/Legal act<br />
22 The Land Planning Act, Cap. 303<br />
Laws of Kenya/Legal act<br />
23 The Land Act Laws of Kenya/Legal Act<br />
Source: Author’s compilation<br />
Other useful sources of secondary data included annual reports of the key national agencies<br />
such as NEMA, The Forest Department. Centre for Biodiversity, Kenya Wildlife Services,<br />
Resource Surveys and Sensing Department among others. Various national reports and<br />
27
parliamentary session papers presented within the realm of biodiversity and natural resources<br />
were reviewed. The research also reviewed different publications that were produced by<br />
several environmental NGOs and other papers, reports and policy briefs published by various<br />
environmental journals in Nairobi.<br />
Primary data (national and sub-national level)<br />
Data at the national level was gathered in Nairobi, while that at the sub-national level was<br />
gathered in Kakamega district. The justification for using Nairobi arises out of the fact that<br />
Nairobi is the national capital of Kenya and therefore houses most of the national key<br />
ministries that were important for this mapping. These include the ministries of Agriculture,<br />
Environment and Natural Resources, Lands, Water among others. Nairobi is also home to<br />
most of the major agencies dealing with natural resources and environment. These include;<br />
NEMA, Resource Surveys, Biodiversity Centre, National Museums of Kenya, the Forest<br />
Department, and Kenya Wildlife Services among others. It is also imperative to mention that<br />
Nairobi is the central operating point for most of the NGOs working in the realm of<br />
biodiversity conservation and implementation of the numerous biodiversity protocols to<br />
which Kenya as a nation has accented.<br />
In terms of co-ordination mechanisms, it is instructive to point out that most of the actors<br />
dealing with co-ordination of national and international biodiversity regimes are stationed<br />
there. Besides, a lot of other opinion and informed leaders in this subject area are located and<br />
based there.<br />
The other issue that is worth mentioning is that the national formal institutional development<br />
process in terms of policy and legal framing processes begins and reaches its zenith in the<br />
city, so issues to deal with national norm emergency and national norm framing begin and<br />
ends in Nairobi.<br />
Lastly, Nairobi harbours the greatest bulk of the national population. More than 10% of the<br />
country’s urban population resides there. With the high population growth of rate of 7%,<br />
Nairobi is the commercial, industrial and trading capital. 106 The city is inhabited by people of<br />
diverse cultures and diverse communities.<br />
The sub-national mapping was obtained in Kakamega. It is of significant importance to<br />
discern that Kakamega serves as a home for both Western provincial administration and the<br />
district local government. It lies in the western part of Kenya. This region has a severe<br />
shortage of land and most of the indigenous inhabitants are the predominantly agricultural<br />
Luhya community. Agriculture accounts for 62% of the household income in this province<br />
and the province has relatively low literacy rates and low infrastructure. 107 Data for the<br />
national and sub-national level mapping covered different attributes such as standards applied<br />
during institutional design at various levels, prioritisation of communities or household<br />
106 GOK. 2004. Statistical Abstract. Nairobi: Government Printer.<br />
107 GOK. 2006. Statistical Abstract. Nairobi: Government Printer.<br />
28
knowledge, opinions, notions in relation to biodiversity, institutions responsible for policy<br />
implementation. Other issues ivestigated were; institutional frameworks regarding natural<br />
resource ownership, existence of conflicts in natural resource use and the scale of such<br />
conflicts, the key national institutions involved in biodiversity management and preservation,<br />
whether varied notions of biodiversity existed, institutional co-ordination, existence of<br />
informal networks, governance techniques and decision making among others.<br />
Primary data (local level mapping)<br />
The local level mapping was carried out in Kakamega District. It was carried out in 11<br />
clusters that are spread in the four different divisions of the district, that is; Ikolomani, illeho,<br />
shinyalu, kabras and Navaholo. The primary data from the local mapping was gathered from<br />
households in these divisions. The location which is the lowest administrative unit of the<br />
district was the principle Pampling Point (PSP). The local level mapping aimed at gathering<br />
data on household demographics, education, biodiversity values, perceptions and knowledge.<br />
Similarly, the study made investigations on resource ownership patterns, forest resource user<br />
groups, informal structures of control in society and household links to informal structures of<br />
control. Lastly, data was gathered on human and environmental values, integration of<br />
biodiversity into land use systems and livelihood interests, community rules of access to<br />
resource commons as well as community perceptions of formal institutions relating to<br />
biodiversity.<br />
Secondary data<br />
In order to make a full and meaningful use of the data collected from the local and<br />
national/sub-national mapping, more literature related to this subject matter was reviewed.<br />
The subsequent chapter(s) will discuss and present those results, assumptions and theories<br />
which are thought to have relevance and are taken to be significant to the current study.<br />
1.9 Organisation of the Study<br />
This study is presented in eight chapters. In the first chapter, a detailed background to study is<br />
given. Subsequently, the central research proposition, the central research question and the<br />
study’s problem statement as well as its objectives, are presented. This is followed by a<br />
concise treatment of the contemporary debates and notions relating to biodiversity. The last<br />
part of this chapter, delves into the research methodology.<br />
The second chapter presents the theoretical concepts and aspects related to this study. In here,<br />
a detailed and incisive look at institutions, institutionalism and the different interpretations is<br />
made. Part two of this chapter addresses the different branches of institutionalism, while the<br />
last part of this chapter makes an effort to establish a link between theory and actual research.<br />
The discussions in the third chapter dwells on national biodiversity perceptions and natural<br />
resources regimes. It discusses issues related to politics and the actors involved in the<br />
29
estoration of biodiversity in Kenya. The last part of this chapter provides an insight into the<br />
governance aspect of biodiversity in Kenya.<br />
The fourth chapter details our understanding of biodiversity, local decentralisation and neo-<br />
patrimonial politics in Kenya. The chapter begins with a look at the history of neo-patrimonial<br />
politics and how it led to the degeneration of national biodiversity. The second part makes a<br />
detailed presentation on biodiversity and local decentralisation in Kakamega district,<br />
highlighting issues of bioethics and ends with a discussion on the role of cognitive<br />
institutionalism in appreciating biodiversity conservation.<br />
The fifth chapter looks at institutional mapping at the national and the sub-national levels. It<br />
begins by introducing the national resource management and institutional regimes in Kenya,<br />
institutional roles and responsibilities, evolution of current institutions from the preindependence<br />
times up to the immediate years after independence. The second part of this<br />
chapter makes an analysis of the current policies and legal frameworks. This in a large<br />
measure deals with the current policy approaches to biodiversity conservations. The third part<br />
addresses the processes of institutional design and mediation and the general institutional<br />
legislation. Similarly it investigates the role of international interest as well as showing why<br />
the policy framing process later undertook demand driven approaches.<br />
The sixth chapter makes a presention of results from the local mapping household survey<br />
exercise. The first part deals with the study sample, choice of clusters, and an analysis of the<br />
demographic details of the survey in Kakamega. In the second part we make a detailed look at<br />
biodiversity perceptions, human and environmental values, information on biodiversity,<br />
integration of biodiversity into land use systems and livelihood interests, gender and cultural<br />
practices linked to biodiversity conservation.<br />
The seventh chapter looks at historical and sociological perspectives in Kakamega. The<br />
researcher examines the role of the two institutionalisms in explaining specific cultural and<br />
customary law practices in understanding local ecological thinking and other formal<br />
institutions relating to biodiversity in Kakamega. Furthermore, we analyse perceptions<br />
towards biodiversity formal rules, rules governing access to resources in Kakamega, as well<br />
as community user groups and property rights.<br />
The last chapter makes a final evaluation of the study. In doing so, it re-examines and refocuses<br />
on critical issues regarding biodiversity and resource protection in Kakamega and<br />
Kenya at large. In this chapter, an effort is made to re-contextualise the two important themes<br />
that have been central to this study. These are: institutionalism and local participation in<br />
natural resource management in Kakamega, hence making an outlook on the future of<br />
institutions regarding forest biodiversity conservation in Kenya. In doing so, the study makes<br />
an insight into policy areas that will warrant improvement in the future.<br />
30
2 Theoretical Considerations<br />
2.1 Institutions and institutionalism<br />
Institutions and institutionalism are central to contemporary debates across the social<br />
sciences. So too are concepts such as actors, action and agency. In order to understand how<br />
local perceptions shape peoples’ thinking regarding their local environment, or more precisely<br />
local understanding of biodiversity, entails the use of institutional theory in unraveling this<br />
interplay. There is widespread agreement that understanding institutional interplay constitutes<br />
a key challenge for institutionalists and action theories of all types.<br />
This chapter is intended to guide our study through the key debates and contemporary<br />
interpretations regarding the relationship between institutions, resource actors, and the role of<br />
institutions and institutionalism in addressing the governance of resource users, especially in<br />
instances where resources are held in common. The first section of the chapter will compare<br />
the major contending schools of thought in the realm of “new” institutionalism which has<br />
emerged in recent years. Specifically, we shall deal with the rational choice institutionalism,<br />
sociological institutionalism as well as historical institutionalism. In this evaluation we shall<br />
look at their methodological orientations and empirical weaknesses.<br />
The second part of the section shifts the focus from institutions to actors in resource regimes<br />
to find out which branches of institutionalism will be of utmost importance in helping us to<br />
understand the existing perceptions and perspectives in the realm of notion construction in<br />
Kakamega district. The aim here is to explore the theoretical basis for understanding reflexive<br />
practices, of varied actors in society (including individuals, organizations, or groups) in the<br />
use of a natural resource common like Kakamega forest. The analysis will aid our<br />
appreciation of the historical and sociological foundations of their habits, routines, and<br />
strategies in the light of the social and biological interaction.<br />
2.2 Institutions defined<br />
Institutions are simply rules, and as such make the foundation of politics, organization and<br />
ultimately society. Institutions can be divided into formal and informal. Formal institutions<br />
take the form of the national constitutions, statutes, laws, policies, regulations, zoning<br />
ordinances, and permit decisions. Informal institutions are those relating to the cultural,<br />
traditional and other societal norms. 108 Institutions form the basis of contemporary world<br />
order and without them; there would be no organization at all. This study will look at<br />
institutions as mediators of people-environmental relations, hence seeing institutions as<br />
regularized patterns of behaviour between individuals and groups in society, rather than as<br />
community level organizations. 109<br />
108<br />
Norgard, R. B. 1981. Social Systems and Ecosystem Evolution in the Amazon, Journal of Environmental<br />
Economics and Management 3: 238-254.<br />
109<br />
Ostrom, V, D. Feeny and H. Picht. eds. 1988. Rethinking Institutional Analysis and Development: Issues ,<br />
Alternatives and Choice.Sani Francisco, C.A: The Institute for contemporary Studies.<br />
31
Institutional theory suggests that, in a country’s formal protected and unprotected areas,<br />
institutions should be well defined, appropriate and enforceable at all times. 110 This means<br />
comprehensive legislation regarding conservation, transparent government policies and highly<br />
specified property right arrangements and contracts. Achieving this involves an evaluation,<br />
appreciation and understanding of relevant paradigms existing within the local environment<br />
and in particular, the relevant institutions to benefit and aid proper design of development<br />
policy. This should be augmented by a clear identification and description of some statistical<br />
correlations between the level of development and various social, political and institutional<br />
indicators. 111<br />
In addition to formal structures of laws, government policies and property rights, every<br />
country and society has an equally important parallel system of unwritten rules that govern<br />
everyday human behavior. These are unwritten rules or informal institutions. These can be<br />
cultural and behavioral norms, mores, beliefs, traditions and other rules governing<br />
organizational relationships and co-ordination processes. 112 Such institutions can be more<br />
influential. A society’s informal rules can for instance be more influential than a country’s<br />
formal rules. This is because, such informal rules are deeply embedded in individual practices<br />
and they represent an accumulation of social convention and conviction. 113 However, it is<br />
imperative to note that, the process of institutional building or more precisely institutional<br />
development is a more elaborate one in which institutions change. Institutions cannot be<br />
safely assumed to remain constant as in some other areas of social and economic life. 114<br />
Therefore, this makes the application and analysis of new institutions in relation to<br />
biodiversity not only interesting, but also disturbing and challenging. Like Bromley and<br />
Cernia noted, this is borne out of the fact that, intersecting formal and informal institution in<br />
the realm of development and more prominently in the link to biological diversity<br />
maintenance can be a great hurdle to overcome. 115 Overcoming this hurdle takes into account<br />
zeroing on the different characteristics and aspects of embedding the nature of institutional<br />
make up. Some of the aspects requiring greater attention include: (i) organizational, that is to<br />
say; the extent to which organizations and institutions coincide, (ii) formal (iii) created at a<br />
specific time and place by a specific means as opposed to having evolved from more diffuse<br />
sources (iv) embedded in as opposed to differentiated from other institutions (v) universal as<br />
110 North, D. 1986. Institutions and Economic Growth: A historical Introduction. Paper prepared for conference<br />
on the role of institutions in Economic Development. Ithaca, New York: Cornwell University.<br />
111 Scully, G. W. 1988. The institutional Framework and economic development: Journal of Political Economy.<br />
96 (3): 652-662.<br />
112 Pyhala, A. 2002. Institutions, Participation and protected Area Management in the Amazonia. A paper<br />
presented at the biennial Conference of IASCP; Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe.<br />
113 Greif, Aand D. Laitin. 2004. An Endogenous Theory of Institutional Change. American Political Science<br />
Review 98(4): 633-52.<br />
114 Sabel, C. F. 2005. A Real Time Revolution in Routines. In The Firm as a Collaborative Community, edited<br />
by C. Heckscher and P. Adler. Oxford: Oxford University Press.<br />
115 Bromley,D.W and M.M,Cernea. 1989. The management of common Property natural Resources :Some<br />
Operational Fallacies. Washington DC: The World Bank.<br />
32
opposed to particularistic in the interests they do serve (vi) creating as opposed to simply<br />
maintaining a certain public good. 116<br />
It is however significant to note that, the biggest challenge is in establishing agreement on<br />
whether institutions can be understood from a behaviour perspective, in which institutions are<br />
viewed as complexes of norms and behaviours that persist over time by serving collectively<br />
valued purposes. Or from a rules perspective wherein, institutions are viewed as rules of<br />
society or of organizations that facilitate coordination among people, by helping them form<br />
expectations where each person can reasonably hold in dealing with others. 117 This however,<br />
brings us to institutional levels of analysis as well as sequence of analysis. In specific terms<br />
this means that, at the “modest” level, one would have the contractual arrangements, where<br />
the rules characteristics may dominate, but in the relatively “high” level of analysis, the<br />
cultural values, mores, beliefs and traditional behaviours may seem more relevant. 118<br />
Similarly, as regards sequence, while at a given point in time, the rules and norms that<br />
characterize the institutions may be considered as given and independent of individual or<br />
group behaviour, over time they may evolve. We may observe dynamic claims going from<br />
rules to behavioral regularities to rules. 119<br />
Management of a natural resource common requires a commonly accepted criterion for<br />
successful institutional development, formal or informal. Biodiversity being a common public<br />
good means that in order to enhance control and discipline, and to avoid Hardin’s tragedy of<br />
commons, strong institutions must be built and instituted. 120 It is however significant to note<br />
that under conditions of collective or multiple resource usage, resource users can design and<br />
enforce resource control rules that govern their individual and collective choices so as to<br />
facilitate the sustainable management of resource commons. Edwards and Steins put it that<br />
social institutions have evolved as a means establishing to a stream of benefits that may be<br />
derived from a resource system. 121<br />
A resource system with property rights attached to it indicates the intention for some party to<br />
ensure that potential users observe predetermined restrictions or prohibitions concerning<br />
access to land and other natural resources embedded therein. In pure common resources or<br />
common property situations, the rights to resources are shared equally and are exclusive to a<br />
well defined set of people. 122 In this regard, Singh and his collaborates don’t point out clearly<br />
what happens to a natural resource regime when it is invaded by other groups of people who<br />
116<br />
Uphoff, N. 1992. Local Institutions and Participation: An Example of protected Area Planning. Public<br />
Administration and Development 17:413-423.<br />
117<br />
James, S.P. 2001. An Institutional Approach to Protected Area Management performance. In The politics of<br />
Park Management edited by S.P, James. Oxford: Rowmm and little field Publishers.<br />
118<br />
Nee, V. 2005. The New Institutionalisms in Economics and Sociology. In the Handbook of Economic<br />
Sociology, edited by J. Smelser and R. Swedberg, 44-74. NewYork: Sage/Princeton University Press.<br />
119<br />
Ruttan,V. M and K.Yahami. 1984. Towards a Theory of Induced Institutional Innovation. Journal of<br />
Development Studies 20:203-23.<br />
120<br />
Hardin, G. 1968. The Tragedy of Commons. Science 162:1243-1248.<br />
121<br />
Edwards, V.M and N. A, Steins. 1999. A framework for Analysing Contextual Factors in Common Pool<br />
Resources Research. Journal of Environmental Policy Planning 1:205-221.<br />
122<br />
Singh, S., et al. 1997. Harvesting Wild Species : Implications for Biodiversity Conservation. Baltimore: John<br />
Hopkins: University Press.<br />
33
are not originally part of the well defined group. What happens when such a group fails to<br />
adhere to existing institutions within that resource common? What happens to free riders, and<br />
how are they regulated and mediated? A more distinct and precise scenario would have been,<br />
relating this argument specifically to the kind of resource regime in question, clearly<br />
indicating whether it applies to a closed or open access resource regime. The questions<br />
highlighted in this scenario, will be of particular relevance to us, as we evaluate the particular<br />
behavioural responses particular of people thought to be different from the original tribal<br />
groups in the areas around Kakamega forest. Specifically this inference will be highlighted in<br />
chapter seven.<br />
In linking this Hardin’s tragedy of commons, it would be proper to point out that Hardin<br />
premised his postulation on the logic of individual rationality or lack of it, which according to<br />
him, led to the tragedy of commons. Theorists in the realm of institutions and common<br />
resource regimes have since identified the differences between open and closed access<br />
resource regimes, where internally enforced or social institutions harness individual<br />
rationality to the collective good. 123 It is no secret, social institutions have emerged and<br />
evolved as a means of establishing claims to a stream of benefits that might be derived from a<br />
resource system. A resource regime which lacks instituted property rights, conflicting rules,<br />
insecurity of tenure can lead to more degradation and over exploitation of resources. 124<br />
However, for successful institutions to work in a common resources arena, such institutions<br />
must obtain to certain aspects. One such aspects as Ostrom puts it, is the rules and constraint<br />
nature of institutions. 125<br />
Ostrom has defined these rules and constraints as prescriptions commonly known and used by<br />
a set of participants to order repetitive, interdependent relationships. She uses the term<br />
prescriptions to refer to the actions that are required, prohibited or permitted. 126 However, it is<br />
important to consider configurations of rules in terms of institutional analysis rather than<br />
single rules separately. This is based on the understanding that; rules are considered to reflect<br />
basic characteristics or norms of a particular society. 127<br />
The other aspect considered more peculiar to institutions is the inability of institutions to<br />
govern the relations among individuals and existing groups. Whether they are voluntarily<br />
accepted through custom or tradition, or they are enforced and policed through an external<br />
authority or by a coercive incentive system. 128 To serve an institutional role, these rules and<br />
123 Ciriacy-Wantrup, S.V and R.C, Bishop. 1975. Common property as Concept in Natural Resource Policy.<br />
Natural Ressources Journal 15: 713-727.<br />
124 Fortmann, L and J. W, Bruce. 1988. Whose Trees? Priprietary Dimensions of Forestry.<br />
Boulder: Westview Press.<br />
125 Ostrom, E.l. 1986. An Agenda for the study of Institutional. Public Choice 48(1): 3-25<br />
126 Ibid.<br />
127 March, J. G. and J. P, Olsen.1989. Rediscovering institutions: The organizational basis of politics. NewYork:<br />
Free Press.<br />
128 Holling, C.S. 1995. What Barriers? What Bridges. In Barriers and Bridges in Renewal of Ecosystems and<br />
Institutions. Edited by C.S, Holling, 14-16. New York: Columbia University Press.<br />
34
constraints have to be applicable to social relations because institutions are a product of social<br />
constructions. 129<br />
The third important aspect about institutions is that, they should be predictable. Rules and<br />
constraints should be understood as cardinal principles. They should be applicable in repeated<br />
and future situations. Agents should expect these rules and constraints to have some degree of<br />
stability. 130 Therefore, as discussed above, institutions can be characterized along a number of<br />
dimensions. These include: formal or informal rules, number of actors, membership, and<br />
heterogeneity of interests, leadership, incentive structures, societal level, centralized or<br />
decentralized, institutional dynamics, purposes, functions and outcomes as well as the way in<br />
which they are formed. Institutions may be embedded or nested within other institutions or<br />
overlap them. 131<br />
Therefore, understanding perceptions about biodiversity in Kakamega can be well understood<br />
when we look at the variations in the political and social institutions at both the local the<br />
national and international level. Furthermore, it will entail appreciating the fact that the biotic<br />
and social communities are co-evolutionary and interdependent.<br />
2.3 Unpacking Institutionalism<br />
Institutionalism specifically examines the ways in which institutions structure other social and<br />
political behavior. Institutions play a crucial role through influencing the relationships<br />
between individuals and how they interact. The method of inquiry is evolutionary; the object<br />
of inquiry is the social process; the search is for factual explanations and causal<br />
understandings. 132<br />
When dealing with institutionalism as a method of inquiry, social value judgments are a part<br />
of the process and must themselves be objects of analysis; the normative-positive dichotomy<br />
is rejected. More attention is given to uniformities of customs, habits, and laws as modes of<br />
organizing economic life. Individuals are influenced by motives that cannot be quantitatively<br />
measured. 133 However, it is imperative to note that, variations regarding the understanding of<br />
the concept of institutionalism continue to occur. These variations stem from the varied<br />
traditions of institutionalism and institutional thought. Therefore, understanding of the<br />
concept of institutionalism calls for our attention regarding the existing variations between<br />
these different traditions. Here, we need to divide institutionalism into two: between<br />
‘classical’ and ‘new’ institutionalism.<br />
129 Kraatz, M.S. and E. J, Zajac. 1996. Exploring the Limits of the New Institutionalism: The Causes and<br />
Consequences of illegitimate Organizational change. American Sociological Review 61(5): 812-836.<br />
130 King, A. L. 1997. Instituttonal Interplay: A Report for Institutional Dimensions of Global Change.<br />
International Human Dimension Programme on Global Enviromental Change, University of Vermont.<br />
131 Giddens, A. 1984. The Constitution of Society. Berkeley: University of California Press.<br />
132 North, D.C.1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance.<br />
Cambridge: Cambridge. University Press.<br />
133 Clerkin, R M. 2006. Equifinality in nonprofit advocacy: A neoinstitutional exploration of nonprofit advocacy.<br />
Doctoral dissertation. Bloomington:.Indiana University.<br />
35
While the positions taken in the field of institutional theory are plentiful, these broad<br />
groupings have meaning and it allows us to stress a core distinction and divide in social<br />
theory, which is; between a social constructivist and an individualist perspective on behaviour<br />
and choice. 134 Understanding this divide is a crucial component of this study. In the foregoing<br />
treatment, it is logical to stress that, the rule values and rule frameworks governing a<br />
particular natural resource regime, reflect the functions such rule values play. They also depict<br />
the behaviours of the users. This is seen in the context of institutions at play, which is<br />
consequently the role of institutionalism. 135<br />
Traditional Institutionalism<br />
Traditional classical institutionalism has a complex history. This branch of institutionalism<br />
has remained shelved for a time. It is a brain child of theorists working in two different fields<br />
of study. Thorsten Veblen, 136 largely from an economists´ perspective and Emile Durkheim, 137<br />
from the sociological areas of study. The two proponents have in most scholarly literature on<br />
institutions and institutionalism been referred to as the two traditionalists. The duo appeared<br />
at the close of 19th and dawn of 20th Century. They provided the foundations for building this<br />
arm of institutionalism. Its characteristics reflect a distinct way of understanding behaviours<br />
and social interactions and interplays. 138<br />
Over time, institutional thinking has developed, implying refinement and the establishment of<br />
sub-positions. But still, there are some core ideas that are common to these various stances.<br />
According to the classical stand, the individual is looked at as socially constructed, meaning<br />
that he carries norms, values and expectations that have its origin in the institutions of a<br />
society. The social make up is an objective reality, meaning that it can be observed as<br />
something independent of the subjects who are the specific individuals. The society has<br />
distinct effects on the shaping of the individual. Institutions are thus constitutive of<br />
individuals and the communication between them. This has been emphasised by Veblen who<br />
defined institutions as “settled habits of thought common to the generality of man”. 139<br />
Another scholar, Scott, looks at institutionalism as “cognitive, normative, and regulative<br />
structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior”. 140 Thus, both<br />
these authorities being active at the front end of the 20th century emphasized that institutions<br />
have a formative influence on individuals. Scott is more explicit when it comes to pointing<br />
out the underlining tenets that lead to the process of institutionalism. He mentions that the<br />
134<br />
Spash, C.L. 1999. The development of Environmental thinking in Economics.Enviromental Values 8: 413-<br />
435.<br />
135<br />
Hall, P. 1986. Governing the Economy. New York: Oxford University Press.<br />
136<br />
Veblen, T. 1919. The Place of Science in Modern Civilization and Other Essays. New York: Huebsch.<br />
137<br />
Clark, J. 2002. Structuring Deliberation in Environmental Decision-making Using a Multicriteria Approach.<br />
Paper presented at ESF/SCSS Exploratory workshop on new strategies for solving environmental conflicts.<br />
Leipzig, 26-28 June.<br />
138<br />
DiMaggio, P.J. 1991. The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago<br />
Press.<br />
139<br />
Veblen, T . Opcit.<br />
140<br />
Scott,W.R. 1995. Institutions and Organizations..California: Sage Publications.<br />
36
process is a product of both external rules which form the regulative structures and constructs<br />
that shape the individual. 141 They become synthesised and internalised through the process of<br />
social construction. This concerns both what the individuals have learned to observe and what<br />
they have learned to respect. 142 In terms of natural resource regimes, what has been going on<br />
as a norm in a given resource environment is more likely to continue unabated over time<br />
unless a strong external force, usually by a coercive authority, changes the norms and<br />
customs. 143<br />
Therefore, this branch of institutionalism helps us understand what the cognitive aspects are<br />
and what should be the normative aspects. These are important social dimensions to both the<br />
cognitive and the normative issues in life. 144 While different languages may be used to explain<br />
different existing phenomena, a quite coherent basic perspective has evolved across such<br />
broad fields as classical institutional economics. That is to say: the traditionalists from Veblen<br />
and his disciples, to sociology, organizational theory and parts of political science. 145<br />
Scott’s works are distinctively in a sociological and ultimately within the theory of<br />
organizations realm. His position is quite representative when viewed from a modern<br />
approach and analysis of the so called classic institutional economists. 146 These tend to<br />
support the individual in his capacity to act through delivering structure and meaning to both<br />
cognitively and normatively intractable problems. 147 Situations of the sort as described in the<br />
preceding paragraph can create opportunities to promote cognitive transitions aimed at<br />
devising new and improved systems for managing human uses of living resources in<br />
situations characterized by cross-level interactions. This cognitive framework also postulates<br />
that, mental models are not only important in situations of radical uncertainty. If it is<br />
recognized that information is generally imperfect, then it becomes clear that individual<br />
perceptions of the resource choice set generally varies and the cognitive dimension comes to<br />
the forefront of the analysis. 148<br />
Simon has made pioneering contributions in this respect. He explains sub-optimal decisionmaking<br />
by cognitive limitations. However, such limitations are seen as something, which in<br />
practice cannot be overcome. 149 This has generated criticism from classical institutional<br />
economists such Hodgson, for ignoring the social influences on the process of decisionmaking<br />
and the institutional aspects of the complex transformation of sense data via bits of<br />
141 Berger, P. and T. Luckmann. 1967. The Social Construction of Reality. A Treatise in the Sociology of<br />
Knowledge. London:Penguin Books.<br />
142 Meyer, J.W and R.Scott. 1983. Organisational Environments:Ritual andRationality. Bevery Hills: Sage<br />
Publications.<br />
143 Brinton, M. C and V. Nee. 1998. The new institutionalism in sociology. Stanford: Stanford<br />
University Press.<br />
144 Weick, K. E. 1995. Sensemaking in organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.<br />
145 Pierson, P. 2000. Increasing returns, path dependence, and the study of politics. American Political Science<br />
Review, 94 (2):251-267.<br />
146 Mizruchi, M. S and L. C, Fein. 1999. The social construction of organizational knowledge: A study of the<br />
uses of coercive, mimetic, and normative isomorphism. Administrative Science Quarterly, 44 (4): 653-683.<br />
147 Scott, W.R. 1995. Institutions and Organizations. California: Sage Publications.<br />
148 Simon, H. 1991. Oraganisations and Markets. Journal of Economic Perspectives 5: 25-44.<br />
149 Ibid.<br />
37
information to knowledge. 150 Hodgson together with other economists and sociologists stress<br />
the importance of cultural specificity in the generation of information through pre-established<br />
interpretative schemes.<br />
North has illustrated that rationality is not necessarily imperfect, but procedural ideas and<br />
ideologies matter, and therefore institutions play a major role in determining how much they<br />
matter. Ideas and ideologies are seen to shape the mental constructs that individuals use to<br />
interpret the world around them and make choices. 151 Institutions deliberately or accidentally<br />
increase or decrease the price on acting upon one’s ideas and thereby influence the role of<br />
mental constructs and ideological stereotypes. 152 In summary, North recognizes the central<br />
role of ideologies and its insufficient attention in economics as well as the incapability of<br />
analyzing this role by means of economic theory alone. Other contributions do stress similar<br />
mechanisms by using the concept of values. Cognitive processes at both the individual and the<br />
organizational level are seen as fundamentally shaped by values.<br />
New Institutionalism<br />
New institutionalism is here used to mean or label a rather “newer” arm of thinking in the<br />
study of institutionalism. It has its roots in institutional economics, originating in the 1960s<br />
and carried forward by proponents like North, 153 Eggertsson, 154 and Coase. 155 This school of<br />
thought is largely grounded in the individualist model of rational choice as it appears more<br />
rooted in neo-institutional economics. Proponents of this branch of institutionalism apply<br />
these tenets to the development of institutions. This branch of institutionalism views<br />
institutions as external restrictions. North plainly defines institutionalism as the “the rules of<br />
the game”. 156 New institutionalists thus define institutionalism within the context in which<br />
individuals’ acts, interests and interactions. To them rules frame transactions for individuals<br />
by establishing formalized rights and duties as well as measurement scales among others. To<br />
some scholars, such as Shepsle, this means an effort to apply economic reasoning and rational<br />
choice models to the analysis of institutions. 157<br />
Central to the tenet of new Institutionalism is that institutions are not immune or neutral to<br />
policy outcomes. The organization of policy making outcomes affects the degree of power<br />
and anyone set of actors has over policy outcomes. 158 On the other hand organizational<br />
150 Hodgson, G .M. 1998. The Approach of Institutional Economics. Journal of Economic Literature 36:166-92.<br />
151 North,D.C. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge:Cambridge<br />
University Press.<br />
152<br />
Ibid.<br />
153<br />
North,D.C.1990. Opcit.<br />
154<br />
Eggertsson, T. 1990. Economic Behavior and Institutions.Cambridge:Cambridge UniversityPress<br />
155<br />
Coase, R.H. 1984. The New Institutional Economics. Journal of Theoretical and Institutional Economics<br />
140(1):229-231.<br />
156<br />
North, D.C. 1990. Opcit.<br />
157<br />
Hodgson, G. 2002.The Evolution of Institutions:An Agenda for Future Theoretical Research,” Constitutional<br />
Political Economy 13:111-128.<br />
158 Shepsle, K. 2006. Old Questions and New Answers about Institutions: In The Riker Objection Revisited,<br />
38
position also influences actors’ definition of their own interests. In this respect Young points<br />
out that, institutions are organizational artefacts created by human beings to cope with the<br />
problems associated with of coordination and cooperation that arise as a result of<br />
interdependencies among activities of individuals or social groups. 159 Therefore, in a way<br />
organizational factors affect the degree of pressure that an actor can bring on policy, and the<br />
likely direction of that pressure. Hence new institutionalism defines the rules of the political<br />
and economic games and as well as the actors at play. 160 Thus, this branch of institutionalism<br />
can inform and shape who wins and who loses, since it is all about shared strategies,<br />
inherently defining who can play and how they can play. 161<br />
Rational Choice Institutionalism (RCI)<br />
This branch of new institutionalism buds out of new institutional economics. Rational choice<br />
proponents attempt to apply formal logic and methods to study politics and history, carefully<br />
avoiding mushy or less precise variables such as norms and beliefs. They instead use basic<br />
assumptions to understand human behavior. 162<br />
This type of methodological inquiry helps the rational choice institutionalists to unmask and<br />
examine the basic laws governing political behaviours and actions. Scholars in this tradition<br />
argue that, once laws are discovered, models which will help us to understand and predict<br />
political behavior can be constructed. 163 Rational choice scholars look at the real world to see<br />
if their model is right. For these scholars’ understanding of the real outcomes is not the first<br />
issue, but creating and elaborating or refining a theory of politics. 164 To this Key adds that, the<br />
most peculiar item about the rational choice institutionalism is the ability to make policy<br />
decisions normally arrived at in a rational manner. 165 Policy making, according to this<br />
approach, involves the identification of a problem, examination of the various alternatives for<br />
dealing with the problem and selecting the best policy package, based on costs and benefits.<br />
Although institutions are developed as economic and social norms, these restrictive and<br />
regulative rules are important not only in establishing necessary order, but also simplify<br />
transactions between given individuals and firms. 166 Most authors within this school of<br />
thought such as Williamson adhere to the idea of individual rationality as in neo-classical<br />
edited by B, Weingast and D, Wittman, 57-58. Oxford Handbook of Political Economy. Oxford: Oxford<br />
University Press.<br />
159 Young,O. 1982. Resource Regimes in Natural Resources and Social Institutions. Berkeley: University of<br />
California Press.<br />
160 Williamson, O. 1979. Transactions Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations. Journal of<br />
Law and Economics.<br />
161 Imperial ,M.T. 1999. Institutional Analysis and Ecosystem-Based Management: The Institutional Analysis<br />
and Development Framework. Environmental Management 24:449-465.<br />
162 Fiorina, M.1995. A Rational Choice and the New Institutionalism.Polity 38:107-115.<br />
163 Levi, M. 1988. Of Rule and Revenue. Berkeley: University of California Press.<br />
164 Weingast, B. 1996. Political Institutions, Rational Choice Perspectives. A New Hand Book of Political<br />
Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.<br />
165 Key,V.O. 1947. Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups. New York:Thomas and Crowell Company.<br />
166 Sartorius,C. 2002. The Relevance of the Group for the Evolution of Social Norms and Values,” Constitutional<br />
Political Economy,13: 149-172.<br />
39
economics, that is; rationality as maximizing individual gain. For the individual is understood<br />
as self-contained; implying that preferences are stable and thus independent of the institutions<br />
of a society. 167 This is further galvanised by Milgrom and Roberts who mention that<br />
institutional mechanisms where by principles can monitor and enforce compliance on their<br />
argents have to be instituted. 168<br />
The major underlying point of contention here is; how does received knowledge and wisdom<br />
find its way into policy and manage to stay with tenacity? To appreciate this, the study<br />
undertakes to investigate the local perceptions of biodiversity, and how they are mediated into<br />
policy. Implicit in the above, we observe two distinct views on what rationality is. The ‘new’<br />
rationalists base their model on rational choice as maximization of individual utility. This we<br />
shall term individual rationality. 169 Choices are here understood as rational if preferences are<br />
rational and choices are made in accordance with what is preferred to as the most satisfying<br />
by the individual. Preferences are rational if they are complete, transitive and continuous. This<br />
links rationality directly with maximization of individual utility. Concerning completeness, it<br />
is demanded that the agent knows all about him or herself and the goods. Concerning<br />
transitivity, it is demanded that all rankings are consistent. 170 Concerning continuity, it is<br />
demanded that choices, values, norms and prevailing rules regime are commensurable.<br />
Individuals are therefore assumed to be fully rational and don’t exhibit non rational<br />
behaviour. 171 But the issue of individual rationality is a very contentious and rather subjective<br />
one especially when it comes to measurability and judgement. For example, how can we<br />
measure substantive rationality, since rational behaviour is seen in terms of choices it<br />
produces? How can these choices be evaluated in the interest of preserving and maintaining<br />
biodiversity in commonly owned resources especially under open access regimes? 172<br />
The classical view on rationality is however quite different. For, it embodies two distinct<br />
ideas. First, it is emphasizes that institutions are crucial for supporting individual human<br />
choices. It is found impossible for the individual to act rationally without the support of social<br />
institutions. 173 This has a lot to do with the fact that institutions simplify life, reduce<br />
complexity through defining what is at stake, which actions are relevant, legitimate and<br />
enforced. 174<br />
The other issue is that internalised norms are socially defined solutions to the conflicts<br />
involved when individual acts are competing. 175 In relating this to choices made for or against<br />
biodiversity maintenance, it is important to acknowledge that norms are an expected solution<br />
167 Williamson, O. 1985. Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: Free Press.<br />
168 Milgrom, P and J. Roberts. 1992. Economics, Management and Organisation. New York: Prentice Hall.<br />
169 Denzau, A. and D. North. 1994. Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions 47(1):3-31.<br />
170 Hausman, D.M. 1992. The Inexact and Separate Science of Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge University<br />
Press.<br />
171 Simon, H.A. 1986. Rationality in Psychology and Economics. Journal of Business 55(4): 209-224.<br />
172 Rothstein, B. 1998. Just Institutions Matter: The Moral and Political Logic of the Universal Welfare State.<br />
New York:Cambridge University Press.<br />
173 Etzioni, A. 1988. The Moral Dimension: Towards a new Economics New York: The Free Press.<br />
174 Ibid.<br />
175 Hayek, F. 1945. The Use of Knowledge in Society. American Economic Review.<br />
40
to a specific choice problem, which further supports a certain underlying value cause. The<br />
norms resolve the conflict, typically a conflict between the ‘I’ and the ‘We’, the individual<br />
and the group interest. This can be seen as a preferred solution to a coordination problem<br />
where the group or the society has developed rules and values concerning how the needs of<br />
the ‘I’ and the ‘We’ should be balanced. 176 There is not only calculation, but there is also<br />
involvement, and discussion, with consideration given to the inner working and decisionmaking<br />
process that occurs at aggregation levels, rather than the individual level alone. 177<br />
There are behaviours motivated both by individual utility and there are behaviours founded on<br />
norms. Basing ourselves on the behaviours motivated or founded on norms, it is imperative to<br />
note that, underlying choices and goals are made according to existing institutions.<br />
Etzioni proposes a broader behavioural mode that obtains in the neo-classical model-that is to<br />
say; the global rationality in choosing means. 178 He asserts that the normative and effective<br />
values are a category that includes both moral values and social values. Taking into account<br />
the fact that moral reasoning is about what is the right thing to do. 179 What is rational is,<br />
according to this view, is not a result of isolated individual calculation, given external<br />
institutional constraints. First, institutions influence what we observe. When assigning values<br />
to the environment, the individual decision making process has to be taken into consideration.<br />
This is because there is no legitimate source of values apart from individuals. 180 Many neoclassical<br />
economists regard the “homo economi-cus” constructs as a fiction. Usually, it’s not<br />
thought that this model reflects actual behaviour and is useful in predicting economic<br />
behaviour and usually its not adopted. It is therefore imperative to note that, this model of the<br />
individual can tell what human economic behaviour towards the environment can be.<br />
The other issue to consider is that institutions influence which preferences we hold and find<br />
right to defend. Choices, more precisely rational choices, are thus not simply about what is<br />
“optimal” for the individual. Individual preferences are hard to change. The assumption of<br />
stable, unchanging preferences with the assumption of maximizing behaviour form the heart<br />
of this arm of institutionalism. 181 Preferences are also about what is “right” to do in a certain<br />
situation or institutional context. It is about which acts are defensible in specific situations. 182<br />
What can be defended depends on the institutional or social frame of reference. That may be<br />
family, a certain social class, the local community, or a larger social grouping like a state. 183<br />
This emphasis is crucial, especially when making the distinction between individual and<br />
176 Katzenstein, P.1976. Between Power and Plenty. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.<br />
177 Tacconi, L. 2001. Biodiversity and Ecological Economics: Participation, Values and Resource Management.<br />
London: Earth Scan Publications Limited.<br />
178 Etzioni, A. 1988. Opcit.<br />
179 Ibid.<br />
180 Orren, K and S. Skowronek. 1994. Beyond the Iconography of Order: Notes for a 'new'Institutionalism. In<br />
Dynamics of American Politics edited by L. Dodd and C. Jillson, 311-332. Boulder: Westview Press.<br />
181 Levi, M. 1997. Consent, Dissent and Patriortism. New York: Cambridge University Press.<br />
182 Jepperson, R.L.1991.Institutions, Institutional Effects and Institutionalism. In The New Institutionalism in<br />
Organisational Analysis edited by W.W Powell and P. Di Maggio, 143-163. Chicago: Chicago University<br />
Press.<br />
183 Ibid .<br />
41
social rationality. 184 The social grouping may be very different based on very different internal<br />
motivational structures. 185 Hence, like what Hall and Taylor noted, rational choice<br />
institutionalists employ a characteristic set of behavioural assumptions positing that the<br />
relevant actors have fixed set of preferences. In this regard there are many ‘WEs’, a fact that<br />
should be upheld. 186<br />
Furthermore, in each social setting every one is designated a specific role that carries a set of<br />
expectations, be it the village elder, the teacher, the citizen, the mediator or the local<br />
knowledge expert. 187 From the above analysis we observe that there is a clear link between the<br />
definition of what rational choice is and the perspective of what institutions are and do. This<br />
should not be a surprise. Instead, by discussing these matters over and over, one can<br />
appreciate the fact that, there must be a strong connection. 188 This observation is not relevant<br />
only as a characteristic of the two involved main models. It has great impact on how we<br />
understand and institutionalise social choices. 189<br />
While there is an understanding of what institutions are and can do, it is still riddled with<br />
variations. 190 One such variation is the ability to acknowledge that, to reason, to communicate<br />
or calculate, and to do the choosing is not cost free. 191 It is this cost that we weigh to find out<br />
what benefits come with the choices in respect to particular facets of the natural resource at a<br />
given time. 192<br />
In relation to the above, Simon cautions us; he informs that, this is demanding, irrespective of<br />
the way choices are made. Whether choices are made on the basis of calculative rationality or<br />
they are normatively based. The idea of ‘bounded rationality’ is a response to this problem. I93<br />
The basic idea here is that the decision maker transforms complex or intractable decision<br />
problems into tractable ones. 194 One procedure is to look for satisfactory choices instead of<br />
optimal ones. Another is to replace abstract global goals with tangible sub-goals, whose<br />
achievement can be observed and measured. 195 The third issue is to divide up the decisionmaking<br />
tasks among many specialists, coordinating their work by means of a structure of<br />
184 Shepsle, K. A. 1986. Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium institutions. Political Science 23:27.59<br />
185 Ibid.<br />
186 Hall, A.P and C.R, Taylor. 1996. Political Science and The Three New Institutionalisms: Political Studies<br />
27:936-957.<br />
187 Ibid.<br />
188 Synyder, R and J.Mahoney. 1999. The Missing Variable: Institutionalism and the Study of Regime Change.<br />
Comparative Politics 3:103-122.<br />
189 Immergut, E. 1998. The Theoretical Core of the New Institutionalism. Politics and Society 26 (1):5-34.<br />
190 Ibid.<br />
191 Green, D and I. Shapiro. 1994. Pathologies of Rational Choice Institutionalism. New Haven :Yale University<br />
Press.<br />
192 Fearson, J and D, Latin. 1996. Explaining Interethnic Cooperation. American Political Science Review<br />
90:715-735.<br />
I93 Simon, H.A. 1979. Rational Decision Making in Business organisations. The American Economic Review 69:<br />
493-513.<br />
194 Jupille, J and J. A Caporaso. 1999. Institutionalism and the European Union: Beyond Comparative and<br />
International Relations. International Review of Political Science 2:429-444.<br />
195 Hall, P.A. 1993. Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of Economic Policymaking in<br />
Britain. Comparative Politics 25 (3): 275-296<br />
42
communications and authority relations”. 196 Boundedness is relevant for both kinds of<br />
rationality as defined above.<br />
In the case of individual rationality as maximization, it implies that since maximizing is costly<br />
and indeed very costly as defined– satisfying would be the only realistic option. 197 More still,<br />
one could retain the focus on individual utility. While one would like to build social choices<br />
on aggregating such individual satisfying behaviour is another issue. 198 Material welfare<br />
economists attempted to compare the well-being of social groups but refrained from<br />
comparing the utility of individual persons. 199 This presents us with a dilemma, since we tend<br />
to gang up individual interests as if they happen in the same place and time!<br />
Concerning the social forms of rationality, one could make similar claims. 200 Individuals may<br />
not always be able to follow norms, or act reciprocally because they misinterpret the situation<br />
or do not take the time necessary to figure out what it demands. 201 While boundedness applies<br />
to both models of rationality, it should be emphasized that conventions and norms may both<br />
be viewed also as responses to problems appearing when solving complex choice problems. 202<br />
Thus boundedness is in a way already captured by the classical view. Conventions and norms<br />
are a solution to individually intractable or very difficult choice problems. 203<br />
Katznelson and Weingast in a comparative analysis of rational choice and historical<br />
institutionalisms, explain that the breakdown of institutions can lead to institutional conflict<br />
and thus impose costs on all parties involved. 204 In the first application, the duo asks why we<br />
have ethnic conflict in resource management when it is too costly for those using natural<br />
resources. The simple answer is; ethnic conflict is irrational but this answer does not resolve<br />
the fundamental institutional puzzle. 205<br />
Therefore we note that this sub-set of institutionalism has come under criticism by analysts<br />
like Bell. He argues that the rational choice approach borrows heavily from economics and<br />
adopts a ‘deductive’methodology. This, he explains, results from the fact that explanations<br />
and working hypotheses are‘deduced’ from abstracted first principle assumptions about the<br />
motives and preferences of actors. 206 As Fiorina points out, the rational choice approach as the<br />
196 Ibid.<br />
197 Weingast, B. 2002. Rational-Choice Institutionalism. in Political Science: The State of the Discipline, edited<br />
by I. Katznelson and H. Milner, 660-692. New York: W.W. Norton.<br />
198 Simon, H.A. 1979. Opcit.<br />
199 Fearson, J and D, Latin. 1996. Opcit.<br />
200 Vatn, A. 2004. Valuation and Rationality. Land Economics 8:1-18.<br />
201 Ibid.<br />
202 Knight, J. 1995. Models, Interpretations, and Theories, Constructing Explanations of Institutional<br />
Emergence and Change. In Explaining Institutions edited by J. Knight and I. Sened, 95-119. Ann Arbor:<br />
University of Michigan Press.<br />
203 March,J.G. 1994. A Primer on Decision-Making. How Decisions Happen. New York: Free Press.<br />
204 Katznelson, I and B. R, Weingast. 2005. Intersections Between Historical and Rational Choice<br />
Institutionalism. In Preferences and Situations:Intersections Between Historical and Rational Choice<br />
Institutionalism,edited by I.Katznelson and B, R. Weingast, 1-27. Newyork: Russell Sage Foundation.<br />
205 Ibid.<br />
206 Bell, S. 2002. The Limits of Rational Choice: New Institutionalism in the testbed of Central Banking Polics<br />
in Australia. Political Studies 50:477-496.<br />
43
name stipulates, assumes that individuals and actors are rational. 207 Actors are also assumed to<br />
have motives dominated by preferences, selfish maximising motive, and utility maximisation.<br />
We must also make mention of the conventional view that the rational choice approach is one<br />
that takes preferences as given”. 208 While the pre-supposition that actors are essentially preinformed<br />
and economically rational individuals is justifiable, it can sometimes be misleading.<br />
As a result, Shepsle informs that a sort of behavioural box which is understood as a structured<br />
field of behavioural incentives and disincentives is necessary. The author maintains that this<br />
behavioural box contains the formal and informal rules, practices, routines or norms of the<br />
institutional setting in question. In this context, actors’ pre-given motives and preferences are<br />
regulated. The institutions thus, are some kind of force field of incentives and disincentives<br />
are said to shape the maximising behaviours of actors. 209 Hence, the rational choice approach<br />
features the use of exogenous assumptions about motives and preferences and a deductive<br />
methodology.<br />
Rational choice institutionalism and biodiversity interaction<br />
Given the different perspectives on rationality, distinct views on human interaction with the<br />
environment or particularly biodiversity also follow. The perspective of individual rationality<br />
implies an instrumental perception of action. Acting is to pursue strategies that secure<br />
maximum individual utility while on the other hand protecting the biological diversity. Other<br />
actors are either irrelevant to that process, appear as competitors, or they are mere instruments<br />
in terms of rule enforcement of resource regime maintenance. The natural consequence of this<br />
view is the development of non-cooperative game theory. 210 People act to maximize their<br />
returns given the structure of the game. They do not communicate, or if they do it, they do so<br />
strategically. They do this through diplomatic or persuasive talk, meaning that they say one<br />
thing but still do the contrary. 211 For instance, community members may agree to conserve a<br />
given plant and animal species because of their social and biological importance, but on the<br />
contrary the same members of the community hunt down the same species.<br />
The idea of social rationality brings in communication, cooperation, dialogue and trust. It is<br />
about developing appropriate norms in a dialogical way, about which solutions are the best for<br />
the group involved. 212 As defined here, this is what we call communicative action which<br />
builds on social rationality. Acting or arguing selfishly in such a situation is counteracted by<br />
207 Fiorina, M. P. 1995. ‘Rational choice and the new institutionalism. Polity, 28: 107–15.<br />
208 Bates, R. H., de Figueiredo, P. R. and Weingast, B. R. 1998. ‘The politics of interpretation: rationality,culture<br />
and transition’, Politics and Society 26: 603–38.<br />
209 Shepsle, K. A. 1989 ‘Studying institutions: some lessons from the rational choice approach’, Journal<br />
Theoretical Politics, (1): 1-34.<br />
210 Austen–Smith, D and W.H, Riker. 1987. Asymmetric Information and coherence of Legislation. American<br />
Political Science Review 81: 879-918.<br />
211 Habermas,J. 1984. The theory of communicative Action. Volume one: Reason and the rationalisation of<br />
Society. Boston: Beacon Press.<br />
212 Elster, J. 1986. The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties of Political Theory. In Foundations fo Social<br />
Choice Theory, edited by J.Elster and A.Hylland, 103-132. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.<br />
44
the subsequent lack of general or socially acceptable validity in the claim. 213 It is about<br />
reasoning together over which solution should be sought and about developing and testing<br />
arguments concerning which preferences, norms or behavioural rules should be supported in<br />
the defined social setting among others. People seem to exhibit interest in both, using their<br />
environment as well as conserving it. Conservation initiatives may benefit from people who<br />
exhibit conservation interests. Thus, utility or willingness to pay forms the basis for individual<br />
rationality. On the other hand the ability of communities to follow existing institutions forms<br />
the core of social rationality. 214<br />
From the above analysis we observe that cooperation, trust and communicative action are<br />
paramount to institutional success. In short, we are talking about individuals as paramount<br />
institutional structures. Therefore, understanding individual behaviour is of essence, since it<br />
informs the wider set of individual motivations as implied by the classical institutional<br />
position. Such behaviour is favoured by the establishment of markets or market surrogates. 215<br />
We must also mention that individual choice in the neo-classical sense has to be supported by<br />
structures such as private property rights, accounting devices, corporate business forms,<br />
markets, land access rights etc. 216 This raises a crucial question; which institutional structure is<br />
best suited for treating the issue at hand? Is it the market or is it the forum? One can quickly<br />
answer; it is the market not the forum. The answer to this question though simple, is also a<br />
confusing one. While the idea of individual rationality is best fostered by the establishment of<br />
markets – by creating non-communicative exchange processes – the idea of social rationality<br />
is in itself plural. Its institutional counterparts can take a variety of forms. 217 This is actually<br />
the challenge faced when formulating communicative or deliberative institutions for making<br />
environmental choices. 218<br />
There are two crucial aspects to the choice of proper value articulating institutions. First, one<br />
has to ask which issues are at stake. Are they individual? Is calculation and exchange the<br />
proper solution implying that the goods at stake can be interpreted as commodities? Or are<br />
more societal issues involved moving us to consider a forum type value articulating<br />
institution? If the latter is chosen, the issue of which type of forum to choose involves an<br />
evaluation of the type of the problem at hand. It does however, also involve a second issue:<br />
that of evaluating the overall institutional setting in which the specific problem appears.<br />
Furthermore, we note that no institutional structure can be set up independent of the historical<br />
context in which an issue is to be treated. Existing resource rights, property rights or others<br />
213<br />
Dryzek J.S. 2002. Deliberative Democracy and Beyond. Liberals, Critics, Contestations.<br />
214<br />
Elster, J.1998. Deliberative Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University.<br />
215<br />
Dryzek J.S. 2002. Opcit<br />
216<br />
Lucas, R. E. 2000. Some Macroeconomics for the 21st Century’, Journal of Economic Perspectives 14<br />
(1):159–78.<br />
217<br />
Hall, P. and R. Taylor. 1996. Political science and the Three New Institutionalisms. PoliticalStudies 44: 936-<br />
957.<br />
218<br />
Bates, R et al. 1998. The Politics of Interpretation: Rationality, Culture,and Transition. Politics and Society<br />
26(4): 603-638.<br />
45
will play important roles. This evaluation would necessitate directing our attention to<br />
discussions concerning another branch of institutionalism, historical instituionalism.<br />
Historical Institutionalism<br />
The historical institutionalists are interested in understanding and explaining events and<br />
outcomes. Scholars working in this tradition argue that one can explain particular historical<br />
outcomes by examining the way in which political institutions had shaped or structured the<br />
political process. 219 One key concept is through upholding the path dependency concept. The<br />
path dependency concept postulates that the historical track of a given institution will result in<br />
almost inevitable occurrences. In some institutions this may be a self-perpetuating cycle:<br />
actions of one type beget further actions of this type of institutions. 220<br />
It is also imperative to make mention of the fact that the phrase path dependence is used in<br />
both fields, the economics as well as in the historical traditions of institutionalsim to mean<br />
one or two things depending on the specific circumstances. Some authors use pathdependence<br />
to mean simply "history matters" - a broad conception - whilst others use it to<br />
mean that institutions are self reinforcing. 221 It is this self-reinforcing conception, which has<br />
the most explanatory force and which the subsequent discussions in this sub-section will<br />
benefit from. The claim that "history matters" is central to understanding institutions from<br />
both a formal and informal perspective. 222 This dynamic vision of historical institutional<br />
evolution is very different from the neo-classical economics tradition, which in its simplest<br />
form assumed that only a single outcome could possibly be reached, regardless of initial<br />
conditions or transitory events. With path dependence, both the starting point and 'accidental'<br />
events can have significant effects on the ultimate outcome. Deeply embedded in the<br />
historical institutionalist literature, path dependence roots in the assumption that institutional<br />
making systems tend to be conservative, and find ways of defending existing patterns of<br />
institutions, as well as the organizations that make and deliver those institutions. 223 In<br />
Pierson’s terms there are self-reinforcing processes in institutions that make institutional<br />
configurations, and hence their policies difficult to change, once a pattern has been<br />
established. 224<br />
During the past several decades, historical institutionalism has emerged as a leading approach<br />
to institutional analysis and indeed a prominent approach within political science more<br />
219<br />
Steinmo, S and K. Thelen. 1992. Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis.<br />
New York:Cambridge University Press.<br />
220<br />
Pierson, P. 2000. Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics. American Political Science<br />
Review 2:251-267.<br />
221<br />
Pierson, P. 2004. Politics in Time. American Political Science Review 87: 845-855<br />
222<br />
Weingast, B. 1996. Political Institutions: Rational Choice Perspectives. In A New Handbook of Political<br />
Science edited by H.D,Goodin, 167-190. Oxford: Oxford University Press.<br />
223<br />
Bovens, M. A, P P. Hart, and B. G. Peters. 2001. Success and Failure in Public Governance.Cheltenham:<br />
Edward Elgar.<br />
224<br />
Pierson, P. 2000. Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics.” American PoliticalScience<br />
Review 94(1): 251–66.<br />
46
generally. Historical institutionalism deals with institutional making and political change as a<br />
discrete process, characterized by extended time periods of considerable stability, interrupted<br />
by turbulent, “formative moments.” 225 During those formative periods institutions are assigned<br />
new objectives. New priorities are established and new political and administrative coalitions<br />
evolve to sustain those new policies. 226<br />
There are three important features that characterize historical institutionalism in the<br />
contemporary political science. Historical institutionalism addresses big substantive questions<br />
that are inherently of interest to the study of institutions. As already mentioned, the scholars in<br />
this area of institutionalism are also interested in tracing transformations of varying scales.<br />
Such scholars work best by delineating the origins and development of institutional structures<br />
and processes over time. They tend to emphasize sequences in the development and timing of<br />
events and phases of political change. 227<br />
This branch of institutionalism seems not to be too interested in understanding the critical<br />
roles of major actors and agents shaping structures and moments but rather in the major<br />
factors framing the moments. To them, unlike the rational institutionalists, there are no<br />
individual actors as such, whose actions and interests spurn off events. 228 They base their<br />
argument on the unintended consequences and the unpredictability of intervening events. This<br />
is well collaborated by Thelen who noted that, rationality in the strict rational choice sense is<br />
present only in so far as the intended consequences of actors are foreseen/predicted. 229<br />
In line with the above, fellow historical institutionalist Hall defines institutions as formal<br />
rules, compliance procedures and standard operating practices between individuals in the<br />
various units of the economy, puts across one strong point of distinction. He notes that the<br />
fundamental difference between the historical institutionalists and the rational choice<br />
institutionalists is on the questions of how institutions shape political behavior and where<br />
institutions come from. 230 This point of distinction therefore, places historical institutionalists<br />
at the center of societal institutions, not only looking at the individual for continuity of the<br />
societal values, but looking at social relations that shape the continuity of an entire society or<br />
polity for that matter.<br />
Historical institutionalists therefore analyze macro contexts and hypothesize about combined<br />
effects of institutions and processes. Rather than just examining only one institution, they<br />
examine the entire process over time. 231 Hence taken altogether, these three features-<br />
225 Thelen, K. 1999. Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics. Annual Review of PoliticalScience 2:<br />
369–404.<br />
226<br />
Jones, B.D. 2001. Politics and the Architecture of Choice. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.<br />
227<br />
Zysman, J. 1994. How institutions create Historically Rooted Trajectories. Industrial and Corporate Change<br />
31: 243-383.<br />
228<br />
Grafstein, R. 1992. Institutional Realism. New Haven: Yale University Press.<br />
229<br />
Thelen; K. 1998. Historical Institutionalism in comparative Politics. A paper presented at the APSA,Boston,<br />
Sept 3-6.<br />
230 Hall, P. 1986. Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France: New York:<br />
Oxford University Press.<br />
231 Campbell, J. L. 2001. Institutional Analysis and the Role of Ideas in Political Economy. In Neoliberalism and<br />
47
substantive agenda, temporal arguments and attention to contexts and configurations add up to<br />
a recognizable historical institutional approach that makes powerful understanding of politics<br />
and public choices. 232<br />
Furtherstill, historical institutionalists have always focused on how institutional factors, such<br />
as the relative insulation and centralization of political elites or relationships between<br />
branches of government, constrain policy making. 233 Some researchers recognized that policy<br />
makers use policy ideas as the basis for creating new policy tools, government agencies and<br />
other formal institutions that limit policy options later. 234 This argument however, remained<br />
closed to the traditional notion that institutions rather than ideas are the critical ingredients to<br />
policy making constraints. More scholars have argued that for policies to be adopted, they<br />
must fit within the underlying norms of society. 235<br />
In their study, Severio and Jeremy exemplify an historical institutionalism approach in the<br />
current management of conflict and declining biodiversity in Kenya. The study indicates that<br />
the origins of the many conflicts in developing countries can be traced over land tenure. The<br />
two authors for instance, note that: in the Narok District in Kenya, has been a source of<br />
prolonged unrest due to contradicting institutions regarding land resources. Results show that<br />
lack of understanding by the new institutions for land tenure; land use and market change by<br />
some groups in the area, has often led to exploitation and magnetization by the rational choice<br />
of some groups who are more informed than others. 236 This same contention is held and<br />
further explained by the duo contends that, under the goal guile of indigenisation, it was easy<br />
for the emerging ruling elite to manipulate the land tenure system within the permissible<br />
boundaries of the law, for purposes of enriching some groups and disenfranchising others.<br />
Several scholars emphasize how policy legacies —the effects of earlier decisions— constrain<br />
subsequent policy choices. This notion of constraint is not a new claim, and indeed Heclo<br />
singled it out in his comparative study of British and Swedish social policy: “The context of<br />
modern social policy begins, to flesh out one major theme: the considerable impact of policy<br />
inheritances upon the substance of policy making.” 237 The same argument is expounded by<br />
path dependency theorists, who seek to argue more that history matters, to some extent a selfevident<br />
truth. 238 Rather, they claim that apparently small choices in institutional arrangements<br />
Institutional Analysis, edited by J. Campbell and O. K. Petersen,148-191. Chicago: University of Chicago<br />
Press.<br />
232 Pierson,T and K. Skocpol. 2000. The limits of design: Explaining Institutional Origins and Change<br />
Governance 13(4):475-99.<br />
233<br />
Ibid.<br />
234<br />
Goldstein, J and R. Keohane. 1994. Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and political Change. New<br />
York: Cambridge University Press.<br />
235<br />
DiMaggio, P and W.W, Powell. 1995. The new Institutionalism in organizational Analysis. Thousand Oaks:<br />
Sage.<br />
236 Saverio, K and J. Swift. 2000. Understanding and Managing Pastrol Conflicts in Kenya. Institutite of<br />
Development Studies University of Sussex.<br />
237 Heclo, H. 1974. Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden. New Haven: Yale University Press.<br />
238 Berman, S. 1998. The Social Democratic Moment: Ideas and Politics in the Making of InterwarEurope.<br />
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.<br />
48
can have remarkable consequences at a later date, regardless of whether they were adopted<br />
purposefully or unthinkingly and that some policy choices may prove almost irreversible.<br />
Overall, we ought to note that there are a number of important theoretical and analytical<br />
problems in the use of the historical institutional approach. The very factors that make the<br />
approach so appealing at the onset such as a description of reality tend to diminish its ability<br />
to function as an explanation of those same phenomena. 239 That is to say, the notion that<br />
institutions persist along well-worn paths when they make policy and when they manage their<br />
internal affairs, is a common observation about organizations, whether public or private. That<br />
observation borders on banality, especially when considered in the context of constructing<br />
institutional theory. 240 Furthermore, the ability to predict persistence does not help in<br />
understanding institutional change. If, as in the historical institutionalist account, change tends<br />
to be defined in primarily terms of major shifts away from the status quo, then somewhat<br />
paradoxically we are left with little possibility of institutional explanations for change.<br />
Sociological Institutionalism<br />
Sociological institutionalism buds out of sociology, the sub-field of organizational theory. It<br />
attempts to look at cultures and the study of organization. 241 According to Hall and Taylor,<br />
sociological institutionalism was developed by the Stanford sociologists Meyer, Rowan,<br />
Scott, DiMaggio and Powell from the late 1970s. 242 The intellectual root of this school of<br />
thought illustrates the distinction between those parts of the social world said to reflect a<br />
formal means-ends to rationality and those parts said to reflect culture. Sociological<br />
institutionalists build on this to argue that, the reason why many of the institutional forms and<br />
procedures used by modern organisations have been adopted, is not necessarily that they are<br />
most efficient for the task at hand. Instead they argue that many of these forms and procedures<br />
should be seen as culturally-specific practices. 243 This is opposed to views that see certain<br />
institutional forms as inherently and transcendently rational. Examples are ‘weberian’<br />
portraits of bureaucracy.<br />
Hall and Taylor argue that one distinctive feature of sociological institutionalism relates to the<br />
relationship between institutions and individual action. 244 We have seen that this branch of<br />
new institutionalism typically has a ‘cultural’ approach to this relationship. This implies that<br />
239<br />
Weir, M. 1992. Ideas and the Politics of Bounded Innovation. In Structuring Politics: Historical<br />
Institutionalism in Comparative Perspective, edited by S. Steinmo, K. Thelen and F. Longstreth.<br />
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.<br />
240<br />
Hedstrom, P., and R. Swedborg. 1998. “Social Mechanisms: An Introductory Essay.” In Social<br />
Mechanisms:An Analytic Approach to Social Theory, edited by P. Hedstrom and R. Swedborg.<br />
Cambridge:Cambridge University.<br />
241<br />
Selznick, P. 1949. TVA and the Grassroots: Study in Sociology of formal Organization. Barkley: University<br />
of California Press.<br />
242<br />
Hall, P and R. Taylor. 1996. Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms. Political Studies 44: 936-<br />
958.<br />
243<br />
March, J. 1999. The pursuit of organizational intelligence. Malden MA: Blackwell.<br />
244<br />
Karen, L. R. 1997. Theoretical Decay and Theoretical Development: The Resurgence of Institutional<br />
Analysis,’ World Politics, 50:34-61.<br />
49
institutions are assumed to influence preference formation. The second distinctive feature<br />
relates to the definition of institutions. Sociological institutionalism tends to define<br />
institutions broadly to include “not just formal rules, procedures or norms, but also the symbol<br />
systems, cognitive scripts and moral templates that provide the ‘frames of meaning’ guiding<br />
human action. 245 Taking into account its intellectual roots and distinctive features, it is not<br />
surprising that the substantive questions about organisational change sociological<br />
institutionalists tend to raise, are about why institutional practices originate or change.<br />
Brunsson, Czarniawska, Sahlin-Andersson, Christensen, Laegreid and Roevik are all<br />
proponents of this approach. 246<br />
The above scholars and their collaborators have produced a range of studies that seek to<br />
account for why and how institutional forms, procedures or symbols are diffused through<br />
organisational fields or across nations. This is what Hall and Taylor claim is typical for this<br />
branch of new institutionalism. Their explanations tend to emphasise that “organisations often<br />
adopt a new institutional practice not because it advances the means-ends efficiency of the<br />
organisation, but because it enhances the social legitimacy of the organisations or its<br />
participants. 247 March describes this as the logic of appropriateness in contrast to logic of<br />
consequence. 248 However, sociological institutionalists have developed a set of theories that<br />
are of growing interest to political scientists.<br />
These scholars are also interested in the study of cultures and norms as institutions. They<br />
emphasize the use of folkways in understanding patterns of behaviour and cognitive maps.<br />
They argue that, using these social institutional tools is critical in understanding of social<br />
structures as well as political and economic interactions. 249 Building upon their analyses of<br />
complex organizations, these scholars show the relationship between formal institutions, their<br />
structures, patterns of behaviour and beliefs. But to differentiate themselves from pure<br />
organizational theorists who stressed how behaviour was normatively based, sociological<br />
institutionalists stress that routines and habits are important aspects of actors underlying<br />
cognitive framework. 250<br />
Furthermore, scholars in this tradition argue that the informal institutions are fundamental<br />
when labouring to understand the non rational aspects of human communication and<br />
exchanges. Putting it clearly, this means that many of the institutional forms and procedures<br />
used by modern organizations were not adopted simply because they were the most efficient<br />
for the tasks at hand, but were in line with the transcendent rationality. 251 They argue that<br />
many of these forms and procedures should be seen as culturally specific practices, akin to the<br />
245<br />
Pierson, P. 2000. Path Dependence, Increasing Returns, and the Study of Politics. American Political Science<br />
Review 94:251-67.<br />
246<br />
Czarniawska, B. 1998. Narrating the Organization: Dramas of Institutional Identity. Chicago: University of<br />
Chicago Press.<br />
247<br />
Hall, P and R. Taylor, Opcit.<br />
248<br />
March, J. Opcit.<br />
249<br />
March , J and P. Olsen. 1989. Rediscovering Institutions. New York: Free Press.<br />
250<br />
George, T et al. 1987. Institutional Structure: Constituting State , Society and Individual, Beverly Hill: Sage.<br />
251<br />
Hall, P and Taylor,R. 1996. Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms. Political Studies.<br />
50
myths and ceremonies devised by many societies and assimilated into various organizations.<br />
However, critics have argued that by relying on the above metaphors, sociological<br />
institutionalists fail to specify the casual processes through which structures enable and<br />
empower actors and the constituted actions. As a result they neglect the important role of<br />
agency in policy making and their theory of action leaves the impression that actors blindly<br />
follow institutional adopts and cues around them. 252<br />
The sociological institutionalists are also accused of being too specific and supportive of<br />
local/cultural knowledge. This is based on the fact that sociological institutional explanations<br />
are arrived at inductively rather than deductively and hence can lend insight into individuals’<br />
reasons for actions. 253 However, Katzenstein notes that there is a big danger for<br />
generalizations because sociological institutionalism can appear culturally deterministic<br />
where it emphasizes the cultural routines and rituals to the exclusion of individual action<br />
which breaks out cultural norm, that is to say rule making and rule creation as opposed to rule<br />
following action. 254<br />
In summary, the most intriguing question that motivated this exposition is; what exactly are<br />
institutions and what is institutionalism? The examination in this chapter made an exploration<br />
of the theoretical underpinning regarding the concepts of institutions and institutionalism. In<br />
the process, we have seen the role of institutions in mediating political and economic as well<br />
as social order. However, it is striking to note that although no single branch of<br />
institutionalism can be used in total isolation of the other, it is also an uphill task to combine<br />
the three approaches. In the subsequent chapters, we shall examine the institutional process<br />
that shape natural resource regimes in Kenya. Specifically, our study shall benefit from the<br />
tenets of historical and sociological institutionalism in making this evaluation.<br />
252<br />
Meyer, J. W. and W.R, Scott. 1983. Organizational Environments: Ritual and Rationality. California: Sage<br />
Publications.<br />
253<br />
Pettigrew, A.M. 1997. What is processual analysis? In Scandinavian Journal of Management 13 (4):337-348.<br />
254<br />
Katzenstein, P. J. 1986. Cultural Norms and National Security: Policy and Military in Post war Japan.<br />
Ithaca/New York: Cornell University Press.<br />
51
3 Perceiving Biodiversity and Natural Resource Regimes in Kenya<br />
3.1 Biodiverdity as natural resource capital.<br />
Literature on biodiversity provides a variety of explanations for its importance and grounds<br />
for its conservation. In that respect Malcom makes an important observation when he<br />
mentions that:<br />
Apparently biodiversity is here to stay and holds an important vocabulary in the natural<br />
resource management. Despite its importance, it still confuses a lot of people simply<br />
because of its association with quantifications. 255<br />
Put clearly, biodiversity can simply be defined as, diversity of life in all its forms and at all<br />
levels of organization. We can further appreciate biodiversity when we look at it in terms of<br />
the millions of species that share the earth. We can also look at it in terms of genetic diversity,<br />
diversity of ecosystems, forests, meadows, lagoons, lakes among others.<br />
Genetic resources that are distributed through out the world’s regions make a substantial<br />
contribution to development efforts in both the developed and the developing world. These<br />
contributions range from economic, scientific, cultural strategic values among others. 256<br />
However, some countries including many in the developing world have greater concentrations<br />
of these resources and commensurately greater burden to bear in conservation and sustainable<br />
use. Most of these countries are located within the tropics and more specifically Tropical<br />
Africa, largely depending on clearing large tracts of forested and high biologically resourceful<br />
areas for both extensive and subsistence agriculture. In Uganda for instance, large tracts of<br />
land consisting of natural forest cover the Lake Victoria islands, are currently being cleared in<br />
order to establish large plantations of palm oil production. In Kenya, the areas around<br />
Kakamega forest belt are equally threatened by cash crop production in terms of sugar cane<br />
and tea growing. 257 Conway and his collaborators note that; making agricultural systems<br />
sustainable in Africa demands a double green revolution with a special focus put on<br />
accelerated re-capitalization of soils to reverse the downward spiral of land degradation. The<br />
Conway group further notes that; this revolution will be achieved through putting in place<br />
policy measures which should be associated with continued development of environmentally<br />
sound and economically viable technologies that enable small holders to meet increasing<br />
demand for food and other agricultural commodities. The other strategy is to improve<br />
individual and group security of tenure, deregulate agricultural prices to allow private<br />
entrepreneurs function more efficiently in both inputs and output markets. A combination of<br />
these two, constitute the re-capitalization strategy. 258<br />
255<br />
Malcolm, L. H. 2001. Forest Ecosystems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.<br />
256<br />
Perkoff, S. 2000. Protecting Biodiversity: National Laws Regulating Access to Genetic Resources in the<br />
Americas. Ottawa: IDRC Publications.<br />
257<br />
Norton-Griffith, M and C. Southey. 1995. The opportunity cost of Biodiversity conservation in Kenya.<br />
Elsevier Ecological Economics 12:125-139.<br />
258<br />
Conway, G et a l. 1999. Sustainable Agriculture for a food Secure World. A vision for International<br />
Agricultural Research. Washington D.C. World Bank Pbulications.<br />
52
In light of the above postulation, it is imperative to note that Conway and his co-authors have<br />
strength in their double strategy for the green revolution, especially if one looks at it from the<br />
price and land tenure component. However, some shortfalls obtain in their strategy. True, it<br />
goes without saying; small holders have had an upper hand in the degradation of high<br />
biodiversity areas especially in Sub-Saharan African, but in the same regard, the state in most<br />
of these countries is not innocent. The state has equally played an insurmountable role in the<br />
degradation of biodiversity. 259<br />
As we shall later come to learn, the apparent rush for industrialization, extensive market<br />
gardening policies and political patronage have largely been responsible for this<br />
environmental crisis. 260 Kenya which is our center of focus, affords us a glowing example.<br />
Forests and other areas of great biological diversity are treated as political pawns in exchange<br />
for political support. 261 High biodiversity areas are not seen in terms of their environment and<br />
high capital value. 262 To this Cleaver and Schreiber add that; such a situation puts this natural<br />
capital at risk. Some areas for example those in Meru and Embu districts in Kenya have taken<br />
to agriculture intensification as a result of the high population increases and food deficits.<br />
Permanent intensive cropping is the current pattern in the favourable highlands, but<br />
degradation is high especially under low technological inputs and without enough control<br />
measures in the sub-region. 263 The threats resulting from farming in many developing<br />
countries like Kenya are innumerable, yet food needs are more acute and the population is<br />
growing rapidly. Needless to mention is that the large area of woodland along the forested<br />
belt is of vital importance for limiting runoff and erosion. 264<br />
Due to scarcity of land in Kenya, the remaining pockets of the mountain rain forests with their<br />
unique biodiversity are at risk. Since 1986, The Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO)<br />
has estimated the annual deforestation rate at 5%. 265 There is also more land required by the<br />
pastoral communities for their animals; hence the continued ethnic clashes in Kenya. There<br />
were trials with artificial boundaries aimed at reducing human and livestock degradation of<br />
soils, as well as averting the risk of serious drought. However, this scheme failed due to<br />
resistance from pastoralists. 266 The proceeding sub-section delves into the issues of land use<br />
variation and concomitant conflicts which in a way affect biodiversity regeneration.<br />
259 Krugman, H. 2001. Impact of land use changes on Biodiversity and Land degradation in Kenya.<br />
Ottawa:IDRC Publications.<br />
260 Ross, M. 1996. Timber Booms and Institutional Break down in South East Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge<br />
University Press.<br />
261 Deacon, R. T. 1994. Deforestation and the rule of law in a cross-section of countries. Land Economics 70(4):<br />
414-430.<br />
262 Key Informant Interview with Dr. Matanga, KENRIK 27 th June 2006.<br />
263 Cleaver, M and G. Schreiber.1994. Reversing the Spiral: The population , Agriculture and Environmental<br />
Nexus in Sub-Saharan Africa. Directions in Development Series. Washington D.C: World Bank.<br />
264 Bohn, H., and R.T. Deacon. 2000. Ownership Risk, Investment, and the Use of Natural Resources. American<br />
Economic Review 90(3): 526-549.<br />
265 Ashby, J., et al. 2000. Investing in farmers as researchers: Experience with local Agricultural Research<br />
Committees in Latin America, Cali, Colombia: CIAT.<br />
266 Little,M.A. 1985. Multi-displinary and Ecological Studies of Nomadic Turkana Pastoralists. Paris: Biology<br />
International 11: 11-16.<br />
53
Land use variability and concomitant land use conflicts<br />
Land use variability represents the different human uses of the land. For example smallholder<br />
agriculture, grazing and wildlife reserves among others. 267 Discussing biodiversity perceptions<br />
and national resource regimes in Kenya inevitably leads us into discussing the issues of land<br />
use. Land use variations wittingly or unwittingly leads to escalation of land use conflicts, one<br />
of the important factors helping us to understand biodiversity dynamics in Kenya. Like any<br />
other African societal setting, ethnic arrangements form the social fabric of Kenya. As a<br />
result, land use is defined basing on the ethnic tents. 268<br />
Land use in Kenya is divided into two major types: pastoral and agricultural land use systems.<br />
Rainfall irregularity is a characteristic feature from year to year and more severe within<br />
particular years. In the east and northern parts of Kenya, rainfall is expected between March<br />
and May, while in the south and western parts of Kenya, rain falls during March and June. 269<br />
The lowest rainfall is registered along the shores of Lake Turkana and the central plains which<br />
receive 150mm of rain fall per year.<br />
The seasonality and distribution of rainfall has an important bearing in determining land use<br />
patterns. Poor rainfall distribution creates patch vegetation, and during each interval of the<br />
rainfall, the ephemeral vegetation continues to degenerate. If the season is prolonged, the<br />
cycle continues. 270 It is imperative to note that, rainfall distribution and variability is extreme<br />
in both time and space. When one part of the country receives rainfall, the other half<br />
experiences a drought and its attendant problems. This kind of phenomena causes variations<br />
in land use strategies and calls for copping mechanisms. These different copping mechanisms,<br />
with regard to variable environment and land rights insecurity, were studied by Ellis and<br />
Swift. 271 They noted that, when relations between pastoral groups are good, there is<br />
reciprocity in access to grazing and water resources during periods of stress. As one group<br />
crosses into another’s territory, access to key resources is governed by the host group’s<br />
institutions and regulations. 272 The hosts by agreeing to host their troubled brothers in the<br />
trade expect reciprocal rights in future when similar catastrophes befall them too. During such<br />
friendly contacts, raids, killings and land conflicts are few or even rare. However, when there<br />
are sour relations and more so when reciprocity is not met, the status quo is challenged and<br />
there are concomitant clashes between rival groups competing among themselves, over access<br />
to water and land resources. Here, raiding rather than reciprocity becomes the major facet<br />
267 Lee, D.R and C.B, Barret. 2000. Trade offs or Synergies? Agricultural Intesfication, Economic Development<br />
in Developing Countries. Wallingford: CAB International.<br />
268 Scoper,R.C. 1985. Social Cultural Profile of the Turkana District. Nairobi: University of Nairobi.<br />
269 Ngecu, W. M and E.M, Mathu. 2004. The El-Nino-triggered Landslides and their social economic Impact<br />
on Kenya. Environmental Geology 38:277-284.<br />
270 Murton, J .1999. Population Growth and Poverty in Machakos District, Kenya.The Geographical Journal<br />
165.<br />
271 Ellis, J.E and D,M. Swift. 1988. Stability of African Eco systems. Alternative Paradigms and Implications for<br />
Development. Journal of Range Management 41(6):450-459.<br />
272 Kamau-Kimani, J. 1998. Recent Trends and Implications of Group Ranch Sub-Division and Fragmentation in<br />
Kajiado District,Kenya .The Geographical Journal 164(1):202-213.<br />
54
among inter ethnic relations. 273 During times of severe drought, pastoralists travel greater<br />
distances following biodiversity trends to feed their livestock hence; the land use changes and<br />
ensuing land clashes with other land users. 274<br />
This kind of situation also extends to agro-based communities. These, as noted earlier,<br />
convert land cover from vegetation to cultivable lands. Farmlands comprise of agroecosystems<br />
that are modified by such communities through removal of native species and<br />
replacing them with food and cash crops that are fast growing and commercially valuable.<br />
These conversions result into destruction of native species, destruction of habitats for animals,<br />
exposing of soils to water and wind erosion because of reduction in the soil shade. 275<br />
Cultural preferences for different types of biodiversity lead to different land use systems in<br />
the same environments across different cultures and countries for instance, matooke growing<br />
in Uganda as well as potato cultivation in Kenya. Cultural adaptations to food productions<br />
evolve within communities over time, stemming from generations. This may not be limited to<br />
food crops but income crops as well. These crops may also be adaptive to particular kinds of<br />
habitats where they best grow. 276 Such communities will always migrate in search for similar<br />
habitats, inevitably clashing with others ethnic groups as well as destroying the biodiversity of<br />
the new found lands.<br />
In a broader perspective, cultivators tend to focus on areas with thick vegetation where soils<br />
are richer, with more organic matter and more reliable rainfall, while agro-pastoralists or<br />
livestock keepers tend to select open grasslands where their herds will get more pasture. 277<br />
These selections are based on biodiversity assessments as an indicator for potential<br />
productivity. This however, does not come without trouble; it comes with a lot of ethnic<br />
clashes and inadvertently affects the biodiversity of the areas involved. It’s however, pertinent<br />
to mention that some traditions have cultural restrictions preventing people from using places<br />
of high value biodiversity places for instance the Khaya forests and related sacred forests. 278<br />
Better still, in many cases it is due to the uniqueness of the forest biodiversity and the physical<br />
features such as the waterfalls, which make the surrounding communities develop cultural and<br />
religious values towards the same forest hence; the need for their protection. Such<br />
communities will prevent external migrants from tampering with such treasured environments<br />
and in a way this will ultimately work to protect such biodiversity spots. 279 It is therefore the<br />
interest of this research to further reveal institutional perceptions regarding biodiversity in<br />
273 Ellis, J.E et al. 1985. Pastoralism and Drought in Turkana District. Nairobi: NORAD.<br />
274 Kamau-Kimani, J. 1988. Opcit.<br />
275 Maitima, J et al. 2004. A Methodological Guide on How to identify Trends and Linkages Between changes in<br />
Land use, Biodiversity and Land Degradation. LUCID Working Paper series No.43.<br />
276 Obote-Ochieng, C.M. 2002. Sustainable Agriculture in Africa: Towards A New Paradigm – The<br />
Embeddedness Approach. Oxford: International Development Centre.<br />
277 FAO.1983. Guideline: Evaluation for Rainfed Agriculture. Soil Bulletin 52. Rome: FAO<br />
278 Wuyts-Fivaro, A. 1996. ‘Linkages between research, farmers and farmer organisations in Kenya: A summary<br />
of findings’, ISNAR Briefing Paper, No. 32.<br />
279 Mackenzie, F. 1998. Land Ecology and Resistance in Kenya. Edinburgh:Edinburgh University Press.<br />
55
areas around Kakamega forest and how this interplay is finally mediated in the broader<br />
framework of national resource regimes.<br />
Perceiving biodiversity in the context of ecosystems<br />
Before delving into the intricacies of local biodiversity perceptions in Kenya and Kakamega<br />
district in particular, it is imperative for us to understand biodiversity as a system good. When<br />
looking at the systems view on biodiversity, structural and functional relationships between<br />
species are emphasized and form the core of the biodiversity status in an area. Species are<br />
understood as integrated webs of matter and energy cycles that reproduce or maintain the<br />
systems. In this case the systems also involve some disease vectors such as mosquitoes, and<br />
tsetse flies which are responsible for transmission of trypanosomiasis and sleeping sickness<br />
diseases respectively. As a result, these animal vectors become the guardians of the wild,<br />
since they prevent human occupation in affected areas. 280 In the process this integration leads<br />
to the development of strong ecosystems over long periods of time. These shape the internal<br />
relationships of matter and energy transformation. Jacobs notes that species are greatly<br />
influenced by the physical environments in which they live as well as the composition of the<br />
atmosphere. 281<br />
The above perspective does not deny the fact that species composition changes due to natural<br />
forces. As Wilson emphasizes, species get extinct all the time as part of the process of<br />
evolution. In this process those species that are more fit take over the resource niches, while<br />
displacing those that are weak. He argues that an average lifetime of a species of about one<br />
million years. 282 In some periods more abrupt developments like mass extinctions have been<br />
observed. Altogether there have been five such periods over the last 450 million years. He<br />
concludes that, on average it takes approximately 10 million years for species to recover. 283<br />
Pimm et al. noted that we are now in such a period of mass extinction, may be with levels far<br />
beyond those previously observed. In their study; the future of biodiversity, they observed that<br />
from a systems point of view, there is a certain redundancy in ecosystems. 284<br />
In most situations ecosystem functioning is maintained by a smaller number of processes and<br />
a reduced number of species. Some species can be termed cornerstone process species. 285 In<br />
evaluating this, Holling observes that although keystone process species are necessary for<br />
ecosystem functioning, they may not be sufficient for ecosystem sustainability. They argue<br />
that the remaining species that depend on the niches formed by keystone process species are<br />
280<br />
Vatn, A. and D. Bromley. 1994. Choices Without Prices Without Apologies. Journal of Environmental<br />
Economics and Management, 26:129-148.<br />
281<br />
Jacobs, M. 1997. Environmental Valuation, Deliberative Democracy and Public Decision Making. In Valuing<br />
Nature? Economics, Ethics and Environment edited by J. Foster, 232-246. London: Routledge.<br />
282<br />
Wilson, E.O. 2001. The Diversity of Life. London: Penguin Books.<br />
283<br />
Ibid.<br />
284<br />
Pimm, S., G. Russell, J. Gittleman and T. Brooks. 1995. The Future of Biodiversity. Science 269:247-350.<br />
285<br />
Schindler, D.W. 1990. Experimental Perturbation of Whole Lakes as Tests of Hypotheses Concerning<br />
Ecosystem Structure and Function. Oikos 57:25-41.<br />
56
also important for maintaining the resilience of the ecosystem. In this context resilience is<br />
used to mean the system's ability to counteract perturbations from external shocks. 286<br />
Analyzing this from a systems perspective, we understand that system maintenance and<br />
resilience are two core issues in appreciating ecosystems survival and ecosystem functioning.<br />
Ecosystems are viewed as complex systems, characterized by different and competing<br />
organisms including man, yet made up of self organized, self regulating and adaptive<br />
structures. Actually the biggest factor in the successful existence of every system is the ability<br />
of its component species to live together in a state of compatibility. 287<br />
The capacity of constituent species to exist in a harmonious, agreeable, or congenial<br />
relationship determines a systems cohesion and durability. The complexity of the systems<br />
tends to make them fairly robust in the face of historically repeated disturbances of state<br />
variables. This is a basic characteristic of self-organization. In elucidating this further we note<br />
that, to be able to develop this kind of complex resilience, the system has to produce some<br />
randomness, which serves to constantly develop and test better ways of adaptation. It creates<br />
‘searches’ within the available state space through processes like genetic mutations. Variation<br />
increases and the systems become better and able to handle shifts in environmental<br />
conditions. 288 The challenge here it is impossible to predict what changes will occur and the<br />
impact such changes may have on the entire system. For instance what happens when the<br />
changes are too diverse or too frequent and beyond levels not earlier observed? These changes<br />
may affect the system performance in an essential way, hence attracting a shift in a negative<br />
direction. However, it is imperative to note that we are unable to predict where, when and<br />
how such a shift will happen. This makes it hard for us to ascertain the resultant consequences<br />
of such a shift.<br />
On the contrary, Lemons informs that it is this radical uncertainty rather than ordinary risk<br />
that characterize most systems. He further notes that it is the important task of those observing<br />
the system to develop tools of analysis to watch and predict any upcoming or pending shifts in<br />
the system. 289 This is well appreciated by Vatn and Bromley who are quick to mention that<br />
looking at systems through this kind of lens leads us to one conclusion. They mention that in<br />
this sense, ecosystems are functionally opaque. The exact contribution of species in an<br />
ecosystem is not known. 290<br />
286 Holling, C.S, D.W. Schindler, B.W. Walker and J. Roughgarden. 1995. Biodiversity in the Functioning of<br />
Ecosystems: An Ecological Synthesis. In Biodiversity Loss. Economic and Ecological Issues, edited by<br />
Perrings, K.G. Mäler, C. Folke,C.S. Holling and B.O. Jansson, 44-83. Cambridge: Cambridge University<br />
Press.<br />
287 Perrings, C. 1996. Ecological Resilience in the Sustainabilityof Economic Development. In Models of<br />
sustainable development, edited by S. Faucheux, D. Pearce and J. Proops, 231-252. Cheltenham: Edward<br />
Elgar.<br />
288 Graves, J., and D. Reavy. 1996. Global Environmental Change. London: Longman.<br />
289 Lemons, J. 1998. Burden of proof requirements and environmental sustainability: Science, Public policy, and<br />
Ethics. In Ecological Sustainability and Integrity:Concepts and Approaches, edited by J.Lemons, L. Westra<br />
and R.Goodland, 11-38. Dordrecht/Boston/ London: Kluwer Acdemic Publishers.<br />
290 Vatn, A. and D. Bromley. 1994.Opcit.<br />
57
While their assessment is valid, it makes the entire essence of studying ecosystem functioning<br />
is a little blurred. True, it has been observed that ecosystem functioning probably remains<br />
unknowable, until it breaks down or completely ceases to function. If the system has<br />
essentially stayed within the same negative shift for a considerably long period of time, then<br />
we can expect that it is able to retreat from such a change in stated variables. It is sometimes<br />
difficult to establish what could have really happened in such a state. But that is the very<br />
essence of studying of biodiversity and the systems that obtain. However, the biggest<br />
challenge here is mastering system functioning and its critical fundamentals. It also entails<br />
understanding these issues relating to valuation and bio-ethics, to which we now turn our<br />
attention.<br />
Perceiving biodiversity as a common good: The essence of valuation and bio-ethics<br />
The above perspective embodies another message: one which brings human beings and<br />
biodiversity together. Since human beings are species developed as part of the complex<br />
ecological webs discussed earlier, their livelihoods and future is closely linked to the<br />
functioning of the whole ecosystem. In this respect humans are just as other species. The way<br />
humans utilize their niches depends on their capacity to produce goods and restructures to the<br />
benefit of the environment and other species. 291<br />
The health of human beings greatly depends on the health of other ecological species. The<br />
immune system of humans is integrated with the various capacities within the ecological<br />
environment. What distinguishes humans from other species is their capacity to appreciate<br />
and to shape their ecological niches. As a result of the above interlink, human beings are<br />
linked to each other in a very integrated sense through the ecosystems processes. 292 When one<br />
reclaims a lagoon, wetland, swamp, marsh, and cuts down a forest to construct an industry, a<br />
house, set up a plantation or builds a road, through that, we can never realize and ultimately<br />
enjoy its cleaning capacities, its species richness and a host of other benefits as it originally<br />
was. Biological diversity in terms of the ecosystems and their species is a common good in all<br />
its total scope and time. 293<br />
The above synthesis holds strong connotations regarding the choices and decisions made in<br />
the realm of the biodiversity. In a large measure these are fundamentally connected with<br />
issues of ethics and rationality in the sense that, preferences and perceptions each individual<br />
makes or holds, constitute the resultant actions concerning the valuation and usage of<br />
biodiversity as a common good. 294 The decisions taken by individuals wholesomely influence<br />
291<br />
Gowdy, J.M. 1997. The Value of Biodiversity: Markets, Society, and Ecosystems Land Economics 73(1): 25-<br />
41<br />
292<br />
Hunter, M.L. 2000. Fundamentals of Conservation Biology. Massachusetts: Blackwell Science.<br />
293<br />
Primack, R.B. 2002. Valuing Biodiversity. In Essentials of Conservation Biology, edited by R.B. Primack,<br />
85-158. Massachusetts: Sinauer Associates.<br />
294<br />
Van Dyke, F. 2003. Values and Ethics. In Conservation Biology Foundations, Concepts, Applications, edited<br />
by Van Dyke, F, 56-76. Newyork: McGraw Hill.<br />
58
what sort of environment is left for others to enjoy, which future risks, (both ordinary and<br />
extreme) they might be exposed to.<br />
Therefore through examining the existing linkages within nature, a social interconnectedness<br />
arises and is inadvertently forced upon human beings to give value to the existing biological<br />
diversity as a common good for all. 295 More specifically, ideas about the rights of other<br />
species to live are typically an issue of bio-ethics which the next chapter will explicitly<br />
highlight. Human interaction with biodiversity is aided by laws relating to nature and<br />
associated values regarding rationalism. 296 Such values sometimes tend to have strong<br />
relations with culture, or society to which individuals subscribe. Moving to this level involves<br />
enumerating another problem, that of summing up individual values. If biodiversity exists as a<br />
common good, the issues of constraints in relation to usage confront humans as users. If<br />
humans, for certain reasons accept that the value existing dimensions of biodiversity as a good<br />
are commensurable can be collapsed into one dimension at the individual level, then there is a<br />
problem of summing up all these values for the group as a whole. If all individuals gain, this<br />
may be thought to be unproblematic. 297 More importantly we need to note that the distribution<br />
and measurement of gain is one of those hurdles that the community interest principle faces.<br />
Even at this level, we encounter problems regarding accepting the rule of one dimension and<br />
simple summation. 298 There are two dimensions involved; the total distribution and total gain.<br />
We ought to mention that these two dimensions are common practices relating to common<br />
goods. These practices also pertain to issues concerning biodiversity protection and<br />
conservation. While some individuals will find it gainful, others will look at it as a loss. 299<br />
This accentuates the distributional effect even further. When someone loses as a result of an<br />
effect of the acts of others, it is very problematic. This sometimes makes summation or<br />
aggregation irrelevant and provoking.<br />
Therefore based on the understanding that biodiversity can hardly be treated unidimensionally<br />
and therefore unilaterally, we are left in a situation where there is only one way for all of us to<br />
walk. This entails assessing, reasoning and agreeing over which principles and values should<br />
govern the allocation of the available common good. We hence move away from summing up<br />
of individual interests or bids to assessing and reasoning over, and potentially agreeing on a<br />
common set of priorities that benefit all of us as potential users. The implication here is that<br />
people are able to change their views as a result of trying out various arguments and reaching<br />
certain compromises. 300 It implies that they are brought into an institutional setting where a<br />
process of individual trade-off is obtained .This synthesis will logically enable us to build<br />
295<br />
Ibid.<br />
296<br />
Rolston, H. 1988. Environmental Ethics: Duties to and Values in the Natural World. Philadelphia: Temple<br />
University Press.<br />
297<br />
Jacobs, M. 1997. Environmental Valuation, Deliberative Democracy and Public Decision-Making<br />
Institutions. In Valuing Nature: Economics, Ethics and the Environment, edited by J. Foster, 211-231.<br />
London: Routledge.<br />
298<br />
Bryan G. N. 1984. Environmental Ethics and Weak Anthropocentrism. Environmental Ethics. 6: 131-48<br />
299<br />
Moran, D. and D. Pearce. 1994. The Value of Biodiversity. London :Earthscan Publications.<br />
300<br />
Schindler, D.W. 1990. Experimental Perturbation of Whole Lakes as Tests of HypothesesConcerning<br />
Ecosystem Structure and Function. Oikos: 57:25-41.<br />
59
answers to our lead questions of how biodiversity is synthesized and what is its place in the<br />
entire national resource management regime in Kenya.<br />
3.2 An analysis of national resources regimes in Kenya<br />
As we noted earlier, regimes are social institutions composed of agreed upon rules, norms,<br />
principles and decision making procedures that govern interactions for actors in specific areas.<br />
Krasner makes this observation at an international level. He suggests that the definition of<br />
international regimes has been used to explicitly refer to principles, norms, rules and decisionmaking<br />
procedures in the area of international relations. 301<br />
Resource regimes evolve over time and space. They are nurtured, grown and changed. They<br />
persist and occasionally die but this doesn’t translate to mean that all regimes have an<br />
indefinite life cycle. In order for us to make a meaningful analysis of the national resources<br />
management regime in Kenya, we shall still use the institutional perspective on natural<br />
resources as opposed to the micro economic or the ecological perspective. This will enable us<br />
to differentiate resource regimes from the broader domain of human behavior and empirically<br />
identify regimes through analysis of social conventions.<br />
Young identifies three different approaches to use in doing a resource regime analysis. In one<br />
such approach Young analyses the regime as a pervasive characteristic of the international<br />
system. He advances his argument based on the economic and power relations that shape<br />
nations. 302 Through his submission, Young seems to point out that: natural resource regimes<br />
whether in Africa, Latin America or even Asia are in a way structurally linked to international<br />
regimes under certain circumstances. In short, Young as a great proponent of structural<br />
realism reasons and gives due recognition to the influence of international regimes in many<br />
defined situations. 303 Young’s analysis is useful in helping us to synthesize the nature of<br />
resource regimes in Kenya.<br />
A critical look at the current resource management regime in Kenya inevitably displays these<br />
traits. Kenya is a member to the conference of parties, a signatory to most of the international<br />
environmental regimes and above all a signatory to the Convention to Biological Diversity<br />
(CBD). Not forgetting to mention that Kenya hosts the headquarters of the United Nations<br />
Environmental Protection and a hive for other environmental actors. In fact any efforts to delink<br />
Kenya from this analysis would be self-defeating. But this should not be interpreted to<br />
mean that Kenya employs the “best practices model” in her biodiversity behaviours. It only<br />
helps us to make an assessment as to whether the globalcentric notion of biodiversity has<br />
played a significant role in the biodiversity restoration efforts. The globalcentric notion of<br />
biodiversity is strategically positioned in Kenya’s national resource management regime.<br />
301<br />
Krasner, Stephen.D .1983. International Regimes. New York:Cornell University Press.<br />
302<br />
Young, Oran .1996. Institutional Linkages in International Society: Polar Perspectives. Global Governace.21:<br />
1-23.<br />
303<br />
Ibid.<br />
60
Rittberger called it “institutionalized cooperation” of states in the management of resource<br />
conflicts and interdependence problems. 304<br />
Still in relation to the above, Young makes further elucidation regarding the concept of<br />
regime governance. He labours to do so through postulation of his notion of “governance<br />
without government", in the managing of international environmental regimes. He postulates<br />
that such governance involves the establishment and operation of social institutions capable of<br />
resolving conflicts, facilitating cooperation or more generally alleviating collective action in a<br />
world of interdependent actors. 305<br />
In taking the above observation further, we can simulate it to another one made by Keohane<br />
and Ostrum. The two scholars analyze international resource regimes and local common<br />
property regimes while investigating concepts of heterogeneity and cooperation in resource<br />
regimes at different levels. In their observation they conclude that this work illuminates the<br />
value of comparing collective action problems at varyingly different scales and such<br />
comparisons across different scales can be so daunting. 306 However, in this regard, there is a<br />
danger of making conclusions which may somewhat be misleading. For instance, when one<br />
takes to comparing regimes at different levels of development, there is a danger of under<br />
measuring which may definitely lead us into making invalid conclusions.<br />
3.3 Biodiversity governance : Between restoration and Preservation<br />
In order to locate biodiversity‘s place in the national resource management regime, it is<br />
imperative that we further explore the institutional policies and practices regarding use and<br />
regulation of biodiversity resources in Kenya’s broader resources management framework. It<br />
is important to redefine a resource management regime as a structure of legal and social<br />
relations with respect to particular natural resources. However, it is also noteworthy to point<br />
out that this kind of understanding has to take place within the desired frameworks of the<br />
national regulating regime. Ostrum defines governance as the conscious management of<br />
regime structures with a view of enhancing legitimacy of public realm by focusing on the<br />
rules as reflected in the public structures and how they are managed. 307 This definition paints a<br />
picture of an institutional framework within which public decisions and choices are made and<br />
at the same time presupposing a framework in which values and interests of the citizens are<br />
met. Thus we are talking about a product of human agency that helps to define the relations<br />
and interactions between state and society. The author adds that this process involves the<br />
conscious management of regime structures with a view of enhancing legitimacy of public<br />
realm, by focusing on the rules as reflected in the regime structures and how they are<br />
304<br />
Rittberger,V. 1993. Regime Theory and International Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press.<br />
305<br />
Young, O. 1994. International Governance: Protecting the Enviroment in a Stateless Society. New York:<br />
Cornell University Press.<br />
306<br />
Keohane, R and E.Ostrum. 1995. Local Commons and Global Interdependence: Heteroginity and<br />
Cooperation in Two Domains. London: Sage.<br />
307<br />
Ostrum, E. 1990. Governing the commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. New York:<br />
Cambridge University Press.<br />
61
managed. Barrett, further emphasizes the combination of ethical standard setting, formal rulemaking<br />
and institutional framing by which organizations attempt to ensure that they live up to<br />
the values by which they justify themselves to the community in which they belong. 308<br />
Issues of resource governance arose out of the fact that there is a need to deal with divergent<br />
interests and collective action problems confronting both the state and its agencies in the<br />
realm of environment. The situation therefore requires a combination of different elements<br />
which include a variety of formal rules, market incentives, organizations and a host of related<br />
actors. 309<br />
Ribot notes that with decentralization reforms taking shape across Africa, it is imperative to<br />
align local institutions that manage local resources, with national legal framework in order to<br />
increase participation in ways that will profoundly reflect who manages and benefits from<br />
these resources. 310 But he is quick to add that local institutions chosen to transfer powers<br />
don’t establish conditions for more efficient or equitable use and management. 311<br />
Therefore a combination of locally accountable representation and discretionary powers is<br />
needed. Ribot’s suggestions indicate absence of democratic governance in the choice of<br />
institutions used in the management of local resources in most of African decentralization<br />
reforms relating to natural resource governance. Anderson points out factors that explain why<br />
some local governments are more successful than others in governing their natural resources.<br />
He mentions that there is growing interest in finding empirical evidence regarding this<br />
divergence. One of the empirical findings in recent decentralization literature indicates that<br />
effectiveness of local governments in the management of natural resource sectors depends on<br />
the degree to which local governments involve local resource users in political decision<br />
making and how they are down-worldly accountable to these users. 312<br />
A review of the above treatment reveals that although participation in political decisionmaking<br />
is increasingly taking shape, it is important to investigate the contents, outcomes and<br />
impact of such decisions on local area resource management, since such decision-making may<br />
face high chances of elite capture, neglecting the evolution and continuation of locally<br />
cherished institutions such as indigenous laws which in many cases forms the backbone for<br />
local resource utilization. 313<br />
Singleton outlines the importance of vertical communication in management of biodiversity.<br />
First he defines vertical communication as the inter-actions between actors at different levels<br />
308 Barrett, C et al. 2001. Conserving tropical biodiversity amidst weak institutions. BioScience 51(6): 497-502.<br />
309 List , M and V.Rittberger. 1992. Regime Theory and International Environment Management. In The<br />
International Politics of the Enviroment: Actors, Interests and Institutions edited by A. Hurrel and<br />
B.Kingsbury, 166-179. Oxford: Clarendon Press.<br />
310 Ribot,C.J. 2000. Choosing Representation: Institutions and Powers for Decentralised Natural Resource<br />
Mnagement. Washington.D.C. World Resources Institute.<br />
311 Ibid.<br />
312 Anderson, K. 2002. Can Decentralization Save Bolivia’s Forests? An Institutional Analysis of Municipal<br />
Governance of Forest Resources .CIPE Dissertation Series. No.9.<br />
313 DiMaggio, P.J and W.W, Powell. 1983. The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective<br />
Rationality in Organizational Fields. American Sociological Review 48(2):147-160.<br />
62
of governance. 314 For instance, forest users engage in vertical communication when they talk<br />
to municipal government or with central government officials. Vertical communication is<br />
important for both accountability and for devising different policy responses.<br />
Further more, it is through vertical communication that forest principals find out what their<br />
agents have, or have not done. The proper functioning of both upward accountability from<br />
municipal officials to central government and downward accountability from municipal<br />
government to citizens relies on the frequent use of these vertical channels of communication.<br />
Cohen and Peterson add that Vertical communication is necessary for policy makers to<br />
acquire information about local institutions, time and place in which they are framed. They<br />
emphasize that this is one of the cardinal justifications for decentralization. 315<br />
While decentralization can help to boost local resource governance as well as building<br />
horizontal communication between a variety of area actors such as tribal chieftains,<br />
community resource user groups other existing informal systems involving both forest and<br />
non forestry actors operating in the local area, local authorities don’t have the capacity to<br />
effectively manage the local forests. 316 There is lack of information on the sustainable<br />
management of forest resources. 317 This kind of scenario puts decentralized forest<br />
management in Kenya in a situation of jeopardy. However, the recently adopted Forest Act<br />
2005 stipulates that a local authority shall be responsible for the preparation of a management<br />
plan with respect to each local authority forest within its jurisdiction. 318 This is widely seen as<br />
a move that gives more powers to the decentralized forest governance. It is also construed as a<br />
move in the direction of biodiversity restoration. Section 35(5) of the same act points out that<br />
the service of a local authority may discharge its responsibilities under this section by<br />
preparing any requisite plans and adopting a plan prepared by another person or body. 319<br />
While this section further points out that in preparing and adopting a management plan the<br />
local authority shall consult with the local conservation committee. 320<br />
As Johnson and Minis noted, information flow is the currency of all linkages between local<br />
authorities and the governed. Efforts to strengthen the performance of local governments need<br />
to enforce the communication between local government and local communites. 321 It is worth<br />
noting that the planning processes for effective management of forest resource commons<br />
entails vertical communication channels. These channels are important for learning about<br />
opportunities regarding how to combine local experiences regarding resources management,<br />
through joint sharing of varied actors’ common experience and interests in solving common<br />
314<br />
Singleton,S. 1998. Constructing Cooperation:The evolution of Institutions of Co-Management. Ann Arbor:<br />
University of Michigan Press.<br />
315<br />
Cohen,J.M and S.B,Peterson. 1999. Administrative Decentralsation: Strategiesfor Developing Countries.<br />
Bloomfield: Kumarian Press Inc.<br />
316<br />
GOK. 2005. Sessional Paper No.9 on the Forestry Policy, Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources.<br />
317<br />
Ibid.<br />
318<br />
The Kenya Forest Act Caps 2005. 35(3).<br />
319<br />
The Kenya Forest Act Caps 2005. 35(5).<br />
320<br />
The Kenya Forest Act Caps 2005. 35(6).<br />
321<br />
Johnson, R.W and H.P, Minis. 1996. Towards Democratic Decentralisation: Approaches to Promoting Good<br />
Governance. Research Triangle Park. N.C: RTI International.<br />
63
esource problems. The horizontal information exchange is linked to governance performance<br />
in two ways: one, the ease with which information passes between the various actors involved<br />
in both provision and production of services helps determine the eventual effectiveness of<br />
services delivered.<br />
The Second aspect is that, both vertical and horizontal communication when upheld over a<br />
long period of time, and when group members value the potential future benefits arising from<br />
such cooperation will lead to greater trust between participating actors. 322 This is borne out of<br />
the fact that increased trust between actors would facilitate their cooperation, and such<br />
cooperation is deemed necessary for effective outcomes. It also brings a durable relationship<br />
between local communication patterns and the effectiveness local area forest governance.<br />
This will help in overcoming collective dilemmas. 323 Lyon on the other hand seems to<br />
disagree. He argues that trust across nations depends on a long term culture specifically<br />
religious tradition and economic equality. He mentions that trust has cultural roots that are<br />
resistant to change. Trust leads to better institutions and not the other way around. 324 He<br />
concludes by remarking that all this depends on the level of economic equalities. Therefore,<br />
this implies that societies with economic inequities may take long to develop trust in<br />
prevailing institutions and this will endanger the execution of and implementation of existing<br />
institutions.<br />
In line with the above observation, Gibson and his collaborators inform that institutional<br />
arrangements are continually established and redefined to modify existing natural resource<br />
regimes. They re-affirm the fact that resource relations between two or more people can thrive<br />
if there is institutional cohesion. They argue that this is attained by resource users accepting<br />
the principle that one may have a right only when all the others have a duty. 325 However, it is<br />
imperative to appreciate that while natural resources are commonly endowed regimes and<br />
commonly owned, need to be conserved. The question of concern here is do communities<br />
appreciate the essence of commonality and the need for conservation? How do communities<br />
perceive local biodiversity? Enumerating these questions lies in the interest of this study to<br />
establish the link and gap between the universal norms and community local biodiversity<br />
perceptions. This research endeavors to understand whether the policy formulation process<br />
takes this into account. This same scenario is highlighted by Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop.<br />
The duo noted that, it is a right to benefit from a common stream and that right is only as<br />
secure as the duty of others to respect the conditions that protect that stream. 326 True, it goes<br />
without saying, if one has a right; he expects that those with a duty will respect both the law<br />
322<br />
Truman, F. 1971. Towards a Rational Policy of Decentralisation: Another View. The American Political<br />
Science Review 65(1): 172-179.<br />
323<br />
Truman, F. 1971. Opcit.<br />
324<br />
Lyon, F. 2000. Trust Networks and Norms: The creation of Social Capital in Agricultural Economies in<br />
Ghana. World Development 28(4): 663-681.<br />
325<br />
Gibson, C.C, et al. 2000. Explaining deforestation : The role of local Institutions. In People, and Forests:<br />
Communities, Institutions and Governance, edited by C.Gibson, , M.A Mackean and E. Ostum, 135-161.<br />
Cambridge: MITT Press.<br />
326<br />
Ciriacy –Wantrup, S.V and R.C, Bishop. 1975. Common Property as a Concept in Natural Resource Policy.<br />
Natural Ressources Journal. 15: 713-727.<br />
64
and his claims. Hence it is the function of the state to restrain those with duty. The puzzle here<br />
is: what happens when the state is unable ensure compliance to duties? What happens in an<br />
instance where a community’s local laws are more self enforcing than formal state laws<br />
relating to the environment?<br />
Bromley argues that much of the confusion in environmental policy stems from a fundamental<br />
misunderstanding of possible resource regimes. The “tragedy of the commons" idea has<br />
helped confuse scholars and prevents meaningful understanding of resource management<br />
regimes. 327 Among these possible regimes, common property carries the misplaced blame for<br />
"inevitable" resource degradation that really lies with both open access and closed regimes.<br />
Freeny et al. added that Garrett Hardin's tragedy of the commons has been remarkably<br />
durable. Many users confuse an open access regime with a free-for-all common property<br />
regime which specifies behavioral rules. 328 This observation however, ignored the possibility<br />
that resource users can act together and institute checks and balances, rules and sanctions for<br />
their own interaction within a given resource environment. This actually presents us with yet<br />
another point of concern.<br />
At issue is the need to find out whether communities particularly in Kakamega have had any<br />
specific behavioral rules governing the use of their common resources? And if they exist, we<br />
endeavor to understand how the current institutional framework encompasses these<br />
communally built regulations. We also wish to establish the place for community regulations<br />
regarding biodiversity within the national resource management regimes.<br />
Bromley further recounts that at the most fundamental level, biodiversity as a public good is<br />
similar to private good in the sense that non-owners are excluded from use and decision-<br />
making. Along with this exclusionary similarity, we also find that each of the co-owners in a<br />
common-property regime has rights and duties inside the regime. 329 A true common resource<br />
regime requires the same thing as private property; exclusion of non-owners. While we know<br />
that property-owning groups vary in nature, size, and internal structure across a broad<br />
spectrum, they are all social units with definite membership and boundaries, with certain<br />
common interests, with at least some interaction among members, with some common<br />
cultural norms, and with their own endogenous authority systems. 330 For instance, ethnic<br />
groupings, sub villages, neighborhoods, small transhumant groups, kin systems, or extended<br />
families are possible examples of meaningful authority systems. In many societies, these<br />
groupings hold customary ownership of certain natural resources such as farm land, grazing<br />
327<br />
Bromley, D.W and M.M, Cernea. 1989. The management of common Property Natural Resources : Some<br />
Conceptual and operational Fallacies. Washington D.C: The World Bank.<br />
328<br />
Freeny, D. Berkes, F . McCay, B.J and J. Acheson. 1990. The tragedy of Commons: Twenty years Later.<br />
Human Ecology 18:1-19<br />
329<br />
Bromley,D.W. 1989. Property Relations and Economic Development.The Other Land Reform. World<br />
Development 17(6): 867-877.<br />
330<br />
Agrawal, A. 2001. Common property, forest management and the Indian Himalaya Contributions to India.<br />
Sociology 35(2):181–212.<br />
65
land, and water sources. 331 Compliance, reinforced by an authority system, is a necessary<br />
pre-condition for the viability of any resource regime.<br />
A common resource regime would not work without the requisite authority system that makes<br />
it certain that rights and duties are adhered to. 332 The same requirements exist for state or<br />
public goods such as biodiversity. Without authority there can be no property! When the<br />
authority system breaks down, the coherent management of natural resource use collapse.<br />
Under these circumstances, any resource regime, whether private, common, or state,<br />
degenerates into open access. 333 Therefore putting all this together we understand that a<br />
reasonable degree of authority and organization among resource using communities is not an<br />
option, it is a must. The big question that arises is: with this kind of structure put in place and<br />
supported by revamped institutions, can we see a move to restoration rather than continued<br />
degeneration of natural resource regimes in Kenya?<br />
Mearns points out that the central role of institutions is in regulating patterns of governance.<br />
He makes the evaluation in specific regard to the behaviour between individual groups in<br />
society in mediating environment-society relationships. 334 He grounds his argument in the<br />
extended form of entitlements analysis, looking at how differently positioned social actors<br />
command environmental goods and services. 335 But our concerns here are; how do different<br />
social actors view natural resource regime changes at different times? How does control of<br />
access by these actors transform the natural resource governance?<br />
Sen uses the term entitlements not to mean what people should have but the range of<br />
possibilities that people can have. In other words to him entitlements represent the set of<br />
alternative commodity bundles that a person can command in society using the totality of<br />
rights and opportunities he or she faces. 336 Sen’s analysis seems to look at how individuals<br />
gain from different resource endowments to improve their well being and social standing.<br />
However, Melissa reacts differently to Sen’s analysis. He informs that this is a rather<br />
descriptive approach and cannot easily show us how such people can or cannot survive under<br />
a given institutional setting. 337 But then Sen goes ahead to mention that entitlements can<br />
enhance people’s capabilities, which explains what people, can do with their entitlements. He<br />
illustrates this through examples like, command over fuel resources derived from rights over<br />
331<br />
Behnke, R H. 1984. Fenced and Open-Range Ranching: The Commercialization of Pastoral Land and<br />
Livestock in Africa', In Livestock Development in Sub-Saharan Africa, edited by Simpson, J.R. and P.<br />
Evangelou, 261-284. Boulder: Westview Press.<br />
332<br />
Baden, J. 1977. A Primer for the Management of Common Pool Resources', In Managing the Commons,<br />
edited by H.Garrett and J, Baden, 137-146. San Francisco: W.H. Freeman.<br />
333<br />
Andelson, R. V. 1991. Commons Without Tragedy: The Congruence of Garrett Hardin and Henry George', In<br />
Commons Without Tragedy: The Social Ecology of Land Tenure and Democracy, edited by R.V, Andelson,<br />
613-615. London: Centre for Incentive Taxation.<br />
334<br />
Mearns, R. 1995. Environmental Entitlements towards empowerment for sustainable development. In<br />
Towards Sustainable development edited by Singh, N and V.Titi, 37-53. London: Zed Books<br />
335<br />
Sen, A. 1984. Rights and Capabilities. In Sen, A. Resources, Values and Development. Oxford: Blackwell.<br />
336<br />
Sen, A. 1999. Development as Freedom. New York: Anchor Books.<br />
337<br />
Melissa, L, R. Mearns, and I. Scoons. 1999. Environmental Entitlements: Dynamics in Community Based<br />
Natural Resource Management. Brighton: World Development 27:225-347.<br />
66
trees, food resources, warmth or ability to cook and so on. These, he says contribute to their<br />
well being. 338 But it is also important to ask whether under such circumstances individuals can<br />
make rational choices versus the maintaining of the natural resource regime healthy.<br />
In their analysis, Guyer and Richards argue that natural resource regimes entail exchange<br />
rights, entitlements over the distribution of net economic surplus accruing to the communities,<br />
a management subsystem, and authority mechanisms as necessary components of the<br />
enforcement system. When any part of this complex system is undermined, they caution, the<br />
entire system malfunctions and ceases to operate as a resource regime. 339<br />
It is indeed the management subsystem with its authority mechanisms and ability to enforce<br />
operating rules and system-maintenance provisions, which ensures that the rules relating to a<br />
particular property regime are adhered to. This, in principle, is not different from the ways in<br />
which the other property regimes operate as authority systems. 340 For instance, as earlier<br />
noted, under private-resource regimes the owner relies on the authority of the state and its<br />
coercive power to assure compliance and to prevent intrusion by non-owners. In absence of<br />
this regulative and coercive authority, even private resources would collapse and become<br />
open-access resource regimes. 341 Therefore, in light of the above treatment some issues arise.<br />
One such issue is the fact that a resource regime entails the distribution and sharing the<br />
economic surplus as well as other entitlements. In respect to Kakamega which is a habitat for<br />
different sub-tribes, we ask ourselves; what are the entitlements involved and what are the<br />
institutions governing the distribution and sharing the economic surplus?<br />
Swallow notes that resource degradation in common resource areas will usually occur if the<br />
government holds local communities using such resources in low esteem. 342 This is<br />
exemplified by instances of state disregard to the interests of those segments of the population<br />
occupying a particular communal resource regime. For instance, when external threats to such<br />
a common resource occurs, such populations will not receive the same state response as<br />
would a threat to private property or that common property regime which has high state<br />
consideration.<br />
The willingness of the modern state to legitimize and protect different property regimes is<br />
partly explained by the state's perception of the importance of the citizens holding different<br />
types of resource rights. This situation is well illustrated by Elbow. He elucidates that if<br />
pastoralists for instance are regarded as politically marginal, then the resource regimes central<br />
to pastoralism will be indifferently protected against external threats. On the contrary if those<br />
threatening pastoralist property regimes, for example sedentary agriculturists, enjoy more<br />
338<br />
Sen, A. 1999. Opcit.<br />
339<br />
Guyer, J and P.Richards. 1996. The Invention of Biodiversity: Social Perspectives on the Management of<br />
Biological Variety in Africa.66(1): 1-13.<br />
340<br />
Hess, C and E, Ostrom. 2003. Ideas, Artifacts, and Facilities: Information as a Common-Pool Resource",<br />
Law and Contemporary Problems 66:111-146.<br />
341<br />
Espen, S and D,W.Bromley. 1997. Indigenous land rights in Sub-Saharan Africa: Appropriation,Security and<br />
Investment Demand. World Development 25(4):549-562.<br />
342<br />
Swallow,B.M. 1990. Strategies and Tenure in African Livestock Development. LTC Paper 140. Madison:<br />
University of Wisconsin.<br />
67
favour from the state, then the protection of rangelands under common property against<br />
encroachments for cultivation will be indifferent at best. 343 This represents the external<br />
political and economic legitimacy of the property regime.<br />
The above argument and elucidation translates to mean that there are political and economical<br />
inclinations embedded in the governance and management of common resource enterprises.<br />
This helps our appreciation of political games involved. Governments will protect and<br />
conserve resource regimes whose populations are considered to be of importance to the state.<br />
This same argument also raises some points of worthy concern to this study. For example we<br />
need to ask; of what political or economic importance are the people residing in and around<br />
Kakamega forest to the government? This is grounded in the fact that politics is defined in<br />
terms of power relations, that determine who gets what when and where. What is the<br />
contribution of these communities in terms of national economic importance? Are they in any<br />
way marginalized and not perceived as important to the state? Are they in a way opposed to<br />
the state and opposed to the governmental policies including conservation? Or they are<br />
victims of external encroachment and if they are; can these threats in any way be state<br />
inspired?<br />
3.4 Resource actors, and local perspectives on biodiversity in Kenya<br />
Edwards and Steiner define resource actors as individuals and agents with bargaining power<br />
and are able to change the “collective-choice rules” that comprise of the institutional<br />
framework in which resource users operate and operational rules are established. 344 Resource<br />
actors may also be defined by their preferences. Perhaps most obvious are differences<br />
between people who are concerned about different products of multiple-product natural<br />
resource system. One of the most challenging issues especially in the developing countries is<br />
that different individuals and groups have different preferences and perceptions about<br />
different natural resource endowments such as grazing lands, woodlands and wetlands. 345 For<br />
example, in the Kakamega district of western Kenya, resource users include urban-based<br />
cattle owners, sellers of wood fuel and charcoal, and pastoralists, and local agro-pastoralists.<br />
Resource actors can also be defined on the basis of their preferences toward the different<br />
functions of the resource management institutions. For example, preferences toward the risk<br />
management function will depend upon people’s attitudes toward variation in the supply of<br />
products from the natural resource system, which in turn depends upon their capacity to<br />
generate income from alternative sources and access to markets. Preferences toward the<br />
343<br />
Elbow, K. 1996. Legislative Reform, Tenure and Natural Resource Management in the Niger: The New Rural<br />
Code. A Paper Presented for the Comite Permanent Inter-Estats-des lutte Countre la sécheresse dans le Sahel.<br />
Land Tenure Centre, University of Madison.<br />
344<br />
Edwards, Victoria.M and Steiner; Nathalie. A. 1997. Developing an Analytical Frame work for Multi-Use<br />
Commons. Department of Land and Construction Management, University of Portsmouth. Portsmouth:<br />
Mimeo.<br />
345<br />
Oloson, M. 1965. The logic of Collective Action. Public Goods and the theory of groups. Cambridge:<br />
Harvard University Press.<br />
68
environmental externality function will depend upon whether people are the generators or<br />
recipients of external benefits or costs. 346<br />
Namara and Nsabagasane mention that tensions between national and local objectives<br />
concerning issues like foreign exchange, watershed management, conservation and<br />
commercial production and local livelihoods interfere with the individual powers over natural<br />
resource conservation and environment. Within this theatre of local tensions, there is a<br />
common tension between technocratic practices of development managers and the newly<br />
pluralistic political practices of development managers. 347 Therefore, this illuminates what<br />
usually happens when unmitigated efforts to manage a natural resource common meets with<br />
varied individual preferences. There emerges a shift in perceptions and preferences among the<br />
different actors at both the state and local levels. Although the two authors don’t delve in the<br />
intricacies of the political and social tensions, this study is further interested in appreciating<br />
the existing relationship between the different actors in the management of the nation’s<br />
biodiversity.<br />
Analysts of common resource regimes for grazing and forestry resources often note the<br />
importance of political institutions for managing the common resources, particularly during<br />
times of stress and more specifically for the rural poor. Jodha analyzed the contribution of<br />
such political institutions to the welfare of rich and poor households in 82 villages in seven of<br />
India's dry states. He found out that the poor derived much larger proportions of their fuel<br />
supplies, animal grazing, employment and total income from common forest resources than<br />
did the wealthy. For example, both the wealthy and poor derived an average of 80% and 20%<br />
of their household needs, respectively, from common natural resources. Common natural<br />
resources contributed 14-23% of the income of the poor but only 1-3% to the income of the<br />
wealthy. The contribution to the income of the poor increased to between 42% and 57%<br />
during times of drought. 348 However, evidence is less clear for Africa.<br />
Migot- Adhola et al. found out that the rural poor in Kenya relied on foods harvested from<br />
common resource regimes more than the wealthy and that those foods were particularly<br />
important in drought years. 349 Alila in his research on formal and informal credit in rural<br />
Kenya found that the poorest households in rural particularly those in Vihinga, generated a<br />
high proportion of their money income from common natural resource regimes under<br />
communal and customary arrangements than did the relatively wealthy households, who live<br />
on land purchased from their incomes. 350 He notes that these also have a different perspective<br />
346 Meyers, R et al. 1994. Institutions, Enviroment and Organisations.Thousand Oaks: CA Sage.<br />
347 Namara, A and X. Nsabagasane. 2001. Decentralised Governance and Wildlife Management: Devolving<br />
Rights or Shedding off Responsibility? The case of Bwindi Impenetrable National Park, Uganda.<br />
Environmental Governance working Paper. Washington D.C: World Resources Institute.<br />
348 Jodha, N.S. 1992. Common Property Resources: A missing Dimension of Development Strategies. World<br />
Bank Discussion Paper No.169. Washington D.C: World Bank.<br />
349 Migot- Adhola, S.E et al. 1994. Security of Tenure: Land and Productivity in Kenya. In searching for land<br />
Tenure Security in Africa, edited by J.Bruce and ,S.E Migot- Adhola, 251-265. Dubuque: Kendau/ Hunt<br />
Publishing House.<br />
350 Alila, P. 2000. Formal and Informal Credit in Rural Kenya. IDS occasional paper, University of Nairobi.<br />
69
as regards resource management as compared to their counterparts above. This same view is<br />
noted and approved of by Migot-Adhola who notes in agreement when he mentions that the<br />
individuals who benefit from products of a natural resource system are likely to differ in a<br />
number of important respects. In terms of power and decision-making those differences will<br />
affect their individual strategies toward resource use and the benefits they expect to obtain<br />
from property rights and collective action institutions. 351<br />
Ascher enumerates three types of criteria that are used to distinguish resource actors and<br />
perceptions. These include: the complexity of the intra-organizational procedures which<br />
stipulate the rights, entitlements and reward structures of the system, second is; learning<br />
patterns and the third is time horizons. 352 The following treatment describes these criteria in<br />
more detail. Resources actors have different rights and perceptions depending on their<br />
position in the resource regime.<br />
Taking it from Swallow and Bromley, who define a right as a guarantee given by a collective<br />
authority system to those who subscribe to the total entity and a property right as a right to a<br />
potential future benefit. 353 Rights to the products of a natural resource system may be the same<br />
for all those who benefit from those products. Often, however, such rights held by an<br />
individual are conditioned upon their ethnicity, location of settlement, length of time settled in<br />
a particular area and gender. Property rights can differ by the types of rights held by the<br />
different subscribers or by the products to which they apply. For example, Moorhead uses an<br />
analogy in the Niger Delta in Mali, to elucidate this case further. He mentions that in many<br />
settings, different ethnic groups have primary rights to different resources available. For<br />
example, rangelands for animal grazing, rivers and streams for fishing, wetlands for<br />
producing paddy rice, and plateaux for producing millet. 354 He also points outs that secondary<br />
rights include gathering products such as fonio, forest fruits, water-lily seeds, tubers, young<br />
wild birds, and wood for smoking fish or domestic use. 355<br />
Therefore, from Moorhead’s discussion, we note that resource usage, ownership and rights<br />
especially in the tropics, have a substantial relationship with ethnic group. However, the big<br />
question is whether degradation or preservation resource in particular natural resource areas<br />
can be linked to a particular ethnic group? It is however important to avoid the temptation of<br />
using this same analysis to explain resource degradation in Kakamega forest, based on a<br />
conglomeration of other inputs fuelling the problem. It will nevertheless help us in making<br />
future linkages to make a logical ending.<br />
351<br />
Migot- Adhola, S.E et al. 1991. Indigenous Land Rights Systems in Sub Saharan Africa : A Constraint on<br />
Productivity. World Bank Review 155.<br />
352<br />
Ascher, W. 2000. Applying Classic Organization Theory toSustainable Resource & Environmental<br />
Management. A Paper presented at 5th Annual Colloquium on Environmental Law & Institutions Duke<br />
University.<br />
353<br />
Swallow, B.M and W, Bromley. 1995. Institutions, Governance and Incentives in Common Property<br />
Regimes for African Rangelands. Jouranal of Environment and Resource Economics 5:1-20.<br />
354<br />
Moorehead, R. 1989. Changes taking place in Common property Resource Management in Inland Niger<br />
Delter of Mali, In common Property Resources: Ecology and Community Development, edited by F.<br />
Berkes, 256-272. London,: Belhaven Press.<br />
355<br />
Ibid.<br />
70
Wear observes that the enhancement or establishment of forest resources whether privately,<br />
communally or publicly, that is through national legal regimes, represents an increase in<br />
natural capital, and the transfer of forest ownership rights to intended beneficiaries, who can<br />
be local households or communities. 356 The observation to make here is that the above<br />
investment constitutes the transfer of capital assets. As natural capital, forests can be put to<br />
sustainable use or harvested, or converted to produce other types of capital. Forest harvesting<br />
and conversion to agricultural land are both means of converting natural capital to financial,<br />
physical, human or more valuable natural capital. These strategies may make sense for local<br />
people, as long as they can also protect ecosystem stability and opportunities for future forest<br />
resource use by retaining critical forest elements in the landscape. 357 However, we need not<br />
delve into the resultant nested benefits but rather we should note that the above authors seem<br />
to argue that changing ownership and guarantee of ownership rights can increase natural<br />
capital accumulation. Apparently the dilemma is that of linking capital accumulation to<br />
conservation. The authors also don’t point out how this can be sustainably done in face of<br />
increasing flow of masses to most of the forested areas. This is one of the reasons explaining<br />
the continued degradation of biodiversity resources in Kenya. The authors also fail to point<br />
out how such people perceive resources established under communal and public legal<br />
arrangements. Do they view them as communally or publicly owned resources or part of their<br />
own? More so the authors don’t illustrate how central authorities can control movement of<br />
masses into the areas held in common esteem such as a forest?<br />
Gottfried et al. discussed the advantages of local cooperative institutions otherwise known as<br />
local user groups for managing heterogeneous resources. The need for some form of public<br />
regulation or cooperation among the users of such natural resource systems arises from at<br />
least two sources. One, the spatial pattern of resource use within a natural resource system<br />
affects the mix of goods and services supplied by the ecosystem or landscape; and two<br />
ecosystems are inter-related so that the way in which one ecosystem is used has spillover<br />
effects on contiguous ecosystems. 358 Ostrom refers to the effect of this spatial pattern on<br />
landscape output mix as the economies of configuration. 359 The use of common property<br />
regimes as mechanisms for capturing economies of configuration is now being tested by the<br />
Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) in<br />
Zimbabwe. Metcalfe mentions that this holistic rural development program aims to improve<br />
people’s livelihoods by developing their capacity to manage their indigenous resources like<br />
grazing, forestry, water and wildlife better. For over fifteen years that this program has been<br />
356<br />
Wear, D.N. 1992. Forest Management, Institutions and Ecological Sustainability. A paper presented at the<br />
Appalachian society of American Foresters meeting, Asheville, North Carolina.<br />
357<br />
Gorttfried, R, D. Wear and R.Lee. 1996. Institutional Solutions to Market failures on the Landscape Level.<br />
Ecological Economics 18:133-140.<br />
358<br />
Meinzen, D., Ruth, E. Mwangi and S. Dohrn. 2006. Securing the Commons. CAPRi Policy Brief 4.<br />
Washington DC: IFPRI.<br />
359<br />
Ibid.<br />
71
in existence, it has focused almost exclusively on the management and commercial<br />
exploitation of wildlife. 360<br />
Bhenke informs that the configuration of land use is very important for maintaining the<br />
habitat of the wildlife that generates the greatest revenues. 361 The above scholars’ discussion<br />
though present a big case on the role of communities or more precisely community<br />
involvement in the management of natural resources, does not spell out who does what at<br />
what levels. The discussion though offers a place for equity, does not inform us whether<br />
small-scale cooperatives or small scale resource users in this case have completely taken over<br />
the role of the central authorities as actors in the use and management of natural resources.<br />
While looking at the economies of configuration, it is also important to ask: Under which<br />
mechanism and regime do the small cooperative institutions work? Is it under the norms<br />
established by the communities or under the policies and guidelines stipulated by the central<br />
and local government legal regimes? Answers to these and other questions raised in this<br />
chapter will be of profound importance in debating biodiversity and the local of<br />
decentralization in the subsequent chapter.<br />
360 Metcalfe, S. 1994. Zimbabwe's Communal Areas Management Programme For Indigenous Resources in<br />
Natural Connections: Perspectives in Community-based Conservation Washington D.C: Island Press.<br />
361 Bhenke, R.H and I. Scoones. 1992. Rethinking Rangeland Ecology: Implications For Rangeland Management<br />
in Africa. Working Paper No. 53. Washington D.C. The World Bank.<br />
72
4 Biodiversity, local decentralisation and the politics of neo-<br />
patrimonialism in Kenya<br />
This chapter examines how sub-nationalist politics that emerged within the post independence<br />
ruling party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU), government marked by high levels<br />
of ethnic heterogeneity and a history of political and economically privileged presidential<br />
cronies, benefited from the large tracks of national biodiversity resources, particularly forest<br />
belts, considerably led to degeneration of the national biodiversity. We also mention how<br />
overgeneralization and over concentration of power in the hands of the ruling president and<br />
his cohorts contributed to this quagmire, characterized by interpersonal interchanges, social<br />
and political relations. In almost all the provinces of this country, a large number of ethnic<br />
minorities carved out a considerable degree of autonomy within each region and at the<br />
community level, while consolidating long-standing practices of inter and ethnic cooperation.<br />
We use the term political patrimonialism to capture the imagery of glaring facets social,<br />
economic and political bootstrap-relations that historically defined a shared political<br />
preference to the plurality of conventional politics and service delivery. Political<br />
patrimonialism encompasses practices linked to illegal operations arising from corruption and<br />
related facets. Such include the sale of government property by government officials for<br />
personal gain. These mosaic-like practices were each abhorred and confronted by strong<br />
hostile external forces from the underprivileged masses, university students and other related<br />
civil society activism. Though a parallel system of decentralization based on regional,<br />
provincial and district local governments was established to delegate powers, it was not far<br />
from what the leadership style at the centre obtained.<br />
4.1 Biodiversity and the politics of neo-patrimonialism in Kenya<br />
Kameri-Mbote in a rather more insightful analysis of natural resource governance, property<br />
rights and biodiversity management in Kenya, points out that legal regimes are sometimes<br />
framed on the basis of neo-classical models which sometimes fail to recognize crucial actors<br />
in the management of natural resources, resulting into framing of rights at wrong levels. 362<br />
This implies that sometimes the rights holders may not be the best people to protect the<br />
resources over which they have interests. This assertion opens the debate regarding neopatrimonial<br />
politics in Kenya. It makes one wonder whether formulation of natural resources<br />
rules in Kenya is linked to political patronage. The current biodiversity crisis in Kenya began<br />
to take its roots at the close of the 1970’s and at the dawning of the 1980’s. It was also<br />
discovered that corrupt government agents were responsible for much of the deforestation, by<br />
illegally selling off biodiversity resources in form of forested land to political patrimonies in<br />
363<br />
the name of industrial developers.<br />
362 Kameri-Mbote, P. 2001. Biodiversity and Property Rights Management in Kenya. Nairobi: ACTS Press.<br />
363 Kanyinga, K 1994. Ethnicity, Patronage and Class in Local Arena: High and low Politics in Kiambu, Kenya<br />
1982-1992. In new Local Level Politics in East Africa, edited by P. Gibson, 87-117. Uppsala: The<br />
Scandinavia Institute of African Studies.<br />
73
Kenyan forests were depleted by "selfish individuals," who at the same time fueled tribal<br />
conflicts leading to the land clashes of the 1990s. Supporters of the ruling party got the land,<br />
while those in the pro-democracy or opposition movements were displaced. This was one of<br />
the roots of deforestation and forest degradation in Kenya. 364 Ironically, this was one of the<br />
government's ways of retaining power. In essence, if communities were kept busy fighting<br />
over land, they would have less opportunity to demand democracy. 365 O’Donnell, who<br />
focused on problematic tendencies of political and democratic transitions, mentioned that the<br />
formal level of negotiation and political activity largely produces informal maneuvering<br />
which plays a critical role in the dynamics of political change. 366 Similarly other theorists of<br />
neo-Patrimonial politics such as Bayart, view corruption and predatoriness as modes of social<br />
and political behavior shared by a plurality of actors on a more-less grand scale.<br />
A critical look at the land clashes in the early and late 1990s, by Muungano wa Wanavijiji<br />
informs that, the use of public resources by government to get favors from supporters or<br />
ensure political patronage made natural resources available to a small fraction of people,<br />
hence a legalized de facto privatization of common property resources. With such practices<br />
there were increased land clashes and land shortages especially with the Rift Ralley region<br />
and other forested fertile land belts. 367 Kenya is one of the few former settler colonies that<br />
enacted trust land tenure system. This was motivated by the need to redistribute land that was<br />
formerly occupied by white farmers. However, a survey of post independence land resources<br />
in Kenya reveals that Kenya is faced with landlessness of many of its natives with recurrent<br />
land disputes among ethnic groups and between communities. 368 Obtaining from such a<br />
diabolical situation, the former Moi Government was forced to set in train a national land<br />
policy formulation process, to try and sort out these underlying problems.<br />
It must be mentioned that even efforts to solve the underlying land problems were marred by<br />
inequities and inconsistencies, to the extent that such efforts degenerated into the sale of most<br />
of the public forested resources in the name of solving underlying land problems. 369 The new<br />
government of the President Mwai Kibaki put in place a commission to investigate and find<br />
out the reasons why there were illegal land acquisitions especially public land linked to<br />
national forests and other biodiversity reserves. The commission was referred to as the<br />
Ndung’u Comission. 370 It was one of the series of measures designed to tackle the irregular<br />
allocation of forest land to private developers in the country. It was also expected that such<br />
ownership will be revoked soon and that disciplinary action taken against all government<br />
364 Holquist, F and F. Micheal. 1992. Kenya: Slouching Towards Democracy. Africa Today 39(3): 97-111.<br />
365 Klopp, J. 1999. Electoral Despotism: Ethnic Cleansing and Winning Elections in Kenya. A paper Presented at<br />
the New York Association of Political Science Annual Conference.<br />
366 O’dnell, G. 1996. Illussions And Conceptual Flaws. Journal of Democracy 7(4): 160-168.<br />
367 Bayart, J. F, E.Stephen and H. Beatrice. 1999. The Criminalisation of the State in Africa.<br />
Oxford: James Curry.<br />
368 Muungano, W.W. 1997. Manifesto on Land Security and Permanent Schelter for the Poor. Nairobi.<br />
369 Matiru, V. 1999. Forest and Forest Cover in Kenya: Policy and Practice. Nairobi:ICUN.<br />
370 The commision was established in 2003 and charged with the responsibility of inquiring into unlawful<br />
allocation of public lands and liase with the relevant Government departments to have the allocations<br />
nullified.Much of the land unlawfully allocated was forested land.<br />
74
officials found to have dished out the forest land to politically “correct individuals.” In one of<br />
its findings, the report informed that awards of public and trust land were given to the<br />
previous cronies of the past KANU regimes led by former presidents, Kenyatta (RIP) and<br />
Arap Moi. The report categorically put it that:<br />
Among other details there are glaring concerns of illegal land awards made to both the<br />
Kenyatta and Moi families, as well as to a raft of former ministers, MPs, judges, civil<br />
servants and military officers. The commission recommends that the large majority of such<br />
awards should be revoked. 371<br />
However, while it is such juicy findings which have been highlighted, one important feature<br />
in this report is the way it gives the systematic ways in which established procedures designed<br />
to protect the public interest, were perverted, flawed to serve private and political ends which<br />
may well prove to be its most long lasting value and therefore, the most intrinsic information<br />
which highlights these mosaic practices in the management of the Kenyan national resource<br />
regime.<br />
Land resource issues in Kenya are complex and easily exploited by politicians. Like we have<br />
earlier mentioned, land forms the basis for the significant part of the national resource regime<br />
in Kenya. It must also be reaffirmed that land retains a focal point in Kenya’s natural resource<br />
history. It was the basis upon which the struggle for independence was waged. 372 It has been<br />
traditionally dictated as the pulse of nationhood not only in this vast East African nation, but<br />
also else where in Africa. It continues to command a pivotal position in the country’s social,<br />
economic, political, legal natural resource relations.<br />
Though it is not the major focus of this study, it is critical to understand and appreciate the<br />
history of land ownership and distribution in Kenya. It should be noted that politicians and<br />
bureaucrats everywhere have powers to allocate property rights over scarce resources. This<br />
places them in a position to bargain for a share of the benefits they allocate. This creates<br />
widespread societal complicity in patrimonial practices with legitimacy, primarily a function<br />
of who is able to gain access to state resources – hence the role of patronage. 373<br />
It is imperative to mention that, though official sources will never acknowledge patronage and<br />
related practices in the management of biodiversity resources in Kenya, a discussion with<br />
individual respondents acknowledged this as one of the key factors that has bedeviled<br />
biodiversity and natural resource management in the country. Many of those who were close<br />
and related to the Ex-President Moi, were located large tracts of forest reserves to harvest<br />
timber and other resources. They exploited most of the forest resources in a rather depleting<br />
way. They were protected by this relationship and conservators of forests found it an uphill<br />
task to stop their unscrupulous practices. 374<br />
371 GOK. 2005. The Ndungu Report on Land Grabbing in Kenya. Nairobi: Government Printer.<br />
372 Kanongo, T. 1987. Squatters and the Roots of the Mau Mau, 1905-1963. London: James Curry.<br />
373 Reno, W. 1995. Corruption and the State Politics in Sierra Leone. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.<br />
374 Key Informant Interview with the Conservator of Forests, Mr. Eric Nahamya 22 May 2006.<br />
75
In the early 1990s, the Green Belt Movement launched a civic and environmental education<br />
program. In her Nobel Prize acceptance speech in December 2004, Nobel Laurent Wangari<br />
Maathai said that:<br />
The purpose of the program was to help people “make the connections between their own<br />
personal actions and the problems they witness in their environment and society. This<br />
would also enable people to oppose all facet related to environmental degradation. 375<br />
Maathai and the Green Belt Movement led high profile campaigns to save Kenya’s forests<br />
and green spaces. In 1991, for instance, the movement saved Nairobi’s Uhuru Park from an<br />
enormous tower block to be built by the ruling party. During the interview she noted that:<br />
The dictatorship was still strong, and not amused by protests. Government security forces<br />
and hired thugs that regularly inflicted beatings on such protesters, causing enormous<br />
injuries to many and yet, they were not put off. You cannot protect the environment if you<br />
do not have democratic governance and democratic space. 376<br />
Wangari further explained how the country’s biodiversity resources were plundered by the<br />
same government that was supposed to protect these resources. She informed that the same<br />
government led by President Moi continued to use legal methods to achieve illegal means.<br />
This is well exemplified by the attempts that were made to degazzet Karura Forest in 1998.<br />
However, the regime abandoned its illegal development plans, which had seen large chunks of<br />
the forest land chopped down and fenced off under legal notice Legal Notice 97/13.6.97 and<br />
allocated to private developers. 377<br />
We further note that in Kenya’s case, the politics of patronage adversely affected the<br />
protection and investment in biological conservation and management. This was due to the<br />
weakening state in the context of ethnically fragmented politics, based on ethnic and tribal<br />
tenets. 378 This weakness was also manifested in the continued decline in institutions as well<br />
as institutional management and enforcement agencies like the National Environmental<br />
Management Authority, the Forest Department or the Ministry of Environment together with<br />
the Kenya Wildlife Services. 379<br />
It is worth noting that although these agencies are established under the act of Parliament to<br />
conserve the national biological diversity, they were unfortunately caught in this web of<br />
political patronage. Sadly, the same state institutions demonstrated failure wriggle themselves<br />
out of pressures of this web. Fleuret who examined a similar scenario, noted that in the mid<br />
eighties Kenyan masses moving into the common resources including parks and forest<br />
reserved areas were sometimes a product of ethnic and tribal politics, spearheaded by the<br />
KANU party strongmen. He goes ahead to inform that such movements ended up into ethnic<br />
clashes which were used as an argument against multiparty democracy and pluralism at the<br />
375<br />
Wangari, M. 2005. Looking in a new Mirror. Nairobi:The Green Belt Movement.<br />
376<br />
Key Informant Interview with Prof. Wangari- Mathai Assistant Minister of Environment and Natural<br />
Resources.14 May 2006.<br />
377<br />
Karura allocations Irreguar. The Daily Nation 2 Dec. 1998.<br />
378<br />
Key Informant interview with Prof.Wangari-Mathai, Assistant Minister of the Enviroment and Natural<br />
Resource and 2004 Nobel Lauret.<br />
379<br />
Krhoda, G. 1998. What ails Kenya's policy on wildlife? Policy Insight 1(2):1-4.<br />
76
national level. At the local level victims of violence become easy ploys and acted as pawns<br />
for manipulative politics. 380 The above observation is however, important in making an<br />
analysis of the current trend. Currently the existing central institutions paint a picture of<br />
autonomy and increased vigilance although it is still suspect to make a well grounded<br />
conclusion towards the same effect.<br />
In an expert opinion interview with Dr. Samuel Kasiki, it was pointed out that rare species of<br />
birds and animals in the forests have since disappeared due to the massive encroachment. This<br />
arises out of the fact that there is habitat destruction. Environmentalists have warned that if<br />
urgent measures are not taken, forests like Mau will disappear in the next decade. This will<br />
leave the national biodiversity threatened. Destruction of Mau forest for instance is one of the<br />
products of patronage politics, yet it serves as a catchment area for many rivers in Kenya and<br />
Tanzania. It was partly the reason why the Cabinet recently heeded to the environmentalists’<br />
call and took a radical action to save the crucial forest – a water catchment source. 381<br />
It has been reported in the local media such as the Daily Nation that former politicians and<br />
benefactors of these client-patron transactions, who are at the verge of losing them have<br />
turned to indiscriminate destruction of the indigenous forests, with trees of 100-plus years<br />
being felled by illegal loggers, using powerful chain saw machines to cut trees from these<br />
once flourishing protectors of the country’s biological diversity, a scenario that continues<br />
unabetted. Rivers that once crossed these well conserved forests have since dried up with<br />
Lelongo dam, which was meant to supply the entire Nairagi Enkare area five kilometres<br />
away, holding only rainwater during the rainy seasons. In a key informant interview with Dr.<br />
Oyieke, the Director Centre for Biodiversity at the University of Nairobi, She informed that:<br />
One is able to count several river channels cutting through the hilly topography, a sign that<br />
the complex was a water catchment area for many rivers. This is a great danger to the<br />
national ecosystem and biological resources. Countless tree stumps, pieces of gigantic logs<br />
and rotting tree branches dot the complex – a testimony to the massive encroachment that<br />
the forest has been subjected to for many years. 382<br />
The National Environmental Management Authority (NEMA), the lead agency working to<br />
enforce evictions, listed politicians such as Narok County Council officials as the facilitators<br />
of illegal logging in most of the central forests. NEMA insists that such politicians are to<br />
blame for the mess because the same local governments are sometimes not helpful. Most local<br />
government officials are accused of conniving with the encroachers. Such a scenario frustrates<br />
conservation efforts. One of the NEMA officials, Mr Joseph Masinde was interviewed for this<br />
study. He noted that local council officers have been colluding with Members of Parliament<br />
of the former KANU government to distribute parcels of forest land in return for favours<br />
380<br />
Flurent, P. 1985. The Social Organisation of the Water resources Control in the Taita Hills, Kenya. American<br />
Anthropological Review.<br />
381<br />
Key Informant Interview with Dr. Samuel Kasiki, Reserch Scientist, Kenya Wildlife Services. 26 Sept<br />
2005.<br />
382<br />
Key Informant Interview with Dr. Oyieke, Centere for Biodiversity,University of Nairobi. 30 Sept 2005<br />
77
during presidential, parliamentary and local elections. 383 This happened in the four decades<br />
that marked the post independence KANU regime in Kenya.<br />
Mr. Jackson Ole Kamoye, the chairman of the Narok Chamber of Commerce, said politicians,<br />
council officials and the provincial administration officials had benefited from the forest<br />
illegally through such dubious political schemes. He informed the researcher that Politicians<br />
grabbed forestland and sold it to their friends, relatives and tribesmen purely for party,<br />
presidential and parliamentary bids for re-election, an aspect that depicts the client-patron<br />
relationships in the current biodiversity crisis in Kenya. 384<br />
Kartodiahaijo and Supriano noted that, often governments cannot control illegal operations.<br />
The two argue that this lack of control can either be deliberate (often linked to patrimonial<br />
politics) or determined by limitation of their capacity. 385 While the two authors were writing<br />
about conservation and forest degradation in Indonesia; their exposition represented the real<br />
features obtaining in the Kenyan forestry and biodiversity sector. In one way or the other,<br />
illegal use and destruction of forest biodiversity is rampant in many of the Kenyan forests.<br />
Kakamega, Mau or Karura only afford us a microscopic view of the entire national picture.<br />
By their nature, the true extent of illegal operations in the Kenyan biodiversity enterprise and<br />
more importantly in the forestry sector cannot be accurately known. But available evidence<br />
indicates that such activities continue, and their existence is important in unearthing the<br />
underlying causes of these mosaic practices in the country.<br />
Patrimonial politics weakens the administrative apparatus of the state decisions, as<br />
fundamental decisions are biased against activities that do not attract personal concessions or<br />
put in another way bribes. 386 As a result, a lot of illegal activities linked to degradation<br />
continue to occur. An overview of Kenyan forest governance has revealed inconsistencies and<br />
contradictions between legalities governing biodiversity in Kenya. These contradictions occur<br />
between different levels of administration in government and will be explicitly illustrated in<br />
the next chapter. In countries like Kenya, different levels of government ministries, agencies,<br />
provincial and local governments possess overlapping legal and regulatory systems that are<br />
always inconsistent with each other.<br />
Shleifer and Vishney argue that this is sometimes used as a ploy by the actors in the<br />
patrimonial political games. 387 Although we cannot make outright conclusions in this regard,<br />
some instances in the Kenyan context act as glowing examples in this direction. One such<br />
example is illuminated by the presidential pronouncements that were thought to have a direct<br />
bearing on forest conserving forestry biodiversity. For instance, in 1986 the President<br />
383 Key Informant interview with Mr Joseph Masinde NEMA 29 Sept 2005.<br />
384 Key Informant Interview with Mr Jackson Ole Kamoye, the chairman of the Narok Chamber of Commerce.<br />
385 Kartodiahaijo,H and A.Supriano. 2001. The Impact of Sectoral Development on Natural Resource<br />
Conservation and Degradation:The case of Timber and Tree crops in Indonesia. CIFOR Occasssional Paper<br />
No.6. Borgor,Indonesia.<br />
386 Oyugi, W.O. 1993. Local government in Kenya: A Case of Institutional decline. In Local Government in the<br />
Third World, edited by P. Mawhood, 24-48. Pretoria Africa Institute of South Africa.<br />
387 Shleifer, A and R.W, Vishney. 1993. Corruption Quatery.Journal of Economics10(8): 599-601.<br />
78
declared a ban on felling indigenous trees. 388 Whether or not these presidential decrees were<br />
followed by a legal notice is highly debatable. This results from the fact that, on the contrary<br />
Kenya entered a period of great change, losing the opportunity to move towards social and<br />
environmental justice. Many of its vast forests continued to be wrecked by companies owned<br />
by the few businesses that benefited from collusion, corruption and nepotism during the Moi<br />
regime. Local people were oppressed by these companies, often through the authoritarian<br />
apparatus of the police, army and Forest Department. Across Kenya, the situation was so bad<br />
that illegal logging outstripped legal timber production. 389<br />
The above scenario vindicates the role played by neo-patrimonial politics in the destruction of<br />
the national biodiversity resource regime in Kenya. That is if put simply, political cronies in<br />
the former regimes used official institutional power to carry out illegal and unofficial<br />
transactions on behalf of the state. Agents of patrimonial politics are seldom independent of<br />
each other. This makes it hard to apportion individual contributions to the biodiversity crisis<br />
in Kenya at this point in time. However, what we know is that such agents operate at different<br />
times and their roles play a significant role in fostering subsequent mosaic practices. In the<br />
next sub-section we delve into the historical context of neo-patrimonial Politics in Kenya.<br />
Locating neo-patrimonial politics in Kenya: A historical context<br />
In order for us to understand the history of neo-patrimonialism in Kenya, it is imperative to<br />
draw ourselves back to the immediate years of post independent Kenya, specifically looking<br />
at the new government under the leadership of President Jomo Kenyatta and his eventual<br />
successor President Daniel Arap Moi. The new government was sworn into power after the<br />
Mau Mau revolution whose chief slogan was to reclaim back the land that had been grabbed<br />
by the white settlers.<br />
In all, the new government was faced with a task of land redistribution and restoration to the<br />
rightful owners. 390 While this cause was noble, it was heavily abused. This resulted from the<br />
widespread presidential discretion with regard to alienated lands especially the land around<br />
forested areas and highlands. In many instances both Presidents Kenyatta and Moi were<br />
making land grants to individuals without any consideration to the public interests. This was<br />
done for political reasons, and without proper pursuit of legal procedures, whilst there was<br />
also extensive illegal allocation by the presidents of alienated land that is; land which they did<br />
not have legal power to allocate. 391<br />
There were also various commissioners of land who made direct grants of government land<br />
without any authority from the President, but also undertook the system of patrimonial land<br />
and resource allocation. Forged letters and documents were used to allocate land in numerous<br />
instances, with many records at the Ministry of Lands and Settlements having been<br />
388 Wass, P. 1995. Kenya’s Indegenous Forests: Status, Management and Conservation. Naiorbi:IUCN.<br />
389 Daily Nation. Firm Destroying Forests, Says Church leaders. Sepetember 1996.<br />
390 Muchai, J.1985. A History of Mordern Kenya.Nairobi:East African Publishing House.<br />
391 GOK. 2005. The Ndungu Report on land grabing in Kenya. Opcit<br />
79
deliberately destroyed. 392 Very often, land was sold by grantees without any adherence to the<br />
conditions laid down by letters of allotment, and many illegal titles to public land were<br />
transferred to third parties. In most circumstances such land belonged to state corporations<br />
and the Forest Department. 393<br />
The Ndung’u Report on land which was illegally allocated to individuals and companies, and<br />
then often sold on to third parties, whilst land reserved for public purposes such as forests,<br />
national sanctuaries and reserves etc., had been sold off in blatant disregard of the law by both<br />
the Commissioner of Lands and numerous local Authorities. 394 In summary, it was found out<br />
that the powers vested in the President had been grossly abused by both the President and<br />
successive Commissioners of Lands and their deputies over the years. This happened under<br />
both the Kenyatta and Moi regimes. At the lower levels, there had been unbridled plunder of<br />
public land and other biodiversity resources by local councillors and provincial officials. 395<br />
Most high profile allocations of forested land were made to companies incorporated by<br />
henchmen in the ruling KANU Party. Finally, and strikingly, the Ndung’u Report found out<br />
that ‘most illegal allocations of public land took place before or soon after the multiparty<br />
general elections of 1992, 1997 and 2002, reinforcing the view that public land was allocated<br />
‘as political reward or patronage, which Bayart referred to as the as the “politics of the<br />
belly”. 396<br />
The other issue that we ought to highlight in this treatment is the farming system that has been<br />
obtained in most of the Kenyan Forests - the shamba system. This is a system used by the<br />
people who live in the forest because they want to participate in some quasi agro-forestry<br />
program. 397 Such people are not really forest dwellers. For they are people who are brought<br />
into the forest to assist the foresters establish commercial plantations. However, they have<br />
been used as agents of deforestation and land grabbing. The shamba system became one of<br />
the transit routes to destroy Kenyan forests. But as it obtains today, this is a very politically<br />
charged issue because there are people who were displaced and have not been able to go back<br />
to their land. This scenario has also led to heated debates, tensions and clashes. There are<br />
chances of more emerging clashes and perhaps making the people to reclaim their land could<br />
probably create more tension since land issues are commonly exploited by politicians in an<br />
effort to obtain political mileage over their rivals.<br />
392<br />
Ibid.<br />
393<br />
Njuguna, P and D. Mbithi. 1996. Reconnaice Survey of Forest blocks in East and Western Rift Valley.<br />
Permanent Presidential Commission on soil consevation and Afforestation. Nairobi.<br />
394<br />
Ibid.<br />
395<br />
The Ndungu Report, Opcit.<br />
396<br />
Bayart, J.F. 1993. The State in Africa: The politics of the belly. London: Longman.<br />
397<br />
Jackqueline, M.P. 2000. Pilfering the Public: The Problem of Land Grabing in Contemporaray Kenya. Africa<br />
Today 47(1): 7-26.<br />
80
4.2 Institutionalism, local decentralisation and biodiversity resource usage in Kakamega<br />
Debating biodiversity and natural resource usage in Kenya would be incomplete without<br />
debating institutionalism and local decentralisation in Kakamega. It should be noted that after<br />
independence, Kenya abandoned the vestiges of colonial administration, which was based on<br />
western capitalist ideals and embraced various degrees of formal centralization punctuated by<br />
some low levels of delegation. 398 Recent years have witnessed a worldwide movement aimed<br />
at transferring authority regarding the use of living resources from national governments to<br />
regional and even local governments. 389 Not only are such measures expected to produce<br />
results that are more responsive to the concerns of local stakeholders, such measures are also<br />
expected produce more sustainable human/environment relationships. 390<br />
Decentralisation is defined as the transfer of powers from central government to lower levels<br />
within the political administrative hierarchy. It may take the form of decocentration or<br />
delegation. Ideally, effective decentralization would place accountability and powers in the<br />
hands of local institutions and local instituionalism. That is to say downward accountability,<br />
because discretionary power is a key to institutional responsiveness. 391 But what happens in<br />
real practice is the major interest of this sub-section.<br />
Like many other developing countries, Kenya joined the decentralisation bandwagon through<br />
devolution of powers to provincial and regional governments, which we can call regional or<br />
local decentralisation. Decentralization is indicated by a combination of different variables<br />
that collectively confine the authoritative allocation of political and economic values to a<br />
relatively varied number of state actors, through deconcetration, devolution and delegation of<br />
power at all levels of governance. 392 Proponents of decentralisation argue that in extreme<br />
cases, over centralization fostered personalized rule and dictatorships as well as failure in<br />
service delivery. 393 In the foregoing treatment, an effort will be made to draw a relationship<br />
between decentralisation and biodiversity resource usages in Kakamega. What is most<br />
striking here is, understanding the relationship between the local resource users and the local<br />
power structures within Kakamega District. Specifically we ask our selves, what is the role of<br />
the local resource users in the framing of legal regimes relating to resource usage in the<br />
398 Barrow, E. 1998. Collaborative Forestry Management in East Africa. An opportunity for Sustainable forestry<br />
Management. Nairobi:IUCN.<br />
389 Ribot,J.C. 2002. Democratic Decentralisation of Natural Resources:Institutionalising Popular Participation.<br />
Washington D.C: WRI.<br />
390 Gibson, C.K and F. E, Lehoucq. 2003. The Local Politics of Decentralised Environmental Policy in<br />
Guatemala. Journal of Environment & Development, 12 (19):28-49.<br />
391 Litvack, J.J and R.Bird.1998. Rethinking Decentralisation in Developing Countries. Sector Studies Series.<br />
Washington D.C: The Wrld Bank.<br />
392 Barkan, J and M. Chege. 1989. Decentralising the State: District Focus and Politic of Reallocation in Kenya.<br />
Journal of Mordern African Studies 27(3):434-438.<br />
393 Sylvain, H.B. 2002. Decentralization and Reform in Africa. London: Aspatore Books.LeLondonc<br />
81
district? Does legislation support local accountability for representation? In what forms are<br />
powers devolved? What are the discretionary privileges to be allocated by administrative<br />
authority as rights? Is there an accessible independent judiciary? Are powers of decision –<br />
making that should be kept central such as fixing of minimum environmental standards being<br />
devolved to smaller units of government?<br />
One issue that this study wishes to point out is that there is a gap between resource users and<br />
the legal framers within the district, given the fact administrative supervision is not built on a<br />
local representative structure. True decentralisation means off loading of power to the people<br />
and making their voice heard for effective decision-making. 394 Biodiversity resource use and<br />
conservation go hand in hand and therefore when we talk of resource degradation, there ought<br />
to be strong role of the local resource users in determining of the institutional choices at play.<br />
We shall not over emphasise that degradation of the forest biodiversity is a result of land use<br />
intensification especially in an area which relies on cash crops like tea, maize and sugarcane<br />
for its rural economy. While many studies on environmental change in Kenya have been<br />
conducted with their point of departure being on the nature of land use change and possible<br />
degradation, these processes are still so rudimentarily understood that case by case situations<br />
are pertinent to undertake.<br />
One important issue that this study wishes to emphasize is that land use, conservation and<br />
degradation occur simultaneously. Such processes, we argue, are strongly dependent on the<br />
nature and development of diverse livelihood strategies at the sub-community level,<br />
ultimately leading us to diverse institutional roles and backgrounds to the afore mentioned<br />
localities. For instance, Butere-Mumias and Ireho, two of the leading sugarcane producing<br />
areas in the district, look at cane production as the leading livelihood strategy and therefore<br />
channel their resource management roles in that direction. In this case environmental change<br />
or precisely biodiversity and livelihood strategies in agriculture are due to human-induced<br />
land degradation that has been the subject of debate for several decades, especially concerning<br />
the forested belts of Kakamega district. Earlier research efforts were devoted to the definition<br />
of processes of degradation, deforestation and explanations were found mainly in poor<br />
resource management regimes especially at the local level aggravated by overgrazing, over<br />
cultivation, and deforestation. 395<br />
Litereature on decetralisation and natural resource usage has demonstrated that technicist and<br />
management-oriented explanations are inadequate, not at least in explaining the diversity of<br />
change and in attributing sufficient importance to social and political factors, both at the<br />
micro and macro levels. 396 Therefore, not only has the perspective on the nature of<br />
394 Fiszbein, A. 1997. Decentralisation and Local Capacity: Some Thoughts on a Controversial Relationship'.<br />
Paper presented at the FAO/UNCDF/World Bank Technical Consultation on Decentralisation. Rome, 15-18<br />
December.<br />
395 Thomson, J. T. 1994. The Role of the State versus the Community in Governance and Management of<br />
Renewable Natural Resources. An argument and Sahelian examples. Occasional Paper no. 12. International<br />
Development Studies, University of Roskilde.<br />
396 Dahlberg, A. 1994. Contesting views and changing paradigms. The land degradation debate in Southern<br />
Africa. Discussion Paper No. 6. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.<br />
82
iodiversity change been altered, but causation, institutionalism and local decentarisation<br />
policy intervention issues re-assessed. This evaluation is augmented by concerns over<br />
technical solutions with regard to restructuring of production techniques and inputs at the<br />
community level. 397 The debate about interventions and/or remedies now revolves around a<br />
much larger degree regarding the complexity of local and wider community interactions. This<br />
does not consider whether the point of departure is taken from above areas such as forest<br />
buffer zone management or from below, in form of re-interpreting local change and local<br />
resource needs. 398<br />
Biodiversity, political decentralisation, and local participation in Kakamega District<br />
While local changes, biodiversity and indigenous knowledge are increasingly emphasized, the<br />
"local" discourse often remains at the level of the community, as for instance in the<br />
Boserupian reinterpretation of conservation and intensification processes in West and East<br />
Africa. 399 Subcommunity processes such as social differentiation, growing poverty, a diversity<br />
of institutions and livelihood strategies, render such generalized community-level<br />
interpretations insufficient for understanding how processes of biodiversity resource<br />
conservation are sustained from top to bottom or bottom to top. 400<br />
Therefore if we are to write about a conservation success story in Kakamega, we must have a<br />
strong focus on the outcome of institutional interplay in the planning process for natural<br />
resource usage between the district technocrats and the resource user groups as stipulated in<br />
the national resource use policy. While we think of achieving this, attention must also be paid<br />
to the critical issues of marginalization, institutional heterogeneity and poverty in the<br />
conservation process in the district. However, due to heterogeneity within the rural<br />
communities, seen in terms of access to and control over resources, conservation and<br />
degradation may take place simultaneously within a smallholder community owing to the<br />
diversity of household strategies.<br />
The livelihood perspective is a way of studying biodiversity and likely changes from below as<br />
a way of emphasizing resource actor diversity. This is an issue that has recently gained<br />
importance. One example is when the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)<br />
toward the end of the 1990s, made environment and sustainable livelihood programs based on<br />
the local decentralised development programs, as a focus area for poverty reduction and<br />
diversification in rural economies. 401 Another example is when the British Department for<br />
397<br />
Benjaminsen, T.A. 1997. Natural Resource Management, Paradigm Shifts and Decentralisation Reform in<br />
Mali. Journal of Human Ecology 25(1):121-143.<br />
398<br />
Oyugi, W. 2000. Decentralization for Good Governance and Development. Regional Development Dialogue<br />
21(1): 3-22.<br />
399<br />
Netting, R. 1993. Smallholders, Householders-Farm families and the Ecology of Intensive, Sustainable<br />
Agriculture. Stanford: Stanford University Press.<br />
400<br />
Cernea, M. 1985. Putting People First: Sociological Variables in Rural Development. New York: Oxford<br />
University Press.<br />
401<br />
UNDP.1999. Sustainable livelihoods. http://www.undp.org/sl/ 15/ 6/ 2006.<br />
83
International Development (DFID) in 1998 redefined its approach to rural development as<br />
"sustainable rural livelihoods" based on the decentralised service delivery. 402<br />
All the above strategies indicate a positive move to link conservation to local resource usage<br />
within an existing institutional make-up. In both cases, decentralisation was preferred based<br />
on the fact that it was the best way to manage regional and district resources in Kakamega.<br />
We can perhaps argue that such strategies targeted increased institutional usage in form of<br />
local knowledge in the appreciation of biodiversity as well as enhancing resource users’ role<br />
in resource, institutional planning and framing, to achieve a two pronged approach: livelihood<br />
and conservation via local decentralisation.<br />
The interest in this kind of approach is derived from several quarters as illuminated by Reitsma<br />
et al. 403 It also obtains from studies emphasizing income diversification within the tropical<br />
forest belts, given the fact that many of the people in such areas use local natural resources to<br />
eke a living, without necessarily looking at the resource decline. 404 Subscribers to such<br />
schools of thought also view improving local governance and resource use structures as a way<br />
of reversing this spiral. However, we still need to add that such local innovations need to<br />
delve more into the local institutional matrices; otherwise they are bound to suffer from what<br />
we call elite capture. 405<br />
Decentralisation is the devolution of state assets and powers to local or private decisionmaking<br />
bodies, representative local government, local administrative branches of central<br />
government, non-state actors and organisations such as NGOs, co-operatives, associations,<br />
etc or private individuals and corporations. 406 When powers are delegated to local units of the<br />
state, the process is called deconcentration or in simple terms known as bringing government<br />
and its services closer to the population. Devolution to non-state bodies like NGOs or other<br />
private groups or individuals is called privatisation. 407 However, it is a form of enclosure<br />
when it involves the privatisation of community or public resources. Devolution to<br />
community and representative local government is usually called political decentralisation<br />
and can be a mechanism of community participation. 408<br />
402 Bryceson, D. F. 1999. African Rural Labour, Income Diversification and Livelihood Approaches: A long-<br />
term development perspective. Review of African Political Economy 80:171-89.<br />
403 Reitsma, H; T. Dietz and de Haan, L., eds. 1992. Coping with semi-aridity: How rural the Poor Survive in<br />
dry-season Environments. Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam.<br />
404 Davies, S. 1996. Adaptable Livelihoods. Coping with Food Insecurity in the Malian Sahel. Chichester: Wiley.<br />
Reardon, T., and Vosti, S. A. 1995. Links between rural poverty and the environment in developing<br />
countries: Asset categories and investment poverty. World Development 23:1495-1507.<br />
405 Ribot, J.C. 1993. Market-state relations and environmental policy: limits of state capacity in Senegal. In The<br />
State and Social Power in Global Environmental Politics, edited by Ronnie D. Lipschutz and Ken Conca,<br />
24-46. New York: Columbia University Press.<br />
406 O’Donnell, G. 1998. Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies. Journal of Democracy 9(3):112-126.<br />
407 Murombedzi, J. 1998. The Evolving Context of Community Based Natural Resource Management in Sub-<br />
Saharan Africa in Historical Perspective. Paper prepared for the International Workshop on Community<br />
Based Natural Resource Management, The World Bank, Washington, D.C. 10-14 May 1998.<br />
408 Porter,G and E. Young. 1998. Decentralized Environmental Management and Popular Participation in Coastal<br />
Ghana. Journal of International Development 10:515-526.<br />
84
We shall use the term participation in following the sense of Donnelly-Roark. Participation as<br />
a concept is used to mean power-sharing in decision-making. Participation must include real<br />
devolution of significant powers. Despite its problematic nature, we use the term community<br />
to mean a well dissected area of a geographically specified local population. 409 The concept of<br />
participation waded through the third World at the dawn of the 1990s. This was after the state<br />
weathered from a progressive force of change and modernisation to a backward, primordial<br />
arena of neo-patrimonialism, dictatorship, corruption and greed, hindering far reaching<br />
development. 410<br />
Therefore, when we talk of local decentralisation and local particiapation in natural resource<br />
usage, we drift away from the earlier notion of people and local communities being perceived<br />
as bad environmental managers or natural resource villains. 411 We also tactfully move away<br />
from Hardin’s tragedy of commons where communities are perceived to take part in<br />
destroying nature through ignorance selfishness and greed. 412 But we are rather moving to a<br />
dimension where people – environmental relationship is central. We look at people, their local<br />
knowledge and affinity with nature as strong drivers to save the earth's threatened biological<br />
resources. 413 Local decentralisation and participatory approaches to environment and<br />
development received a great boost from the state-society oscillation. The two notions<br />
emerged from a long history of distress, characterised by failed and frustrating top-down<br />
approaches. This “new” phenomenon which is largely a product of social movements notion<br />
of biodiversity, centered on indigenous rights, anti-statist sentiments of both the left and the<br />
right, structural adjustment agendas and fiscal cries of post-Cold War Third World states. 414<br />
Local participatory development has become a means to incorporate civil society into the<br />
decisions formerly reserved for state policy elites. Now that the heavy weight of the state is<br />
sowly weathering away, decentralisation and local decision-making are inadvertently seen as<br />
routes by which control is being transferred from one power centre to another. The process<br />
entails local accountability, decision-making, benefit sharing, transfer of discretionary powers<br />
as well as local legislation and legal framing, to which we now turn.<br />
It was found out that many programs in Kakamega district approach local resource users<br />
groups such as woodcutters, pastoralists, farmers, women's or youth associations as a way of<br />
enlisting local participation in form of legislation and legal framing. These groups, however,<br />
409<br />
Donnelly-Roark, P. 1997. Reinventing Decentralisation Burkinabe Style: progress and Strategy notes'.<br />
Mimeo.<br />
410<br />
Ferguson, J. 1998. Transnational Topographies of Power: Beyond "the State" and "Civil Society" in the<br />
Study of African politics'.Draft Mimeo: Department of Anthropology, University of California.<br />
411<br />
Ehrlich, P.R. 1978. The Population Bomb. New York: Ballantine Books.<br />
412<br />
Banuri,T, and F. A, Margolin. 1993. Who will Save the Forests? Knowledge, Power and Environmental<br />
Destruction. London: Zed Books.<br />
413<br />
Downs, R. E., and Reyna, S. P. 1988. Land and Society in Contemporary Africa. Hanover: University Press<br />
of New England.<br />
414<br />
Rasmussen, T. 1986. The Green Revolution in the Southern Highlands. In Tanzania: Crisis and Struggle For<br />
survival, edited by J. Boesen, K. Havnevik, J. Koponen, and R. Odgaard, 191-205. Uppsala: Scandinavian<br />
Institute of African Studies.<br />
85
do not necessarily reflect the concerns of a village as a whole, particularly in matters<br />
concerning public resources such as Kakamega forest, streams, pastures or public works.<br />
While such groups are often treated as if they were representative, more often they are not.<br />
They represent the particular interests of an elite leadership. This scenario is confirmed by<br />
Ribot who examined representation in natural resource decentralizations in 15 countries. He<br />
found out that:<br />
Across all the cases, where you had the transfer of powers to local institutions, those<br />
institutions were upwardly accountable, almost systematically. When you found<br />
downwardly accountable institutions, they had no significant, meaningful discretionary<br />
powers. 415<br />
Regarding powers over decision–making we noted that, since the beginning of participatory<br />
efforts in Kakamega in the 1990s, little and no real participation has been effected. Rather,<br />
local populations have been viewed as “objects of development”, to be educated, informed<br />
and guided. In this regard we observed that the only participants in development have been<br />
the international experts through international NGOs, politicians, and national technocrats<br />
often located at district and provincial local governments in form of Forest Extensities officers<br />
and Wildlife Service agents.<br />
A scenario related to the above was analysed by Engberg-Pedersen while studying<br />
decentralisation and natural resource management in the Sahel region, particularly in Bokina<br />
Faso and Mali. 416 He found out that natural resource management committees of the closely<br />
related village common projects set up by donors across Burkina Faso to be undemocratic,<br />
arguing that they did not represent village populations, owing to the lack of a locally rooted<br />
institutionalised process. 417 The situation that obtains in Kakamega district depicts little or no<br />
representational over forest resource disposition. No power is devolved to local communities.<br />
Hence power over decision-making such as fixing minimum environmental standards which<br />
should be devolved remains officially located with the Forest Service. No realm of<br />
autonomous decision-making is specified.<br />
The existence of such a malfunctional and unrepresentative process creates unintegrated<br />
institutional framework in the management of environmental and biodiversity resources in<br />
Kakamega district. When it comes to participation in the terms of production, management as<br />
well as benefit sharing in form of revenue generated from sale of forest products, licences and<br />
related eco-tourism services, it was found out that no such mechanisms existed at all.<br />
Kenya’s new forestry laws stipulate an institutional structure regarding local management of<br />
biodiversity resources related to forestry. The law somewhat assigns shared responsibility<br />
regarding forest management to local governments as well as the local community therein<br />
415<br />
Ribot Ribot, J.C. 1996. Participation without representation: Chiefs, Councils and Forestry Lwas in Western<br />
African Sahel. Cultural Survival Quarterly20(1): 40-44.<br />
416<br />
Engberg-Pedersen, L. 1995. Creating Local Democratic Politics from above: the "gestion des terroirs"<br />
approach in Burkina Faso. Mimeo Working paper.<br />
417<br />
Evans, Peter B. 1997. The eclipse of the state? Reflections on Stateness in an era of Globalisation', Worm<br />
Politics 50:62-87.<br />
86
known as community forest user groups. 418 The new law gives local governments jurisdiction<br />
over forests within their territorial boundaries. On the other hand the new law also envisages<br />
local interest variations, hence the propositions for local community participation. According<br />
to the new law, any individual or group of individuals wishing to benefit from forest resources<br />
must organise in a community forestry association. However, the study noted that although<br />
this was perceived as a mechanism for protecting local forests through local participation, it is<br />
a far cry from realising this objective. Instead Foresters have used the law to allocate more<br />
limbering rights to timber companies through concessions and sale of permits. In the final<br />
analysis it was observed that, although the new forest law aimed enlisting local participation<br />
through improved decentralisation, more is yet to be achieved in terms of enlisting genuine<br />
local participation. Therefore, evaluating it from studies emphasizing decentalisation and<br />
resource use among rural communities, one key notion has been found central; protecting<br />
local resources from degradation, requires appreciating local people and institutions in their<br />
diversity. 419<br />
Overall, appreciating biodiversity, local politics and local participation calls for three<br />
dimensions: first, the provision of a framework whereby it becomes possible to examine how<br />
wider socio-economic and socio-political changes relate to local change; second, an emphasis<br />
on the importance of social differentiation and of agency in determining outcomes of local<br />
change; and third, the importance given to both physical and social resources employed by<br />
individuals or households in shaping strategies and values for living.<br />
4.3 Institutionalism and bioethics in biodiversity resources management<br />
In the previous chapter, we discussed the concept of biodiversity as a common good, whose<br />
health guarantees wellness for all and whose destruction pronounces disaster to all. Therefore,<br />
in order to address the perceived biodiversity problems and risks, environmental advocates<br />
and bureaucracies have coordinated the use of certain techniques such as environmental<br />
planning and environmental impact assessment, biodiversity protection policies and other<br />
formal rules in protection of protected areas and threatened species. 420<br />
The focus of this subsection is to draw a link between institutionalism and bioethics as an<br />
avenue that can be used to protect the quality of biodiversity. The interplay of these<br />
techniques entails political, technical and individual rationality. Political rationality is based<br />
on the ability to solve problems and arrive at effective and collective decisions. Individual<br />
rationality however deals with the personal appreciation of what is good for an individual and<br />
bad for both him and the society. 421<br />
418<br />
The Kenya Forest Act Caps 385, 2005.<br />
419<br />
Reardon, T, and S. A,Vosti. 1995. Links between Rural Poverty and the Environment in Developing<br />
Countries: Asset Categories and Investment Poverty. World Development 23:1495-1507.<br />
420<br />
Christiansson, C, Dahlberg, A., Loiske, M.V.; and W, Ostberg, eds. 1993. Environment-Users -Scholars:<br />
Exploring interfaces. Stockholm: EDSU, School of Geography, Stockholm University.<br />
421<br />
Bebbington, A. 1999. Capitals and Capabilities: A framework For Peasant Viability, Rural Livelihoods and<br />
Poverty. World Development 27:2021-45.<br />
87
Technical rationality on the other hand deals with critical decision-making, in modern<br />
capitalist societies, based upon the value of efficiency. Therefore, when discussing these<br />
modern environmental management techniques, the concept of bio-ethics is very critical and<br />
central. Very central indeed and entails the use of rationality in attaining both means and<br />
ends. 422 Rationality in this context specifies the means by which given ends can be achieved.<br />
Those ends are strictly environmental goals such as less pollution, less forest destruction<br />
through over grazing, over cultivation and the arrest of diminishing biodiversity. We must<br />
also add that since rationality is hard to achieve and to predict, sets of formal and informal<br />
rules are adopted in order to achieve intended objectives. This explains our interest in<br />
institutionalism, bio-ethics and biodiversity.<br />
Being cognisant of the fact that individual rationality is suspect, the use of biodiversity<br />
management rules and methods in tropical poor countries is sometimes hard to implement.<br />
Institutionalisation of rationality is grounded in democratic values. In most countries, such<br />
values include establishment of environmental management standards as one of the<br />
parameters followed in ascertaining rational environmental values. 423 A number of agencies at<br />
different levels of government are instituted to ingrain such values. These environmental<br />
value ingraining agencies may take the form of community groups, interested corporations,<br />
resource users and organised ordinary citizens. 424<br />
In Kenya, NEMA the leading agency for such an undertaking, working in conjunction with<br />
other coalitions and non governmental as well as governmental agencies such as the Forest<br />
Department, Kenya Wildlife Services, Resource Sensing and surveying Centre. Other<br />
agencies in the non-governmental sector may include: INCRAF, the Forestry Society of<br />
Kenya, WWF and IUCN among others. NEMA for instance uses a decentralised system of<br />
administration to achieve this feat. Its management system is spread in various districts to<br />
monitor and implement environmental management standards in liaison with sister agencies.<br />
These obtain information that might otherwise be excluded from administrative decisionmaking<br />
although this information may not directly influence the final decisions; it makes<br />
environmental and democratic values more visible and legitimate than before. Hohl and<br />
Tisdell reported that for over two decades, development assistance agencies have urged<br />
developing countries to adopt rationally based environmental management techniques. 425<br />
Howarth and Norgaard add that such organisations while working with government agencies<br />
especially in the developing countries, have pressed upon environmental impact assessment as<br />
one of a suite of predictive, scientific and essentially rational techniques developed in the late<br />
422 Peluso, N. 1992. Rich Forests, Poor People: Resource Control and Resistance in Java. Berkeley: University of<br />
California Press.<br />
423 Crook, R, and Manor, J. 1994. Enhancing Participation and Institutional Performance: Democratic<br />
Decentralisation in South Asia and West Africa'. Report to ESCOR, the Overseas Development<br />
Administration, on Phase Two of a Two Phase Research Project. London: Economic and Social Committee<br />
on Overseas Research.<br />
424 Fisher, A. C. and Hanemann, W. M. 1990. Information and the Dynamics of Environmental Protection: The<br />
Concept of thre Critical Period," Scandinavian Journal of Economics 92(3):399-414.<br />
425 Hohl, A. and C. A ,Tisdell. 1993. How Useful are Environmental Safety standards in Economics? The<br />
Example of Safe minimum Standards For Protection of Species," Biodiversity and Conservation 2:168-181.<br />
88
1960s and early 1970s in Europe and North America, in response to growing public concern<br />
about environmental degradation. 426<br />
On the other hand, Wicks seems to look at bio-ethical stands from another angle. He informs<br />
that it has been customary in the past to think of ethics as a purely individualistic school of<br />
science. Ethicists or scholars of ethics largely concern themselves chiefly with a description<br />
of the moral reactions of the individual human personality. 427 However, that is not the sort of<br />
ethics this study is interested in, since it is a known that, such a branch of ethics is no-longer<br />
realistic given the competition for resource usage. In this regard we are discussing ethics<br />
backed by institutional regimes. This argument is buttressedd in the fact that, moral traditions<br />
to which individuals give expression, are depicted to be social and economic, rather than<br />
moral. 428<br />
Moral insight delves into the structure of society; moral interest on the other hand includes the<br />
fortunes of institutions as well as of individuals. 429 Therefore, in one way it is also the<br />
problem of every individual scholar and scientist. The problem of bioethics is a problem faced<br />
by all, since we are all engaged in the business of living. We are all concerned with a healthy<br />
environment. We are all concerned and affected by the problems associated with<br />
desertification, global warming and other associated externalities associated with biodiversity<br />
degradation. The only specialized role left to the professional bioethicist, then is not the<br />
impossible task of solving the problem, but that of directing the attention of others,<br />
elucidating its vastness and its difficulty. 430<br />
Ayres noted that the individualistic bias manifesting itself in both social ethics and in neoclassical<br />
economics is replaced by a thorough growing sense of the individual's social<br />
makeup. Again Chisholm, notes that bio-ethics is wholly social, and there is no such thing as<br />
an individual, in the sense that it is absurd today to think of a 'moral agent' without at the same<br />
time thinking of him as a social product capable of producing certain changes in the social<br />
structure that surrounds him most intimately. 431<br />
Ayres also rejects the notion that bio-ethics is a highly segregated field of inquiry relegated to<br />
authority of experts. This follows from the intrinsic nature of the problem that ethics takes for<br />
itself which, Ayres further viewed this as, “the problem of life as a whole”. 432 Therefore it is<br />
instrumental to note that bio-ethics encompasses accumulated wisdom regarding existing<br />
426 Howarth, R. B. and , R. B, Norgaard. 1990. "Intergenerational Resource Rights, Efficiency, and Social<br />
Optimality," Land Economnics 66(1):1-l1.<br />
427 Wicks, A. C. 1995. The Business Ethics Movement: Where Are We Headed and What Can We Learn from<br />
Our Colleagues in Bio Ethics?Business Ethics Quarterly 5: 603-20.<br />
428 Wolf, S. M. 1991. "Ethics Committees and Due Process: Nesting Rights in a Community of Caring."<br />
Maryland Law Review 50: 798-858.<br />
429 Hauserman,N. 1997. New Values, New Conflicts. Paper Presented at 25th Conference on<br />
Value Inquiry, Appalachian State University, April 1997.<br />
430 Ayres, C.E. 1918. The Nature of the Relationship Between Ethics and Economics. Chicago:<br />
University of Chicago Press.<br />
431 Chisholm, A. H. 1988. Sustainable Resource Use and Development: Uncertainty, Irreversibility and Rational<br />
Choice. In Technological Change, Development and the Environment: Socio-economic Perspectives, edited<br />
by C. Tisdell and P. Maitra,188-216. London/New York: Croom Helm.<br />
432 Ayres,C.E. 1918. Opcit.<br />
89
iota. It is this biota that becomes the subject matter of investigation. It also develops from the<br />
embedded values that are ingrained within the subject matter that is under trail. 433<br />
Bioethics is therefore a product not necessarily incommensurable and even not invisible! It is<br />
the state of the common mind reflected in the institutional order. It is not a special science<br />
restricted to or within a particular field and subject-matter. But rather the main concerns are<br />
with the methods of inquiry and particular apparatus that are peculiar to the kind of task in the<br />
particular realm. 434 In this regard, the ethical problem is the general problem in contrast with<br />
which it is possible to speak of others as "special". Special because, we are somewhat dealing<br />
with biological issues but with ethical leanings.<br />
Therefore, ethical issues derived from this type of perspective will support and reinforce the<br />
basic insights underlying bioethics' current efforts to revolutionize biodiversity and natural<br />
resource conservation within an integrated institutional program. 435 The only danger of the<br />
latter effort is being undermined by an ethical analysis that is premised on the ground that<br />
there are alternative, individualistic and varied views of ethics, as seen in the neoclassical<br />
institutionalism and ethical paradigms. Thus as Klein and Edythe noted, for purely bioethical<br />
analysis to be conducted, the institutionalist perspective would seem, once again, to premise<br />
insights more in accordance with the needs of the transition underway, regarding biodiversity<br />
and natural resource usage today, than does the mainstream alternatives. 436<br />
In the theory of institutionalism and more so in the ethical progress, Ayres postulates his<br />
critique of classical and neo-classical ethical thought with a reminder that whether we take it<br />
or not, bioethics continues to be an undertaking involving a price, a price in the sense that<br />
ethical issues based on rationalism, which is based on economics rather than moral and social<br />
decisions. We are therefore talking of a science of value evaluation. 437 The analysis drawn<br />
from the above postulation informs that efforts to understand bio-ethics will therefore be<br />
found more meaningful if it is more associated with economics and less associated with moral<br />
or social relationships. Therefore, if bioethics has meaning related to economics, the problem<br />
of bioethics and institutionalism is to elicit that meaning.<br />
The above analysis presents the point of departure which is critical in the search for both a<br />
common good, common ground and a shared perspective that is necessary to ensure fruitful<br />
mitigation and collaboration between institutionalists, economists and bioethicists. In<br />
reference to understanding biodiversity, the challenges surrounding the amelioration of<br />
institutionalists, economists and bio-ethicists include: the introduction of technological and<br />
biochemical resources to the biodiversity sector, especially issues surrounding the genetic<br />
engineering prowess and threats evidenced by modern science research on one hand and the<br />
433 Lantos, J. D. 1994. "Ethics Committees and Resource Allocation." BioEthics Forum 10 Summer Fall.<br />
434 Ibid.<br />
435 Klein, P.A and Edythe S. M. 1996. Concepts of Value, Efficiency, and Democracy in Institutional<br />
Economics.Journal of Economic Issues 30: 267-77.<br />
436 Ibid.<br />
437 Lawson, C.L. 1998. The second Stage of Bio-ethics and Institutionalist Economics. Journal of Economic<br />
Issues 32:1187-1192.<br />
90
upholding of the social values and indigenous and local knowledge institutions as well as<br />
local and indigenous species. This is a challenge for biotechnology, bioethics, and<br />
institutionalism as well as economics.<br />
Most commentators on the escalation of costs in the maintained of a rich, indigenous and<br />
healthy biological diversity cite the rapid pace of biotechnological innovation in this sector as<br />
one of the most critical factors influencing this trend. For instance, Lantos cited that such<br />
challenges invariably lead to resource redistribution and allocative question, that is; what kind<br />
of resources should be allocated to this sector of the economy and, more broadly, to<br />
conservation and economic as well as a social goals. 438 Closely related to this is the issue of<br />
how allocation resource use rights among individuals and conservation efforts. Here we are<br />
talking of how two shared interests between individual, local and societal interests as well<br />
national conservation objectives should take place.<br />
This discussion is routine, especially in the realm of bioethics and institutional analysis. We<br />
often talk of environment and buffer zones and forget enterprise zones which are likely to<br />
shift greater pollution and degradation burdens into the neighbourhoods seeking economic<br />
development. 439 In other words: lower-income minority communities. Therefore ultimate<br />
solutions require leadership at all levels of society in redefining biodiversity, economic and<br />
conservation goals. We also need to ask ourselves; in what ways can we structure support for<br />
sustainable modes of development in rural forest belts, on communal and individual as well as<br />
public farms, and throughout the country? Public policies need to be reoriented to take full<br />
account to adjust to human activities, social values and to take full account of the value of life<br />
with which we share this environment. This means not only disproportional impacts on<br />
populations and ecologies that are already at risk, but also rebuilding those communities so<br />
that they can survive and flourish alongside the environmental protection.<br />
Biodiversity being our area of concern, we ask ourselves, what are those ingrained values that<br />
are embedded within the resource users’ experiences? We continue to ask, what are the<br />
accumulated levels of wisdom and how these levels of wisdom aid natural resource usage<br />
within a given biota? Answering these questions will form the basis of discussion for the next<br />
sub-chapter. The following sub-section delves into the institutionalsim, local knowledge and<br />
associated cognitions as well as the ethical realties. Finally, to some extent environmental<br />
injustices may be redressed and prevented through revising our laws and regulations.<br />
438 Lantos, J. D, Opcit.<br />
439 Evans, J, H. 2000. A sociological Account of the groth of principalism. The Hastings Center Report 30.<br />
91
4.4 Mapping an institutionalist, social cognitive-dimension for biodiversity management in<br />
Kenya<br />
Too often, researchers talk about conservation, but lightly think or talk about the role of<br />
informal institutions. It is important to realize that some communities have important aspects<br />
of their institutions that facilitate conservation of the environment and some aspect may<br />
destroy the environment. Informal institutions define who the people are and how they see<br />
themselves. Their attitudes towards nature provide space for new institutions to change and<br />
improve attitudes towards culture and the role it plays in environment and sustainable<br />
development. 440<br />
The social cognitive-dimension for biodiversity which this treatment intends to adopt is<br />
rooted out of evolutionary economics of institutionalists. It rests on theories of human choice<br />
that are in clear opposition to those of neoclassical. Neo-classical institutionalists reject the<br />
assumption that the person’s economic character is that of a fully informed, atomized,<br />
rational, and maximizing individual. 441 They base their reasoning on a variety of theories of<br />
human choice. The purpose of this sub-section is to highlight ways in which modern<br />
normative dimensions can contribute to an understanding of institutions and institutional<br />
change in biodiversity management in a country like Kenya.<br />
Advances in human cognition have exposed empirically and well-founded appreciation of<br />
how individuals process information. 442 This understanding provides an opportunity for<br />
scholars opportunity to avoid reducing the human mind to a into a fixation This in turn,<br />
presents an occasion to understand the complexities embedded in human choice and social<br />
processes in biodiversity resource management in this case. In the light of the contemporary<br />
debates regarding the cognitive-dimension, traditional institutionalist theory appears to be<br />
based on a somewhat reductionistic perspective of the human mind. 443<br />
Although the institutionalist thought is more or less paralleled, the early development of<br />
normative theory as well as the recent contributions to cognitive-dimensions can barely be<br />
detected in institutionalism, even when these contributions appear to be widely adopted in<br />
other social science research undertakings. 444 The cognitive-dimension is not free from<br />
criticism; it has its own limitations. For instance, like the behavioral theory, this cognitive<br />
dimension relies heavily on studies in experimental settings. As a result, environmental, social<br />
and societal influences on the human mind are not given due recognition from an<br />
institutionalist perspective. 445<br />
440<br />
Gifford, A. 1992. Cognition and Rules. Journal of Bioeconomics 6(3):235-238.<br />
441<br />
Anderson, J. R. 1990. Cognitive Psychology and It’s Implications. New York: Freeman & Company.<br />
442<br />
Bourne, L. E., R. L. Dominowski, E. F. Loftus, and A. F. Healy. 1986. Cognitive Processes. Englewood<br />
Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall.<br />
443<br />
Carroll, G.R. 1988. Organizational Ecology in Theoretical Perspective. In Ecological Models of<br />
Organizations, edited by G. R. Carroll, 1-6. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger.<br />
444<br />
Gergen, J. K, and G. R. Semin. 1990."Everyday Understanding in Science and Daily Life." In Everyday<br />
Understanding: Social and Scientific Implications, edited by G. R. Semin and K. J. Gergen, 1-18. London:<br />
Sage Publications.<br />
445<br />
Giddens, A. 1984. The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration. Berkeley: University<br />
of California Press.<br />
92
The social-cognitive dimension can be used as a conduit for furthering our understanding of<br />
biodiversity management in Kenya, particularly in Kakamega. Human cognition treats<br />
behaviour, which emanates from societal and cultural blueprints as adaptive to individual<br />
experiences and other cognitive processes. According to this perspective these are under<br />
socialized, especially when talking about biodiversity perceptions and biodiversity<br />
management.<br />
In the foregoing analysis, the socio-cognitive dimension is presented to make an<br />
understanding of institutions and institutional evolution in regard to particular communities.<br />
This analysis is also rooted in the communities around kakamega forest like, the Bakusu,<br />
Batsotso, Wanyore, the Kisa, Luo, the Marama, the Marachi, Wahayo, Isuha and Wadumbi<br />
among others. In doing so, the cognitive-dimension enables us to understand how such<br />
communities relate to the forest biodiversity. We also use this same dimension to evaluate<br />
why human choice and rationalism are central in the biodiversity management of the area. We<br />
learn that human behaviour is related to inter-subjectively shared beliefs and value-infused<br />
norms and knowledge about the way things were done and the way things are supposed to be<br />
done. 446 Such knowledge is part of the broad social structures and processes that do mould the<br />
society in question. Human behavior is also related to the value-infused knowledge and<br />
traditions of societal collectives and of individual interpretations. We also must mention that<br />
individuals act upon their interpretations of social events around them as well as exposures<br />
over time. 447<br />
Therefore, basing our analysis on the human cognitive, it becomes important to consider how<br />
and to what extent such interpretations are affected by social forces, and how these social<br />
forces can affect biodiversity management in an ethnically dominated setting like Kakamega.<br />
From a cognitive perspective, we learn that ideas about reality are constructed through<br />
interactions that are processes of interpreting the meaning of different species related to<br />
ecosystem richness. Human cognition needs to be included in the analysis of such processes.<br />
However, this does not mean that the socio-cognitive perspective should be equated to<br />
voluntaristic standpoints. 448<br />
The above analysis reveals that human thought and behaviour is to a large extent socially<br />
restricted in a given situation, say the relationship between man and biodiversity, or more<br />
specifically the relationship between the Luhya and particular animal species like snakes, why<br />
are the Luo attached to marine biodiversity? why the Wadumbi have spiritual relationship<br />
with particular tree species. We also ask whether this relationship amounts to better<br />
management of biodiversity or the reverse. On the other hand, this analysis may also disclose<br />
that individuals are sometimes ambiguous about the way they act and the way they interpret<br />
the situations around them.<br />
446<br />
Ayres , C. E. 1961. Toward a Reasonable Society: The Values of Industrial Civilization. Austin: University of<br />
Texas Press.<br />
447<br />
Tomasello, M. 1999. The cultural origins of human cognition. Cambrige:Havard University Press.<br />
448<br />
Douglas,N. 1987. How Institutions Think. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.<br />
93
Institutions as principle agents in the social-congnitive dimension<br />
In the second chapter we looked at the contending debates about how institutions are born. An<br />
institution in this regard is a socially constructed belief system about the way things were<br />
done, how they are done and the way things should be done in regard to a particular societal<br />
setting. This particular belief system happens to be the principle agent that organizes human<br />
thought and action. 449<br />
It is prudent to mention that institutions in this perspective are not objectives related to<br />
physical phenomenon, but rather human mental and metaphysical constructs. 450 Institutional<br />
beliefs are intrinsically shared among a collection of individuals in a given setting either<br />
formally or informally. Institutions in this regard share a wide range of facets, springing from<br />
a wide spectrum. It is from this spectrum that they are articulated with tenacity. Therefore,<br />
institutions can span across a wide scope involving transboundary-specific realms such as<br />
organizations. 451<br />
This synthesis factors on institutions as principle agents that govern the creation of meaning<br />
and the patterning of actions at various social levels and across diverse categories of agents.<br />
Thus in drawing a relationship between different social structures, institutions here act as<br />
central structuration principles. Taking this from Bromley who put it that: “it is necessary to<br />
view institutions within a particular societal setting as an evolving phenomenon that spans<br />
from generation to generation”. 452<br />
The implication here is that institutions are mediators of the outcomes of the actions they<br />
induce. In view of this, if we are to use the perspective of decision and choice as a central<br />
domain in cognitive dimension, then we are looking at the set of opportunities defined by an<br />
institution. In this regard such domains are portrayed as being constituted by various kinds of<br />
values. Furthermore, social representations of values, such as evaluation routines, and routines<br />
for searching information, are also part of the institutional choice domain. 453 These<br />
interactions are the continuous composition of knowledge transfer as we shall later see.<br />
Institutions transfer substances of intuition such as meaning and understanding in relation to<br />
the environment and within the society. 454 However, a distinction must be made between the<br />
transfer of value-infused beliefs and the transfer of a physical content of both tangibles, such<br />
449<br />
Stein, J. 1997. How institutions learn:A social Cognitive perspective.Journal of Economic Issues 31.<br />
450<br />
Rizzello, S and M. Turvani. 2004. Subjective Diversity and Social lerning. A cognitive Perspective for<br />
Understanding Human Behaviour. Constitutional Political Econmy 13(2):197-210.<br />
451<br />
Weick, K. 1979. The Social Psychology of Organizing. Belmont: Addison-Wesley.<br />
452<br />
Bromley, D. W. 1989. "Institutional Change and Economic Efficiency." Journal of Economic Issues 23 :<br />
735-59.<br />
453<br />
Arrow, K. J. 1951. Social choice and individual values, New Haven, London: Yale University Press.<br />
454<br />
Parsons, T and E. Shils. 1951."Values, Motives, and Systems of Action." In Toward a General Theory of<br />
Action, edited by T. Parsons and E. Shils, 247-275. New York: Harper & Row.<br />
94
as goods and certain services, and intangibles, such as information and knowledge. The<br />
psychological content of interactions in turn has both cognitive and social sides. 455<br />
Can human cognition structure institutions?<br />
In the foregoing treatment it is imperative to ask this rather simple but complex question. Can<br />
human cognition structure institutions? Human cognition is hereunder defined as all processes<br />
by which the sensory input is transformed, reduced, elaborated, recovered, and used. 456<br />
Cognitive scholars view the representation of the world as an active construction that involves<br />
transformation of sensory input through reduction and elaboration. Because human attention<br />
is limited in capacity, we need to be selective in order to prevent an overload of<br />
information. 457 Even so, only a small part of what we attend to can be remembered. In respect<br />
to the reduction of information, we use elaboration by adding to the sensory input through the<br />
recovery of information from the long-term memory. The learning process occurs with the<br />
transfer of information to the long-term memory. 458<br />
Based on the internalization process of information from their social setting and contexts,<br />
individuals develop personal collections of assumptions about the way things happen, why<br />
they are happening and the way things should happen. These collections can be compared to<br />
institutions on social levels. Even though individuals need such intuition to mitigate with their<br />
bounded rationality, the cognitive processes of reduction and elaboration can lead to choice<br />
biases. For example, individuals tend to overestimate the likelihood of events that are<br />
available or easy to recall or imagine from experiences. 459 When individuals continually<br />
create such notions on how to act within the constraints of their bounded rationality, they are<br />
governed by experiences or prior knowledge. This apriority knowledge, which results from<br />
exogenous processes of social interaction influences sensory inputs. This also implies that<br />
individuals need to pay attention to other external process because these provide us with an<br />
opportunity to create meaning out of the things that have to be paid attention to. 460 As a<br />
result, apriority knowledge tends to be used as a basis for verification of individual knowledge<br />
processes. This verification is borne out of the bounded capacity to process information, but<br />
there is a difficulty in handling too many radical changes in our thought structure.<br />
It has been proposed that our knowledge is organized around routine activities. What we<br />
know and what we see about such activities that are script-like. These script-like activities<br />
make humans to focus their attention on how to fulfil such a routine. 461 In here, we use the<br />
455<br />
Geoffrey, M. H. 2004. The Evolution of Institutional Economics: Agency, Structure and Darwinism in<br />
American Institutionalism. Journal of New Political Economy 10(1):133-137.<br />
456<br />
Anderson,J.R Opcit<br />
457<br />
Neisser, U. 1967. Cognitive Psychology. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.<br />
458<br />
Ibid.<br />
459<br />
Reed, S. K. 1988. Cognition: Theory and Applications. Pacific Grove, Calif.: Brooks/Cole Publishing.<br />
460<br />
Posner, M. I and C. R. Snyder. 1975. Attention and Cognitive Control. In Information Processing and<br />
Cognition, edited by R. L. Solso, 55-85. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum.<br />
461<br />
Leighton, J.P., M.J, Giel and S, Hankas. 2004. The Attribute Hierachy Method for cognitive Assesment: A<br />
variation on Tatsuoka’s Rule-Space Approach. Journal of Educational Management 4:205-236.<br />
95
term automatic processing to give recognition to such routines that occur without intention<br />
and that do not give rise to conscious awareness. This arises out of distinct signals that stem<br />
from the social context which may be needed to raise the consciousness and awareness of<br />
individuals and to get them to question their experiences in processing information in<br />
situations across board. This cognitive capacity is strongly linked to intuitive capacity of the<br />
individuals to tabulate knowledge and information which they receive from both physical<br />
objects surrounding them as well as received wisdom.<br />
March and Olsen mentioned that institutions can be construed as persons that exist in<br />
different environments. They are like all other social phenomena, at the individual level,<br />
which emanates from mental constructs. 462 In this we mean that changes of such instructional<br />
constructs imply learning rehearsing and remembering. It also involves rethinking and<br />
evaluating of knowledge about an existing institution. Therefore, as individuals absorb a bowl<br />
of value-infused knowledge and beliefs, chances are that, there may be cases of ambiguity<br />
about how such beliefs come about and how such beliefs follow and in which sequence. It<br />
must also be pointed out that in a certain situation individuals also recognize that there are<br />
often cases of miss-representation of facts and issues about received wisdom on values<br />
relating to perceived knowledge. This leads to dilemmas of how to interpret both historical<br />
and current situations. 463 These dilemmas lead to knowledge ambiguity of all kinds and is<br />
frequently communicated to others.<br />
Further more, if individuals lack experience regarding the shared beliefs in a given collective<br />
environment, then they may as well act against established beliefs of others. This situation<br />
also obtains from the variation among individuals' experiences which may also lead to<br />
different interpretations of a situation. 464 Therefore, taking it from our earlier appreciation of<br />
the role of knowledge and rules in shaping society, we should point out that institutions<br />
influence how information is retrieved, organized, and selected. To say this, is not to suggest<br />
that institutions themselves think and act; but they in a way guide and determine the ways<br />
through which individuals think and act. In a way institution exert influence on individuals.<br />
However, Douglas North thinks otherwise. He insists that institutions are influenced by the<br />
knowledge they themselves have induced. 465 He seems to inform that institutions play a<br />
cyclical role in the process of knowledge generation. To take this to another level we need to<br />
understand the emergence, reproduction, and change of institutions, and the reciprocal<br />
relationship obtaining between institutions and the knowledge manifesting it’s self in the<br />
different societal environs.<br />
462 March, J. G. 1994. A Primer on Decision Making: How Decisions Happen. New York: The Free Press.<br />
463 Johnson-Laird, P.N. 2004. Mental Modelling and Reasoning. In the Nature of Reasoning, edited by J.P<br />
Leighton and J.R.Sternberg, 269-270. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.<br />
464 Zucker, L.G. 1991. The Role of Institutionalization in Cultural Persistence. In The New Institutionalism in<br />
Organizational Analysis, edited by W.W. Powell, and P.J. DiMaggio, 83-107. Chicago:The University of<br />
Chicago Press.<br />
465 North, D. C . 1990. Opcit.<br />
96
In summary, in this chapter we have endeavoured to appreciate the role of local politics and<br />
local decentralisation in understanding current status of national biodiversity. This chapter has<br />
also reviewed various aspects of bioethics and the possibility of adopting a cognitive<br />
dimension as an avenue to understanding the biodiversity resource regime in Kenya. These<br />
postulations add to the current debates in the realm of natural resource usage, particularly<br />
biodiversity and of the changes sweeping the sector. This however puts significant attention<br />
on the role of institutionalism and human cognition in achieving this feat. To this end it is<br />
imperative to suggest that there is a need for mitigation between resource users,<br />
institutionalists, ethicits, bioethicists, economists and political decision-makers. This might be<br />
useful especially when defining new policy agendas in the improvement of this resource<br />
regime. It is apparent that contemporary literature and evolving debate among scholars and<br />
practitioners working in the realm of bioethics, biodiversity and natural resource governance.<br />
97
5 National and sub-national level mapping<br />
5.1 Institutional mapping of the biodiversity sector in Kenya<br />
In their writings Scherr et al. postulated that biodiversity is an essential component in<br />
environmental, social and economic systems. Humans, animals and plants require protection<br />
to survive. 466 Different species play different roles in the functioning of ecological systems,<br />
providing critical inputs within the food chain. 467<br />
Biodiversity is considered to be an important resource in the Kenyan biodiversity enterprise.<br />
However, this resource is one of those facing great threats due to a number of anthropogenic<br />
factors. 468 As a result, a number of interventions to reverse the resource degradation spiral<br />
especially in the area of forest biodiversity have been hatched. Such efforts include<br />
nationwide programmes that seek to protect the dry mountain forests such as the Namanga<br />
Hill forest, the Eastern Arc Mountain Forest Parches in Taita-Taveta District and the dry<br />
mountain forests of the Loima Hills in the Turkana district. 469<br />
It is equally imperative to highlight the different interventions at various provincial and<br />
district levels in form of cross-cutting initiatives such as the Nile Basin River Initiative (NBI),<br />
Lake Victoria Environment Management Programme (LVEMP), cross border biodiversity<br />
interventions projects such as Mt. Elgon Integrated Natural Resources Management Project<br />
(Kenya and Uganda) Mara River Basin Conservation Project ( Kenya and Tanzania ) and Bio-<br />
Earth, a project bringing together varied institutions related to biodiversity research such as<br />
the University of Nairobi, Kenya Agricultural Research Institute, National Council on Science<br />
and Technology. However, at the heart of all these conservation efforts is the restructuring<br />
and re-organisation of exiting agencies such as Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) and the Forest<br />
Department, which has since been restructured to become the Forestry Services for in-situ and<br />
ex-situ conservation purposes. 470<br />
Governance in Kenya is defined by a decentralized administrative system where power and<br />
authority are delegated to sub-national levels in form of regional or provincial governments.<br />
Here power is further lowered to the district and other local administrative units. At all these<br />
levels, biodiversity is highlighted as one of the most treasured resources, owing to the well<br />
pronounced catch phrase that “every one has a right to a clean, complete and healthy<br />
environment”<br />
Biodiversity issues have been a common concern to all Kenyans for along time. This is based<br />
on the fact that most of the country is dry and the climatic conditions continue to deteriorate.<br />
466<br />
Scherr, S. J., L. Buck, R. Meinzen-Dick, and L.A. Jackson. 1995. Designing Policy Research on Local<br />
Organizations in Natural Resource Management. EPTD Workshop Summary Paper 2. International Food<br />
Policy Research Institute. Washington, D.C: Mimeo.<br />
467<br />
Kagwanja, J.C, and M.E. Bredahl. 1996. Determinants of farm-level adoption of Soil Conservation and soil<br />
management technologies: Case study of Enbu, Kenya. A Working Paper. Missouri: University of<br />
Columbia.<br />
468<br />
GOK. 2001. Biodiversity for all. Nairobi:Global Environnemental Facility.<br />
469<br />
Ibid.<br />
470<br />
GOK. 2002. National Report on the Implementation of the Convention on Biological Diversity. Nairobi:<br />
Government Printer.<br />
98
This is compouded by glowing structural weakness in institutions and enforcement agencies.<br />
A combination of these have provoked wide spread contentions regarding the nation’s future<br />
biodiversity situation. 471 It is believed that such concerns could have arisen out of the dire<br />
need to change the rather unfriendly environment to both human, plant and animal lives. The<br />
other fact that ought to be illuminated is the need to preserve a number of fast disappearing<br />
indigenous species and indigenous knowledge. 472<br />
Other biodiversity issues in Kenya range from destruction of forest cover, grazing systems,<br />
ecosystem stability, protection of marine biodiversity from pollution, protection of wildlife,<br />
conservation of general habitats, pollution from the manufacturing sector, impact of farm<br />
chemicals on plant and animal life as well as the impacts of the large construction projects<br />
such as dams and irrigation projects. 473 An evaluation of all these concerns pointed to one<br />
important aspect, the question of institutional inadequacy or institutional gaps in meeting all<br />
these challenges.<br />
The realisation that the nation lacks an institutional clearing house to mediate the conflicting<br />
rules and regulations regarding the management of biodiversity in the country, have been a<br />
daunting one. Until the end of the 1990s, Kenya lacked a comprehensive legal regime<br />
regarding mediation of conflicting environmental management institutions. However, inspire<br />
of enacting the Environmental Management and Coordination Act (EMCA), laws on different<br />
aspects of biodiversity still remain scattered in the different acts and statutes as well as policy<br />
briefs. Such include the water, forest, mineral, fisheries, wildlife, timbers agriculture and a<br />
series of other acts. 474<br />
The other instructive issue worth noting is that there are several agencies with authority and<br />
power to enforce the implementation of the different sections of the environmental laws.<br />
These include the ministries of environment, agriculture, fisheries, forest services, local<br />
authorities and provincial departments. Therefore because of lack of streamlined coordination,<br />
there are always conflicting in-roads on who has what mandate? This implies that, although<br />
the legal and policy framework provided a foundation for sustainable management of the<br />
environment which of course includes biodiversity, there are shortfalls during institutional<br />
implementing by coordination agencies. The result is continued degradation and decline of<br />
biodiversity resources. In the subsequent sections we shall evaluate the current formal<br />
institutions that are used in the management of the country’s biodiversity resources.<br />
471 Ibid.<br />
472 FAO. 2006. A Brief on the on the Inconsistencies in Environmental management in Kenya. Nairobi: FAO.<br />
473 Mugabe,J and A. Masika. 1996. Incentives for Biodiversity Management in Kenya: Acase Study of<br />
Community -Based Conservation Around Amboseli National Park, Kenya. A paper presented at the<br />
Workshop for the Development of a Framework for Biodiversity Loss Assessment. Gland, 22–24 April 1996.<br />
474 Ibid.<br />
99
5.2 Biodiversity in the Kenyan constitution<br />
A constitution is a system, often codified as a written document, that establishes the rules and<br />
principles through which an organization or political entity is governed. In the case of nationstates,<br />
this term refers specifically to a national document defining the fundamental political<br />
principles and establishing the structure, procedures, powers and duties of a government. 475<br />
Most national constitutions also guarantee certain rights to the people. Historically, before the<br />
evolution of modern-style codified national constitutions, the term constitution could be<br />
applied to any important law that governed the functioning of a government. 476<br />
The constitution being the highest legal order in any country or society, basic rights such as<br />
environmental rights ought to be central and well entrenched in the national constitutions. 477<br />
When debating environmental concerns, it becomes irresistible to discuss biodiversity issues<br />
because the former ultimately embodies the later. As pointed out earlier, biodiversity has a lot<br />
to do with the human and other living objects’ life support system. Therefore, any potential or<br />
perceived danger to environment is agreeably a danger to life itself. Its protection requires the<br />
stability of a constitution which should only be changed by a special and substantial majority<br />
of the national legislature, based on detailed discussion and debate. 478 Hence environmental<br />
legislation should see the entrenchment of environmental rights and duties. These should be<br />
ranked among some of the highest constitutional provisions. Stone in his classical writings on<br />
environmental law and the legal rights of natural objects instructively argued that the<br />
environment as a natural object has a legal right to live and this legal right should be<br />
protected. He also states that such protection must be based on standing statutes and special<br />
environmental legislation, which could be enacted along lines of traditional guardianship. 480<br />
Stone further points out that: such provisions must enlist guardianship for natural objects such<br />
as forested lands. In short he postulates that the constitution, the Supreme Court and the<br />
legislature are the guardians of the environment in this sense. 481 However, an overt analysis of<br />
the current Kenyan constitution clearly shows that this important component of natural life<br />
was blurred by the framers of the Kenyan Constitution. Though the present Constitution of<br />
Kenya does not make any direct reference to the environment or biodiversity, specific<br />
sections on land tenure and the protection of personal property have a direct impact on the<br />
management of forests which are indirectly linked to biodiversity.<br />
In addition, broader issues of political governance systems and the role of African customary<br />
law have indirect impacts on environment and forest issues. Chapter 9, Section 114-120 of the<br />
Kenyan constitution is devoted to Trust Land, the only land category specifically dealt with in<br />
475<br />
Kibwana, K. 2000. Making our Constitution: Questions and Answers. Nairobi: Claripress and Friedrich Ebert<br />
Stiftung.<br />
476<br />
William, A. 1968. Constitutions and Constitutionalism. Princeton: Dvan Nostrand Company.<br />
477<br />
Okoth-Ogendo, H.W. 2001. The Politics of Constitutional Change in Kenya since Independence. Oxford: St<br />
Anthony’s College.<br />
478<br />
Ibid.<br />
480<br />
Stone, C.D. 1972. Should Trees have Standings? Towards Legal Rights for Natural objects: In Southern<br />
California Law Review,7: 450-501.<br />
481<br />
Ibid.<br />
100
the Constitution. The Constitutional provision for setting aside Trust Land is intended to<br />
provide a mechanism for the direct involvement of the people in managing their resources.<br />
This Chapter stipulates that Trust Land shall be vested in local authorities for the benefit of<br />
communities resident in the area. 482<br />
Chapter 9 of the Constitution also outlines the conditions and procedures under which Trust<br />
Land may be set aside for other purposes through an Act of Parliament or through a request<br />
from the President. This may be for the purposes of public utility, for the prospect of minerals<br />
or any other purpose that a county council may deem to be of benefit to the people resident in<br />
its area of jurisdiction. Trust Land represents the largest land area in Kenya and as of<br />
December 1995 the total area classified as Trust Land was estimated to be 457,449 sq. km<br />
representing approximately 78% of the total land area of Kenya. Some areas of Trust Land<br />
are set aside as National Reserves under the Wildlife Conservation and Management Act<br />
(Cap.376) and managed by the local authorities. An estimated 100,000 hectares of close<br />
canopy forest is currently found on Trust Land outside these National Reserves. This is<br />
approximately 7% of the total closed canopy forest area in Kenya. 483<br />
Chapter V; Section 75 of the Constitution of Kenya recognises and provides protection from<br />
deprivation of private property. This section specifies the conditions under which the rights to<br />
private property can be forfeited, for example through compulsory acquisition by the<br />
government. This provision can be used to protect forest catchment areas and can also provide<br />
for measures intended to protect and preserve the environment from abuse, pollution and<br />
degradation and to manage the environment for sustainable development. The section<br />
inherently informs that projects relating to the environment have to be subject to a rigorous<br />
national level decision-making. Such projects may include irrigation, power production,<br />
industrial works, multi purpose water works among others. The above analysis shows that<br />
environment and biodiversity protection issues must be explicitly located and therefore<br />
fundamentally registered in the national constitution. It should further be noted that national<br />
constitution by its very nature is a social contract aimed at promoting and advancing basic<br />
interests and rights of the governed. Environmental rights fall under such a realm of rights<br />
and as a matter of fact such basic rights need to be explicitly written in the national<br />
constitution. 484<br />
Furthermore, arising from the current threats to natural resources in Kenya, it is important that<br />
such rights should be overtly mentioned in the country’s supreme governing law; more so in<br />
an explicit, fundamental and bold character. 485 This would highlight the continuing<br />
importance of such rights and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve and<br />
protect environmental resources along traditional guardianship. Having pointed out how<br />
political patronage contributed to the current biodiversity decline in Kenya, it is of glowing<br />
482<br />
The Constitution of the Republic of Kenya. Chapter 9 Section 114-120.<br />
483<br />
Wass, P. 1995. Kenya’s Indigenous Forests: Status, Management and Conservation. Nairobi:IUCN.<br />
484<br />
KIFCON. 1994. Kenya Indigenous Forest Conservation Programme: Phase I Report. Kenya IndigenousForest<br />
Conservation Programme. Nairobi.<br />
485<br />
Edward, C. 1999. What did the Constitution mean for the early Americans? New York: St. Martins Press.<br />
101
importance that provisions relating to the environment and biodiversity for that matter should<br />
be well entrenched in the nation’s supreme governing law book. Within the constitution,<br />
environmental provisions may further be adduced in form of a declaration of public policy or<br />
as fundamental rights. While the former provisions normally prescribe enforceable rules, the<br />
fundamental rights expressly provide actionable obligations. However, often constitutional<br />
provisions have a combination of both. 486 The 1998 Constitutional Review Act grants the<br />
Parliament power to facilitate the comprehensive review of the Constitution by the people of<br />
Kenya and its eventual alteration. A reviewed constitution may have far reaching implications<br />
on existing legislation and institutions mandated with the management of biodiversity<br />
487<br />
resources in the country.<br />
The current constitutional amendment process in Kenya presents an opportunity to have<br />
significant contributions that relate to constitutional protection of the environment and<br />
biological diversity in particular. Accordingly Harrison notes that discussions can go to great<br />
length as long as formulations can lead to creation of effective and durable action plans for<br />
long-time environmental governacne. 488<br />
Harrison cautions that actors involved should be committed in terms of funds and manpower.<br />
He calls for further government commitment, with all government departments and agencies<br />
pulling the same way to ensure consistency and durability. 489 In short, provisions concerning<br />
the environment and specifically biological diversity should be constitutionally entrenched<br />
like it is the case in Malawi and a host of other African countries, including Equatorial<br />
Guinea, Ethiopia, Burkina Faso, Malawi, Ghana, Lesotho, and South Africa.<br />
5.3 The Ownership and usage of Biodiversity in the Kenyan context<br />
The biodiversity or environmental sector is divided into different aspects in the purview of<br />
usage and ownership. This is found at two levels. The first level is that of the state, if one<br />
looks at it from a state like perspective in form of central and regional or provisional<br />
governments. The other level is at the private and communal and/or local level arrangement.<br />
At the statist level, biodiversity is fragmented into different categories, governed by different<br />
sub-sectors and ministries. These range from biodiversity for agricultural usage, marine to<br />
food security and so on. 490<br />
Coordination in regard to mandate among various agencies is not only minimal but also<br />
complicated and hard to achieve. The Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources is<br />
mandated to coordinate the ownership and usage of biodiversity as well as to steer the policies<br />
and programmes relating to the same. There is however little inter-sectoral coordination in as<br />
486<br />
Maarseveen, H and G. Tang. 1978. Written Constitutions: A computerised Study. Newyork: Oceania<br />
Publications.<br />
487<br />
Juma C. and J.B. Ojwang.1996. In Land We Trust: Environment, Private Property and Constitutional Change<br />
in Kenya. Nairobi: ACTS.<br />
488<br />
Harrison, P. 1989. The Greening of Africa. London. Paladin Grafton Books.<br />
489<br />
Ibid.<br />
490<br />
GOK. 1999. Sessional Paper No.6 on Environment and Development. Nairobi.<br />
102
far as ownership is concerned. As a result several administrative divisions exist. This lack of<br />
coordination is visible and even multiplied at the policy level. 491 The case of Kenya Wildlife<br />
Services and the Forest Services affords a glowing example.<br />
Institutional disorder creates uncertainty, resulting into an unclear organizational mandate. 492<br />
For instance, prior to 1988, parks were managed as a government department. From 1989–<br />
1991 they were transferred to a corporate management organisation as a body incorporating<br />
some form of community involvement. However, this was not achieved because the basis of<br />
this shift was partly a philosophical one involving the concept of "parks without borders", yet<br />
at the same time maintaining the fines and fences paradigm. 493<br />
Private or communal ownership of biodiversity is linked to land ownership. 494 This is difficult<br />
to regulate given the obscure regulatory legislation. This arises out of the fact that land has a<br />
multiplicity of uses and users. 495 It will be recalled that this is very typical of common pool<br />
resources and linked to Hardin’s tragedy of commons. As expected, it leads to inequities,<br />
uncertainties of various kinds as well as conflicts, given the fact that land ownership rights are<br />
in most cases skewed. 496 Furtherstill, it is important to note that when we talk of private<br />
ownership of biodiversity, we are inadvertently linking biodiversity to land rights which leads<br />
to unmitigated tapping and unregulated usage by the varied sections of society. This has far<br />
reaching repercussions on conservation efforts especially in the rural areas. It is further<br />
complicated by the fact that up to 80% of the populations in these areas use the land for<br />
cultivation and other livelihood activities. 497<br />
Efforts to control the over exploitation of the nation’s biodiversity have already focused on<br />
the regulation through the legal and administrative control over its usage. These attempts have<br />
seen the amending of several of the existing legislative regimes that indirectly relate to<br />
biodiversity. These amendments include the new Forest Act, the amended Wildlife Act, the<br />
Water Act, the Timber Act, the Agriculture Act, the Environment Management and<br />
Coordination Act, the Chiefs Authority Act, the Tress pass Act and the Mining Act among<br />
others. Within these acts, issues relating to biodiversity ownership are still not well defined, a<br />
fact that renders their implementation an insurmountable task. For instance, like we noted<br />
earlier, private and local owners of biodiversity view it in form of land ownership. This makes<br />
it hard to draw a distinction between community land, public or private land. Sometimes the<br />
state has prevailed and used this complex situation to retain ownership of community land in<br />
491 Fischer, E. 1996. Habitat Conservation Planning under Endangered Species Act: No Suprises and the Quest<br />
for uncertainty. University of Columbia Land Tenure Review 76:371-405.<br />
492 Ostrom, E. 1986. An Agenda for the Study of Institutions. Public Choice 48(1): 3-25.<br />
493 KIFCON. 1994. Opcit.<br />
494<br />
Ibid.<br />
495<br />
Okowa-Bennun, P and M.Mwangi. 1996. Land Tenure and Forest Resource Management in Kenya. In In<br />
Land We Trust: Environment, Private Property and Constitutional Change in Kenya, edited by Juma C. and<br />
J.B. Ojwang, 175-198. Nairobi/London Zed Books.<br />
496<br />
Bromely, D.W. 1995. Natural Resources Issues in Environmental Policy in South Africa. Madison:<br />
University of Winscosin, Land Tenure Centre.<br />
497<br />
David, S. 1997. House hold Economy and Traditional Agro-Forestry Systems in Western Kenya. Agriculture<br />
and Human Values.14:169-79.<br />
103
an effort to regulate biodiversity. This has in most cases increased tension between the<br />
government and the communities. Mbugua illustrated this using the Taita-Taveta<br />
communities. He mentioned that even before independence, 62% of their land was classified<br />
as public land and placed under Kenya Wildlife Services for administration. This translated<br />
into 2,604,186.9 acres of land for which the people of Taita-Taveta earn nothing, yet land is a<br />
crucial factor of production in the development of communities ranging from agricultural<br />
development to shelter as well as environmental growth. This has increased tension between<br />
the government and the communities who live adjacent to the parks. 498<br />
At present, Kenya has several inconsistent Acts of Parliament relating to the governing of<br />
land. This continues to be a major hindrance to the development of community land and<br />
inevitably affects issues regarding ownership of biological diversity. The argument to make<br />
here is that since ownership translates into responsibility, it espouses biodiversity protection.<br />
However, in cases where responsibility is suspect, biodiversity stability is put in a situation of<br />
double jeopardy. 499<br />
At a more regional level, there are cases of collective action to regulate the use of<br />
biodiversity, primarily by banning incidents which lead to destruction of existing biodiversity<br />
enclaves. In Kakamega for instance, there have been reinvigorated efforts to revive the Nyayo<br />
Tea zones, a kind of forest buffer zone management system introduced in the post<br />
independence years to protect the forest fringes. This kind of management system does not<br />
only act as a boundary to prevent community encroachment on forest biodiversity, but it also<br />
helps to control negative externalities such as fires to the forest.<br />
It was found that the Nyayo Tea Zones Corporation was established through Legal Notice No.<br />
285 of 1986 under the State Corporations Act. Its main objectives are to protect indigenous<br />
forests currently threatened by human encroachment and over exploitation thereby<br />
contributing to global environmental and biodiversity conservation. The other reason was to<br />
provide an alternative source of earnings through employment in the intensively managed<br />
Nyayo Tea and fuel wood plantations and lastly to develop rural infrastructure through the<br />
construction and maintenance of roads and bridges. The Nyayo Tea Zones were established in<br />
gazetted Forest Reserves. Out of approximately 6,154 hectares of forested areas that were<br />
cleared for the tea zones, an estimated 4,000 hectares are currently under tea. These<br />
plantations are being maintained with local communities through a non-resident shamba<br />
system, whereby young trees are intercropped with vegetables and other food crops. 500<br />
Another issue of concern here is the over abstraction of water tapped from the springs of<br />
Kakamega forest. The Water from these springs is tapped far beyond the recommended two<br />
thirds levels. The Water Act recommends that water extraction should not go beyond the<br />
498<br />
Mbugua, N. 1999. Getting to Terms with Wildlife Conflict with Man. Sunday Nations Special Reports.<br />
499<br />
Key Informant Interview with Mr. Mirambo, DistrictForest Extension Officer, Kakamega. 24 July 2006<br />
500<br />
MENR. 1994b. The Kenya National Environment Action Plan (NEAP). Ministry of Environment and Natural<br />
Resources: Nairobi.Government Printer.<br />
104
maximum spring discharge level. 501 This over abstraction is due to the over dependency on<br />
spring water from the forest. But through analysis and discussion in subsequent chapters, we<br />
shall highlight that this excessive usage is due to inadequate availability of water outside the<br />
forest, an increase in human and live stock population around the forest fringes, coupled with<br />
poor management of existing water systems. We shall also inform that this situation is also<br />
linked to cultural and spiritual reasons. Overall, we note that in some instances state-like<br />
actions and controls towards the conservation of forest biodiversity have had far reaching<br />
impacts. In some cases it has led to accelerated cases of illegal forest exploitation. 502<br />
Key National agencies responsible for different sectoral uses of biodiversity<br />
The global call for raising biodiversity awareness was one of the issues that the precluded the<br />
United Nations World conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de<br />
Janeiro in 1992. 503 At the conference Kenya did not only endorse and adopt Agenda 21, but<br />
also signed the convention for biological diversity. This same document was nationally<br />
ratified in 1994. It will be recalled that the Rio de Janeiro and Earth summit in 1992 and 1994<br />
respectively called upon member states to devise means to check all behaviours that<br />
undermine biological diversity as well as promote the environment as a means to attaining<br />
sustainable development. 504<br />
The Government of Kenya (GOK) founded the National Environment Secretariat (NES) in<br />
1994 as the environmental agency to coordinate environmental activities in the country.<br />
However in late 1994, partly as a result of the global call at the Earth Summit, the NES<br />
founded the Interministerial committee on Environment which was a loose and some what<br />
ineffective multi-sectoral and multi-disciplinary membership team with members from the<br />
government, the private sector and NGOs. This committee was also made up of subcommittees<br />
responsible for the implementation of the Convention for Biological Diversity<br />
(CBD). 505<br />
In the foregoing sub section we shall look at the national agencies involved in this effort. We<br />
note that their motivation is grounded in a national vision under the banner of protecting<br />
biodiversity resources and ensuring food security for all the people. 506 Most of these agencies<br />
premise their action plans on the fact that biodiversity resource will be sustainably conserved<br />
if communities are sensitised and empowered. Basing themselves on the best practices model<br />
in biodiversity conservation, these agencies call for the integration of biodiversity in their<br />
national planning and development strategies. 507 However, as we have observed earlier, best<br />
501 The Kenya Water Act Cap 372 of the Laws of Kenya.<br />
502 Nettings, R.M. 1997. Unequal Commons and Unequal equity: Property and Community Among Small holder<br />
Farmers. The Ecologist 8:27-28.<br />
503 United Nations World conference on Environment and Development(UNCED). Rio Dejaneiro,1992.<br />
504 GoK. 2000. The Kenya National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan.<br />
505 Ibid.<br />
506 GOK. 2000. First National Report to the Conference of Parties. Nairobi:Government Printer.<br />
507 Ibid.<br />
105
management practices have always eluded most of these agencies, hence failing to realise the<br />
benefits of sustainable utilisation and conservation of biodiversity.<br />
5.4 Evolution of legal regimes and legal reforms relating to biodiversity<br />
The pre-independence period<br />
Kenya became independent in 1963. Prior to her independence, Kenya was administered as a<br />
British settler colony. It was Kenya’s mountain climate, a characteristic feature of the Kenya<br />
highlands, and its incredible fauna and flora that attracted most of the early British settlers<br />
into this East African Country. 508 This new found land later became a home to many Kenyans<br />
of British descent. The new settlers also referred to as new conquerors, became owners of the<br />
Kenyan highlands and as a result demanded that new policies relating to the conservation of<br />
biodiversity had to be instituted. 509<br />
It is imperative to point out that these policies were not aimed at protecting biodiversity as an<br />
end in itself, but rather at promoting/securing the interests of the new class of settlers. As a<br />
result the newly instituted policies never took into consideration the interests, knowledge’s,<br />
cultures or even attitudes of the indigenous people at the time of colonisation. 510 We ought to<br />
note that while policies relating to biodiversity conservation were enacted, it did not mean that<br />
indigenous Kikuyu, Masai, Kamba or Meru were poor managers of their own biodiversity.<br />
Sorenson, noted that the new settlers had destroyed the biodiversity else where in Europe<br />
through hunting and recreation games. As a result the framers of the new policies to govern<br />
the land had to put this into consideration. 511 One fascinating issue as Steinhart puts it, is that<br />
the new legal framers forgot that as living conditions become better, so will the issue of the<br />
population growth. As expected, the new policies did not anticipate this. Generally speaking,<br />
as the population of the newfound lands increased, so did the demand for more land and more<br />
natural resources. This marked the beginning of the threats to biological diversity in Kenya. 512<br />
There is a correlation between population growth and increased demand and/or destruction of<br />
natural resources, and this needs no recapitulation. 513 Although there are no significant<br />
statistical figures for the pre-independence days, earliest estimates made by Kuczynsk put the<br />
population in the colony at 2.500.000 in 1897. By 1914 this population was reported to have<br />
increased to 4.000.000. 514 These estimates were computed based on the hut and poll taxes and<br />
therefore can not be taken as absolute figures. However, they can offer us an insight into the<br />
population trends in the country at the time.<br />
508<br />
Sorenson, M.P.K. 1968.The Origin of European Settlement in Kenya. Nairobi: East African Literature<br />
Bureau.<br />
509<br />
Ibid.<br />
510<br />
Steinhart, E. 1991. The Ideology of Game Conservation in Kenya.1945-1965.<br />
511<br />
Ibid.<br />
512<br />
Dilley, M. 1937. British policy in the Kenyan colony. New York: University Press.<br />
513<br />
Liu, J., G.C, Daily, Ehrlich P.R. and Luck G.W. 2003. Effects of Household Dynamics on Resource<br />
Consumption and Biodiversity. Nature 421 (6922): 530–533.<br />
514<br />
Kuczynsk, L. B. 1948. Demographic Survey of British Royal Empire. Vol 11. Royal Institute of International<br />
Affairs.<br />
106
During pre-colonial times, issues of environmental conservation or biodiversity conservation<br />
for that matter were not taken as critical as we see them today. However, societies lived side<br />
by side with the environments and as such the environment played a leading role in the lives<br />
of the people by providing products for the basics of life like food, clothing and shelter. In a<br />
way, intentionally or not, societies practiced biodiversity conservation especially in a bid to<br />
protect those species that were thought to be rare through ensuring that they were not overharvested.<br />
515<br />
The need to balance between natural wants and nature sowed the foundation for colonial<br />
policies and legal regimes aimed at biological conservation. This is clearly discernible in both<br />
forestry and wildlife colonial legal frameworks. The escalating recreational and hunting safari<br />
games introduced by the European settlers only acted as a major incentive to this endeavour.<br />
On top of that, there was a notable increase in the number of visitors coming to the new<br />
settlers’ colony. 516 It is also important to note that the completion of the railway improved<br />
trade between the interior and the coast. This trade increased demand for wildlife products<br />
such as ivory and rhinoceros horns, hence affecting the national fauna since Kenya was the<br />
greatest supplier of these trade commodities. 517<br />
Furthermore, the settlers’ agricultural interests were beginning to take root and as a result<br />
Kenya witnessed further destruction of biological diversity. Wild animals also posed a danger<br />
to the settlers’ crops and were hence killed in great numbers. On the other hand group hunting<br />
was also taking strong roots among the African tribal communities. 518 Hunting was not only a<br />
game but also seen as a way to attain animal protein to those communities who could not have<br />
domesticated animals due to the rampant spread of sleeping sickness in humans. Sadly, many<br />
of the domesticated were wiped out by rinderpest and therefore hunting was one way of<br />
providing this source of protein. 519<br />
It is imperative to note that since there were no laws relating to biological diversity at the<br />
time, many conservationists were at pain with the continued destruction of biodiversity in the<br />
“newfound lands”. The British government was equally appalled by this state of affair.<br />
However when dealing with pre-independence legalities relating to biodiversity, it is<br />
important to note that they did not take place in a vacuum and were also not motivated by<br />
merely a desire to conserve, but rather by long-term colonial interests. 520 This is manifested in<br />
the 1900 Convention on Biodiversity Conservation which made a distinction between harmful<br />
and non harmful species. This convention formed the background and foundation for the pre-<br />
independence biological diversity conservation legal regimes particularly in Kenya. 521<br />
515<br />
Lord, H. 1957. An African Survey. London: Oxford University Press.<br />
516<br />
Konnange,M. 1955. The People of Kenya speak for themseleves. Detroit: Kenya Publication Fund.<br />
517<br />
Leys,C. 1975. .Politics in Kenya: Development of Peasant society in the British Journal of Political Science<br />
3 (1):307-337.<br />
518<br />
Crafter, S.A.; J. Awimbo and A.J. Broekhoven, eds. 1997. Non-timber Forest Products: Value, Use and<br />
Management Issues in Africa, including examples from Latin America. Nairobi: IUCN.<br />
519<br />
Ibid .<br />
520<br />
Schillings, C.G. 1907. With a flash light and a rifle in wildest Africa. Edited by T,Spear and R.Waller.<br />
521<br />
The 1900 Convention on Biodiversity Conservation.<br />
107
Although this convention was initially applied to the fauna, it was later extended to cover<br />
flora as evidenced by the subsequent amendments in 1904, 1905 and 1906. 522 The convention<br />
outlawed the hunting and gathering of specified or classified species. Selective hunting was<br />
introduced and hunting licences were awarded to varied persons of the then settler colony.<br />
Such persons included the public officers, settlers and sportsmen. Hunting by the natives was<br />
equally prohibited, based on the premise that they used crude hunting methods. 523 It should<br />
however be noted that although this convention laid the foundation for the future conservation<br />
regimes in Kenya and later East Africa, it had a lot of inconsistencies and perhaps this also<br />
explains the current inconsistencies in the present day biodiversity conservation policies in<br />
Kenya evidenced by the nature of the legal regimes governing biodiversity.<br />
Like we have previously noted, the 1900 Convention formed the background for the post<br />
independence legal regimes relating to biodiversity in Kenya. At the time of independence,<br />
Kenya did not have any specific laws relating to biological diversity conservation and as a<br />
result had to embark on it after independence. This sub-section will endeavour to highlight the<br />
significant changes made to the effect in the realm of biodiversity.<br />
To begin with, the framing of legal regimes under the pre-independence period saw no<br />
featuring of local populations. Africans were viewed as an impediment in the construction of<br />
these regimes and ultimately the colonial agricultural commercial enterprise. This is faceted<br />
by the forceful eviction of most communities notably the Kikuyu and Meru from their<br />
traditional lands to pave way for the white farmers especially in the highland areas. 524 The<br />
practice sent most of the evicted Africans to search for new land elsewhere in the country.<br />
This was occasioned by most peasant African farmers turning to forested areas for the reestablishment<br />
of homesteads and subsistence farms. Understanding this is critical since it<br />
helps in tracing the current roots of forest biodiversity destruction in the present day Kenya.<br />
In fact the colonial administrators’ institutions took no interest in the African traditional<br />
institutions which formed the texture and meaning of community life. 525 An evaluation of the<br />
British Protectorate Ordinances reveals that the whole concept of environmental conservation<br />
was not aimed at protecting the natural environment in which people lived but rather changing<br />
the environment for the settlers. 526<br />
The year 1928 saw the introduction of the Colonial Game Ordinance which prohibited<br />
communities from keeping animals suspected to be harmful to the agricultural farms of<br />
settlers. This was followed by the 1933 Convention which emphasised biological<br />
conservation as a prime function of national parks. In this convention the national parks were<br />
defined at three levels. 527 The first level included a place which was under public control and<br />
522<br />
Tudor, J. 1978. The Law of Kenya. Nairobi.<br />
523<br />
Bernstein, H. 1976. Underdevelopment and the law of the Value. In the review of African Political Economy<br />
6:51-64.<br />
524<br />
Sorrenson, M.P.K. 1967. Land Reform in the Kikuyu Country.<br />
525<br />
Cunning, H.M. 1993. Conservation Issues and problems in Africa. In voices form Africa, edited by J Lewis<br />
and N.Carter, 1-8. Nairobi: WWF.<br />
526<br />
Colony and Protectorate of Kenya.Ordinace No.58 of 1921.<br />
527 Ibid.<br />
108
whose boundaries could not be altered by any person and no portion of this land could be<br />
alienated except by a person of competent authority. The second level involved setting aside<br />
large tracks of land for propagation, protection and preservation of fauna and flora and objects<br />
of aesthetic, geological, pre-historic, historic and archaeological other scientific interest for<br />
the benefit, advantage or enjoyment of the general public. The third level included<br />
prohibition of killing, hunting and capturing of fauna and the destruction or collection of flora<br />
except by the direction and agreement of the park authorities. 528<br />
The above ordinance was amended in 1945 as a way of fitting it into the Commonwealth<br />
Conservation Protocol. It was aimed at bringing land under conservation given the fact that<br />
human populations in these areas were increasing. However, Musili disagrees and instead<br />
points out that, the amendment was a clear route to the land grabbing policy that was to be<br />
instituted later. 529 It will be recalled that all land that was occupied by game reserves and<br />
protected parks automatically became crown land herein controlled by the Native Land Trust<br />
Board. 530 In short, legal regimes relating to biodiversity conservation in the pre-independence<br />
era de-linked biodiversity from the people, hence institutionalising state control of resources<br />
and usurping of common property rights. This state-like method was carried on even after<br />
Kenya attained independence in 1963.<br />
The post-independence period<br />
Kenya became independent in 1963 and this practically implied that she was now responsible<br />
for her own domestic legal regime not only in the area of resource governance but also in the<br />
general legal setting and governance structure. Kenya had an option to change those laws that<br />
she felt were not in line with the national objectives and in favour of her population. But it<br />
should also be noted that since the colonial enterprise had prepared this country as a settler’s<br />
colony, this was an uphill task. It involved a lot of discussion with Britain, the former colonial<br />
master given the fact that Britain held a lot of commercial and political interests in Kenya.<br />
Consequently the conservation legal regimes in post independent Kenya did not change as<br />
such. 531 The new government was built on the legal frameworks of the old colonial<br />
government. Specifically, the appropriation of property and conservation rights was one issue<br />
that has remained unresolved until today. 532 Laws relating to resource management have since<br />
remained a prerogative of the state. The only thing that has changed is the fact that the<br />
government has devolved some powers to the regional and provincial governments. This may<br />
be construed as a government effort to consolidate its position in as far as resource<br />
management is concerned. This sort of scenario leaves the local communities with no access<br />
528 Ibid.<br />
529 Musili, D.N. 1993. Wildlife Conservation and Tourism in Kenya. Nairobi: University of Nairobi.<br />
530 Colony and Protectorate in Kenya. Land and Land Conditions in the Colony and Protectorate of Kenya 171of<br />
1931.<br />
531 Ghali, P.Y and P.W.B, McAuslan. 1970. Public law and Political Challenges in Kenya. Nairobi.University of<br />
Nairobi.<br />
532 Keohane, R.O. & E, Ostrom. 1995. Local Commons and Global Interdependence: Heterogeneity and Co-<br />
operation in Two Domains. London: Sage Publications Ltd.<br />
109
ights relating to biodiversity, a situation which usually degenerates into forced access to most<br />
of the conserved resource regimes. 533 Given the existing institutional inadequacies and<br />
inconsistencies, enforcement has largely become hard even in the post independence era. This<br />
results from the varied users and uses of biodiversity, ranging from the provision of food,<br />
direct economic benefits, to promotion of culture. 534<br />
In light of the above, the different post independence legal regimes relating to biodiversity<br />
management ought to have taken into consideration the aspirations of these different users. 535<br />
Although the Kenyan Wildlife Services seems to portray this in its public memorandum, the<br />
fact remains that biological diversity is strictly and closely controlled by government. Both,<br />
the pre and the post-independence legal regime relating to biodiversity undermined and<br />
consequently weakened the traditional institutions of natural resource management in<br />
Kenya. 536 The new institutions of resource management alienated the local people hence<br />
taking away conservation roles from the natives. 537 This is illuminated by the laws that were<br />
finally enacted.<br />
The existing legislations make mutual existence almost impossible and this in part explains<br />
why cases of encroachment on biodiversity remain high. Thus, because of this state of affair,<br />
the governmental biodiversity governance regimes have largely remained unmitigated and<br />
subsequently less effective. Nagendra, like many scholars in the realm of biological resource<br />
usage has pointed out that in governing common pool resources such as forests, there may be<br />
conditions that tempt individuals to cheat and gain substantially higher benefits. This happens<br />
especially when rule mitigation and compliance is weak. 538 In light of such a scenario,<br />
resource commons in this regard are bound to be vulnerable to externalities. This significantly<br />
obtains in the Kenyan resource regime structure.<br />
5.5 Current legal and policy regimes in conservation of biodiversity<br />
In the opening section of this chapter, we did mention that although biodiversity is an<br />
important national resource, it does not appear in the provisions of the supreme law in Kenya.<br />
Further still, there are no clear cut policies that are spelt out for conservation of biodiversity as<br />
a resource. Furthermore, there are no provisions for local biodiversity notions. However,<br />
issues relating to biodiversity conservation are entailed in scattered, divergent legal and policy<br />
frameworks. This means that, in order to analyse the institutional approaches in biodiversity<br />
management entails an evaluation of related acts and policies. The study will detail itself on<br />
the following acts: The Forests Act, the Wildlife Conservation Act, the Agricultural Act and<br />
the Environmental Management and Coordination Act.<br />
533<br />
Fischer.E Opcit.<br />
534<br />
Conservation awareness, The Daily Nation April 17 1997.<br />
535<br />
Kenya will not allow the hunting of Wildlife. The Daily Nation September 1997.<br />
536<br />
Ibid<br />
537<br />
The Kenya Wildlife Act Cap376 Section 34(c), of the laws of Kenya.<br />
538<br />
Nagendra, H. 2002. Tenure and forest conditions: Community forestry in Nepal.Terai. Environmental<br />
Conservation 29:530–539.<br />
110
Although Kenya’s policy and legal framework provides for a firm foundation for sustainable<br />
management of national biodiversity, there are shortfalls in formal and informal institutional<br />
mediation which leads to cracks during implementation. The result is the continued<br />
degradation of biological diversity in Kenya. Since this study is interested in identifying the<br />
different notions and institutions regarding biodiversity in Kenya, our analysis of the<br />
following acts will rightfully highlight the same. We shall augment this analysis with selected<br />
literature on this subject matter.<br />
The last section of this chapter discusses issues related to biodiversity management including<br />
an evaluation of the demand responsive approaches, the role of international interests in<br />
biodiversity restoration as well as the re-evaluation of formal rule design and mediation.<br />
The Forests Act, chapter 385 of the laws of Kenya<br />
This law was established as an act of parliament to protect the country’s forest biodiversity in<br />
terms of forest flora and fauna. The Forests Act, Captor. 385 of Laws of Kenya was first<br />
enacted in 1962. It was subsequently revised in 1982, 1992 and 2005. The Act defines a forest<br />
as “an area of land declared under section 4 to be a forest area.” The Act addresses<br />
preservation, protection, management, enforcement and utilization of forests and forest<br />
resources on Government land. The Forests Act is also applicable to Forest Reserves. This<br />
Act interprets biodiversity to mean the variability among living organisms from all sources<br />
including ecological complexes of which they are part and the diversity within and among<br />
species and ecosystems. According to this Act the forests and woodlands are construed to be<br />
the natural habitats for biodiversity. The Act, thus defines a forest as: land containing a<br />
vegetation association dominated by trees of any size, whether exploitable or not, capable of<br />
producing wood and other products, potentially capable of influencing climate, exercising and<br />
influence on soil, water regime and providing habitat for wildlife and includes woodlands.<br />
This same Act also defines forestry as the act of tendering, utilizing, establishing and<br />
protecting forest and tree resources and therefore includes the processing and use of forest and<br />
tree products. Lund defined a forest as an ecological system dominated by trees and other<br />
woody vegetation. Forest communities are characterized by complex interactions between<br />
woody and herbaceous flora, fauna, soils and other physical factors. 539 The International<br />
Conservation Union (IUCN) defines forests as tree dominated landscapes. 540<br />
According to the current Forests Act, Forest Reserves are land areas that have been surveyed,<br />
demarcated and gazetted. They can be gazetted either from Trust Land or from unalienated<br />
government land. Forest Reserves on government land are managed by the Forest<br />
Department, while those on Trust Land are managed by local authorities. By 1994, gazetted<br />
forest reserves on government land amounted to 1,359,254 ha, while gazetted forest reserves<br />
on trust lands totalled 328,136 ha. This amounts to about 20% of the total area gazetted as<br />
539<br />
Lund, H. 2006. Definitions of Forest, Deforestation, Afforestation, and Reforestation'. Gainesville, VA:<br />
Forest Information Services.<br />
540<br />
IUCN. 1996. Forest Cover and Forest Reserves in Kenya: Policy and Practice. Nairobi: IUCN.<br />
111
Forest Reserves. 541 Most of the area under forest reserves is covered by indigenous forests. A<br />
significant 25% of that area in forest reserves is covered by non-forest vegetation while 9% is<br />
plantation forests. Approximately 64.63% of indigenous forests are found in gazetted Forest<br />
Reserves. 542 Section 3 (21) of the same Act also informs that all forests in Kenya, apart from<br />
those on private land and those owned by the local authorities, all other forests are vested in<br />
the state. 543<br />
While this distinction has been made, we must point out that a large bulk of forests in Kenya<br />
fall under state ownership, yet continued degradation and extinction continue to occur in most<br />
of these reserves. This indicates a shortfall in the implementation of enforcement<br />
mechanisms. It is another pointer to the failings embedded in the statist and globalcentrict<br />
notions of biodiversity conservation in Kenya. Our analysis indicates that these shortcomings<br />
have been far reaching and somewhat reflected in the amended Forest Act, 2005. Though the<br />
Act tries to devolve some powers to local governments, local users’ notions and perceptions<br />
are still delineated.<br />
The Forests Act makes mention of a forest community, which has been defined as a group of<br />
persons who have a traditional association with the forest for purposes of livelihood, culture<br />
and religion. Usage of forests for purposes of cultural and traditional significance also<br />
requires due registration and due permission from the Director of the Kenya Forestry Service,<br />
who in turn writes to the Forest Service Board informing it of the apparent need. The Board<br />
hereafter advises the Minister of Environment and Natural Resources on subsequent action.<br />
All this shows that there are wide discretionary powers vested in the minister who can grant<br />
or refuse an application and his response to this is treated as final. We also observe that<br />
though the new Forest Act has a fair appreciation of local populations, it is still riddled with<br />
inconsistencies regarding local populations’ usage of forest biodiversity. Local institutions<br />
can not freely relate to these forest resources. Cernea notes that in order to maintain strong<br />
institutions community needs must have social organization. 544<br />
Thus in relation to the above, we note that a form of social organization comes with the ability<br />
of such communities to take part in effective decision making especially in cases where<br />
informal institutions relating to resource usage are strong. This is clearly lacking in the<br />
Forests Act. There happens to be no requisite power granted to the local communities living<br />
around the forests to achieve such a feat. The Act also points out that sacred groves found in<br />
any state forest, nature reserve, or private forest shall not be interfered with and any person<br />
who without lawful authority fells, cuts, damages or removes any such grove or tree or<br />
541<br />
UNEP. 1992. Convention on Biological Diversity. Nairobi.<br />
542<br />
Wass, P. 1995. Opcit.<br />
543<br />
The Kenya Forest Act Cap 385, Section3 (21).<br />
544<br />
Cernea, M.M.1987.Farmer Organization and Institutional Building for Sustainable Development. Regional<br />
Development Dialogue 8:1-24.<br />
112
egeneration thereof or biodiversity therein or abets in the commission of any such act<br />
commits an offence. 545<br />
Armed with such power, the enforcers of the Act have every right to curtail local communities<br />
and their informal institutions relating to biodiversity. By virtue of the fact that this power<br />
also extends to private forests, is an indicator of total disregard and abuse of private<br />
biodiversity property rights. Steins and Edwards remarked that, one commonly accepted<br />
criterion for institutional development to take place is devolution of property rights to<br />
individuals who use the resource. 546 The duo mentions that social institutions that have<br />
evolved as a stream of benefits might be stronger and more durable in managing a resource<br />
system. 547<br />
A resource system with well defined local institutions and property rights attached to it<br />
indicate the intention for some party to ensure that potential users observe any predetermined<br />
restrictions or prohibitions concerning access to and use of the resource. 548 The mere fact that<br />
institutional property rights are flawed and poorly defined may probably be interpreted to<br />
mean that local communities may never have the trust and responsibility to protect forest<br />
biodiversity. 549 In the same regard North warned that failure to define property rights in<br />
resource regimes will lead to increased transaction costs. 550 The implication here is that<br />
enforcers of formal legal regimes may turn to more stringent enforcement measures such as<br />
“fines” and “fences” in the management of forest biodiversity. This is more evident when one<br />
closely examines section 5 of the current Forest Act.<br />
Furthermore, the Act gives a detailed account on issues regarding enforcement, with far<br />
reaching powers given to the paramilitary and forest officers alike. More of these far reaching<br />
powers are further entrenched in the hands of the Director of the Forest Services under<br />
paragraph 25(1). With such power the Director of Forest Services can even enter any private<br />
registered forest in order to asses the condition thereof, or to perform any other duty he<br />
considers necessary in the circumstances. 551 This is a clear violation of rights relating to<br />
ownership of property. It is also a direct contradiction of laws regulating ownership of private<br />
resources such as land and related resources as indicated by the Land Adjudication Act.<br />
The entire amended Forests Act, gives little recognition to informal institutions and their<br />
contribution to rule enforcement among communities living near the forest biodiversity<br />
545 The Kenya Forest Act, Section 33 (4).<br />
546 Edwards, V.M. 1996. Managing the Commons: A Framework for the Analysis of Institutional Change and its<br />
Application to the Management of the Multiple-use Commons of theNew Forest. Research Monograph.<br />
Portsmouth, UK, University of Portsmouth.<br />
547 Stein, N.A and V.M,Edward. 1999. Collective Action in Common Resources Management: The contribution<br />
of social constructivists Perspective to existing Theory. Society and Natural Resources 12:539-557.<br />
548 Ibid.<br />
549 Meinzen-Dick, R. and L.A. Jackson.1996. Multiple Uses, Multiple Users of Water Resources. Paperpresented<br />
at the 6th Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property.Berkeley,<br />
California, 6-10 June 1996.<br />
550 North, D. 1992. Transaction Costs, Institutions and Economic Performance.Ocassional Paper 3o.<br />
International Centre for Economic Growth . SanFransco: ICS Press.<br />
551 The Kenya Forest Act Cap 385, Section 25 (1) of the laws of Kenya.<br />
113
esources. The analysis obtained from this examination, portrays a situation of the perceived<br />
state fear that if informal institutions take precedence, then most of forest resources would<br />
degenerate into unregulated access. However, Claude et al. think otherwise. They inform that<br />
informal institutions in the form of indigenous knowledge are instrumental in the biodiversity<br />
conservation efforts. They look at this contribution outside the economic and political<br />
mindset. They observe that local knowledge held by local communities concerning useful<br />
plant and animals in and around forests is a practical and cost effective method for identifying<br />
species at risk of over-exploitation and hence a great contribution to ethno-botanical research<br />
too. 552 This position seems to be well collaborated by Uphoff who agrees that informal or<br />
local knowledge if well utilized can form the backbone for information which<br />
conservationists can use for interventions to promote sustainable use of resources around<br />
forest ecosystems. 553<br />
Finally regarding the Forests Act, we ought to note that under the current forest law, there<br />
happens to be reviewed understanding between the Forest Services and the Kenya Wildlife<br />
Services. The two acts hither to operated in contradiction especially regarding the issue of<br />
licenses and game permits. Paragraph 54(3b) informs that provided nothing in this sub<br />
paragraph shall be deemed to prohibit the capturing or killing of an animal in accordance with<br />
the conditions of a valid license or permit issued by the KWS. 554<br />
The Environmental Management and Co-ordination Act (EMCA)<br />
The Environmental Management and Co-ordination Act (EMCA) enacted into law in 1999. It<br />
provides for the establishment of an appropriate legal and institutional framework for the<br />
management of the environment. It should be noted that the EMCA did not override or<br />
replace other laws, but was rather established to coordinate and be used alongside other<br />
existing laws regarding environmental management. NEMA, which was established by the<br />
same Act, is the major agency involved in the execution of this law. Its major role evolves<br />
around the co-ordination of environmental activities in collaboration with other governmental<br />
agencies and departments. This Act looks at different aspects of the environment such as<br />
pollution of land, forest and water biodiversity. 555<br />
The Act was designed to fill the gaps that were created by sister acts in the realm of<br />
environmental protection. For this, it upholds an all inclusive approach towards environmental<br />
protection and preservation. It provides for the legal regime to regulate, manage, protect and<br />
conserve biological diversity resources and access to genetic resources, wetlands, forests,<br />
552<br />
Claude, R, E.Gregorie, P.J Jean and P.L.Delvilled. 1997. Societies and Nature in the Sahel. London and New<br />
York: Routledge.<br />
553<br />
Uphoff, N. 1992. Local institutions and Participation for Sustainable Development. International Institute of<br />
for Environment and Development-Sustainable Agriculture and Rural Livelihoods Programme, Gatekeeper<br />
Series 31: 1-16.<br />
554<br />
The Kenya Wildlife Conservation and Management Act. 54 (3b).<br />
555<br />
The Kenya Environment Management and Co-ordination Act, Article 9(2)a.<br />
114
marine and fresh water resources and as well the ozone layer. 556 As earlier noted, the Act<br />
creates NEMA as the agency responsible for the implementation of specified clauses of this<br />
Act. In relating this act to institutional related aspects, Section 43 of the Act points out that the<br />
interests of local communities customarily resident within and around lakeshores, wetland,<br />
coastal zones, riverbanks or forest can be declared to be of protected interests. 557<br />
The Act however, does not define what protected interests are and for whom. This<br />
shortcoming as earlier pointed out, is consistent in most of the legal regimes. Since protected<br />
interests are not well defined, utilisation and conservation becomes suspect. This same fact is<br />
illustrated by Section 54(2) which states that a Minister in consultation with the lead agency<br />
can declare an area of land, sea, or river to be a protected natural environment for the purpose<br />
of promoting and preserving specific ecological processes, natural environmental systems,<br />
natural beauty or species of indigenous wildlife or the preservation of biological diversity in<br />
general. More still, using Section 54(2), the National Environment Management Authority<br />
(NEMA) may issue guidelines and prescribe measures for the management and protection of<br />
any area considered to be of environmental significance under the section. 558<br />
An informed analysis of the above sections and several others portrays a picture of a legal<br />
framework aimed at extreme formalisation of environment and biodiversity management in<br />
particular. Though this is aimed at preventing further destruction of the environment and<br />
biodiversity including that found in private and commonly owned resources, it may face a<br />
dilemma of misperception. The Act is also at variance with informal institutions such as<br />
customary law in the management of environment or biodiversity. More so, the Act curtails<br />
customary rights of access to environmental resources and proposes no steps for<br />
compensation to affected communities or individuals. 559<br />
Therefore given such an evaluation, structuring and mediation of formal and informal<br />
institutions co-existence in regard to biodiversity is of paramount importance. We ought to<br />
appreciate March and Olson who put it that mediation between formal and informal<br />
institutions is imperative because it constrains individual behaviour. 560 It also goes without<br />
saying that institutions constrain the actions of individuals hence individual behaviours are<br />
bounded to some degree. This similar situation can be likened to what Khadaha and Gurung<br />
described as a catch–all strategy in relation to the Forest Nationalisation and Management Act<br />
in Nepal. The duo mentions that when the Nepalese Government nationalised the country’s<br />
Forests, it took away collective and individual control of local forest resources. Thus<br />
communal responsibility for forestry management rapidly disappeared in the country. Forests<br />
were converted into open access areas as a common property resource, with communities<br />
having no stake in forest preservation. Yet at the time of nationalisation, the state was unable<br />
556<br />
The Kenya Environment Management and Co-ordination Act, Article 9(2)o.<br />
557<br />
The Kenya Environment Management and Co-ordination Act, Section 7.<br />
558<br />
The Kenya Environment Management and Co-ordination Act, Section 54(2).<br />
559<br />
The Kenya Environment Management and Coordination Act, Section 54(1).<br />
560<br />
March.E and J.P Olson .1984. New Institutionalism: Organisational Factors in Political life. American<br />
Political Science Review 78: 9734-749.<br />
115
to protect and manage the country’s forest resources given the fact that it lacked effective<br />
institutional network and capacity. 561 This same scenario is relevant as we grapple to<br />
understand the kind of institutional regime that obtains in Kenya.<br />
The Agriculture Act (Cap 318)<br />
The Agriculture Act has the following stated objectives: To promote and sustain agricultural<br />
production, provide for the conservation of the soil and its fertility and stimulate the<br />
development of agricultural land in accordance with the accepted practices of good land<br />
management and good husbandry. 562 In the Agriculture Act we find a strong institution<br />
regarding the Kenyan resource sector. However, this should not be wholesomely construed to<br />
represent efforts to protect biodiversity, but should be appreciated in the purview that<br />
agriculture is one of the leading sectors in the Kenyan Economy, contributing up to 27 percent<br />
of national GDP and up to 75 percent of the foreign exchange base. 563 Agriculture also<br />
provides up to 70 percent of raw materials to Kenya’s agro-based industries and provides<br />
employment in the rural areas through intensive and extensive farming. 564 Fundamentally, the<br />
Act defines ministerial statutory powers on how such powers should be used in enforcing the<br />
provisions of the act, especially in implementing agricultural related tasks. The Act identifies<br />
a number of agencies to assist the Minister in executing these duties. These agencies include<br />
the District, Provincial and the Central Agricultural Committees. To achieve its objectives, the<br />
Act gives the Minister the authority to determine ownership of agricultural lands.<br />
The Act gives the Minister and/or the Director of Agriculture in consultation with relevant<br />
authority such as the District Agricultural committee, powers to take over any land resources<br />
in emergency cases. 565 The Act further stipulates the important formal institutional roles in<br />
this sector. These roles are entrusted in the person of the Minister of Agriculture and/or the<br />
Director of the ministry and must ensure among others. 566 The other institutional role regards<br />
enabling of new settlements and provides rules that govern such settlement, including<br />
outlining the crops to be grown, the number and type of livestock to be kept, and the<br />
agricultural production procedure. This provision is buttressed in the effort to limit activities<br />
that exploit land and damage the environment. Under this provision, the ministry in<br />
consultation with its various offices can demarcate land for preservation with a land<br />
preservation order. We further note that there are no inherent provisions on property and<br />
rights of tenure to the affected owners.<br />
561 Khadaha,C and E.Gurung. 1999. Forest Nationalisation in Nepal.<br />
562 GOK, The The Kenya Agricultural Act section 2(1) Cap 318 of the laws of Kenya.<br />
563 GOK. 2004. Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries Development:A strategy for Revitalisation of<br />
Agriculture 2004-2014.<br />
564 The Kenya Agricultural Act section31(2) Cap 318 of the laws of Kenya.<br />
565 The Kenya Tea Development Order. LN 113/1970.<br />
566 The Kenya Tea Development Order. LN 113/1970.<br />
116
In addition, the director of Agriculture may issue land preservation orders requiring the<br />
owners to adopt any agro conservation system in relation to the land in question. 567 Under<br />
such orders, the owner is required to undertake conservation and is prohibited to undertake<br />
any activities perceived to be incompatible with good land management practices. 568 Further<br />
still, the director may prohibit the grazing of livestock in vulnerable ecosystems and require<br />
the forestation of land in order to reclaim land which is at the verge of degradation. Similarly,<br />
the Act empowers the above authorities to make rules for preservation, utilisation and<br />
development of agricultural land including the control of farm land activities as well as<br />
limiting the size of land available to farm workers for utilisation. It also allows local<br />
governments to make bye-laws for the same purposes. 569 The particular dilemma with this<br />
law is that it does not elucidate the procedures to be followed in undertaking any of the above<br />
enforcements. Like other laws in this Country, there are no provisions for local or traditional<br />
practices of land conservation in relation to biodiversity, a particular indicator that the law<br />
borrowed form the colonial conservation narratives, that usually branded traditional<br />
conservation methods as inefficient and wasteful.<br />
One other issue that must be pointed out is that the Act can dispossess owners of their land if<br />
they violate any land preservation or land development orders. This exhibits an extreme<br />
command and control posture of this specific Law. This kind of command and control posture<br />
is supported by Wear. He posits that formal institutions exert their inherent influence to<br />
regulate individual or human behaviour through surveillance and sanctioning power. 570 We<br />
however note that while formal institutions perform a regulative function, we must also<br />
appreciate that individuals define and assign values to the environment in which they operate.<br />
Turning to agricultural conservation practices, it must be pointed out that because of assigned<br />
values to the environment, individuals carry out conservation practices based on the<br />
normative structures within defined localities. Given the fact that the framework of the<br />
agricultural the Act is built around commands and controls as exhibited by section 48(1). 571<br />
This can be a major disincentive for efficient land use and long-term biodiversity<br />
conservation.<br />
The Wildlife Management and Conservation Act<br />
Wildlife constitutes an important national resource with substantial socio- economic, cultural,<br />
scientific, aesthetic and environmental values. The Wildlife Act, chapter 376 of the Laws of<br />
Kenya, aims at regulating the management and the conservation of the nation’s wild flora and<br />
fauna. The Act recognises wildlife conservation in two areas. These are areas set aside<br />
exclusively for wildlife such as parks and reserves as well as sanctuaries with no active<br />
567 The Kenya Agricultural Act, Section 48(a).<br />
568 The Kenya Agricultural Act, Section 48(d).<br />
569 The Kenya Agricultural Act, Section 48(2).<br />
570 Wear, D.N.1992. Forest Management, Institutions and Ecological Stability. A paper presented at the<br />
Appalachian Society of American Foresters’ meeting, Asheville: North Carolina.<br />
571 The Kenya Agricultural Act. Agricultural Act, Section 48(1).<br />
117
utilisation and development. The other category includes those areas in private trust or<br />
government lands which have wildlife. 572<br />
The Kenya Wildlife Services (KWS) is the only agency legally mandated to conserve and<br />
manage Wildlife throughout the country. It has the sole jurisdiction over national parks and<br />
plays a regulatory role in the management of private wildlife sanctuaries. 573 The Act was<br />
established on the legal provisions of the 1975 wildlife and conservation policy. As a result, it<br />
retained some of the pre-independence institutional and legal gaps, chief of which was<br />
alienating the informal attributes and values that communities used in the management and<br />
conservation of wildlife.<br />
The Act has also delinked the proximate relationship between the people and natural<br />
resources such as wildlife and land, given the different systems of land tenures that were<br />
followed in the design of the wildlife governing regimes. 574 Regarding the particular regime in<br />
question, we must highlight that, section 18(b) empowers the KWS to demarcate land for<br />
wildlife in the name of wild animal protection. 575 At the extreme end there is a trust system of<br />
permanent land curved out of communal land to create nature reserves, which led to<br />
disintegration of social and cultural institutions relating to land use and other related practices.<br />
Hence it converts most land from traditional tenure to trust ownership which strictly forbids<br />
access to the former owners without due regard to compensatory mechanisms.<br />
Wilson mentions that the economic values of biodiversity can be seen from an aesthetic view<br />
but hasten to add that this is not easily quantifiable. He further points out that as a result<br />
nature’s valuables are reserved in national parks and reserves. However, the Author<br />
admonishes that curving large tracts of land to create parks without considering complex and<br />
interrelating patterns of natural resource users. This he argues, is considered to be inconsistent<br />
with conservation imperatives. 576<br />
As regards the rights to property and access we must note that the Act does not integrate<br />
populations living around the wildlife parks, reserves and sanctuaries. Section 6 of the Act<br />
prohibits those people from collecting and hunting in the parks. This leads to a conflict in the<br />
varied demand for the wild flora and fauna. We also note that this system of land use is<br />
construed as imposed, given the fact that new land use values postulated by the Act are in<br />
conflict with the old values that were found to be well rooted in most of these areas. For<br />
instance, Osolo-Nsubo points out that given the fact that most of the land on which the parks<br />
are located was originally under communal land holding systems, it meant that all resources<br />
found therein were common pool resources and therefore free for members. Such resources<br />
included the pasture for grazing, timber resources, water and ecological plants and animals. 577<br />
572 KWS. 1991. A Policy Framework and Development Programme:1991-1996.<br />
573 The Kenya Agricultural Act. Wildlife Act Cap 376 Section 3(4).<br />
574 The Kenya Agricultural Act. Wildlife Act, Section 3(4)j.<br />
575 The Kenya Agricultural Act. Wildlife Act, Section 18(b).<br />
576 Wilson, P.N. 1990. Ecological Dynamics and Human Welfare: case Study of Population, Health and Nutrition<br />
in Southern Zimbabwe. PhD. Dissertation. Department of Anthropology, University College, London.<br />
577 Osolo-Nsubo, N. 1977. A Social –Economic Study of the Kenya Highlands from 1900-1970: Acase study of<br />
118
Gottfried suggested that natural resource systems that provide related services are<br />
appropriately modelled as multiple productive assets that may be long lived. He mentions that<br />
the productive assets in the African rangelands are a geographical area of bush land some of<br />
which is used to produce food crops. He also points out that the major primary products from<br />
these rangelands are food, grazing grass, and bush meat. He therefore concludes by<br />
mentioning that property rights and collective action institutions that often mediate<br />
relationships between people and natural resources depend upon the motivation of those who<br />
value the products of the natural resource system. 578<br />
Therefore the introduction of parks in the Kenyan resource management system meant that<br />
the original common resource owners had to forfeit their rights since parks are closed or<br />
restricted areas. However, though most of the reserves were created at the dawn of the 19 th<br />
Century, communities that were displaced from these common pool resources still perceive<br />
wildlife conservation with a lot of acrimony and animosity.<br />
5.6 Formal rule design and mediation: between the national and local Interests<br />
Debating the design and relationship between formal and informal rules can be daunting<br />
because it creates several adjunctions and several points of departure. However, mediating<br />
between national and local interests during formal rule design can be more challenging for the<br />
actors investigating institutional mediation, because it is a necessary pre-condition for the<br />
durability of the intended results.<br />
After making an analysis of four critical formal institutions relating to biodiversity in Kenya,<br />
one can argue that overall the regimes need to be re-examined and aligned to mitigate the<br />
interests of multiple actors in the usage of biodiversity as a resource. This is seen and<br />
analysed in the eyes of a holistic rule design which we can also call an institutional and /or<br />
rule based perspective. This perspective postulates that rules typically have the “If; then; what<br />
else”. It is this structure that examines the state of the institutional system in the question and<br />
then sets values in slots accordingly. 579<br />
The rule based system is usually a product of the inputs from forecasting. High priority rules<br />
can sometimes overwrite values set by lower priority rules and the opposite is also possible.<br />
This means that rules are listed in order of priority and these priorities must be based on the<br />
assigned ranking. 580 Based on the fact that higher rules sometimes have insufficient<br />
information, it makes them susceptible to failure and hence they must always be re-thought,<br />
re-examined, re-shaped, and re-ranked in order for them to meet their functions. The assertion<br />
that rules will always be optimal is misleading especially when confronted with conflicting<br />
the Uhuru Government. Nairobi.<br />
578<br />
Gottfried, R. 1992. The Value of the watershed as a series of liked multi product assets. Ecological<br />
Economics 5:145-161.<br />
579<br />
Schauer, F. 1992. Playing by the Rules: philosophical Examination of Rule Based Decision Making in Law<br />
and Life. Oxford: Clarendon.<br />
580<br />
Ostrom, E. 2003. Doing Institutional Analysis. Digging Deeper than Market Hierarchies in Workshop<br />
Readings in Political Theory and Policy. Bloomington: Indiana University.<br />
119
ealities on the ground. Formal institutions formulated in exclusion of informal inputs and<br />
considerations, are always not optimal, efficient and egalitarian. When applied without<br />
carefully or empirically analysing them, they will always lead to misleading results. This will<br />
in most cases be based on functionalist explanations as a justification for irrational rules.<br />
Olson puts it that, formal institutions will always decrease transaction costs, but when<br />
inefficient will lead to increased transaction costs. 581 In order to achieve a genuine and<br />
durable rule system cognisant of the varied interests and conflicts, it is imperative to<br />
undertake rule mediation especially in a country whose population is composed of different<br />
ethnic groups linked to resource commons. If a country like Kenya is to benchmark its formal<br />
rules, it must search for moderated rules systems and methods. This must be done selectively,<br />
consciously and deliberately, following a best practices model. 582<br />
At issue is; to what extent Kenya’s biodiversity regime managers have emulated the bestpractices<br />
consciously and deliberately in accordance with a genuine rule based system? The<br />
answer to this puzzle lies in the argument advanced by Ostrom. She shapes her proposition<br />
from well-documented cases of informal institutions that had evolved into formal institutions,<br />
through appreciating localized arrangements. She argues that groups can evolve effective<br />
institutions without an external coercive authority if they could solve a "common set of<br />
problems relating to resource usage within the group itsself. 583 Naturally, this will entail that<br />
group boundaries are clearly defined, that rules governing resource usage are well matched to<br />
local needs and conditions, that the most affected members can participate in modifying these<br />
rules and that the appropriating rights of members to devise their own rules is respected.<br />
The new forest law endeavoured, though in a very limited measure to appreciate the role of<br />
community participation, but still ignored the role played by informal institutions in the<br />
management of forest resources. This is exhibited by the far reaching powers embedded in the<br />
extremely formal and stringent management style adopted by the particular provisions of this<br />
law. Therefore, although new in outlook it may not be successful in attaining its intended<br />
functions. To understand this further we may crane our focus into viewpoints provided in the<br />
analysis made by Yami and Ruttan. They argue that design principles can be extracted from<br />
cases of successful groups managing their own common resources and simulated to those<br />
groups which are having some strictures or which have failed in the resource management.<br />
The duo postulates that these design principles may act as clues to the problems preventing<br />
collective action in many failed instances. In short they assert that neither direct intervention<br />
by the state nor total privatization are remedies for states to evolve successful formal<br />
institutions. 584<br />
581<br />
Olson, E. 1999. A Microeconomic Analysis of Institutions. Working Papers in Economics. No. 25,<br />
Department of Economic, Goteborg University.<br />
582<br />
Selter, R.1978. The Chain- Sore Paradox: Theory and Decisions. 9: 127-159.<br />
583<br />
Ostrom, V, D. Feeny and P, Hartmut. 1993. Rethinking Institutional Analysis and Development. Issues.<br />
Alternatives and Choices. San Francisco: California Institute of Contemporaray Studies.<br />
584<br />
Ruttan, V. and Yahami. M. 1984. Towards a Theory of Induced Institutional Innovation.Journal of<br />
Development Studies 20:203-223.<br />
120
Based on the review and analysis of the four critical regimes regarding the management of<br />
biodiversity resources in Kenya, it can be pointed out that there is a reasonable degree of<br />
formal and informal institutional mismatch regarding the management of biodiversity<br />
resources, especially seen in the realm of property rights, and informal institutional<br />
arrangements. Currently Kenya employs the formal rules system that forms the cornerstone of<br />
her resource management regime and has close links with donor-assisted interventions.<br />
Therefore, understanding and appreciating this institutional mix is, and will remain essential<br />
in informing future legal reforms governing biodiversity in Kenya. Similarly the need to<br />
investigate and seek to understand why some rules work and why others fail may be a good<br />
formulary for creating new ones that are likely to be successful. This, as Pavlisch notes, is<br />
attained when policy elites detail themselves with the formalist insights and the political logic<br />
of community mediation practices as a confessional institution that deploys social cultural<br />
pressures in a search of non disputing self identities. 585<br />
5.7 The role of international interests in biodiversity restoration in Kenya<br />
International actors, international treaties and customary international law have a significant<br />
influence on institutional development at the national level in Kenya. This influence extends<br />
to the legislation of various national laws in the realm of national environment and/or<br />
biodiversity. It is a duty of states to ensure that the activities within their jurisdiction do not<br />
cause harm to national and global commons. 586<br />
Such global commons include marine mammals, the biosphere, seabeds and the atmosphere<br />
among others. This means they are supposed to observe the best environmental standards in<br />
their boundaries and to control negative externalities to other states. 587 Therefore, in the<br />
following analysis we realise that national jurisdiction is as a very important pillar of<br />
international environmental law. We must also note that the principle of sustainable<br />
development is one of the leading tenets in the development agenda in Kenya. It is also a<br />
central ingredient in international environmental law. 588<br />
In relation to the above and in collaboration with various international actors, Kenya has also<br />
embarked on a strategy to incorporate biodiversity restoration as part of the key pawns in its<br />
new environmental chess game. In its Environment Management and Coordination Act, the<br />
government placed a precautionary provision in relation to biodiversity preservation and<br />
restoration. It states that management activities should be undertaken so as to prevent<br />
significant irreversible environmental dangers to the country. The country is committed to<br />
adopting and implementing the National Biodiversity Strategic Action Plan (NSAP). New<br />
policies and legal frameworks are incorporating measures for conservation and sustainable<br />
585<br />
Pavlich,G. 1996. The Power of Community Mediation: Government and Formation of Self Identity. Journal<br />
of Law and SocietyReview 30:707-733.<br />
586<br />
Birne,P and A.E Boyle. 1992. International Law and the Enviroment.Oxford: Clarendon Press.<br />
587<br />
Ibid.<br />
588<br />
Okoth-Ogendo, H. 1991. Tenants of the Crown: The Evolution of Agrarian Law and Institutions in Kenya.<br />
Nairobi: ATC.<br />
121
development. The 9 th National Development Plan recognizes the importance of sustainable<br />
use and conservation of biodiversity. Many other initiatives include conservation and<br />
sustainable use, deliberately addressing the obligations of the convention.<br />
We ought to note that Kenya as a country plays a central role in the international<br />
environmental organisation. The country is host to the United Nations Environmental<br />
Protection (UNEP) headquarters as well as many other influential organisations and<br />
multinational actors in the realm of environment. This inevitably makes Kenya consider<br />
biodiversity restoration as an important undertaking. It must also be mentioned that being a<br />
tourist destination to many western nationals, Kenya has been adopted as a leading tourist<br />
resort base. For this reason, the diversity in this Country’s wildlife has attracted a number of<br />
international interests. For instance, due to international pressure the Kenyan Wildlife Service<br />
ingrained the provisions of the CITES in the Wildlife and Conservation Act by banning game<br />
hunting and revoking all licences. 589<br />
More recently, concerns over biodiversity management have assumed prominence in Kenya’s<br />
environmental resource regime. In this context, the government of Kenya has undertaken<br />
partnership with many leading transnational actors in this area. These partnerships have<br />
resulted into the development of long-term strategic plans and programmes for restoration and<br />
management of biodiversity. The process has in most cases seen the integration of<br />
biodiversity into the relevant cross-sectoral plans, programmes and policies. Such policies and<br />
plans have also attracted wide donor funding which to a great extent has oscillated<br />
biodiversity restoration in the country.<br />
In this study we wanted to further find out what accounts for increased international interest in<br />
the Kenyan biodiversity enterprise. Among others the interest of this study was to investigate<br />
the impact of international donor initiatives in the biodiversity restoration in Kenya. We found<br />
out that some of the leading drivers in the biodiversity enterprise such as INCRAF, OXFAM,<br />
WWF, GTZ and ICUN among others are deeply rooted in the Kenyan biodiversity sector.<br />
However, a substantial number of the International NGOs evaluated were largely interested in<br />
the medicinal and food plants regeneration, ecosystem stability, bio-prospecting and<br />
ecosystem services in the forest belts of Kenya. But what is not in place currently is a policy<br />
streamlining NGOs working in the biodiversity area.<br />
In most cases monitoring reports reviewed by this study revealed that, many of the<br />
international environmental NGOs had a strong orientation to a wider political economy of<br />
increased forest excisions and bio-prospecting. This observation however, tends to oscillate<br />
uncomfortably with the underpinned interests of the state aimed at portraying a picture of<br />
improved image in the state of biodiversity in the country, particularly in the forestry sector.<br />
This is well articulated in the First and Second Country Reports on the implementation of the<br />
Convention on Biodiversity to the United Nation Environmental Program (UNEP).<br />
589 Thayer,W.H. 2004. Fight to keep Kenya's wildlife off Dinner Tables: Poachers are Snaring in National parks.<br />
Chronicle Foreign Service. San Francisco.<br />
122
Furthermore, issues of monitoring and enforcement stand out very prominently in the<br />
management of biodiversity resources as seen in the realm of forestry and wildlife as sectoral<br />
users of biodiversity. We have earlier noted that this is also given ample clout in the Forest<br />
Act as well as the Wildlife Act. We certainly note that enforcement translates into big donor<br />
funding as articulated in the First National Report. 590 The report points out that there is need<br />
for a simple, robust, and scientifically defensible monitoring system which will enable<br />
institutionalised monitoring within government agencies and other relevant players. To ensure<br />
sustainability, there is need to support the initial running costs of the systems. This should be<br />
done in view of the following: (i) Standard forms have been developed and are being used to<br />
collect data on important bird areas (ii) Synthesised information from monitoring data is being<br />
disseminated to stakeholders regularly (iii) Human resource available, but materials and<br />
operational costs very limiting (iv) Capacity building on indicators and monitoring<br />
programme has been developed. 591<br />
In relation to the above, we must point out that there is also a potential conflict of interest<br />
from the international donor group, especially with regard to the execution of monitoring,<br />
advocacy and other related services for biodiversity. For instance we need to ask: what is the<br />
balance of interest in reporting between the negative (forest crimes and offences,<br />
degeneration, pollution among others) and the positive (in terms of better forest management<br />
and improvement of the national image) try to integrate what is in the brackets into the<br />
sentence. These questions are essential since they inform the decisions for those actors<br />
interested in seeing more investment in the improvement of biodiversity management. Given<br />
the fact that international interest is so strong in the country, such assessments be it partial or<br />
impartial can have a significant impact on the improvement or restoration of biodiversity as a<br />
resource in the country.<br />
The other critical area of interest that forms part of the wider donor interest in the biodiversity<br />
enterprise is the capacity building component. This was found to be an integral component in<br />
many of the international NGOs evaluated. Seen through an international political economy<br />
lens, capacity building translates into big donor funding/multilateral investment. What was<br />
not well tabulated however, is how much of the funds are finally absorbed by the Kenyan<br />
biodiversity sector? Therefore, although the above treatment offers an insight into the<br />
international perspective and influence on biodiversity restoration in Kenya, one key question<br />
that remains a puzzle for future research is why Kenya has become a centre of interest in<br />
terms of biodiversity restoration and conservation at this point in time.<br />
590 GOK. 2000. The First National Report on the implementation of Convention on Biodiversity.<br />
591 GOK. 2005. The Second National Report on the implementation of Convention on Biodiversity.<br />
123
5.8 Biodiversity and institutional reforms in Kenya: A shift towards a demand responsive<br />
approach?<br />
A wave of formal institutional reforms continues to sweep across the environmental and<br />
inadvertently the biodiversity sector in Kenya. The close of 2005 saw the enacting of the new<br />
Forest Act and there is also a new Wildlife Act in the offing. Many other policies relating to<br />
water, land, agriculture, pollution and waste management are also under review. More<br />
strategically, the UNDP/UNEP reviews in the late 1990s pointed out the poor financial,<br />
institutional and operational management of supply driven organisations in the realm of<br />
environment that resulted into further inconsistencies in service delivery and degradation. 592<br />
Other independent reviews supported by the UNDP and the Global Environmental Facility<br />
(GEF) pointed out that the problems were more institutional and structural and if not handled<br />
threatened the national and regional environmental status. 593 There were apparent calls for<br />
more legal reforms at the national level. In such a scenario we continue to ask our selves; are<br />
supply driven approaches not delivering or is it a mere shift towards a demand responsive<br />
approaches?<br />
At the beginning of this chapter we noted that there are no clear provisions relating to<br />
biodiversity as a resource in the supreme law of the land, the constitution. Similarly, there are<br />
no provisions for ownership of biodiversity and its accruing benefits. There are however a<br />
number of calls to carry out reforms in this sector as well as to recognise the intellectual<br />
contributions of the local people in the name of local knowledge transfer, and to entrenched<br />
new legislations for better management of this resource. We have also mentioned in the<br />
earlier sections of this chapter that the constitution of the country puts it clearly that every one<br />
is entitled to a healthy environment and this is apparently not well obtained.<br />
The management of biodiversity is largely a state-centred affair, with responsibilities being<br />
spread to the central and provincial governments through the various agencies in the<br />
respective sister sectors, key of which are Forest Services and the Kenya Wildlife Services.<br />
This centre-state institutional relationship was premised on the understanding that the<br />
government of Kenya, having initiated the process of macro-policy formulation, institutional<br />
establishment and autonomy, would help to strengthen the respective government agencies to<br />
enforce legal regimes regarding the environment. Further still, it was anticipated that state<br />
organisation would gradually enhance efficient policy formulation and achieve financial<br />
independence. However, this has not been feasible. We have discussed the need for formalinformal<br />
institutional embrace and we need no emphasis on this. The call for institutional<br />
reforms in the biodiversity sector? is however not only based on this formal-informal<br />
mismatch, it is also based on the interaction gap between state actors and private sector<br />
592<br />
UNDP/ UNEP. 1999. Development and Harmonisation of Environmental Standards in East Africa.Nairobi:<br />
UNDP.<br />
593<br />
UNDP. 1999. Legal and Institutional Issues in the Lake Victoria Basin. Nairobi: UNDP<br />
124
players, especially given the role of the extractive industry in the rural and semi-rural<br />
economy in Kenya. 594<br />
More so, we need to point out that apart from institutional weakness, there are also structural<br />
weaknesses at the organisational level, culminating into dilemmas at the level of institutional<br />
design and implementation. Throughout the biodiversity decades, that is the years that<br />
followed the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, problems of ownership of biodiversity,<br />
pollution and biodiversity degradation came to the fore. The debate has attracted issues of<br />
Access and Benefit Sharing (ABS) which are increasingly becoming part of international and<br />
national policy and legal agendas.<br />
In this study it is logical to ask: how do people at the local level perceive and assess access<br />
and benefit questions, in particular, in the light of national and international guidelines, model<br />
laws and other new forms of defining and regulating ABS of biodiversity resources? What<br />
mechanisms can support more equitable benefit sharing among the local people? Do these<br />
local perspectives inform the national and international agreements? And if so, how can the<br />
potential conflicts between local level accesses and benefit sharing priorities and<br />
national/international interests be solved? How to build or strengthen local capacity to have a<br />
voice in the above questions and answers to the questions? While these questions formed the<br />
backbone of this study, they were not warmly received by the intended audiences in Kenya’s<br />
biodiversity resource management sector. The same questions also seemed to torment those in<br />
the positions of biodiversity governance and as one Key informant Dr. Matanga intimated to<br />
this study, the same questions have remained unanswered and hastily noted that they could be<br />
responsible for the current wave of reforms that are eating up the sector.<br />
594<br />
Medows, R.F. 2001. Causal Linkages between Poverty and Environment in Kenya. Natural Chatham: UK.<br />
Resource Institute.<br />
125
6 Institutional Mapping at the Local Level<br />
6.1 Sample size determination and identification of clusters<br />
A total of 220 farmers were interviewed in a local institutional mapping household survey<br />
conducted in villages around Kakamega Forest. The survey respondents, who were<br />
predominantly farmers, are spread in the different clusters that were statistically constituted<br />
by the district statistical office in Kakamega. These clusters also fall under the sampling frame<br />
that is used by Kenya Central Bureau of Statistics. The usual sampling procedure in Kenya<br />
consists of randomised selection of clusters corresponding with enumeration areas within a<br />
master sample, with a probability equivalent to size in the number of households in every<br />
selected cluster. In each cluster, there are 168 house holds.<br />
Therefore, delectation of clusters was based on the sampling frame developed by the National<br />
Sample Survey Evaluation Programme (NASSEP III). The NASSEP III sampling frame is a<br />
two-stage stratified cluster sample design with individual districts forming the strata. In this<br />
regard, Kakamega District has 26 clusters. From these, 11 clusters were identified for the<br />
survey. These clusters eventually provided the principle sampling points. The Principle<br />
Sampling Point (PSP) was a village commonly known as a location. These clusters were<br />
purposively sampled given their location and proximity to the forest.<br />
Because the survey intended to investigate the role of local notions in institutional framing,<br />
clusters with localities in or around the forest were found to be useful. Hence the areas around<br />
the forest were deliberately represented in the sample. In each cluster, two villages were<br />
visited and in each village, 10 households were randomly chosen and interviewed. Hence,<br />
from each cluster 20 households were interviewed. In total 220 house holds were sampled.<br />
The sample size for the house holds to be covered in the local mapping survey was<br />
statistically determined based on a precision of 5% and a confidence level of 95%. 595<br />
On top of data collected from the individual household respondents, 11 focus group<br />
discussions were held to augment the quantitative data.<br />
Having processed the sample size, the survey team proceeded to identify the eligible<br />
enumeration areas. It is important to point out that each cluster contained 168 house holds.<br />
These clusters are thought to represent the different geographical scope of the district.<br />
However, these same clusters also take into consideration different other aspects such as<br />
semi-urban/rural stratifications, economic and social differentiations as well as livelihood<br />
zonations. 596<br />
Based on the assumption that local notions are more understood and appreciated by household<br />
heads, the interviews were restricted to the two household heads. In the survey, either the<br />
husband or wife was taken as the respondent. The average distance was 4 kilometres from<br />
Kakamega forest. This distance was ascertained by making rough approximation by the<br />
survey enumerators. In the survey the mean number of adults residing in a particular<br />
595 Bartllett, J.E, J.W, Kotrlik and Higgins, C. 2001. Opcit.<br />
596 CBS. 2006. Kenya Economic survey. Nairobi: Government Printer<br />
126
household was 6. Adults are here defined as persons above the age of 18 years. This figure<br />
was ascertained after taking a mean of all adults residing in the households. During the survey<br />
this figure was ascertained by asking the demographic question; what is the number of adults<br />
residing in the house hold?<br />
Most respondents interviewed had spent at least 40 years in the enumeration area. This is an<br />
indicator that they were at grip with the local institutions in the area. It was derived from the<br />
demographic question to the respondents….…”How many years have you spent in this area?”<br />
The value presented in the table shows the average number of years all respondents in the<br />
survey had spent in the enumeration area. The most predominant occupation in the area was<br />
farming. This is derived from the respondent demographic question; what is your occupation?<br />
The value indicates 85% of the respondents who answered that they were farmers<br />
The following table below presents a summary of the sample characteristics.<br />
Table 6.1 Sample characteristics<br />
Characteristics Value<br />
Approximate distance from the forest 4 Kilometres<br />
Average number of household Adults 6 Adults<br />
Number of Adult workers aged 18-65 116<br />
Number of Villages in the sample 44<br />
Number of years spent in the Enumeration Area 40<br />
Most predominant occupation in percentage terms 85<br />
Total number of households in the sample 220<br />
Source: Field Survey data.<br />
Respondents demographics<br />
Gender<br />
The survey was conducted in July 2006 and it attracted 220 respondents. These were found<br />
across the different divisions in Kakamega district. These included Kabras, Ileho, Ikolomani,<br />
Shinyalu, Navahorolo and Lurambi. 62.56% of these were men while 37.44% were women.<br />
Men constituted the rather bigger component of the respondent given their status as household<br />
heads. Household heads were considered to be more knowledgeable on issues regarding the<br />
local institutions and nomenclatures in the area. The other reason is that issues concerning<br />
biodiversity and more so Kakamega forest are rarely answered by women. Many of the<br />
female respondent contacted for an interview in the household referred the researcher to the<br />
household head. This also has its roots in the patriarchal nature of the Luhya society where<br />
husbands in the home are the ultimate authority and therefore considered to be the<br />
127
spokespersons for the home. Even in situations where a wife in the household accepted to take<br />
the interview, she declined to answer some survey questions in the course of the interview. In<br />
such scenarios, the researcher was told to wait for the husband to answer such questions, or<br />
make a call back. By nature the Luhya people and most notably the Tiriki, have a high level<br />
of secrecy and preferred not to deal at length with outsiders, especially on matters relating to<br />
their culture. Thus ruled by this voice of fear, in most cases the women declined to participate<br />
in the interview based on the above reasons.<br />
Age of Respondents<br />
Of all the respondents interviewed in the survey, it was discovered that the average age of<br />
respondents varied remarkably. It was found that different age groups participated in the<br />
interview. However, the most significant age brackets included 65-74 (29.68%) and the 45-<br />
54(21%) and 55-64(21%). The age groups that participated in the survey have been<br />
categorized in the table below.<br />
Table 6.2 Age of respondents participating in the survey<br />
Age Frequency Percentage<br />
15-24 0 0,00<br />
25-34 5 1,83<br />
35-44 22 10,05<br />
45-54 46 21,00<br />
55-64 46 21,00<br />
65-74 65 29,68<br />
75-84 36 16,44<br />
Total 220 100<br />
Source: Field Survey data.<br />
The dominant age bracket of the respondents in this study (65-74), is not surprising given the<br />
fact that the interviews were carried out in areas that would at best be described as rural. One<br />
aspect that can help us to understand this trend is the rate of migration in Kakamega district.<br />
Most of the youth do leave the countryside and opt for the semi-urban or the urban centres to<br />
look for employment and other related amenities. 597 This leaves most households with<br />
occupants in the age bracket of 45-74.<br />
We must also note that those in the above age brackets were found helpful in this study, as<br />
they were found to be in possession of local knowledge related to Kakamega forest. It was<br />
also very common that respondents in this age bracket were always accessible and were<br />
597 Wondimu, K. 2006. Rural Livelihoods and Land Use: Drivers and Implications for Biodiversity in Rainforest<br />
Ecosystems in East Africa.Acase of Kakamega District in Western Kenya. Paper Presented at the GIGA<br />
workshop, Hamburg 23-24 March 2006.<br />
128
eadily available for the researcher at the house hold level. But all that said, age plays a very<br />
critical role in the transfer of local knowledge.<br />
Education of Respondents<br />
In the study, all respondents were asked about their education attainments. It was however<br />
found out that, the greatest bulk of the respondent had an education attainment of only<br />
primary six. These accounted for 57% of the entire population interviewed. These were<br />
followed by 20% who had an education of attainment of secondary level. Only 9.13% had<br />
achieved vocational education. However, 10% of the respondents did not have any formal<br />
education at all.<br />
The low degree of formal education may be attributed to the age in the sample. The dominant<br />
age bracket of the respondents in this study (65-74), is a clear statement that can be used to<br />
explain the education levels in the sample. For instance, it is important to note that, most of<br />
the respondents in the upper age limit didn’t have a chance to acquire formal education, while<br />
the others only had a chance to acquire primary education, which was also appreciated to have<br />
been an average acquisition at the time. This is partly explained by the British colonial<br />
policies for native education which were ambivalent; for they had a difficulty in choosing<br />
between education for African development on one hand and education for the colonial<br />
economy on the other. 598 It was also established that during the pre-independence years<br />
formal education was discouraged and emphasis was put in production of cash crops and<br />
provision of labour on the white settler farms, an aspect which may explain the low levels of<br />
education in these areas. 599<br />
The early colonial economy in Kenya was premised upon a spatial dichotomy between settler<br />
core of “scheduled areas” and a periphery of African labour reserves. The core was expected<br />
to the generate export income and internal development, and the major function of the<br />
reserves was to provide a labour force for urban and rural sections of settler economy. 600 A<br />
classic labour migration system was developed with circulation of workers between labour<br />
reserves and areas of labour demand in this settler economy. 601 The above political economy<br />
analysis offers us an invaluable insight into the historical perspectives that in part explains the<br />
current education trends in Western Kenya and Kakamega in particular.<br />
598<br />
Whitehead, C.1982. Education in British Colonial Dependencies. 1919-1939: An Appraisal. In Education and<br />
The Third World edited by J.K,P Watson. London: Croom Helm.<br />
599<br />
Overton, J. 1987. The Colonial State and Spartial differentiation: Kenya 1895-1920. Journal of Historical<br />
Geaography13:267-209.<br />
600<br />
Ominde, H.S. 1972. Rural Economy in Western Kenya. In Studies in East African Geography and<br />
Development edited by S.H, Ominde. Nairobi: Heinnemann.<br />
601<br />
Berman, B.J and L.M, Lonsdale. 1980. Crises of Accumulation, Coercion and the Colonial State: The<br />
Development of of Labaour Control System in Kenya. Canadian Journal of African Studies14:37-54.<br />
129
The following table summarizes the education levels among the respondents.<br />
Table 6.3 Education of respondents participating in the survey<br />
Education Level Frequency Percentage<br />
Post. Graduate 0 0<br />
Tertiary 6 2.7<br />
Vocational 20 9.13<br />
Secondary 45 20<br />
Primary 127 57<br />
No formal education 22 10<br />
Total 220 100<br />
Source: Field Survey data.<br />
6.2 Local perceptions of biodiversity in Kakamega<br />
In this study, respondents were asked to give a local definition of what biodiversity is. The<br />
question was put in a way that respondents define biodiversity basing on how they locally<br />
perceived Kakamega forest environment. This was assumed to provide a pathway to what<br />
constitutes the most local perceptions of biodiversity. The answers to this question paint up a<br />
picture of how people perceive biodiversity in general and Kakamega forest in particular. The<br />
answers to this question brought out the different local understandings of what biodiversity is.<br />
As a result, there were different definitions and which form the varied perceptions of what the<br />
local understanding of the Kakamega forest biodiversity is. To most of the respondents, the<br />
environment in Kakamega forest was defined as a habitat for rare plants and animals. These<br />
constituted the majority of the responses accounting for 54.79%. Another section of the<br />
respondents defined Kakamega forest environment as an area of great agricultural potential<br />
and this accounted for 30.14% of the total number of respondents in the sample. There were<br />
however, other varied responses from the survey. These included those who defined the<br />
Kakamega forest environment as a sacred forest for the community. These were 13.24%. The<br />
following table provides summary of local perceptions about the Kakamega forest<br />
environment.<br />
Table 6.4 Varying perceptions of local biodiversity in Kakamega<br />
Value Response Frequency Percentage<br />
Hunting ground 2 0,91<br />
Sacred forest for Community 29 13,24<br />
Area of Agriculturall potential 66 30,14<br />
Place of common worship 1 0,46<br />
Habitat for rare plants and animals 120 54,79<br />
Place of common ancestry 2 0,46<br />
Total 220 100<br />
Source: Field Survey data.<br />
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It is imperative to appreciate that, the varied responses also emanated from the different<br />
ecological divisions and zones of the district. For instance, in Shinyalu, Mulimani, Shitsiulio<br />
and Mushifumbi, there was a higher appreciation of the Kakamega forest as an area of<br />
agricultural potential. This has a strong connotation with the agrarian economy in these areas.<br />
There areas are characterised by pockets of medium plantations for the cash crop economy in<br />
this province. Small plantations of tea are a common facet of the livelihood and income<br />
patterns in these areas. As a result, there is a more indirect relationship between peoples’<br />
livelihood and agriculture. There is a general demand for agricultural land in these areas. 602<br />
Therefore, it should be noted that such a populace perceives the forest as a destination of rich<br />
agricultural potential. However, when probed further about other related gains from the forest,<br />
there was an exposition of a wider appreciation of the forest biodiversity, unwittingly<br />
portraying a less personalised attachment to the forest benefits. One such opinion was<br />
highlighted in a focus group discussion. One participant mentioned that the forest was<br />
important in the maintenance of the hydrological cycle and therefore conservation of the<br />
forest was important in order to maintain supplies of rainfall. Another participant added that<br />
the forest was a good habitat for rare species of plants and animals. This answer was widely<br />
construed by the researcher as the one of the many common definitions of the Kakamega<br />
forest environment.<br />
Although people in Kakamega have less detailed scientific knowledge about the forestry<br />
biodiversity, more people held accurate beliefs about details of the different types of animals<br />
and plants that were found in Kakamega forest. Many of them intimated to this researcher that<br />
some of the most rare plants and animals were found in Kakamega forest. For example, they<br />
mentioned that the most rare species of Kolobus-monkeys, Agama-lizards and frogs are found<br />
in Kakamega forest. Respondents appeared to have a wider knowledge base regarding the<br />
role of Kakamega forest in hosting a variety of rare species. They argued that these species<br />
were also found to be of varied significances among the Luhya people of Kakamega.<br />
This feat may also have been due to the extension program that has been implemented by<br />
various community user groups as the wider aims of the community forestry education<br />
programme. In a separate interview with the council of the village elders, it was revealed that<br />
the importance of rare species of plants and animals are explained to the children by their<br />
parents, grandparents and related clansmen, at an early stage, in order enable new generations<br />
recognise the need to appreciate the importance of the forest. 603<br />
In the same survey respondents were provided with a matrix of animals that are perceived to<br />
be of great significance to the communities around Kakamega forest. Respondents were<br />
asked to inform the researcher their relationship with the said animals to the community. The<br />
animals included snakes, monkeys, frogs, lions, buffaloes and lizards and termites among<br />
602 Nambiro, E and Becker. 2005. Land use and Cropping Intensity in Western Kenya: Driving forces and<br />
Implications on resource quality and Rural Welfare. In The Global Food and Product Chain-Dynamics,<br />
Innovations, Conflicts, Strategies edited by Thiekles, E et al., International Research on Food Security ,<br />
Natural Resource and Rural Development; book of Abstracts. Stuttgart: Tropentag.<br />
603 FGD with Council of Village Elders, 12 July 2006.<br />
131
others. The respondents informed the researcher that frogs for instance manifested tragedy in<br />
the community and were as a result perceived to be animals of not so good luck.<br />
Furthermore, it was learnt that monkeys are perceived as animals associated with prosperity<br />
and as result monkeys are animal which are hunted for their skin and heads which are also<br />
used during the circumcision ceremonies. The red tailed and the blue tailed monkeys are the<br />
most hunted type in this sub-region. Monkeys were also linked to the Luhya ancestral history,<br />
a factor that makes them one of the highly demanded animal species in Kakamega forest.<br />
However, it is not common that this will be easily told to any outsider among the Luhya. One<br />
will most commonly be told that monkeys are hunted because they do feed on the crops in the<br />
field which is equally understandable in the same regard, but inherently keeping the cultural<br />
institutional significance.<br />
It is imperative to note that secrecy among the Luhya community is such a great norm which<br />
is highly guarded and monitored by a tribal oath during marriage and ceremonies related to<br />
adulthood passage. Lizards are considered to be animals related to procreation and extension<br />
of ancestral lineage. 604 It is widely held among the Luhya sub-tribes that lizards are associated<br />
with blessing as far as human fertility is concerned. It was also noted that a young lizard was<br />
always given to a newly married man especially among the Idoha sub-tribe. The significance<br />
here is: to bless the new couple in their marriage so as to have as many children as possible.<br />
The researcher was also informed that couples that mistreated these lizards were bound to<br />
suffer a curse leading to infertility. It was also mentioned that a couple that have failed to<br />
have children was also given a young lizard to heal them overcome a certain curse and<br />
subsequently such a couple would have children. This is such a great custom, a very strong<br />
local institution among the Luhya sub-tribes. Snakes are considered to be animals that are<br />
associated with the Luhya ancestry history. They are considered to be the temples for the<br />
Luhya gods. As a result snakes are some of those animals that are both feared and loved<br />
according to the Luhya institutions.<br />
Each sub-tribe has a great attachment to and cherishes particular snake species. There are over<br />
30 different snake types in the whole of Kakamega forests. For instance, the Tirirki are so<br />
close to the python, the Maragori are so close to the black- Mamba, the Bakusu are closer to<br />
the Jameson-mamba, and the Kabras are closer to the gabon-viper among others. Many of the<br />
Luhya families especially those that live around the forest keep these snakes in their<br />
homesteads and guard them jealously. They are fed and counted as members of the<br />
household. However, not any of them will concede to this fact. Only a few elderly men<br />
confided in the researcher. Many of these snakes are got from the forest and domesticated in<br />
the homes of the Luhya people. Many of the non-Luhyas who get married to the Luhyas are<br />
educated about the importance and significance of snakes and a particular snake for that<br />
matter. They are also advised against ever killing a snake, because doing so would result into<br />
604 Focus Group Discussion 16 July 2006.<br />
132
tragedy for the entire household, clan and sub-tribe. As a result snakes are some of the most<br />
conserved species in and around kakamega forest.<br />
In a focus group discussion with Luhya elders, it was noted that high fines are demanded in<br />
case a snake that belongs to another sub-tribe is killed. There are a series of intercessions that<br />
are held to prevent misfortunes and bad omens from befalling the suspected family or subtribe<br />
for that matter. 605 Lions on the other hand are regarded as animals that portray brevity.<br />
They are revered and therefore associated with heroism. It is a well known fact that the lion is<br />
referred to as the king of the jungle. In this regard, the Luhya people have a great relationship<br />
with this jungle king. Because by nature lions are very strong animals, they are construed to<br />
signify authority and leadership among the Luhya. Lions were always hunted for their skin<br />
and heads as well. This led to increased demand for their heads and skins. Many spiritual<br />
leaders among the Luhya also adorned themselves with lions’ skins as a way of displaying<br />
spiritual leadership to their believers. This institution led to the decline of lions populations in<br />
and around the Kakamega forest. This strong relationship with the lions was however much<br />
more linked to the Bahaya and the Marama.<br />
Lastly, elephants are the other animals that are linked to the Luhya cultural institutions. The<br />
Baluhya have an ancestral linkage with the elephants in two ways. One, the Bukusu sub-tribe<br />
believe that they originated from elephants and as a result, the Bakusu have continued to<br />
name many of their children Wanjovu, a significant institutional attachment linked to the<br />
elephants. This makes elephants a darling among the Bakusu. On the other hand, other subgroups<br />
like the Wanyore, Marama and the Kisa, have a different institutional linkage<br />
regarding the elephants. These mentioned that the sight announces future death of a Luhya<br />
sub-tribal head. In the study, it was learnt that, in the olden days when communities still lived<br />
too close to one another, the sight of elephants was not a welcome sight since they announced<br />
death. These two divergent institutional linkages to elephants, gives them (elephants) some<br />
kind of “respected and feared” position among the Luhya. They are never hunted and as such<br />
respected.<br />
According to the Luhya oral traditions, elephants first appeared during the death of the first<br />
Luhya tribal head long after the Luhya migration from Uganda to the present day Luhya-<br />
Land. It is reported that a heard of elephants appeared and attended the funeral of this great<br />
Luhya head. Ever since then, elephants have been linked to the successive death<br />
announcements of a Luhya Tribal head.<br />
When asked whether the people are named after the above animal species, 95.89% of the<br />
respondents agreed that the people were named after different animal species. However,<br />
4.57% informed that some of the parents no longer name their children especially due to the<br />
tenets of christianity that are seen to be penetrating the Luhya-land. But even then, this is a<br />
very slight proportion compared to the margin that still goes on with the custom. Children are<br />
given such names like Wagwe named after a Leopard, Wanjovu, named after an elephant,<br />
605 Focus Group Discussion with Council of Elders. 12 July 2006.<br />
133
Wasike, named after a swarm of locusts, Walungu, named after worms. Many other names<br />
among the Luhya follow in this kind of rhyme.<br />
The following table illustrates the wide gap between those who persons who are named after<br />
the species and those who are not.<br />
Table 6.5 Respondents named after animal species<br />
Value Response<br />
Yes (Named after an<br />
Frequency Percentage<br />
animal species)<br />
No (Not named after any<br />
210 95.98<br />
animal species) 10 4.57<br />
Donnot know o 0.0<br />
Total<br />
Source: Field Survey data.<br />
220 100<br />
Related to the above, respondents were asked why people were named after the above animal<br />
species. A number of reasons were enumerated to justify this. According to the Bantu people<br />
of East, Central and Southern Africa, names signified continuation of the strong institutions<br />
within the Bantu tribal setting. 606<br />
In accordance with the above Bantu institution, the Luhya sub-tribes are no exception. We<br />
have already mentioned the cultural significance of the different animal species among the<br />
Luhya. For that reason, these institutions are eternally carried on even in the every day lives<br />
of the Luhya people. This is done through giving names to children who are born in the Luhya<br />
community. For instance, respondents answered that people are named after such animal<br />
species as a sign of luck; others are named as a portrayal of prosperity, history of events, and<br />
sign of good health, tragedy in the community and as sign of inspiration among others. It is a<br />
common rhyme to hear names such as Wamalwa, Walungu, Wadumbi, Wenani or Wasike all<br />
names with such a myriad of significances related to biological species, biological<br />
connotations, biological events and happenings. The following table shows the different<br />
reasons why persons are named after different animal species.<br />
606 Llyod, A. T. 1978. The Bantu Bureaucracy. Cambridge: W.Heffer and Sons Ltd.<br />
134
Table 6.6 Why persons are named after different animal species.<br />
Value response Frequency Percentage<br />
Don’t Know 2 0,91<br />
Sign of good Luck 25 11,42<br />
Prosperity 81 36,99<br />
History of events 37 16,89<br />
Ancestral History 47 21,46<br />
Sign of good Health 2 0,91<br />
Tragedy in community 6 2,74<br />
Sign of inspiration 15 6,85<br />
Source of Protection 5 1,83<br />
Total 220 100<br />
Source: Field Survey data.<br />
In the above table only 0.91% mentioned that they did not know the true relationship between<br />
their names and the different biological species, be it plants or animals. However, 11.42%<br />
agreed that their names depicted that such animals were associated with good Luck. 36.99%<br />
informed that their names are associated with an animal that is associated with prosperity.<br />
Others who numbered 16.89% answered that their names were associated with historical<br />
events in the community. 21.46% had their names related to animals of good health. Other<br />
responses (0.91%) included names that reflected animals that are associated with tragedy in<br />
the community, especially at the time of birth. This tragedy is further announced by the<br />
presence of such animals. Lastly, other respondents who numbered (6,85%) informed the<br />
study that, other animals were a source of inspiration. In regard to this, almost all Luhya sub-<br />
Tribes with the exception of the Ishuha, Kabras and Tachoni follow this institutional<br />
arrangement regarding the people–animal relationship religiously, a finding which shows a<br />
linked relationship between local biodiversity perceptions and the local institutions. This<br />
finding to a great extent may explain the framing of local biodiversity perceptions in the areas<br />
around Kakamega forest.<br />
In the study we also found out that when named after respective animal species, such people<br />
developed a special attachment to such animals and as a result became protective of such<br />
animal species. This bond between the animal species and the populace among the Luhya<br />
community, in a way works to keep the animal species protected. The research also learnt that<br />
this institutional relationship bars them from eating such animals. However, on the other<br />
hand, animal which are thought to have no institutional relations such as Kobs, impalas or<br />
squirrels are always hunted down, a fact that has kept their populations low.<br />
The Luhya also believe that there is a strong connection between the animals and their<br />
creator. They believe that if you kill any of the animals then you are bound to meet your death<br />
too. This death may come in a form of an incurable disease or stricken by lightening. This<br />
institution is very respected and followed among the Luhya, especially among the Marama,<br />
Batsotso, Maragori, Bakusus Batura, Marachi and the Tiriki sub-tribes. The institutions<br />
regarding the relationship between the Luhya people and the animal species postulates one<br />
135
interesting finding; that while there are different perceptions about forestry biodiversity,<br />
non-scientific at that, these perceptions seem to complement the existing scientific discourse<br />
regarding biodiversity conservation objectives such as preserving animal diversity for<br />
posterity and biophilia. 607 Biophilia means "love of life or living systems." Kellert, used it to<br />
describe a psychological orientation of being attracted to all that is alive and vital. 608<br />
Wilson also uses the term in the same sense when he suggests that biophilia describes "the<br />
connections that human beings subconsciously seek with the rest of life.” He proposed the<br />
possibility that the deep affiliations humans have with nature are rooted in our biology. 609<br />
Therefore we found out that the Luhya people have institutionalized these attractions and<br />
positive feelings that people have toward the Kakamega forest habitat, objects and living<br />
species found in this natural surrounding. These feelings towards nature, in the Kakamega<br />
forest environment have been refined into culture and informal rules. It was also interesting to<br />
find out that these unwritten informal rules regarding human plant/animal relationships<br />
sounded strong in the minds of the respondents.<br />
6.3 Geography and climate of Kakamega district and Western Kenya<br />
It is needless to emphasize that Kakamega district is one of the districts that form the Western<br />
province of Kenya. Other districts are Bungooma and Busia. The Luhya are the greatest<br />
inhabitants of the district. They do live side by side with other tribes such as the Luo and the<br />
Kalenjin who live in the north and south east respectively. The total area of this part of the<br />
country is 3, 054 Sq miles. Part of this area (53sq miles) is covered by water.<br />
This part of Kenya is situated to the north of Kisumu and gulf of Kavirondo. It is also<br />
bordered by the Mt Elgon, which extends to the Eastern part of Uganda. The Bagishu,<br />
Bagwere, and the Basamia, the Basoga and the Iteso as well as the Japadhola in eastern<br />
Uganda are neighbours to the Luhya of Western Kenya. In a large measure, these<br />
neighbouring tribes have similar institutional underpinnings like the Luhya people. Generally<br />
speaking, Kakamega District is a physically varied area, comprising of lowlands and<br />
highlands ranging from 3,600 ft. above sea level, especially in the low-lying areas. These<br />
areas are close to Busia district, in the west.<br />
The highlands on the other hand are in the ranges of 7500 ft. especially on the mountain<br />
slopes of Elgon in the north. The district is also characterised by ridges, valleys lying between<br />
45,00ft and 5000ft above sea level. 610 There are escarpments such as the Nandi Escarpments.<br />
There are countable hills some of which are named after the different Luhya sub-tribes<br />
residing in these areas. These include the Maragoli, Nyangori, Samia and Bunyore hills. On<br />
607 Malcom, H.J. 2001. Mentaining Biodiversity in Forest Ecosystems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.<br />
608 Kellert, S.R. 1993. The Biophilia Hypothesis. Washington D.C.: Island Press.<br />
609 Wilson, E. O. 1984. Biophilia. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.<br />
610 Baringer, T.A. 1998. Physical Geography of East Africa. Oxford: Oxford Berghahn.<br />
136
the extreme lowland side, the area is characterised by low-lying zones with two major soil<br />
zonations in this sub-region.<br />
Interestingly, there is a side of this province well supplied by high parts of the Mt. Elgon and<br />
as a result contains the Alpine meadows and the shallow soils alternating with great alluvium<br />
and peaty soils. 611 The high slopes in this Luhya land are however characterised by sandy<br />
loam soils that make the land in this part of the country quite fertile and with very healthy<br />
vegetation. The soils are also extensively cultivated a very significant characteristic of the<br />
wetter parts of the tropical land use systems. This also accounts for the reasons as to why the<br />
land in this part of the country is scrambled for and why the population size in this province is<br />
soon going through the roof.<br />
It is also imperative to note that there are very big tracts of land in this province that are<br />
covered by savannah, making the place look like a park-like zonation. Early writers about this<br />
province have indicated that it was once covered by forest from the eastern part of Uganda.<br />
Such writers included Johnson, who formed the advance team that laid the foundation for the<br />
British East African Company. For instance, Johnson asserts that it was due to the wasteful<br />
type of cultivation that led to the degradation and eventual disintegration of the tropical forest<br />
belt in this part of the country. 612 According to this author, the whole of present day Western<br />
Province was covered by a forest and was only brought down by over cultivation.<br />
The above analysis has however been found to be somewhat hollow by scholars like Were.<br />
Were, who has researched extensively about the Buluya-land and Abaluya people, argues that,<br />
Johnson’s claims were an exaggeration. 613 He states that the method of cultivation that<br />
Johnson advances cannot be used as a point of departure in understanding the reasons as to<br />
why the land that was once forested is apparently not. Were further asks why the same type of<br />
cultivation has been responsible for the destruction of the forested land in Western Kenya has<br />
not accounted for the destruction of the forest belt in the parts of West Africa? 614 While Were<br />
seems to have negated Johnson’s synthesis, it was too early for him to make the conclusion.<br />
The steady increase in population of western Kenya can be used to justify Johnson’ argument.<br />
It is also wise to mention that, Were’s writings were made forty years ago and since then the<br />
biodiversity of this area has been declining. Were on the other hand doesn’t seem to postulate<br />
the reasons as to why the area seems to have lost its original forest cover.<br />
In terms of Climate, the area receives abundant rainfall throughout the year. But there is a<br />
short dry spell lasting up to mid-December. However, when compared to the rest of Kenya,<br />
this dry spell is not pronounced. The rain seasons are between the months of March and<br />
August. The area receives up to 61.7m-76.3ml within the different parts of Kakamega. In<br />
Kakamega, the areas of Kaimosi and Cheptul do receive the highest amounts of rainfall.<br />
611 Ominde, S.H. 1963. Land and Population of the Western Districts of Nyanza. London: Oxford press<br />
612 Johnson, H. 1904. The Uganda Protectorate, Vol.II. Brititsh Cataloguing Series.<br />
613 Were, G. 1967. The History of Abaluya of Western Kenya. Nairobi: East African Publishing House.<br />
614 Ibid.<br />
137
Lastly, the area is also watered by a number of rivers. These are: Nzoia, Sio, Lusumu and<br />
Malaba.<br />
6.4 Biodiversity and resource usage in Kakamega Forest<br />
In Kenya, indigenous forests cover just over one million hectares, while plantation forests<br />
cover over 120,000 hectares. About 3 million people in Kenya live within 5 km of forest<br />
boundaries and benefit from a whole range of goods and services from the forest. 615 This has<br />
resulted in pressure leading to encroachment, excisions, over exploitation and loss of flora and<br />
fauna. Biodiversity or biological resource diversity is a comprehensive concept and includes<br />
616<br />
all nature’s possessions and nature’s variety.<br />
Talking about biological resources in Kakamega entails the summation of ecosystem and the<br />
ecosystem functions, species and genes in a given locality that is: Kakamega forest in this<br />
case. Biological resources embrace species richness and genetic diversity. Being a forest that<br />
has people around it, food and cash crop production is the main land use activity. However,<br />
there are individuals who exploit different wild forest roots, fruits and vegetables from the<br />
forest for food. 10.05% of the respondents agreed that they have acquired products for this<br />
very reason.<br />
Further still, there were another 12.79% who answered that they had entered the forest to<br />
collect animal products in form of game meat that is gotten through hunting. Kobs and<br />
impalas are some of the animals that were got for the purposes of hunting to get animal<br />
protein. We have however indicated that animals such as the monkeys, lions and leopards are<br />
demanded for spiritual reasons as well as related cultural rituals. These accounted for 30.59%.<br />
Another 24.66% of respondents also answered that they used forest resources especially the<br />
forest herbs for the medications. The rapidly increasing human population in areas around this<br />
forest has incredibly contributed to the scramble for land for agricultural and related reasons.<br />
Many respondents agreed that even though they are aware of the pressure that such land use<br />
activities presents to the forest, they badly needed land for food and cash crop production.<br />
Others want the land for settlement in order to acquire the accrued benefits from the forest<br />
such as forest firewood, grass and pasture for the animals. This scenario has consequently led<br />
to habitat destruction, all of which have resulted to diminished quality of ecosystems in and<br />
around the forest. This study however didn’t delve in to the intricacies of the impact of the<br />
human population on the Kakamega forest environment. The impact of the human population<br />
615<br />
GoK. 2000. Kenya’s Biodiversity at a Glance. A Report by the Technical Committee of the Conference of<br />
Parties. Nairobi:Government Printer.<br />
616<br />
Myers, N. 2002. Biodiversity and Biodepletion: The need for a paradigm shift. In Biodiversity, Sustainability<br />
and human communities: protecting beyond the protected, edited by T. O’Riordan and S. Stoll-Kleemann,<br />
46-60. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.<br />
138
on the forest biodiversity is neither new nor surprising as evidenced by Olembo et al., 617<br />
Chweya and Eyzaguirre. 618<br />
Through the demand for these forestry resources, humans have impacted and modified natural<br />
biodiversity around Kakamega forest. In doing so, a number of different forest species have to<br />
a large extent been affected. This process has down played the natural regeneration of<br />
different plant species ultimately compromising the species regeneration of such species.<br />
Such plant species to which the Luhya people have a great attachment include the following:-<br />
Murembe, Mutukuyu, Mustu, Mushu, Shingulosho, Mugombero, Mandala, Bikuma,<br />
Tsimbalagaya, Vusangu, Manyumya, Namideri, Visamia, Shinyuza, Lusui, Misine,<br />
Shingututsui, Shingoye, Mweriza, Muduyu, Lusuyi, Mugoma, Mwenye and shishuma among<br />
others.<br />
Kakamega forest’s position in Kenya’s national resources regime needs no recount. The forest<br />
has other physical and biological resources that are of considerable domestic, economic and<br />
intrinsic value. It is estimated that the forest country has other 35,000 known species of<br />
animals, which are important to both life and the rural economy. These are based in natural<br />
habitats such as water, rocks and soils within the forest. These and their ecosystems are<br />
however, increasingly under pressure from competing users resulting in a situation of future<br />
depletion. These biological resources, which are sources of food, medicine, shelter, income<br />
and fuel, are only assured if sustainably used. 619<br />
The government is making efforts to conserve the remaining forests by strengthening<br />
management, creating awareness and encouraging the planting of trees on farmlands and<br />
public utility areas. This however has been slow. In Kakamega forest, there are both formal<br />
and institutional regimes to manage the forest resources. The aim is to reduce the over<br />
exploitation of the species that are found to be under great threat. When asked whether there<br />
are penalties aimed at curbing this wanton harvesting and usage of rare plant and animal<br />
species from the forest, a great section of the respondents answered in affirmative. The study<br />
also learnt that both the formal an informal institutional rule enforcement mechanism were<br />
used in enforcement of such penalties. These were the Community Disciplinary Council, the<br />
Village Chief, Customary Law, the Forest Wardens, the Tribal Heads, the Village Council of<br />
Elders and even Parents. However, amongst all these the Forest Wardens were seen to take a<br />
leading role and were more respected and feared.<br />
In terms of strict enforcement of penalties, the forest wardens were rated at 77.07% while<br />
village chiefs were rated at 15.07%. But inspite of all these enforcement mechanisms, it was<br />
found out that the crimes relating to wanton forest exploitation of rare resources continued<br />
617<br />
Olembo, N.K., Stephen S. Fedha & Edah S. Ngaira. 1995. Medicinal and Agricultural plants of Ikolomani<br />
Division Kakamega District. Development Partners. Nairobi.<br />
618<br />
Chweya, J.A. & P.B. Eyzaguirre. 1999. The Biodiversity of traditional leafy vegetables. International Plant<br />
Genetic Resources Institute, Rome, Italy.<br />
619<br />
Dewees,P.A. 1995. Trees and Farm Boundaries: Farm Forestry, Land Tenure and Reform in Kenya Africa:<br />
Journal of the International African Institute 65: 217-235.<br />
139
and the same victims commit the same crime again even when the penalties have been served!<br />
This same scenario was confirmed by Guthiga et al. 620 Asked why the people committed the<br />
same crime again even after enforcement of penalties, the study found out that an array of<br />
reasons accounted for this predicament. 32.42% informed the study that this state of affair<br />
resulted from weak community disciplinary council that is said not to be strong enough to<br />
enforce the penalties. Another 27.85% informed the researcher that the penalties themselves<br />
were weak and flexible! In this, the perpetrators of the crimes found it easier to commit the<br />
crime and then face the penalties. Another 26.49% of the respondents informed the study that<br />
the culprits found it easier to pay bribes and other related incentives to the enforcers of the<br />
penalties so as to get into the forest and harvest what they wanted. But a given section of the<br />
respondents (9.38%) informed that overall the enforcement mechanisms were weak<br />
characterised by weakening customary law in some areas.<br />
Therefore, the study learnt that because rare plant and animal species are demanded for<br />
different reasons which range from economic, spiritual and medical treatment, it becomes<br />
difficult for the enforcement mechanism to achieve the desired achievements.<br />
6.5 The people of Kakamega<br />
Kakamega district forms the bulk of the province of western Kenya. There are a varied people<br />
in the district of Kakamega, including the Luo, Nandi and the Luhya. The Luhya are also<br />
known as Abaluuyia, but also pronounced as Luhia. The word Luhya refers both to the people<br />
and the Luhya languages. The Luhya are the biggest and the most dominant tribe in the<br />
district. These Bantu people residing in the Western Province of Kenya are bordered by<br />
Uganda to the West. They also face the wind ward side of mountain Elgon.<br />
According to the 1999 Kenya Population and Housing Census, the Luhya tribe is the second<br />
tribal grouping in Kenya, only rivaled by the Kikuyu. They number about 4.6 million people.<br />
Kakamega district is one of the few districts in Kenya which also doubles as a food and cash<br />
crop basket of the country. Land in this part of the Country is very fertile and area receives<br />
reliable rainfall. This in a large measure explains why Kakamega attracts a lot of people,<br />
making it one of the districts with the highest population densities in Kenya. 621<br />
The Luhya tribe is made up of over 17 sub-tribes. These include; Bukusu Maragoli, Wanga,<br />
Abanyore, Marama, Idakho, Kisa, Isukha, Abatsosto, Tiriki, Kabras, Abanyala (Busia and<br />
Kakamega) Abatachoni, Abakhayo, Abamarachi and Abasamia among others. The Luhya<br />
myths of origin suggest a migration into their present day locations from the north. Virtually<br />
all sub-tribes claim to have migrated first from Misri before settling in what is now central<br />
Uganda. 622 The same oral traditions also reveal that the Luhya migrated further east, first<br />
620<br />
Guthiga, P, J. Mburu and S. Wambu. 2006. Extraction of Direct Forest Products and its driving factor. The<br />
Case of Kakamega Forest. A paper presented at that GIGA Workshop. Hamburg, March 2006.<br />
621<br />
CBS.1999. The Natioal Poulation and Housing Census. Nairobi:Government Printer.<br />
622<br />
Were, G. Opcit.<br />
140
settling around the Mount Elgon area before displacing a pygmy race to settle in their current<br />
homeland.<br />
On the other hand anthropologists believe that the progenitors of the Luhya were part of the<br />
great Bantu migration out of Camerron. 623 Other available accounts of Luhya oral tradition,<br />
mention that the Luhya may have been pushed out of a pygmy race in the Central African<br />
tropical forest. These accounts are very similar to the oral traditions of the Baganda. It is<br />
significant to note that the language of the Baganda who have a close migratory history with<br />
the Abaluya, is closely related to the dialects spoken by the Luhya, especially the Maragoli<br />
dialect. This in a way points to a common point of origin.<br />
The structure of traditional authority and Luhya cultural institutions<br />
The sub-tribes<br />
The Luhya are divided into over different 17 sub-tribes, each speaking a certain dialect of the<br />
Luhya language. Linguistically, these sub-tribes can be grouped into four main categories.<br />
These categories were arrived at according to the dialectical variations. 624 This also has a<br />
significant relationship with further emigration and settlement patterns among the Luhya,<br />
after they migrated into this forested belt of Western Kenya. As a result of this, different subtribes<br />
dialect emerged. For instance, the Wanga dialect, or variations of it, is spoken by the<br />
Wanga, Marama, Kisa, Batsotso, Kabras, Isukha, Idakho, Banyore and Tachoni. The Maragoli<br />
dialect is spoken by the Maragoli and the Tiriki. Similarly, the Bukusu dialect, and/or<br />
variations of it, is spoken by the Bukusu, Gisu and Masaba. The Nyala dialect is spoken by<br />
Abanyala of Busia and those who emigrated to Kakamenga popularly known as Abanyala ba<br />
Ndombi. Lastly, the Samia dialect is spoken by the Samia, Nyala, Wahayo, Tura and the<br />
Bamarachi. 625 However, there are significant overlaps that exist between these sub-tribes.<br />
These overlaps stem from mini-dialects that are composed of two or more dialects. In the<br />
Bukusu of Lugari area, for example, speak a dialect that is mixture of the Kabras and Bukusu<br />
dialects.<br />
All the Luhya, with the exception of the Kabras, Marama, and Saamia, practice initiation<br />
ceremonies which includes both circumcision and in some cases clitoridectomy. Traditionally,<br />
circumcision is a period of training the youth for adult responsibilities for the youth. It also<br />
signified a graduation of the youth into adulthood, from one age set to another. Among<br />
Luhya, circumcision is carried out every four or five years, depending on the sub-tribe. For<br />
example among the Banyala living in Navakholo; the initiation of the young boys was every<br />
other year and notably an even year. 626 The initiates are about 8-14 years old, and the<br />
ceremony is carried out in the forest in a highly guarded and exclusively sacred place. When<br />
asked whether this place is accessible to other members of another sub-tribe, the researcher<br />
623 Ibid.<br />
624 Ibid.<br />
625 Mulusa, J. 1999. The Luhya Way of Life. Nairobi: Oxford University Press.<br />
626 Ibid.<br />
141
was overtly informed that this place is sacred and only accessed by the candidates who are<br />
going for the ceremony. Other members are also prohibited form visiting the site.<br />
It was also pointed out that not even firewood is picked from this place. It is sacred and holy<br />
place, a fact which could be proved on observing it flourishing vegetation. As we shall later<br />
learn, the study found out that spiritual head usually collected the herbs to avoid<br />
contamination and undue exploitation. Replanting and regeneration of herbs from the sacred<br />
area is encouraged. The practices of initiation are still popular in Kakamega and traditional<br />
methods of initiation persist.<br />
The clan<br />
Like any other Bantu sub-group, else where in Africa, the Luhya people are usually identified<br />
by a clan. Each clan is traced from the sub-tribe. This is some form of tradition hierarchical<br />
structure, through which people and their ancestral lineages can be traced. A clan therefore<br />
brings together a people with a common ancestry heritage and history. This history is usually<br />
seen in form of generations which span from ten to forty generations. The clan is an automatic<br />
forum that guarantees social interaction and determines how institutional norms should be<br />
observed and passed on. The clan is headed by a clan leader who in most cases is elected by a<br />
council of elders, strictly following particular ancestry history and observing a strict and<br />
conservative tradition.<br />
Through the clan, family relationships such as marriage, kinship ceremonies are arranged. The<br />
Luhya are a strong clan based society that is organized into age groups called likhula. Those<br />
born in the same year usually belong to the same likhula, and are initiated together by a<br />
circumcision ceremony. The initiated group then goes through several different stages<br />
together. These age groups include; middle age, old age, respected old age. Village elders<br />
from the last two stages form an honoured ruling group.<br />
Marriage is an important institution among the Luhya. But marriage within one's clan is a<br />
taboo and is strictly forbidden. This custom persists even today. Before young people get into<br />
serious relationships with members of the opposite sex, they will usually find out the clan of<br />
their would-be fiancée. If it is established that the two, in fact, belong to the same clan, the<br />
relationship is abandoned. The Luhya are a very diverse people with about thirty different<br />
clans which have intermarried forming a whole complicated network of relationships<br />
popularly called "Olwikho".<br />
The Luhya clans include: Abaafu, Ababenge, Abadavani, Abaengele, Abakangala,<br />
Abakhubichi, Abakoye, Abakwangwachi, Abalanda, Abalindo, Abamisoho, Abamuchuu,<br />
Abamugi, Abamwaya, Abasaacha, Abasaya, Abasenya, Abasia, Abasiloli, Abasonge,<br />
Abasumba, Abatecho, Abaucha, Abauma, Abaumwo, Abayaya, Abayirifuma, Abayisa,<br />
Abayundo. One is not allowed to marry from his/her own clan. The Luhya have extensive<br />
customs surrounding death. In the olden days there would be a great celebration at the home<br />
of the deceased, with mourners staying at the funeral for up to forty days, and some times<br />
142
concluding the ceremonies with the intercession of the spirits that was done by a spiritual<br />
leader. These ceremonies involved the ritual performances in forest sacred places. If the<br />
deceased was a wealthy or influential man, a big tree would be uprooted and the deceased<br />
would be buried there. Nowadays, the mourners stay for shorter periods of time (about one<br />
week) and the celebrations are held at the time of burial, with a single closing ceremony again<br />
to end the forty days. The Luhya believe in animisms/spirits. Sacrifices are made to please the<br />
spirits. These traditons are also tied to the birth of first born children. For instance elaborate<br />
ceremonies are carried out during festivals to mark the first born’s birthday. Different animals<br />
species were always involved in these elaborate ceremonies. Such animal would kiss the new<br />
born as a sign of blessing and good health to the new child. Different animals are used by<br />
different clans and such animals were later released back to the forest while others were<br />
domesticated in the respective homes. 627<br />
The family<br />
Luhya culture revolves around the extended family. Polygamy is allowed it is a traditional<br />
norm. Today, however, polygamy is seen to be declining in some parts of Luhya land. About<br />
10-15 families traditionally make up a village, headed by a village headman (Omukasa or<br />
Oweliguru ) who is elected by the male population in the village. In many cases, the village<br />
chief is also a medicine man and healer within a family. 628 Among the men, the man of the<br />
home was the ultimate authority, followed by his first-born son. In a polygamous family, the<br />
first wife held the most prestigious position among women. The first-born son of the first wife<br />
was usually the main heir to his father, even if he happens to be younger than his half-brothers<br />
from his father's other wives. Daughters have virtually no permanent position in Luhya<br />
families. They were viewed as other men's future wives, and are brought up to fulfil this role.<br />
They do not inherit property, especially customary land, and are excluded from decisionmaking<br />
meetings within the family. Children are named after the clan's ancestors, animal<br />
species, grandparents, or after events or the weather. The paternal grandparents take<br />
precedence, so that the first born son will usually be named after his paternal grandfather<br />
(kuka), while the first born daughter will be named after her paternal grandmother (kukhu).<br />
Subsequent children may be named after maternal grandparents, after significant events, or<br />
even after the weather. For example, the name "Wafula" among the Bukusu is given to a boy<br />
born during the rainy season. This comes from the Bukusu word for rain, "efula" and Simiyu<br />
among the Banyala was the name given to the child born during the dry season.<br />
627 Focus Group Discussion 12 July 2006.<br />
628 Middleton, J and G.Kershew. 1965. Ethnographic Survey of East and Central Africa. London: International<br />
African Institute.<br />
143
6.6 Local institutions and farming systems in Kakamega District<br />
The Luhya are traditionally agriculturalists, and they grow different crops depending on the<br />
region where they live. Close to Lake Victoria, the Samia are mainly fishermen and traders,<br />
with their main agricultural activity being the growing of cassava. The Bukusu and the Wanga<br />
are mainly cash crop farmers, growing sugar cane in Bungoma and Mumias areas<br />
respectively. The Bukusu also farm wheat in the region around Kitale. The Isukha of<br />
Kakamega area and the Maragoli of Vihiga raise tea. In Bukura area, the Kisa are large-scale<br />
rice farmers. The Kabras of Malava area grow mainly maize at subsistence levels, with a few<br />
also farming sugarcane.<br />
The farming system in Kakamega district is a mixture of live stock keeping and crop<br />
production for both domestic and for sale. Intercropping is widely used in the district. Farmers<br />
intercrop maize with beans or maize and some bush millet. Most farmers plant between two to<br />
four crops on a piece of land. Many farmers in the relatively highland areas plant between two<br />
to three crops on a piece of land. That is: beans, maize and/or millet. Farmers in the remaining<br />
areas intercrop at least two crops on one plot mainly beans and maize or beans and cassava.<br />
The farmers in the relatively highland areas grow a wider range of crops and this is due to the<br />
different climatic conditions.<br />
The lowland and central plateau areas have relatively less rainfall than the highlands and as a<br />
result allow fewer plants to be grown. Through a system of intercropping, soil fertility is<br />
maintained. In the past the system of intercropping was practiced together with shifting<br />
cultivation a fact which could somewhat explain why some areas are not as forested as others.<br />
This system of shifting cultivation was also combined with charcoal burning. Shifting<br />
cultivation was used to clear field to allow new grasses for the animals. It was also a way of<br />
trapping monkeys and other animals in the forest which were demanded for Luhya traditional<br />
spiritual and cultural ceremonies. However, after the villagernization especially in the late<br />
1960s, and largely because of the increase in the population, shifting cultivation declined. The<br />
recent increase in demand for land and the exhaustion of current farms, has made some<br />
farmers to open up farms near the forest belt have been established, a practice which may in<br />
future threaten the forest margins. Another important feature of the farming system in<br />
Kakamega district is the influence of relief on agricultural activities. In the highland areas<br />
where climate and soils favour a variety of crops, farmers have tended to move away from the<br />
forest margins, a trend which wittingly or unwittingly protects the forest belt. In hilly areas<br />
such as the Nandi and Kaimosi villages, the topography is composed of hilly anticlines which<br />
attract extensive cultivation of maize and millet. The grass lands on the hill also attract some<br />
grazing for the animals.<br />
144
Gender, cropping systems and labour practices in Kakamega<br />
Land is a very important resource in Kakamega and among the Luhya in particular. It is<br />
needless to mention that, it is the most critical resource for the production of both the food<br />
and cash crops on which the Luhya rural economy depends. Understanding gender cropping<br />
systems and labour practices in Kakamega, requires us to unravel the critical institutional<br />
factors and practices underlying relations of production between men and women.<br />
Therefore, to understand the dynamics and linkages between cropping systems and farming<br />
practices as well as the micro institutions governing cropping systems and land, it is important<br />
to investigate peoples’ (both women and men) security as well as their insecurity in perceived<br />
land tenure. But as Leach argues, arrangements for land tenure and access always implicate<br />
gender relations. 629 As a preliminary step, the study inquired why particular crops and plant<br />
species were restricted to a particular gender. It was found out that this relationship lay in the<br />
institutional practices upheld among the Luhya.<br />
In the typical Luhya setting, men and boys for that matter are pre-occupied with the growing<br />
of the specific crops. These crops include bananas and restricted tree plants such as Lusiola<br />
and Museno. Among the Luhya, it is believed that the women are not pure enough in the<br />
cultural sense and therefore cannot be associated with the growing of trees and plants such<br />
bananas. It is also perceived that the growing of tree crops such as Lusiyola and Museno by<br />
women is a taboo. Lusiyola is a tree associated with good luck and this good luck is only<br />
believed to be associated with men. A woman growing such a tree amounts to bringing bad<br />
luck at home and community as a whole.<br />
Museno, on the other hand are tree species that are associated with reconstruction and<br />
regeneration of life. Men are seen to posses the power to this regeneration. Women are on the<br />
other hand are associated with the powers to curse. Other accounts informed the research that<br />
women may also become barren when they plant trees and other restricted crops. Another<br />
account from one of the respondents informed this study that: in the Luhya tradition,<br />
especially among the Maragoli and Tachoni, women are barred from planting trees because as<br />
a woman, “when you plant a tree when your husband is alive, then you want him to die.” 630<br />
These deeply rooted Luhya institutions that restrict women from planting trees and other<br />
restricted plants continue to hold sway especially in the absence of a husband or the elder sons<br />
in the home. While men's roles and responsibilities have eroded in other labour enterprises,<br />
men continue to retain control over the activity of planting trees and different plants species,<br />
in all circumstances. Men's control over this activity represents their power and authority over<br />
biodiversity resources and confirms their control over other material and symbolic<br />
demarcation of physical space.<br />
More still we note that both the decision-making and the actual labour in planting trees<br />
reinforce men's roles as heads of household and are symbolic of men's power. Women who<br />
629 Leach, M. 1991. Gender, Land, and Livelihood in East Africa. Nairobi:IDRC Publications.<br />
630 Focus Group Discussion. 25 July 2006.<br />
145
are heads of household cannot simply hire men to plant trees and other plant species, but must<br />
call upon male relatives or sons to do so. It is therefore important to understand these<br />
gendered rights and nested obligations around the control of trees and related plants when<br />
formulating biodiversity conservation policies in order to reflect these traditionally<br />
institutionalised gendered dimensions in the biodiversity conservation. It was also interesting<br />
to learn that the location of a tree to be planted on the household farm has always been a focus<br />
of struggle between husbands and wives, and this may partially explain the reasons as to why<br />
the colonial forestry programme that characterised the 1940s, consequently collapsed. 631<br />
We have earlier mentioned that, the Luhya cultural institutions bar women from the growing<br />
of particular crop and plant species. This kind of institutional arrangement is also extended to<br />
food crops such as bananas. Women are perceived to have bad luck and as a result, their<br />
participation in the growing of such crop would lead to inviting bad omens which could even<br />
lead to hunger, drought and sometimes community unrest. Women are however advised to<br />
take good care of the crops they find in the homestead and the forest as well. They are also<br />
barred from collecting certain plant species from the forest. A newly wed wife is taught about<br />
these Luhya traditions and is advised to follow them religiously. She is also supposed to pass<br />
on the same information to her daughter and other female members of the household under<br />
her care.<br />
The above practices are also extended to crops and plants in the forest. The study also found<br />
out that in the olden times only men were supposed to collect firewood from the forest since<br />
they could identify specific plant species that were supposed to be used and those that were<br />
not supposed to be used for cooking. The key respondent in this case who happened to be a<br />
tribal head informed the researcher that in a way, this preserved most of the plant species in<br />
the forest. Non members (those who did not belong to the Luhya sub-tribes) were barred from<br />
entering the forest for fear of wanton harvesting of the forest species, meaning that there was<br />
restricted access to the forest as a common resource regime.<br />
In light of the above, it is justifiable to make mention of the fact that a closer look at the part<br />
of the forest where these strict institutions still hold strongest, for instance in Shipalo,<br />
Bukhonyi and Mukshakawe areas, the forest cover is still firm and far more intact and<br />
flourishing compared to shinyalu, Mulinami Shitsuilio and Kapsukuru, where there is relative<br />
flexibility as far as the local institutions regarding access are concerned. This observation was<br />
interpreted to mean that strict local institutions regarding access to common resource regimes<br />
were a pre-requisite to the health forest biodiversity since they culturally regulated the access<br />
to the forest resources and were neither viewed as barriers in anyway.<br />
When cash crops were introduced in the colonial times, there was the introduction of division<br />
of labour in the types of crops grown by men and women. It was however important to find<br />
out that cropping and labour roles changed. Given that land is a critical resource for sustaining<br />
631 MaCGregor, J.J. 1950. Colony and Protectorate of Kenya. An Economic Survey of Forestry in Kenya and<br />
Recommendation Regarding the Forestry Commission. Nairobi: English Press.<br />
146
ural livelihoods, it became the focus of intense struggles between and among women and<br />
men. But we must also note that struggles over land are experienced differently by women<br />
and men, depending upon the complex interactions of gender, class, age, marital status, and<br />
life-cycle positioning.<br />
Men negotiate, access, and maintain control over land as a productive and material resource<br />
and inequitably achieve this within local institutional setting. In the study it was established<br />
that 96.35% agreed that men were the greatest owners of cash crops as opposed to 3.65% of<br />
women who were the controllers of cash crop production. Respondents were asked what<br />
framed the division of labour among the Luhya. It was established that: because men owned<br />
the land as an important symbolic resource, cash crops were a preserve of the men who also<br />
doubled as the managers of the means of production as well as the financial resources in the<br />
home. This fact was also cross checked in a focus group interview held among the tribal heads<br />
of Tirirki sub-tribe. They defended this based on the fact that the land among the Luhya is<br />
customary land and therefore all the work done on the land belongs to the men who controlled<br />
that same piece of land. A focus on women's and men's struggles over land must also consider<br />
the symbolic and discursive contestations that constitute those struggles as postulated by<br />
Meinzen et al., 632 and Beneria. 633<br />
It is further imperative to observe that as a symbolic resource, land holds important meanings<br />
within Luhya cultural discourse, defining gender relations and women's and men's rights to<br />
access and use. These multiple meanings are constantly being contested and transformed<br />
within a situation of legal plurality in Kenya. These, in addition to the dual importance of land<br />
as both a material and an institutional symbolic resource, illustrate the diverse ways in which<br />
women and men struggle over long-term access to and security of land, as rights to land are<br />
gendered.<br />
Among Maragoli, Kisa, Idhoha and Wanyore, there is a critical connection between key<br />
gendered aspects of security in tenure and sustainable soil management and farming.<br />
Although women carry out the day-to-day work and decision-making in farming and soil<br />
management, the planting of trees, cash crops and other restricted crops is a symbolic gesture<br />
of power invoked by men within these societies.<br />
632<br />
Meinzen, R.D, et al. 1997. Gender, Property Rights and Natural Resources. Washington D.C: IFPRI<br />
Publication.<br />
633<br />
Beneria, L. 1992. Accounting for women’s work: The progress of Two Decades. World Development 20<br />
(11):1547-1560.<br />
147
Cherished plants and condemned plants<br />
It is now an open secret that local institutions play a leading role in the protection of local<br />
biodiversity in Kakamega depending on which particular plant species one is pointing to. This<br />
study therefore asked the respondents whether there were plant species that were construed to<br />
be cherished and others that were condemned.<br />
Among the Luhya specific crops are categorized according to how they are perceived. There<br />
are crops or plants that are perceived to be cherished. These sometimes derive their privileged<br />
position from the role they are seen to play in the Luhya traditions. These cherished plants are<br />
seen to be useful because they are used during the spiritual ceremonies, cleansing of the<br />
demonized, circumcision ceremonies, healing of the sick among others. Plant species that<br />
follow in this category included; Apaki, Munyama, Luhabari, Liponi, Bugala, Bukomasi,<br />
Busagala, Busema, and Simbwe. Other plant species are cherished for other nested reasons,<br />
such as: house construction, guarantee of protection, bringing peace, used during the<br />
ceremonies such as the installation of a Tribal head, birth of twins, birth of a first born. Such<br />
plants include: Murembe, lusiola, musufu, mtukunyu, shingulosho, madala, Vusagu,<br />
simbalagay, visamia, shinyuaza, udaro, misine and shingututsi. When asked what the<br />
community of Luhya does to such plants that are perceived as cherished. The following table<br />
illustrates the varied perceptions regarding the protection of cherished plants in Kakamega<br />
forest environment.<br />
Table 6.7 Responses regarding protection of cherished plants in Kakamega<br />
Value response Frequency Percentage<br />
Don’t Know 0 0<br />
Planted in community gardens 73 33.33<br />
Planted in home gardens 52 22.74<br />
Construct homes near such plants 77 35.16<br />
Planted in the forest 7 3.20<br />
Teach children about such plants 10 5.57<br />
Total 220 100<br />
Source: Field Survey data.<br />
In the above table we realize that an array of ways as to how cherished plants are treated is<br />
presented. 33.33% agreed that they do plant such species and protect them when they find<br />
them.22.74% informed the researcher that they construct homes near these plants. It is<br />
perceived that these trees or plant species provided residence for the Luhya gods and spirits.<br />
Therefore constructing homes near such plant species amounted to living near the gods.<br />
35.16% informed the researcher that plants perceived to be of good luck are also planted in<br />
the garden since they too are associated with good or bumper harvests and good soil<br />
management, thereby enabling continuous soil fertility in the gardens. 3.20 % of these<br />
148
espondent said that they planted such species in great numbers so that they could regenerate<br />
in abundance so that they could abundantly found by any person in need of such plants.<br />
Another 5.57% informed this study that they teach their children about such plant and through<br />
such teaching; the children can learn to preserve such plant and even protect them as they<br />
grow up.<br />
On the contrary, there were rather very negative responses regarding individual perceptions of<br />
what the people do to the plants that are perceived to be of bad luck. These are treated<br />
differently! They are condemned plants. It was found out that unlike plant species perceived<br />
to be of good luck, condemned plants, trees or crops have to face the choice of extinction<br />
through the various methods. It was observed that such plants are avoided or destroyed. In<br />
obtaining the varied perceptions regarding such plants the respondents were asked a leading<br />
question; what do you do to plants that are perceived to be of bad luck? The following table<br />
summarizes the various responses regarding community treatment of condemned plants.<br />
Table 6.8 Individual responses regarding treatment of condemned plants.<br />
Response Frequency Percentage<br />
Burn them down 138 62.7<br />
Cut them down 52 23.6<br />
Leave the land with such plants 22 10<br />
Avoid such plants 8 0.36<br />
Total 220 100<br />
Source: Field Survey data.<br />
From the above table, 62.7% of the respondents answered that such condemned plants were<br />
burnt down. While 23.6% agreed that such plants were usually cut down when found to grow<br />
especially around the homesteads. Only 10% informed the study that they would vacate the<br />
land where they found that such plant species had existed. It is however important to note that<br />
the institutional beliefs surrounding condemned plants are; such plants were habitats for the<br />
bad spirits and bad omens. The omens contained in such plants were suspected to move closer<br />
to those who lived or used them. Such plants are never used in the day-to-day lives of the<br />
Luhya sub-tribes. They are only brought into light during performance of rituals such as<br />
cursing those who have proved to be a disgrace to the community. What was however<br />
interesting to find out that this practice of destroying condemned plants was only done in<br />
areas around the homesteads. The implication derived here is that condemned plants found in<br />
the forest remain unaffected and avoided. This gives the forest ecosystem a chance to flourish<br />
as they are practically avoided.<br />
149
When a matrix of cherished crops and condemned plant species, was drawn, it was found out<br />
that there are more cherished crops than condemned plants. As a result there was more<br />
protection given to the cherished plants than the destruction to condemned plants. But it was<br />
also astonishing to learn that while there were efforts to plant and regenerate cherished plants,<br />
this was done on the farm fields and not specifically in the forest. But even then, this practice<br />
was found to be very complementary to the forest biodiversity, given the fact that community<br />
users of such plants can often get them from their own farm fields, than harvesting them from<br />
the forest on a regular basis. This gives a chance to the forest vegetation to regenerate. It was<br />
also found out that the act of growing the cherished plants was motivated by an informal<br />
institutional belief that such plants need to be protected and planted. 634 In a large measure,<br />
this works to protect the forest biodiversity.<br />
6.7 Local Knowledge and biological conservation: The Interface<br />
Local institutional mapping would be incomplete without discussing the place and role of<br />
local knowledge in the understanding of local biodiversity perceptions in Kakamega. It is<br />
needless to mention that local knowledge derives much of its strength from the presence and<br />
continuity of local institutions such as customary law.<br />
Customary law can be understood as an established system of rules that evolved from the way<br />
of life and natural wants of the people. It is also seen in the local norms where the general<br />
context of which is a matter of common knowledge, retained in the memories of the chief and<br />
the chief’s councillors, their sons’ sons until forgotten, or until they became part of the<br />
immemorial rules. 635<br />
Therefore like customary law, local knowledge is knowledge held by a specifically defined<br />
community, following a strict code of procedure and conduct in the management and transfer<br />
of such knowledge, which provides the foundation on which customary law is built; the<br />
philosophy that informs life in local communities. 636<br />
When investigating the interface between local knowledge and biological knowledge in<br />
Kakamega, we need to appreciate that the two are intimately fused into each other. For<br />
instance, during the study it was found out that 76% of the respondents linked their current<br />
protection of local herbs commonly linked to the local knowledge they had come across either<br />
through their parents or through their clan meetings. This same scenario was also encountered<br />
when it came to investigating the role of peoples’ perceptions towards the protection of<br />
animals or different tree species. 85% of respondents informed the study that, they did protect<br />
specific plant species because culturally they are forbidden from using and cutting down such<br />
tree/plant species.<br />
634 Cotran, E. 1988. Case Book on customary Law in Kenya. Nairobi:University of Nairobi Press.<br />
635 Agarawal, A. 1995. Dismantling the Divide between Scientific and Indigenous Knowledge. Development and<br />
Change 26 (3):413-439.<br />
636 Ibid<br />
150
Like we have earlier noted, most of the respondents referred to their local knowledge as the<br />
reason as to why they had come to learn about the protection of the local trees and animal<br />
species. In one of the focus group discussions, the discussants pointed out that cutting a<br />
certain tree species that house some of their ancestral gods had led to drought and poor yields<br />
in their community. 637 Some of the discussants referred to the cutting down of particular tree<br />
species as invoking curses and undue suffering for the same offence. In all, it was established<br />
that all these local perceptions helped to build up a strong base for local knowledge and<br />
ultimately strengthened by customary law. This in the process has shaped future biological<br />
conservation, especially in areas where there is little formal/biological education. The strict<br />
customary law which forbids the non-members from reaching some of the sacred places had<br />
helped to keep large tracts of the forest biodiversity under community guardianship, courtesy<br />
of customary law especially among the Maragori, Tiriki and the Marama.<br />
The Transfer of local and biological Knowledge<br />
In the study, it was imperative to find out how local knowledge that is known to be the<br />
cornerstone of understanding local biodiversity perceptions is transferred. It was also<br />
important to establish how such knowledge is managed for the conservation of forest<br />
biodiversity in Kakamega. To attain this, respondents were for instance asked who they<br />
considered to be the custodians of local biodiversity knowledge in the area. In response to<br />
this, the study found out that village chiefs, traditional priests, Village elders, parents and<br />
Tribal chiefs were the key custodians of local knowledge. However, before we delve into<br />
further details we must observe that there is a thin relationship between the structure of<br />
traditional authority and the custodianship of local knowledge. It was also established that the<br />
local Luhya institutions were also central in the transfer of local knowledge be it related to<br />
biodiversity or otherwise. More to that, age was found to be an important aspect in the control<br />
of local knowledge. Old people such as village elders were considered to be the local<br />
encyclopaedias for the society concerning its local institutional norms, belief and values.<br />
Lastly, within the Luhya institutional setting regarding the transfer of local knowledge,<br />
parents were regarded as central since they were the first point of contact when a new<br />
generation of children was born. Similarly, we found out that 28.31% respondents regarded<br />
the village chief, commonly known as the ligulu as the custodian of local knowledge.<br />
In the following table we see who the custodians of local knowledge are.<br />
637 Focus Group Discussion: 22 July 2006<br />
151
Table 6.9 Custodians of local knowledge<br />
Value response Frequency Percentage<br />
Don’t Know 0 0.0<br />
Village chief 62 28.31<br />
Traditional priest 14 6.39<br />
Village elders 31 13.70<br />
Parents 40 18.26<br />
Tribal chief 73 33.33<br />
Total 220 100<br />
Source: Field Survey data.<br />
It is equally important to mention that, as far as management of the local biodiversity is<br />
concerned, 6.39% the respondents agreed that traditional priests were also custodians of the<br />
local biodiversity knowledge. The respondents mentioned that the traditional priests are<br />
regarded as so, owing from their position in the society. They are perceived to have<br />
supernatural powers that enabled them to have extra-ordinary wisdom. They are also known<br />
to be intercessors and therefore often visit the sacred places in the forest. They are in constant<br />
touch with the forest spirits and this makes members in the local community believe that<br />
traditional priests have a deep understanding of the local forest biodiversity. On the contrary,<br />
33.33% of the respondents showed that village elders were the custodians of local knowledge.<br />
These owed their recognition from the fact that they have lived for long and have a clear grasp<br />
of the local institutions.<br />
Further more, village elders are known to be in charge of enforcing the local customary law,<br />
so they are construed to be the real custodians of the local law and knowledge as well.<br />
28.31% of the respondents highlighted the Tribal chiefs as the custodians of local knowledge.<br />
These, the respondents said are the leaders in the respective sub-tribes and as a result are seen<br />
to be torch-bearers as far as traditional knowledge was concerned. In the process they are<br />
consulted on almost all the major issues that relate to the sub-tribes and are presumed to have<br />
provided answers on almost all including the local biodiversity issues.<br />
Lastly, 18.26% of the respondents agreed that parents and relatives were also important<br />
custodians of local knowledge. This is largely found within the Luhya tradition that maintains<br />
that parents especially the grandparents are the holders of the local wisdom. This arises from<br />
the fact that wisdom manifests its self in age and therefore aged grandparents are hosts of this<br />
much desired/cherished wisdom. Likewise, they are consulted on the relevance of different<br />
local biotic and non-biotic issues, and they readily provide the answer Grandparents are also<br />
behind the major ceremony of naming the newly born children. We have already mentioned,<br />
many of these names have a connotation with the biological species especially animals. The<br />
aged grandparents are also the major teachers in the informal education system that is largely<br />
based on the oral tradition method of instruction that has existed since the old times up to<br />
today.<br />
152
When asked how such people (Custodians of local knowledge) are perceived, there were a<br />
myriad of responses regarding the same, as reflected in the following table.<br />
Table 6.10 Respondents perceptions of custodians of knowledge.<br />
Value response Frequency Percentage<br />
Don’t Know 0 0.0<br />
Protectors of Cultural norms 68 31.05<br />
Sources of Wisdom 20 9.13<br />
Spiritual leaders 19 8.68<br />
Extensions of Culture 72 32.88<br />
Guardians of Society 40 18.26<br />
Total 220 100<br />
Source: Field Survey data.<br />
In the above table, 31.05% of the responses informed the study that they perceived the<br />
custodian of local knowledge as protectors of the local and cultural norms. For this reason,<br />
they specifically referred to the village elders, whom they described as the people in total<br />
control of what “was” and what “should be”. They are consulted on all issues relating to the<br />
local biodiversity and therefore their wisdom is given in lieu of keeping the cultural norms<br />
regarding such biodiversity intact. In another focus group discussion with some of the tribal<br />
elders, it was agreed that their information is taken seriously but hastened to add that; some of<br />
it is disregarded. But they emphasised that their advice is given with an aim of protecting the<br />
cultural norms.<br />
We also found out that 32.88% of the respondents perceived custodians of local knowledge as<br />
sources of wisdom. This is especially in respect to the aged. It is believed that the most<br />
spiritual and magical powers are obtained and retained by the aged. This belief lies in the old<br />
people’s monopoly of magical power and is further reinforced by the Luhya adage that the<br />
most powerful source of wisdom is age. 9.13% agreed that the custodian of knowledge are<br />
also are also seen as spiritual leaders. This is especially in regard to the traditional priests.<br />
These are perceived to be seats for the ancestral spirits, Baguga, and therefore they are<br />
perceived to be close to the Luhya gods. This means that they are able to obtain the goodwill<br />
of the ancestral spirits Misambwa-mu-mi-sambwa, an enhancement of their ability to guide<br />
the people in almost all aspects of the cultural and spiritual nomenclatures which of course<br />
have a lot to do with the local biodiversity in and around the forest.<br />
Finally, with regard to the local, the Luhya traditional religious beliefs, they are in harmony<br />
with the prevailing Bantu idea that the deceased have a continuing influence over the fortunes<br />
of the living. This is a crucial aspect of the relationship between the people the traditional<br />
priest. 18.26% agreed that holders of local knowledge are perceived as guardians of society.<br />
This is construed to mean that, in a way a society can only be held together by those who have<br />
a rich grasp of what the local knowledge systems are. Similarly local biodiversity knowledge<br />
can only thrive on an enriched system of local knowledge especially in areas where local<br />
153
institutions are well rooted. It is needless to recount that the local knowledge system informs<br />
and guides in the local decision-making process of the local resource development and usage.<br />
In view of this, the custodians of the local knowledge are the guardians of society. Lastly<br />
8.68% respondents informed the researcher that the custodians of local knowledge are also<br />
perceived as extensioners of culture.<br />
154
7 Historical and Sociological Institutions in Kakamega district<br />
7.1 Institutionalism and customary law<br />
Anthropology has been branded to be slow in responding to the institutional and<br />
environmental expectations, as well as taking up issues relating to environmental and more so<br />
biodiversity. A number of reasons have been advanced in this direction. One reason for this<br />
hesitancy are the many changes that are introduced in the name of environmental institutions<br />
that are insensitive to local institutions such as customary law. 638<br />
The results in the previous chapter revealed that local institutions are central in the transfer of<br />
local knowledge. We also found out that there is a relationship between the structure of<br />
traditional authority and the custodianship of local biodiversity knowledge. We also found out<br />
that customary law supports the building blocks for this interface. In this chapter, we outline<br />
the interrelationships between institutionalism and customary law, which is sometimes<br />
referred to as legal anthropology. Proponents of legal anthropology typically admire the use<br />
of customs because they arise spontaneously, outside the state. 639<br />
The informality of social norms obscures their operation and causes observers to underestimate<br />
their importance relative to formal law. Informal law plays an important role in basic<br />
community resource usage where state enforcement of formal rules and contracts fails as is<br />
the case in many developing countries. 640<br />
Demsetz noted that over zealous regulation forces informal law to operate in opposition to<br />
formal law, which impairs resources development. 641 In recent years, institutions relating to<br />
environmental management have corrected the tradition of underestimating informal norms.<br />
Anthropology which forms the foundation for the analysis of customary law and social norms<br />
has become central to the law and environmental agenda, especially after Ellickson’s research<br />
on liability for straying cattle framed legal decentralization in terms of the Coase Theorem. 642<br />
In this study we found out that the institutional analysis of social norms, such as the<br />
customary law are central in redirecting resource usage redistribution. This observation is<br />
grounded in the utilitarianism of resource user groups and sub-tribes among the Luhya<br />
communities. Through the use of customary law, it was found out that there is a tendency to<br />
create efficient rules for cooperation within resource communities groups. Customary law<br />
which is partly a result of Kinship provides a framework for repeated interaction among the<br />
same people. Consequently, such kinship groups like sub-tribes can solve problems of internal<br />
638<br />
Kay, M. 1996. Environmentalism and Cultural Theory. Expoloring the role of Anthropology in<br />
Environmental Discourse. London: Routledge.<br />
639<br />
Leoni, B. 1991. Freedom and the Law. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.<br />
640<br />
Winn, J. K. 1994. Informal Financial Practices of Small Businesses in Taiwan. Law and Society Review 28<br />
(2):193-241.<br />
641<br />
Demsetz, H. 1967. Toward a Theory of Property Rights. American Economic Review<br />
642<br />
Ellickson, R. C. 1991. Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes. Harvard: Havard Univerty Press.<br />
155
cooperation without relying upon state law. Posner’s study on group regulations and<br />
collective action affords a glowing example. 643<br />
Historical institutionalists involved in studying common resource regimes note that customary<br />
law is both an essential part of everyday living and a backup system used in maintaining<br />
common pool resources. Rule use must correspond to what the system can tolerate. Successful<br />
resource user groups appear to prefer environmentally conservative use. McAdams further<br />
demonstrated this fact in careful and detailed studies of social groups, in which people have<br />
repeated transactions with each other. Such social groups included those involved in direct<br />
usage of grassland and forest related resources. 644<br />
Accordingly, customary law ideally corrects failures in the “market for social norms,” rather<br />
like regulations should ideally correct failures in the market for commodities. 645 This analysis<br />
upholds that incentive structures in society which cause the evolution of efficient social norms<br />
and, conversely, these incentive structures which are rooted in customary law, cause social<br />
norms to succeed. The principles of social anthropology elucidate that, one prerequisite for<br />
the success of customary law is the possibility that humans have the capacity to engage in the<br />
intentional activity of making rules concerning the appropriateness of human conduct using<br />
customary beliefs of what is right or wrong. 646<br />
Posner’s arguments illustrate that the interpersonal approach recognizes humans as rational<br />
and responsible individuals, facing the task of developing structures to serve human ends. One<br />
way of doing this, is for humans to act both rationally and communally to create valid rules of<br />
customary law that regulate the conduct of both themselves and others. This interpersonal<br />
perspective makes room for customary law as a separate and distinct procedure alongside<br />
formal legislation for the making of valid legal rules.<br />
The linkages between the Luhya people and nature are as old as the Luhya themselves. The<br />
Luhya prospered by husbanding natural resources in an attempt to adapt to the local natural<br />
environment. In the process, a wide ranging body of knowledge, innovations and practices<br />
evolved, inextricably linked to the use of natural resources. This has enabled most of these<br />
communities to live within the limits of their local environment and contributed to shaping<br />
their customary law as well as their spiritual identity. In order to understand how the Luhya<br />
conserve nature and ecosystems, we must take into consideration the interface between the<br />
Luhya, nature and culture, to which we now turn our attention.<br />
643 Posner, E. A. 1995. The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Non-Legal Sanctions on<br />
Collective Action. Paper read at ALEA, at Berkeley.<br />
644 McAdams, R. H. 1995. Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Production and Race<br />
Discrimination. Harvard Law Review.108:1003-1084.<br />
645 Kuppe, R and R. Potz, eds. 1994. Law and Anthropology: International Year Book for Legal<br />
Anthropology. Dordrecht/Boston/London: Martinus Njihof Publishers.<br />
646 Posner, E. A. 1996. Law, Economics and Inefficinet Norms. Paper read at ALEA, Chicago.<br />
156
Biodiversity and customary law in Kakamega District<br />
In previous chapters and more precisely chapter two, we have already mentioned that<br />
institutions are the foundations of politics and economics life as well as social order. These<br />
consist of both formal and informal enforcement mechanisms and systems of attaching and<br />
interpreting meaning to specific life contexts. In this regard institutions also define the context<br />
647<br />
in which individuals and other organizations live, operate and interact with each other.<br />
In the foregoing treatment we understand institutions as settlements born from struggles and<br />
bargains, reflecting the distribution of resources and power in the society. Once created,<br />
institutions determine how people make sense of their world and act in it. It also relates to<br />
how they channel and regulate conflict, hence ensuring stability in the society. At the<br />
foundation of all this stability is customary law. This is the basis of both formal and informal<br />
institutional arrangements in both industrial and agrarian communities. Further more, in our<br />
discussion of customary law in Kakamega, we shall limit ourselves to the institutional<br />
arrangements in terms of customs and nomenclatures relating to the usage of biological<br />
resources.<br />
In the study, it was found out that the Luhya still have a strong adherence to laws relating to<br />
the universe (cosmology), laws/customs relating to rain-making and the powers of the<br />
rainmaker Omugimba. The institution of a rain-maker has an important position in the Luhya<br />
traditional authority structure. He is referred to as a giver of life through rain-making. He is<br />
well guarded from individuals perceived to be harmful to the Luhya sub-tribes and therefore,<br />
only approached through his representatives. Rain is construed to preserve life because it<br />
facilitates both plant and animal life. It also goes without saying that rain is also seen to be the<br />
fulcrum for the Luhya agrarian economy and therefore, the preserver of economic life in this<br />
context.<br />
In the same respect, the institution of the omugimba is a strong institution guarded by Luhya<br />
customary law. We need not to recapitulate the role of precipitation on the development and<br />
sustainability of ecological life and ecological functioning. Metrological observations show<br />
that rainfall is not only abundant, but also regular in Kakamega particularly, in the Luhya<br />
occupied locations. However, there are several rituals and taboos relating to rain-making and<br />
rainfall reliability. These are performed to avoid a repeat of what happened in 1918, when a<br />
great drought hit the area. As a result, customary law in Kakamega forbids people from<br />
getting involved in actions that may lead to rain failure. Such actions may be related to the<br />
destruction of different plant and animal life. It may also result from using plant or animals in<br />
a state of impurity.<br />
As we earlier noted, customary law is extended to the perseverance and respect of different<br />
plants and animal species given their significance in the Luhya communities. For this reason<br />
there are laws relating to plants and animals in a state of impurity. The law here is an<br />
647<br />
Giovani, D, R. Nelson and G. Winter. 2000. Nature and the dynamics of Organisation. Oxford: Oxford<br />
University Press.<br />
157
observation of a number of closely related notions and beliefs regarding a host of plants and<br />
animals in and around the Kakamega Forest environment. The latent meaning and<br />
implications of the law is to avoid such plants and animals.<br />
Customary law is further extended to the places around rivers especially River Nzoia and<br />
River Yala. Places near and around the river are supposed to be cleansing places for particular<br />
cases. They are also associated with the spiritual rituals concerning the death of a senior<br />
Luhya chief. For instance, the Ishuka and the Idaho have very close relationship with River<br />
Yala because it is believed that their descendants the Mwisuha and Mwidaho respectively,<br />
descended and still live there One respondent informed the researcher that; “there is sanctity<br />
and must be observed around such a river. Everything here must be respected.” 648 The same<br />
customary law is invoked by other sub-tribes regarding other small and big rivers and streams<br />
crossing Kakamega Forest.<br />
Lastly, there are strict laws relating to access to the forest. Non-members (those that don’t<br />
belong to the Luhya sub-tribes) are barred from reaching the forest. The local law forbids<br />
such people from entering the forest since they are construed to be destroyers of the forest and<br />
contaminators of certain forest species. To a great extent, customary law bars women from<br />
reaching some parts of the forest. In this regard, most of the laws work to prevent adverse<br />
effect on the ecological diversity of the forest. Generally speaking, there are similar<br />
interpretations of customary law among the Luhya sub-tribes, what happens in one Luhya<br />
sub-tribes, happens in another and almost for the same purpose/reasons. However, other<br />
accounts from focus group discussions with the community elders among the Maragori,<br />
Banyole and Bukusu informed the study that; over the years, local/customary law has been<br />
changing and declining, a phenomenon that is usually referred to as institutional change.<br />
In the realm of historical and sociological institutionalism, it is argued that institutions change<br />
differently, following different time series. The changes are sometimes radical, sometimes<br />
gradual and sometimes evolve more incrementally. But it is also better to understand how<br />
different types of institutions change and understand some of the forces that determine<br />
institutional change. 649 In the case of Kakamega and the Luhya for that matter, it is still<br />
troubling to understand what explains this institutional change. But in some instances, there<br />
are clear accounts that do point to the role of extensive missionary work in this area which<br />
could be used as a prelude to explain this institutional change. Sangere who investigated the<br />
significance of both the mission and break away Christian church groups among the Tiriki<br />
sub-tribe postulated that: the Tiriki and other sub-tribes of the area have been heavily<br />
missionized by a variety of protestant sects. He goes on to illustrate that not only have the<br />
missions been very busy evangelizing, but also ever since 1902, they have provided the<br />
648<br />
Field respondent No: 12, 24 –July- 2006.<br />
649<br />
Thelen, K and S. Steinmo. 1992. Historical institutionalism in comparative politics. Annual Review of<br />
Sociology. 25:597:622.<br />
158
education and a majority of social services in some of these areas, a fact which has seen rapid<br />
economic, political and social transformation. 650<br />
This same revelation is well collaborated by Günter Wagner who researched about the social<br />
institutions of the Bantu of Northern Kavirondo. The Author made several trips to northern<br />
Nyanza between 1938 and 1942 (by then this area was known as Kavirondo). He amassed a<br />
great deal of data on the twenty two tribes of the current Western Province. Much of Günter’s<br />
data dealt at length with the Maragori, Kisa, Bukusu and Tiriki sub-tribes. He noted that the<br />
flexibility in the social institutions in terms of organization, rule enforcement, place and value<br />
of power at the time, were a manifestation of social and political change, a revelation he said<br />
was a product of extensive British administration and innovations. 651<br />
Sources of customary law in Kakamega District<br />
The ability of individuals and communities to preserve natural resource elements within their<br />
environs stems from historical and sociological institutionalism. The proponents of these<br />
institutionalisms, be it formal or informal, argue that it is the rules and procedures that<br />
structure the conduct of the communities and individuals as well as their relationship with the<br />
diverse resource species in any given resource environment. However, organizational<br />
institutionalists recognize that informal rules such as customary law which we take for<br />
granted, are the major framework scripts that form the cognitive struts for the formal rules. 652<br />
But all this said, one question remains important; what are the sources of this influential<br />
customary law in Kakamega? This question will be answered in the light of the Luhya people<br />
living around Kakamega Forest. During the study, it was widely ascertained that customary<br />
law in Kakamega dates as far back as the history of the Abaluhya people. This customary law<br />
has its roots in the many achievements and the many tribulations that the tribes encountered,<br />
right from their cradle land to the arrival in their present day homeland. Like many other<br />
Bantu East African tribes, the Luhya are greatly attached to the far past or remote past kahale<br />
and present future imbeli.<br />
Historical occurrences have a great impact on the lives of the Abaluhya and such happenings<br />
have a way they shape (d) and structure (d) the local or customary law that is followed by the<br />
Luhya sub-tribes. It is by looking at the distant past that the people and more precisely the<br />
council of elders interprets, or finds an explanation for the present occurrences. The<br />
explanation from these occurrences constitutes an abstraction of myths and prohibitions that<br />
later turn into emergence of knowledge, beliefs, customs and eventual customary law. 653<br />
These historical landmarks are transformed, compacted and scaled down into traditions that<br />
are handed down from one generation to another.<br />
650 Sangaree, W. 1966. Age, Prayer and Politics in Tiriki, Kenya. London: Oxford University Press.<br />
651 Wagner, G. 1949. The Bantu of North Kavirondo. London: Oxford University Press.<br />
652 March, J.G and J.P, Olson. 1984. The New Institutionalism: Organisational Factors for Political Life.<br />
American Political Science Review 78(3):734-749.<br />
653 Vanisina, J. 1985. Oral Tradition as a History. Nairobi: Heinemann.<br />
159
Customary law relating to use of biological resources has a great relationship with the<br />
occurrence of specific events. For instance, the appearance of locusts, the delay of rains, the<br />
death of specific animals, the outbreak and spread of epidemics and above all death of<br />
people. These particular happenings are in most cases related to the destruction of certain<br />
biotic species. For example, the killing of a given animal species or the cutting down of a<br />
specific tree species which are related to the Luhya traditions. In an interview with an elderly<br />
respondent, he recounted that: “In 1968, the killing of a cobra by a group of unknown people<br />
led to a host of problems including unrelenting deaths in the community, a trend that took up<br />
to a whole year”. 654<br />
The concept of the “living dead” is a strong institution that has structured customary law in<br />
Kakamega and specifically among the Luhya sub-tribes. There is a way biological life is<br />
linked to the Luhya way of living and other institutional interchanges. There is a cycle of<br />
seasons, occurrences and activities within the Luhya communities such as sowing, cultivating,<br />
harvesting and hunting among others. Such key events are often marked by religious rites and<br />
ceremonies. The unusual events which don’t rhyme within this rhythm of events, for<br />
instance, the occurrence of locusts, the delay of rains, the death of specific animals and<br />
rampant spread of epidemics, are interpreted to be bad omens requiring special attention from<br />
the community, spearheaded by the council of elders. The observation to make here is that;<br />
although unscientific explanations are used to account for the occurrence of such events, there<br />
is usually an informal biological linkage annexed to such explanations.<br />
In a way, some of the informal biological explanations are sysnonymous with some of the<br />
scientific explanations to such “bad occurrences”. It is this linkage that forms an interface<br />
between the local knowledge and the local biodiversity conservation interventions. Though<br />
perceived differently, and not explained scientifically, the customary law among the Luhya<br />
has a great deal of alliance with conventional scientific methods explaining why biological<br />
diversity should be conserved.<br />
The “laws” regarding the preservation of the cosmos and its cosmological interactions are a<br />
clear manifestation of this. This brings us back to the complex issue of historical and<br />
sociological institutional analysis. Institutionalists have been at war, debating whether<br />
institutional analysis involves the recognition of different institutional paradigms sharing<br />
common problems and the need to be resolved. Institutionalists like Campbell argue that, the<br />
best way in which to describe institutional analysis and institutional change is to follow the<br />
evolutionary pattern characterized by gradual accumulation of increased changes over long<br />
periods of time. 655 In this sense, such institutions are characterized by prolonged periods of<br />
either equilibrium or stability or evolution that are interrupted suddenly by a crisis that throws<br />
it into turmoil until a new institutional arrangement is established. Such an institutional<br />
arrangement then remains in equilibrium or evolves slowly for another longer period of time.<br />
654 Key Respondent Interview No: 8. 6 July 2006.<br />
655 Campbell, J.L. 2004. Institutional Change and Globalisation. Princeton: Princeton University Press.<br />
160
Put in the context of Kakamega, it leads us to what we shall call trans-regime ambivalence, a<br />
situation in which two legal regimes regarding the perception and conservation of biodiversity<br />
obtain. We are talking of a people offering two allegiances to both the formal and the informal<br />
institutions regarding the conservation of biodiversity.<br />
There has been gradual institutional change in Kakamega especially with the coming of the<br />
British Administration. Informal institutional regimes are still important in the peoples’ lives<br />
in Kakamega and in this study we found out that this makes people compromised in order to<br />
play these two roles. As a result of this, we are bound to grapple with continuous development<br />
of theories that identify the causes of institutional analysis through change raising such<br />
questions like; what causes radical institutional change in egalitarian communities? What does<br />
it look like and when does it occur? Is it more of revolutionary processes or evolutionary<br />
processes? In short; we continue to wonder about what should be the best patterns of<br />
institutional change – continuous and smooth, following a gradual process where those that<br />
are discontinued paint a different picture consisting of sharp shifts from one institutional<br />
arrangement to another or those that are radical and revolutionary?<br />
Dopfer noted that the best institutional analysis is attained when institutional change is<br />
evolutionary. This is made out of the appreciation that today’s institutions are yesterday’s<br />
because they have inherited their predecessors’ characteristics. 656<br />
As societies change overtime, so does the development of new experiences and practices,<br />
making it difficult to define how much and what kind of change has been accumulated, hence<br />
problems of quantification do set in. According to this school of thought, decision-makers<br />
often suffer from insufficient information regarding the problem at hand, resulting to poor<br />
institutional change analysis.<br />
The above exposition is useful in aiding our appreciation of the Kakamega scenario. This<br />
stems from the deep rooted informal institutional attachments among the Luhya sub-tribes.<br />
These Luyha sub-tribes are too procedural and too conservative, strictly following too many<br />
customs and beliefs. It is therefore appropriate to have a fair grasp of these deep seated norms<br />
and values. Poor methods of evaluation and interpretation may lead to policy ineffectiveness<br />
and related difficulties. This may also help us to explain the constrained implementation of<br />
conservation policies in the 1940s. 657<br />
7.2 Local ecological knowledge and local perception of national biodiversity laws<br />
Local ecological knowledge represents experience acquired over years resulting from direct<br />
human contact with nature and the environment. It also encompasses the perceptions held by a<br />
people in a defined society. This kind of knowledge is usually transmitted through attitudes,<br />
beliefs, principles and conventions of behavior and practice derived from historical<br />
experience. Traditional ecological knowledge refers to the understanding and appreciation of<br />
656<br />
Dopfer, K. 2001. Evolutionary Economics: Framework for Analysis. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.<br />
657<br />
Wagner, G Opcit.<br />
161
plants, animals and their natural history. 658 Local ecological knowledge also involves studying<br />
of peoples’ traditional lifestyles which in a way offers many lessons in the management of<br />
resources, particularly in forestry ecosystems.<br />
Capta observed that ecosystems sustain themselves in a dynamic balance based on cycles and<br />
fluctuations in a non-linear process. 659 Therefore, talking about traditional ecological<br />
knowledge involves the ecological awareness that arises when we combine rational<br />
knowledge with intuitive wisdom. This is characteristic of traditional non-literate culture. In<br />
this sub-section we wish to investigate the role of traditional knowledge in shaping<br />
biodiversity resource management institutions. For instance, what shapes the varied<br />
interpretations of different tree and animal species in and around Kakamega forest? How<br />
relevant is it to compare these interpretations with those given by the national forest<br />
conservatory services?<br />
Local ecological knowledge models followed by the people around Kakamega forest are<br />
buttressed in Luhya old traditions regarding this bio-region. 660 The local ecological<br />
knowledge surrounding the forest has in many ways continues to evolve. Observations and<br />
experiences continue to be accumulated through generations. It was striking to note that local<br />
directories used to document various plants and animals species, contained many more<br />
species that did not appear in some of the recent national forest directories. On the contrary<br />
the people living around these forests argued that these plant and animal species have been<br />
seen for decades.<br />
It is further imperative to note that, the local population is knowledgeable about the species<br />
that are threatened and facing extinction, yet the forest management service is not. While in<br />
practice the local population was more conversant with the informal local ecological<br />
knowledge in these localities, they have a faint grasp of the trend and scientifically related<br />
discussions regarding the natural biota in their region. Similarly, they had no clear<br />
comprehension of the formal legal regimes regarding the national biodiversity laws. This<br />
discrepancy may be useful in exploring the chronic conflict between the local communities<br />
and the forest wardens especially in areas of Shinyalu and Kaimosi among others.<br />
It is therefore logical to ask whether if the local ecological knowledge model used by the<br />
people around the Kakamega forest if well interpreted can be useful in shaping peoples’<br />
knowledge regarding the current formal biodiversity resource management regime used in<br />
Kakamega and other forests. Although this postulation may require further scrutiny, evidence<br />
of strong local ecological knowledge obtained from the Tiriki and Bunyala shows that the<br />
behaviours of the local population towards the forest in these areas is quite different, yet there<br />
is minimal supervision and control especially by the forest wardens. In an opinion interview<br />
658<br />
Gilchrist, G. and M. L,Mallory. 2007. Comparing Expert-based Science with Local Ecological Knowledge:<br />
What are we afraid of? Ecology and Society 12(1):r1.<br />
659<br />
Capta, G. 1995. Ecology, Diversity and Diversity of the Middle Grande Basin. A Report of the United States<br />
Department of Agriculture.<br />
660<br />
Jungerius, P.D. 2004. Indeginous Knowledge of Landscape: Ecological Zones Among Traditional Herbalists.<br />
A case Study in Keiyo District , Kenya Geo Journal 44 (1):55-60<br />
162
with one of the Tirirki elders, the study learnt that due to the strict local ecological knowledge<br />
programme in the area, the behaviour of the local people in these localities is different. 661<br />
Parallel to the above, throughout the entire period of fieldwork, one could not fail to observe<br />
the negative perception that the local population had towards both the national laws and the<br />
formal enforcement mechanisms. Up to 78% of the respondents depicted that they had no<br />
knowledge of the national laws regarding access to forestry biodiversity resources, but knew<br />
about the forest wardens. The answer to this was attained by asking local respondents whether<br />
they had particular knowledge of laws that govern access to forestry resources in Kakamega.<br />
It was also evident that there was an open acrimony between the local population and the<br />
forest wardens. Many respondents interviewed by the study expressed a clear grasp of the<br />
penalties that would befall them if the forest wardens got hold of them. It was also interesting<br />
to find out that the majority of respondents admitted that acts such as charcoal burning,<br />
harvesting of plant species and tree cutting were illegal. Locals were also frequently heard<br />
remarking that they have problems with paying their debts and meeting other monetary<br />
obligations. Such arguments were used in the condemning of forest officials. The remarks<br />
used in the condemnation of the forestry officials were in form of social and economic justice.<br />
Both constructions represent a kind of moral condemnation, referring to norms concerning<br />
“right” and “wrong” methods of forest resource usage, ultimately leading us to issues of<br />
rational choice institutionalism and bio-ethics. However, we may argue that this is the<br />
ecological insight of the Kakamega locals and that is their way of constructing arguments<br />
representing a conflict of economic, social and to some extent cultural institutional interests.<br />
In evaluating the interface between local ecological knowledge and perceptions of national<br />
laws regarding the protection of forestry biodiversity, it can be summed that while scientific<br />
scholars view ecological knowledge in a rather neutral perspective, local people residing<br />
around the forest resource areas in Kakamega, are to a given extent involved in a world of<br />
conflicting institutional interests. It was also found out that varied sections of the local<br />
population viewed or perceived the formal resource regimes as very much in conflict with<br />
their economic and social interests. For instance, in the study we asked the respondents what<br />
their views were, as regards the national laws that are used in the management of national<br />
forestry biodiversity.<br />
The essence of the above question was to gauge local perceptions regarding the formal legal<br />
regimes that govern biodiversity in places around Kakamega forest. Up to 61.64% answered<br />
that they felt the national laws (laws enforced by forest wardens) were unfavorable to their<br />
cultural, social and economic interests. When further probed to find out whether the forestry<br />
authorities knew about these varied interests, 63% of the respondents said that the forestry<br />
authorities knew about their cultural and social and economic interests, while 36% informed<br />
the researcher that the forest authorities did not know about their varied interests.<br />
661 Field Interview No.6 15 July 2006.<br />
163
These responses were collaborated with the transcriptions from a key informant interview<br />
with Mr. Saisi, the District Environment Officer. He admitted knowledge of the varied<br />
interests of the communities. He responded that; as an individual he was aware of these<br />
interests but the law did not permit the use of forestry resources to that effect. 662<br />
Therefore, the situation regarding the local ecological knowledge in Kakamega can help us in<br />
understanding two scenarios: the first is that while scientists like the conservators of forests in<br />
Kakamega view ecological regimes in a scientifically focused scope, local people are<br />
involved in a world of conflicting interests ranging from traditional, social to economic<br />
interests. This will be discussed at length in the subsequent sections.<br />
7.3 Forest biodiversity and cultural heritage in Kakamega<br />
Tracing it from their migratory history, most of the present-day Luhya sub-tribes had been<br />
living in the forested land belts prior to their final destination in the present-day homeland.<br />
For instance, the Banyole during their migration process spent many years in Bunyala forest.<br />
They usually lived in the forest but they farmed in the open fields, growing elesusine, millet,<br />
sorghum, sweet potatoes and monkey nuts. This sub-section outlines the reasons as to why<br />
forest biodiversity and cultural heritage in Kakamega are intimately linked among the Luhya.<br />
We also present reasons as to why this heritage has to some extent contributed to the<br />
conservation of the forest biodiversity in Kakamega.<br />
As earlier noted, the biodiversity of Kakamega is shaped by nature and history that is passed<br />
on from one generation to another. It encompasses a myriad of issues including laws,<br />
language, history, traditions, and cultural diversity of the various places in the forest, as well<br />
as the species and objects found in such places. The Luhya attach great significance to places<br />
related to their cultural heritage. Such places are referred to as sacred. They are<br />
protected/guarded, conserved and respected places of worship and intercession.<br />
In the study, respondents were asked whether they had knowledge of sacred places in<br />
Kakamega forest. Up to 91.78% agreed that they knew about the sacred places in Kakamega<br />
forest. Only 7.31% said they didn’t know about these places. Though the figures are not<br />
surprising, what is astonishing, yet contradictory, is the fact that these places are not discussed<br />
in public. Thus it is assumed that those who answered no could have done so in the interest of<br />
keeping this fact a secret. This was confirmed by the check responses from the question that<br />
intended to find out whether people are allowed to visit such places. 74.89% said yes. But the<br />
yes in this scenario should be taken with caution! It meant that the people who are allowed to<br />
go these sacred places are of the Luhya descent only. 24% answered that people were not<br />
allowed to go there and this can be translated to mean that non-Luhya are not allowed to visit<br />
such places and only 0.91% said they didn’t know. When asked why people visited the sacred<br />
662 Key Informant interview with Mr. Saisi, District Environment Officer 26 August 2006<br />
164
places, there was an array of reasons that were recorded. These are illustrated in the table<br />
below.<br />
Table 7.1 Why people visited sacred places in Kakamega Forest<br />
Value response Frequency Percentage<br />
Never visited 0 0<br />
Spiritual Healing 60 27.40<br />
Circumcision 75 34.25<br />
Carrying out traditional rituals 22 10.05<br />
Clan obligations/ Heritage 50 22.83<br />
Cultural ceremonies 13 5.48<br />
Total 220 100<br />
Source: Field Survey data<br />
In the above table 34.25% informed the study that they had visited these places to witness<br />
circumcision ceremonies, while 10.05% visited to carry out traditional rituals like cleansing<br />
and worship. 22.83% argued that they visited these places due to cultural heritage obligations<br />
(Pilgrimage). 27.40% visited the places in order to seek spiritual interventions and healing.<br />
People visit these sacred places to seek religious healing and purity. They go to get good<br />
heath, good fortune and peace. Therefore, because we bore in mind the role of cultural<br />
continuity in this process, we asked respondents how they had learnt about such places. In<br />
short we wanted to literary find out how this history is shaped and passed on from one<br />
generation to another. The responses are also summarized in the following table.<br />
Table 7.2 How information about sacred places is transferred<br />
Value response Frequency Percentage<br />
Don’t Know 0 0<br />
Parents 18 8.22<br />
Old school peers 46 21.00<br />
Local bulletin 65 29.68<br />
Village peers 34 15.53<br />
Grand parents 52 23.74<br />
Tribal head 5 1.83<br />
Total 220 100<br />
Source: Field Survey Data<br />
From the above presentation, it is observed that 8.22% of the respondents had accessed<br />
information about the sacred places and cultural heritage through their parents, while 21.00%<br />
of the respondents learnt it through their old school peers. 29.68% had learnt about these<br />
places through their local bulletins and another 15.53% had learnt this through their village<br />
165
peers. 23.74% learnt about these places from their grandparents and only 1.83% accessed this<br />
information from the tribal head.<br />
The results from the above question made some important revelations for the study. The first<br />
is that the concern to protect the broader qualities of Kakamega’s sacred places like the<br />
Bunyala site and other old growth shrubs and thickets from degradation is an environmental<br />
as well as a social and fundamental obligation among the Luhya sub-tribes, an aspect which<br />
has great broader ecosystem and bio- regional implications in this part of the country. The<br />
cultural heritage values of Kakamega forest are often difficult to disassociate and disentangle<br />
from the wider biodiversity and conservation issues which have been highlighted in this<br />
study. The other important fact that underlines this statement is that the forest biodiversity and<br />
cultural heritage places are located in the valued and well-protected areas of the forest.<br />
Surprisingly these sacred sites in the forests are not identified and defined/listed as heritage<br />
sites by the Forest Departments, the Kenya Wildlife services or the National Museums Kenya,<br />
as heritage sites, given their significance in this bio-region.<br />
In an interview with one of the respondents regarding the significance of the sacred places in<br />
the Luhya institutional landscape, the informant answered that: “The sacred places signify our<br />
right to this land, the traditional principles of our descent kinship and heritage”. 663 This<br />
pronouncement shades more light regarding the natural and social values that the Luhya<br />
attach to these places. It also depicted the dualism that exists between cultural heritage and<br />
biodiversity in Kakamega, signifying the relationship that people have with their culture as<br />
well as the natural biota on the land. When pressed further on why such land was very valued,<br />
during the study, we learnt that all the land on which the Abaluhya live, was acquired through<br />
conquest and war, an indirect way to inform us that many of their ancestors had died through<br />
the wars of conquest. Therefore, it is believed that the Luhya ancestral spirits converge in<br />
some of these places and that is why such places are referred to as sacred and holy grounds,<br />
which require purity. 664<br />
It was also found out that the sacred places in the forest are often defined in terms of their<br />
spiritual values augmented by their physical fabric. They are resting places for some of the<br />
Luhya spirits and as a result, the Luhya people have a responsibility and a duty to conserve<br />
the sacred places in Kakamega forest. They have the duty to guard, regulate access and grant<br />
permission to those who visit these sites in the forest. Those thought to be impure and hostile<br />
to the Luhya tribes are barred form reaching these sacred places. This was obtained by asking<br />
respondents whether they had great attachment to the sacred places in the forest. Up to<br />
93.61% of the respondents responded in the affirmative. We also wanted to confirm whether<br />
this attachment goes hand in hand with the conservation of the natural biota in these areas.<br />
90.7% of the respondents agreed that the environment of these places in preserved and<br />
protected. It is needless to recount that, the protection of the environment in these areas is a<br />
responsibility of all Luhya sub-tribes.<br />
663 Field interview no.12, 27 July 2006<br />
664 Yokoo, S. 1966. Death Among the Abaluya. PhD Dissertation.Makere University, Kampala<br />
166
Further still, it was discovered that traditional ecological knowledge about such places is<br />
passed on to the young ones through different persons at different mediums, as depicted in the<br />
following table.<br />
Table 7.3 Transfer of local ecological knowledge in Sacred Places<br />
Value response Frequency Percentage<br />
Mother to child 30 13.70<br />
Father to Child 65 29.68<br />
Grand Parents to Children 91 41.10<br />
Clan meetings 34 15.52<br />
Village elders to young ones 0 0.0<br />
Local news bulletins 0 0.0<br />
Total 220 100<br />
Source: Field Survey Data.<br />
In the above table, we note that 43.38% informed the study that parents transfer this<br />
ecological knowledge to the children (this includes a summation of all mothers and fathers<br />
who passed this knowledge to their children). 41.10% responded that the Grand parents were<br />
central in the transferring the traditional ecological knowledge, while 15.52% informed that<br />
through clan meeting, young ones were taught about this vital local knowledge. Incidentally<br />
local news bulletins and village chiefs were not mentioned as central in the transfer of such<br />
knowledge.<br />
The land holding sub-tribes have a collective responsibility to look after the natural biota in<br />
these places through regulation of access and performing traditional ceremonies to ensure<br />
continued fertility, peace, prosperity and good life. Each of the sub-tribes council of elders<br />
shares the responsibility in exercising this leadership. The members of each sub-tribe also<br />
celebrate in the religious festivals, to commemorate creation of the natural features of the<br />
present day Kakamega forest environment.<br />
The history of the cultural heritage in Kakamega forest is associated with the history of the<br />
Abaluhya people. The study appreciated the fact that these natural and cultural heritage sites<br />
have intangible qualities such as spiritual, ethereal, memories, views and perceptions which<br />
have strong meaning to the Luhya sub-tribes. We also wished to know whether there are any<br />
special plants that are got from these places.<br />
93% of the respondents agreed that they always got special plants from these scared places.<br />
However, we also learnt that because these sites are visited for a number of reasons, the plant<br />
species gotten from these places are also used for different reasons. These are enumerated in<br />
the following table.<br />
167
Table 7.4 Why Respondents got plant species from sacred places<br />
Value response Frequency Percentage<br />
Don’t Know 4 1.37<br />
Good life and good luck 8 3.65<br />
Medical healing 91 41.55<br />
Blessing the community 99 45.21<br />
Cleansing the community of evil 13 5.94<br />
Planting at home for prosperity 5 2.28<br />
Total 220 100<br />
Source: Field Survey data.<br />
In the above table, the respondents’ reasons for picking collecting plants forest’s sacred places<br />
are varying. 41.55% of the respondents answered that the carried these plants because they<br />
needed them for medical healing. 45.21% informed the study that the plant species gotten<br />
from these places are used for blessing, while 5.94% of the respondents confirmed that the<br />
plants were used in the cleansing the community of evil. 2.28% noted that people get the<br />
plants from the sacred places to plant in their homes for prosperity. Lastly 3.65% informed the<br />
study these plants are used to bring good life and good luck. Therefore, the above responses<br />
illuminate the fact that traditional and religious beliefs have an influence on nature and<br />
biodiversity conservation practices within the Kakamega forest sacred places.<br />
The above finding postulates a relationship between biodiversity and religion. This<br />
relationship is one laced with generated concerns of rationalism and bio-ethics. Many of the<br />
respondents believe that there is a need to balance and preserve nature. This was extracted<br />
from the Luhya belief that every animal and plant species plays a role in the balance of life<br />
and nature. It is needless to re-emphasise the varied importance adduced from the various<br />
biodiversity species. These interpretations help us to understand the real interchanges that<br />
underpin the link between religion and nature. Therefore, given the fact that the Luhya<br />
communities have variegated meanings assigned to the biodiversity, then, it helps us to<br />
appreciate the synthesis that local communities value biodiversity far beyond the instrumental<br />
and economic values.<br />
This purposeful observation results into the motivation for further conservation of the natural<br />
biota, a strong facet of rationalism and humanism. This deduction is derived from the<br />
interpretations and the different values ascribed to the varied plant and animal species within<br />
different localities. This may also be located within the traditional Luhya belief in the societal<br />
concern for nature and humanity, an aspect which has favorable implications for forest<br />
environment in Kakamega.<br />
168
7.4 Collective community action and biodiversity in Kakamega<br />
This study would be incomplete without looking at issues of collective community action in<br />
Kakamega. When investigating the issues related to collective action in relation to the<br />
environment around Kakamega forest, one central question keeps lingering in our minds. The<br />
question is; what motivates the Luhya to co-operate with the non-Luhya in an environment<br />
that they totally control? Of course those conversant with the scholarship on common<br />
resource regimes will naturally answer this; to avoid the tragedy of commons. But this<br />
similarly posses another challenging question. How can resource governors design institutions<br />
to encourage cooperative behavior of complete social welfare that can be fully maximized?<br />
We have established that biodiversity conservation and institutionalism are closely linked to<br />
issues cooperation and collective community participation or simply put; collective<br />
community action. This interface calls for operationalization of jointed and acceptable<br />
practices especially those that encompass everybody and every one in a particular resource<br />
regime. The process also calls for acceptable and understood practices and norms that deal<br />
with biodiversity and resource conservation mechanisms. These should be well appreciated.<br />
Although such norms many not be effective in guaranteeing conservation, they can be<br />
improvised to suit the present circumstances. Ostrom for instance notes that the ability of<br />
groups to communicate informs the success of conservation regime. 665<br />
In the study we recognized that, to a great extent there was a pleasantly healthy relationship<br />
between the Luhya and the non-Luhya. We learnt that this relationship depends on the<br />
historical interaction that existed between the Luhya and other non-Luhya tribes. For instance,<br />
relations between the Luhya and Nandi, Luhya and Luo, Luhya and Iteso. We did find out that<br />
many of these tribes had been assimilated by the Luhya because they did not have land for<br />
cultivation and had been facing precarious situations like constant famine. However, many of<br />
them had been conquered and were therefore made to adopt the Luhya way of life. 666<br />
Ostrom gives outlines eight design principles for long and enduring institutions, each of<br />
which is an essential element that helps to account for the success of these institutions as well<br />
as sustaining group compliance for generation of appropriators of rules of use. These include:-<br />
i) Clearly defined boundary, (ii) congruence between appropriation and provision, (iii)<br />
collective choice arrangement, (iv) monitoring systems accountable to appropriators, (v)<br />
guarantee sanction for non compliance, (vi) conflict resolution mechanisms, (vii) recognition<br />
of rights of appropriators, to organize their own institutions for common property rights that<br />
were part of larger systems, viii) organization of multiple layers of nested enterprise. 667 But<br />
we have to note that this depends on the existing relationships among the communities. This<br />
is borne out of the fact that the pattern of relations that exits among the populace will be an<br />
instrumental guarantee in securing trust and respect during the conservation process. It will<br />
also spur ethical consideration seen through the usage of the biodiversity resources.<br />
665<br />
Ostrom, E et al. 2006. Rules, Games and Common Pool Resources. Michigan: Michigan University Press.<br />
666<br />
Field Interview No-14, 29 July 2006<br />
667<br />
Ostrom, E. 2005. Understanding Institutional Diversity. Princeton: Princeton University Press.<br />
169
Wholesomely speaking, the Kakamega forest environment does depict all the above<br />
enumerated characteristics and therefore we can safely argue that the internal dynamics of<br />
collective action within and among the Luhya and non-Luhya communities does exist in a<br />
large measure. Agrawal argues that the occurrence of these relationships will support<br />
collective assent of the powerful and the less audible dissent or indifference of the less<br />
powerful or indifference from the less powerful. 668<br />
Collective action in the management of biodiversity resources is important because it reveals<br />
the chain of interrelationships and how they are useful in the governance of the biotic<br />
resources especially in the regulation of access both in open and closed access regimes. 669<br />
Further related to the above, we found out that the management of common biodiversity<br />
resources in Kakamega is punctuated by inter-tribal webs to oil the existing trust,<br />
relationships and other paternal networks.<br />
Holding and managing biodiversity in a common resource regime like a forest is derived out<br />
of the bond that exists between the people and this forms the pivot or basis for collective<br />
action. For instance, we noted that in Kakamega where a communal tenure of ownership<br />
exists, members do govern the available resources based on the patrineal hierarchy which<br />
reinforces the family bonds that spur the collective action and in the same way limits the<br />
access to those with “unethical” conservation methods especially the outsiders. The biggest<br />
unanswered question that remains is; what are the implications of institutional collectiveness<br />
on the access to biodiversity resources especially to outsiders are. The answers to this<br />
question are constructed around the common scenarios that collective action has built. This<br />
has been witnessed in the realm of framing rights over resources especially in the scenarios<br />
where people feel there should be increased rights regarding ownership and management of<br />
resources. We also have to bear in mind that this has been the debate that has framed resource<br />
usage in the last two decades. This is true, as one focus group discussion with some members<br />
of a community resource user group revealed.<br />
Furthermore, when discussing implications of institutional collectiveness in relation to the<br />
Kakamega environment, we ought to note that, this in a large measure mirrors the gender and<br />
tribal differences that exist in the present day Kakamega forest environment. We have earlier<br />
discussed that because of the significant presence of customary law, women and other non-<br />
Luhya are not allowed to take part in significant decisions relating resource control and usage<br />
in this part of the province.<br />
In relation to the above, we highlight that this kind of inequity has in a way blocked the<br />
women and non-members from individually owning land and other related resources.<br />
However, in the study it was found out that this was one of the reasons that accounted for the<br />
668<br />
Agrawal, A. 1992. Risks, Resources, and Politics: Studies in Institutions and Resource Use from India. Ph.D<br />
Dissertation, Duke University.<br />
669<br />
Bromley, D.W and M.C, Michael. 1989. The Management of Common Property Natural Resources: Some<br />
Conceptual and Operational Fallacies." World Bank Discussion Papers no.57. Washington, DC: The World<br />
Bank.<br />
170
development of various community resource user groups in Kakamega. This need to acquire<br />
rights has engineered collective action. For instance, many non-Luhya seem to have joined<br />
most of the community forest user groups in order to acquire use of a collective garden or tree<br />
nursery. For example, when asked about the composition of the community user groups, we<br />
found out that most of the community user groups were characterized by women and non-<br />
Luhya! It was also found out that through collective community action, such “outlawed<br />
members” of society are negotiating for more powers over access to resource usage and<br />
conservation. In such community user groups, there is a call to review a change in the current<br />
customary laws that govern the access and use of resources.<br />
Suffice is to note, women in the collective action groups were also visibly dissatisfied with<br />
the inequitable rights regarding the usage rights over resources because the current local law<br />
forbids them from such ownerships. Such commentaries were very common among the<br />
Maragori, Kisa and Tiriki. However, it was established that this was a general custom among<br />
the Luhya sub-tribes. Therefore this kind of insight brings important revelations that women<br />
are craving for in this resource use/owner matrix under the current customary law in<br />
Kakamega. The second observation is that the non-Luhya are also clamouring for more rights<br />
in the usage of resources in this traditionally Luhya dominated province. However, on the<br />
other hand, community user groups have also been instrumental identifying with the current<br />
customary law, despite the underlined inequalities they do face.<br />
It is also imperative to mention that, community user groups have continued to follow the<br />
local law that governs the usage of specific biotic species. During the study, it was common to<br />
find many members who didn’t belong to the Luhya sub-tribes referring to the Luhya usage of<br />
particular plant and animal species. This kind of adherence to the local Luhya nomenclature<br />
depicts some form of assimilation among the non-Luhya communities, a fact that signifies the<br />
local law regarding the conservation of biodiversity efforts in Kakamega.<br />
Be it as it may, the above observations strengthen the argument that collective action is<br />
critical for the functioning of local law and local conservation efforts. It was also learnt that<br />
this co-existence leads to complementing each other. Thus in many instances, especially<br />
where there is collective control by community user groups, there were increased incentives<br />
for monitoring and restrained misuse, converting owner-protectors into poachers, and thus<br />
restraining the resource depletion. Thus, there is renewed interest both in the lessons to be<br />
learned from successful collective community action.<br />
7.5 Biodiversity and property rights in Kakamega<br />
Biodiversity is associated with property resources rights, characterized by social relations that<br />
are defined by the property holder with respect to the valued attached to the property. We are<br />
also looking at property rights from a rather institutional perspective, meaning that we are<br />
looking at the collective entitlements by which humans seek to mediate interactions with<br />
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nature. 670 In this we also look at the duty as well as the rights holders’ meaning that what is<br />
valuable is therefore worth protecting. When looking at biological resources in Kakamega<br />
forest, we must treat them as both physical and non-physical such as local ecological<br />
knowledge.<br />
It is also imperative to understand the above issues from a rather historical perspective. We<br />
have already noted that land is the most treasured physical property in Kakamega. This<br />
evaluation is derived from the stream of benefits that are accrued from land, ranging from the<br />
forest resources to the agricultural products that are generated from this land in the areas<br />
around Kakamega forest. It is these benefits that will shape our appreciation of the property<br />
rights in Kakamega.<br />
In this study it was hard to make direct interpretations regarding property rights issues<br />
because they are highly contested issues with this sub-region. However, through discussion<br />
and debate especially during focus group discussions, we came to understand that issues<br />
regarding property rights in Kakamega and more precisely among the Luhya can be located<br />
within the larger institutional structure of the Luhya society. In this regard, we found out that<br />
there obtains a dualistic property rights regime regarding the resource rights in Kakamega.<br />
Specifically it emerged that there were vertical and horizontal property rights regimes. This<br />
dualistic regime was found to be embedded in the mutual relationships that are held among<br />
the Luhya people, originating from the existing customary rights regarding landed resources.<br />
On the other hand, the vertical rights were exuded by the collective relationships and concerns<br />
that the Luhya people attach to nature. We have dealt with these concerns and relationships in<br />
the previous sub-section and therefore need no recount in the ongoing treatment.<br />
In line with the above, it is ideal to mention that the foundation of these historical and<br />
circumstantial relationships arises out of the cultural heritage that the Luhya attach to the land<br />
and the resources that are found thereon, creating a cyclical nature of relationships among<br />
them. One observation is central: that property rights among the Luhya are a product of<br />
human/individual relationships shaped by the collective and historical behaviours embedded<br />
within the Luhya sub-tribes. In short, we are talking of the circumstances of value that<br />
structure these collective behaviours among the people of Kakamega.<br />
Generally speaking, the nature of any physical good is found in its inherent physical<br />
characteristic, not susceptible to manipulation by humans. But we must admit that property<br />
institutions are human inventions. In essence, the centrality of property rights refers to the<br />
clarity, specificity, and especially the exclusivity of the rights, and not to the identity of the<br />
rights-holder. 671 Thus, most of the permutations and combinations of resource types, propertyrights<br />
types, and rights holders theoretically exist. But there is surprisingly very little<br />
agreement about which of these combinations and permutations are wise or efficient.<br />
670 McCay, B J., and J.M, Acheson. 1987. The Question of the Commons: The Culture and Ecology of<br />
Communal Resources. Tucson: University of Arizona Press.<br />
671 Larson, B and D.W, Bromely.1999. Property Rights, Externalities and Resource Degeneration:Locating the<br />
Tragedy. In Sustaining Development. Environmental Resources, edited by D.W, Bromely,163-179.<br />
Massechussets: Edward Elgar Publishing.<br />
172
Other scholars in the area of property rights like Engerman and Metzer who studied land<br />
rights, ethno-nationality and sovereign history, noted that traditionally property rights are<br />
viewed as necessary pre-conditions for the efficient operationalization of the environment<br />
market place community user. 672 This same argument is reinforced by McKean who states<br />
that there are natural resource regimes that are governed as open access regimes but no one<br />
claims recognized property rights. 673 This same postulation appears to fit well in the<br />
Kakamega scenario, where the structure of traditional authority in a great measure presides<br />
over ecological and cultural decisions among the Luhya sub-tribes. But we also have to look<br />
at the property rights regimes in Kakamega from another view especially where a<br />
formal/national resource regime management style exists but inherently met with<br />
immeasurable acrimony and missive. There are general principles which are necessary but not<br />
sufficient in them for the efficient normalisation of property rights regimes.<br />
In making an analysis of the above postulation, we observe that specific attributes of social<br />
and ecological contexts which must be represented. The social contexts, as we have noted<br />
earlier contain all the dynamic relationships between the humans and nature, but must also<br />
contain entitlements and duties that come with the entitlements in maintaining the resources<br />
of nature. For instance, as we mentioned earlier, during the study we wanted to investigate the<br />
respondents’ views on whether the current formal legalities such as the Forest Act, the<br />
Environmental Management and Coordination Act, the Local Government Act among others,<br />
favoured their social and cultural interests. 61.64% responded in the negative, arguing that<br />
they felt the current legalities didn’t favour their social and cultural interests. Only 34.29 felt<br />
otherwise. We also wanted to find out whether the respondents felt that the current forest<br />
authorities know about their social, economic and cultural interests.<br />
From the field results, 63.01% of the respondents answered that some of the authorities didn’t<br />
know about their interests, while 36.01% informed the researcher that the forest authorities<br />
knew about their local interests. The above accounts paint a picture of unmitigated resource<br />
usage interests and resource rights between the formal institutional regimes and the local<br />
institutional regimes. For example, the respondents gave instances of when the forestry<br />
authorities curtail them form collecting local herbs which they use in some of their traditional<br />
ritual ceremonies, an issue that put forest wardens and local communities at logger heads<br />
Further still, it was also found out that some of the forest authorities did not even trust the<br />
local tribal heads that worked to prevent unhealthy access by those thought to be<br />
destructionists within their localities. In one such instance a local tribal head among the Tiriki<br />
informed the researcher that they feel mistrusted by some of the forest wardens. As this key<br />
respondent informed; “they think that the local authorities connived with the destructionists<br />
672<br />
Engerman, L.S and J, Metzer. 2004. Land Rights, ethno-Nationationalism and Sovereignity History.<br />
London:Routledge.<br />
673<br />
McKean, A. M. 1992. Management of Traditional Common Lands (Iriaichi) in Japan. In Making the<br />
Commons Work: Theory, Practice, and Policy, edited by. D. W. Bromley. San Francisco: ICS Press.<br />
173
especially those unlicensed timbers extractors”. 674 We later learnt that this has led to increased<br />
animosity and acrimony between the formal and informal regimes. In some areas like<br />
Cheptulu, Mlimani and Shipalo, there happened to be a growing rift between structure of<br />
traditional authority and the forester authorities. From these results we were able to learn that,<br />
rules only work when they are well enforced, but work better when they are well harmonised<br />
with the local needs and interests.<br />
Agrawal who examined the “fit between rule systems and resource use” among the<br />
communities in Uttar Pradesh in Indonesia, found out that enforcement among the<br />
communities in Uttar Pradesh differ widely in the extent to which they devote village<br />
resources to enforcement, particularly hiring guards or assigning villagers to guard duty by<br />
some rotational scheme. 675 He further noted that the communities with healthy common<br />
forests were those that recycled the fines and penalties they collected into providing for their<br />
guards. The communities with degraded forests were those that had fewer guards, enforced<br />
the rules less, collected much less in fines, and put the fines into a general village budget<br />
rather than into the enforcement mechanism. There is also evidence that penalties need not be<br />
draconian: graduated penalties, mild for first offences and severe only for repeated<br />
infractions, are adequate. 676<br />
In this study we have already highlighted the role played by the local authority structures in<br />
using local guards to enforce conservation of the forest in Kakamega through use of local<br />
institutions. What our study did not capture however, was the role of monetary fines in the<br />
enforcement mechanism especially among the local authority structures. But we did mention<br />
the role of penalties in enforcing compliance. Similarly we reported that monetary fines are<br />
perceived as weak and have facilitated the incidence of corruption among the forest<br />
authorities! However, we did not establish whether this could have precipitated the animosity<br />
between the forest authorities and the local tribal guards in some parts of Kakamega.<br />
The results also show that there is an overwhelming display of two points about the<br />
appropriate combination of property rights. First is that: property rights relating to natural<br />
resource usage in Kakamega are reflections of pre-collective function of the Luhya society, of<br />
which property/nature/society relations are of current interest, and that some sections of the<br />
resource regime in Kakamega are best held as collective property. The second observation is<br />
that local institutional innovations, used by communities to manage common resource<br />
regimes such as forests and other resources for long-term benefit, as is the case in Kakamega,<br />
would only work well if well understood by the parallel authorities enforcing the formal<br />
institutions. An arrangement to produce a hybrid system can also be an eventual outcome<br />
after the long-term benefits from this co-existence. This can happen in several different ways:<br />
674 Key respondent Interview No- 7 , 15 -July 2006<br />
675 Agrawal, A. 1994. Rules, Rule Making and Rule Breaking: Examining the Fit between Rule Systems and<br />
Resource Use. In Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources, edited by E. Ostrom, R. Gardner, and J.<br />
Walker, 267-82. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.<br />
676 Ostrom, E. 2000. Reformulating the commons. Swiss Political Science Review 6(1): 29–52.<br />
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for instance, where common property rights regimes have elaborate and long lasting rules can<br />
be codified in an attempt to formalize and codify property rights to the resources in question<br />
as was the case in Indonesia, Brazil, where common property regimes had legal recognition.<br />
The other property regime which this study found important is the non-physical component<br />
which relates to biodiversity, knowledge and intellectual property of the Luhya in Kakamega.<br />
In this regard we are talking about the territory and issues relating to the access to the<br />
intellectual resources. From the study it was learnt that issues to deal with knowledge<br />
determination and the use of knowledge are collective, interrogational, and very restricted.<br />
We for instance found out that the protection of natural, historical cultural and traditional<br />
knowledge resources of indigenous natures is collectively guarded. It was established that<br />
while the custodians of local knowledge system had a duty to relay this knowledge to their<br />
subordinates and tribes-men, those who had received the knowledge had the obligation to<br />
keep that knowledge and prevent though with “wrong intentions” to have that knowledge.<br />
Access to such knowledge is usually through a process that takes one through various<br />
procedures! We must remember that the Luhya are too secretive, too suspicious and too<br />
procedural! For instance locating those people anticipated to have the requisite authority over<br />
some detailed and knowledge that is regarded confidential in the Luhya terms is such a long<br />
process.<br />
From the above account we came to learn that institutions regarding knowledge-giving are<br />
strict. For example during the field study we learnt that, clan elders can only be identified or<br />
accessed through an area warden or local chief who negotiated and briefed the chief about the<br />
kind of people who wanted to meet him. The chief in this case acts as an emissary and exudes<br />
some reasonable degree of diplomatic skill in negotiating the acceptance of the elder. In most<br />
cases an elder would invite other elders who are known to have a clear grasp on the subject<br />
matter. It is also done in an effort to dispel fear that he has not given out any important<br />
information regarding the Luhya customs and critical knowledge found to be confidential to<br />
the society and its resources. In such instances, the team of elders would be briefed about the<br />
real intentions of the study.<br />
Therefore, when one sums up all this, we are made to understand the relationship between the<br />
community and its knowledge resources. We also need to recognize the authority of the local<br />
law or customary law in the governance of the right to knowledge access. This ultimately<br />
makes one appreciate the way in which the rights relating to intellectual property resources<br />
are framed. Among the many justifications usually advanced for over centralising community<br />
ownership of knowledge resources, was the argument that; institutionalising the power to give<br />
and advance the traditional ecological knowledge those outside the Luhya sub-tribes, would<br />
offer enhanced efficiency in resource use and greater long-term protection of both the<br />
knowledge and physical resource. This is very common because there are many traditional<br />
Luhya people who still live near these forest resources and their lives depend upon their<br />
traditional rights of physical access to use these resources.<br />
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More so, the people who live nearest these resources still have ample opportunity to use them,<br />
but when they lose secure property rights in the resources to others, they also lose any<br />
incentive they might have felt in the past to manage these resources for maximum long-term<br />
benefit. The other issue we came to learn is that local ecological knowledge is not monetised<br />
among the Abaluhya, but a token of appreciation is given depending on the scope of the<br />
subject matter. This token is customary and is paid after the elders and respective council of<br />
wise men have passed on the required known. When the researcher probed to further to find<br />
out whether this is the price equivalent of the knowledge given, our confidant, who was the<br />
local Chief, refused to regard it as the price of knowledge. The argument was that knowledge<br />
is not marketed among the Luhya customs, but rather appreciated. This therefore makes it<br />
hard for one to evaluate the true cost of local ecological knowledge among the Luhya.<br />
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8 Summary and Conclusions<br />
8.1 Recap of findings: linking research questions to study findings<br />
The biodiversity crisis in Kenya coincides with the international environmental debates that<br />
have been going on for the last two decades. This has directly impacted on the national<br />
resource regimes in Kenya, particularly in the realm of biodiversity. In a large measure, these<br />
have inspired national debates relating to biodiversity. However, positive change has been<br />
somewhat slow. It is interesting to point out that the biodiversity crisis can be described as a<br />
window of choice especially in the purview that it presents Kenya with an opportunity to stem<br />
the current biodiversity problems in the homeland. This study was guided by five research<br />
questions. First we asked whether there are different notions relating to biodiversity in Kenya.<br />
In the study, our analysis revealed that Kenya has a multiplicity of notions explaining<br />
biodiversity and these depend on what level of analysis one is looking at; national, local or<br />
international. As a result we have identified complex interactions between these three layers,<br />
since each layer represents a varied notion. This raises the two closely related problems of fit<br />
in identifying the incentives of those responsible for enforcing the rules and the determinants<br />
of institutional change.<br />
The second research question of this study aimed at finding out whether there are provisions<br />
for local biodiversity notions in the planning process for national resource management in<br />
Kenya. We revealed that most of the planning for biodiversity management in Kenya is based<br />
on neo-classical models, extremely state-centred and in most cases less informed. Such a<br />
planning process has in most cases led to dysfunctional biodiversity management regimes in<br />
Kenya and Kakamaga in particular. Most institutions have no regard for locally relevant<br />
biodiversity notions or more specifically Local Ecological Knowledge (LEK). Consequently,<br />
LEK is rarely integrated into biodiversity management planning and decision-making. There<br />
is a need to carefully compare specific observations from LEK with those from formal and<br />
technically drafted institutions, because they reflect independent sources of information that<br />
could collaborate and complement each other. Such a comparison could also increase<br />
confidence and depth of knowledge, hence institutional strengthening in biodiversity and<br />
resource management. Therefore because we are aware that institutions may be conceived as<br />
an equilibrium outcome, it is important that initial conditions, path dependence, and cultural<br />
beliefs are allowed to play a significant role in selecting the planning process for national<br />
biodiversity management.<br />
The other research issue that we wanted to answer is: what institutions are in place to manage<br />
the national biodiversity resources in Kenya? We have highlighted that there is no single<br />
institutional arrangement that is unilaterally used in the management of biodiversity resources<br />
in Kenya. However, there are scattered indirect provisions which relate to biodiversity in the<br />
varied formal institutions. These as we have pointed out, are neither put in explicit terms, and<br />
therefore not explicitly defined. This in a number of ways explains the continuation of the<br />
biodiversity crises in Kenya especially at formal institutional level. Based on the analysis in<br />
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the line of national resource management and institutional performance, we endeavoured to<br />
evaluate and highlight some of the flaws in Kenya’s institutional framework relating to<br />
biodiversity management. Taking the Kakamega scenario as a test case, Kenya needs to reevaluate<br />
and benchmark its resource management policies to best rule practices. Though we<br />
have not formulated a complete definition of the entire biodiversity crisis in the literature, we<br />
have noted that part of the problem results from the institutional building capability, and in a<br />
large measure warrants continued institutional reform.<br />
Futhermore, the study intended to investigate the national and local actors in the management<br />
of the country’s biodiversity resources. Our findings have pointed out that there are numerous<br />
actors in the realm of biodiversity and these include the state as an actor and other non-state<br />
actors such as the NGOs, public and private sector organisations, the civil society, local<br />
community resource user groups and individuals. One important drawback is the absence of<br />
coordination between the interests and initiatives from the different actors. These are found to<br />
manage biodiversity at different levels and at times with variegated interests, an aspect which<br />
in part explains the conflict. What was however most intriguing is that at the national level,<br />
there seems to be an absence of a real forum that brings together the all these actors. This<br />
keeps out most of the non-state actors’ opinions in the decision-making matrix regarding<br />
biodiversity and environmental management. The role of public opinion cannot be replaced in<br />
this task. Consequently, one key function of the polity is to preserve the basic right to shared<br />
learning. Perhaps, the bulk of the challenge lies in the effort to build and improve institutions<br />
that guarantee public participation in environmental governance and decision-making.<br />
Further still, one other research question was; what is the role of donors and international<br />
actors in the current biodiversity restoration in Kenya? Our analysis revealed that the Tran<br />
nationalisation of biodiversity and environmental problems has attracted the international<br />
donor agencies in the realm of environmental governance. Most of these agencies though<br />
northern based have set up “support systems”, particularly in the tropical world, where the<br />
biodiversity crises have been linked to poverty. In the Kenyan context, we found out that in<br />
order for the state to build an efficient resource management system, it has enlisted<br />
international collaboration in this regard. Though we are aware that in an interdependent and<br />
asymmetric world, national polities are not always able to perform most tasks alone, we found<br />
that the role of donor interests was far beyond the environmental governance debate. The<br />
donor interests in regard to the biodiversity restoration in Kenya can be linked to issues of a<br />
wider political economy debate. Indeed, since the governance structures of the international<br />
environmental governance are not well defined and coordination failures between the polities<br />
involved are pervasive, it is no wonder that the rules governing donor interests to Kenya’s<br />
biodiversity crisis are rather diffuse. Therefore, much more research is necessary on the<br />
causes and consequences of biodiversity legal reforms motivated by external pressure and the<br />
role of supra national entities in general.<br />
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Conclusions<br />
The overall objective of this study was to examine the contention whether there are<br />
conflicting notions relating to biodiversity and how such conflicting positions are<br />
institutionalized. Based on literature in the line of national resource management and<br />
institutional performance, we endeavoured to evaluate and highlight some of the flaws in<br />
Kenya’s institutional framework relating to biodiversity management. We found out that<br />
national regimes governing and regulating biodiversity usage in Kenya, are often in conflict<br />
with local institutions and practices, a situation which leads to institutional conflict. In short,<br />
one cannot de-link institutional mediation, participation and institutional coordination from<br />
proper institutional functioning as well as efficient resource management in a protected area<br />
like Kakamega forest.<br />
In the study we have noted that in the tropical world, poor protected area management<br />
especially in the realm of forestry, significantly compromises biodiversity, ecosystem<br />
services, livelihoods, and all the other values associated with protected areas. In many<br />
developing countries like Kenya, poor management of resources persists regardless of the<br />
extent of international intervention in form of substantial financial assistance and technical<br />
assistance designed to improve conservation outcomes. These ensuing concerns have<br />
illustrated the need for furthering a deeper understanding of why persisting failures in meeting<br />
protected area objectives continue to exist.<br />
In the study, we have indicated that comprehending the successes and failures in forest<br />
biodiversity conservation is more complex than simply looking at generalised case studies.<br />
Instead, specific local case units like Kakamega need to be considered as part of a larger<br />
system of structured possibilities, within a politically charged framework. The institutional<br />
analysis which this study has employed has provided a framework for examining the<br />
numerous variables influencing actors’ interests, behaviours, values and for understanding the<br />
relationship between these parameters, to one another, as well as the resultant institutional and<br />
management outcomes.<br />
One of the critical requirements for successful performance of conservation programmes in<br />
forest reserves that also inhabit people is that, local populations must participate in the<br />
creation, planning and management of the reserve. The problems in case of the Kakamega<br />
forest reserve demonstrate that, local participation is not an option, but a must. A forest<br />
reserve governed by only formal institutions cannot effectively work, as the forest is a<br />
resource that is linked to the peoples’ feelings. On that note the local people cannot be treated<br />
as pawns of externally enforced mechanical act. Local people should be invited and actively<br />
involved to take part in institutional and management discussions. This calls for a<br />
fundamental shift in the approach to conservation and participation of local populations.<br />
Poor governance is one of the key characteristic that has been highlighted to cause the failure<br />
of tropical forest resource conservation. Again, the Kakamega scenario affords a glowing<br />
example. Therefore, good governance characterized by transparency, accountability and<br />
representation of a multiplicity of interests is one of the key ingredients needed to right some<br />
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of the wrongs in Kakamega forest management. In most of the communities visited, the<br />
community members expressed a high level of dissatisfaction in respect to the current forest<br />
leadership, especially on the side of the government extension workers and forest wardens.<br />
There were reported cases of corruption, lack of communication and community consultation,<br />
and general inefficiency of leaders from the Forestry Services and the KWS. In most cases,<br />
the community members reported that, Forest Wardens were for example, taking bribes from<br />
external resource extractors to allow illegal extraction of timber and related resources from<br />
reserved territory, without consultation with the community. In other cases forest authorities<br />
were believed to be using taxes and fines collected from the forest for their own needs. The<br />
most common complaints however, regarded the lack of recognition regarding the control and<br />
sanctions used by community authorities, both against outside invaders, and against<br />
community members who were seen to be over-harvesting resources. Further still, there are<br />
no institutionalized efforts to resolve intra- and inter-community conflicts.<br />
Effective participation requires efforts from both external protected area stakeholders, and<br />
from the communities themselves. Institutional limitations and conflicts at the national,<br />
regional and local levels hindered the participation of local populations and have resulted in<br />
overall failure in the management of its natural resources. At the national level, the drawbacks<br />
concern the general policy context, which currently fails to support regional initiatives and<br />
bottom-up approaches for conservation. At the regional level, the institutional weaknesses<br />
consist of poor inter-organisational relationships and misfits that limit co-ordination and<br />
collaboration between stakeholders, adding delay and difficulty to the process of reserve<br />
implementation. At the community level, the main challenges hindering institutional<br />
development for sustainable management of natural resources, relate to social organisation<br />
and governance of communities, as well as undefined property rights.<br />
The challenges that external stakeholders face in recognising, defining, and agreeing upon<br />
participatory methods in protected area management are many. The behaviour of protected<br />
area stakeholders is an interaction of a complex and multi-faceted institutional environment<br />
that requires a collaborative relationship which can only work in the long term if the terms of<br />
reference are clearly defined and agreed upon. This requires the conscious effort on behalf of<br />
actors, a balance of power and negotiating skills, and calls for institutional changes in the<br />
policy context. The challenge lies in designing appropriate institutional mechanisms that<br />
encourage the spread of local participation, with directors of all government resources<br />
agencies, members of public, NGO and private sector conservation organisations, radically<br />
restructuring procedures and working relationships both within and between organisations.<br />
Although the local communities within and around Kakamega forest reserve are faced with<br />
numerous challenges in achieving successful community oriented conservation, local<br />
institutional assets such as local knowledge, values and institutional heritage, remain valuable<br />
to any attempt geared towards construction of any localised solutions. Attempts to increased<br />
community oriented management; need to recognise that existing institutional enforcement<br />
mechanisms in Kakamega ought to work in a harmonious manner, in order to uphold what<br />
180
already exits within the Luhya resource management setting. In this study, it has been<br />
observed that there is ample evidence of local people’s willingness to engage in institutional<br />
dialogue if there is sufficient information, communication and trust. It is needless to say that,<br />
this can only happen when new resource management institutional enforcement mechanisms<br />
are appreciated and perceived to be beneficial, and as long as decisions are not externally<br />
imposed.<br />
Furthermore, the local communities in Kakamega do possess some fairly effective<br />
institutions, but few relate to resource mobilisation and management. There are, for instance,<br />
no strong sanctions to deter the abuse of common property. Although the communities are<br />
loosely structured, people’s social networks such as family, sub-tribal and clan kinships,<br />
neighbours, friends still form the pivot to execute the local rules. Some of the communities<br />
seemed to be lacking in terms of internal communication between households. Furthermore,<br />
rivalry was witnessed in several cases among non-Luhya tribes and families, often due to<br />
economic interests in land and related resources, or conflicts in resource harvesting, which<br />
demonstrates a further weakness in the political organisation and its capacity to resolve<br />
internal conflicts.<br />
It is also imperative to mention that despite the rhetoric of observing international<br />
conservation covenants, signatories to such covenants like Kenya, often contradict them in<br />
practice. For instance at the close of the 1990s and late 2005, because of actions which are<br />
both contrary to trends elsewhere in the world and to its own obligations under the IUCN,<br />
COP and CBD, Kenya was faced with a situation where several thousands of people were<br />
displaced and others threatened with ‘displacement by a series of Central Government orders<br />
on wildlife and forests conservation. Yet it was as recent as 2002 when the Kenyan<br />
Government had committed itself to meeting the targets under the CBD, moving towards full<br />
legal and institutional arrangements as well as participation of local communities in the<br />
management of forestry and wildlife conservation, and in receiving benefits from such<br />
conservation, by 2006. However the situation in Kakamega contradicts Kenya’s commitment<br />
to the above international regimes.<br />
Lastly, local institutional development for community oriented conservation has received little<br />
systematic attention in previous literature. If protected area management is to be sustainable,<br />
then researchers, practitioners, and conservationists must pay closer attention to the<br />
architecture and performance of institutions involved in sustainable forest management. Once<br />
these institutions are better understood, local institutional development is of great urgency, for<br />
the participation of local people in managing forest resources is crucial to successful<br />
conservation.<br />
181
8.2 Towards institutionalised participation and local resource governance in Kakamega<br />
In the previous chapter, we presented the various local perceptions and local ecological<br />
knowledge systems that obtain in the management of biodiversity in the areas that surround<br />
Kakamega forest. We however realise that these knowledge systems are not formally<br />
institutionalised and in part fuel the institutional clashes in the management of the forest. We<br />
must make a re-mention of the fact that prior to the introduction of the state-centred<br />
institutions in the management of biodiversity resources in Kenya, most terrestrial as well as<br />
aquatic ecosystems were traditionally managed by local communities according to time-tested<br />
indigenous knowledge systems. Specifically, the management of most forest systems have<br />
since come under the ownership of government agencies, resulting into de jure alienation and<br />
marginalisation of the local communities. The implication is that, the degree to which<br />
indigenous people and local communities can exercise governance of their resources is<br />
subject to government priorities. The issue of local people governing and managing their<br />
natural resources through traditional biodiversity related knowledge systems, especially in a<br />
centrally gazetted forest like Kakamega is highly complex. Indigenous and local groups face<br />
threats from the centralised institutional governance in this regard, and without recourse to<br />
institutional protection, they are completely powerless when the biodiversity agencies are<br />
enforcing their natural resource conservation interests, with influence at the government level.<br />
This is particularly the case in countries like Kenya where the biodiversity crisis has raged for<br />
the last two decades.<br />
We also realise that, this inability to formally mediate these institutions also results from the<br />
failure to guarantee genuine local participation in the management of the forest biodiversity<br />
resources. Yet we are aware that local resource governance is the oldest form of protected<br />
area management. 677 Community conserved areas have developed over the years as human<br />
communities shaped their lifestyles and livelihood strategies to respond to the various<br />
opportunities and challenges that such environments present. Therefore, in doing so many<br />
communities have managed, modified, enriched and often conserved the biological<br />
environments within their surroundings. 678 As earlier noted, the Luhya community in<br />
Kakamega forest affords such a glowing example.<br />
In many cases, as illustrated by the previous chapters, the Luhya community interaction with<br />
the environment has generated a kind of symbiotic relationship, which in some instances may<br />
be referred to as bio-cultural components or cultural landscapes, which form the locally<br />
relevant biodiversity notions in this sub-region.<br />
We have therefore noted that much of this interaction happens in the pursuit of a variety of<br />
interlocked objectives and values including economical, spiritual, and religious which have<br />
resulted into the conservation of eco-systems, species and ecosystem related services. In this<br />
677 Rudel, T. K. 1993. Tropical Deforestation: Small Farmers and Land Clearing in the Ecuadorian Amazon.<br />
Methods and Cases in Conservation Science. New York: Columbia University Press.<br />
678 Endicott, K. 2003. Indigenous Rights Issues in Malaysia. In At Risk of Being Heard: Identity, Indigenous<br />
Rights, and Postcolonial States, edited by B. Dean and J. Levi, 142-164. Ann Arbor: The University of<br />
Michigan Press.<br />
182
sense, the community conserved areas comprise of natural and modified ecosystems including<br />
significant biodiversity, ecological services and cultural values voluntarily conserved by the<br />
indigenous and local people through customary laws and other local institutional means.<br />
Furthermore, in many of the community conserved areas in Kakamega, authority and<br />
responsibility rests with the community through different levels of traditional governance and<br />
locally agreed rules. We have noted that these rules are very complex and represent a myriad<br />
of sociological and historical institutional significances. In this regard, communities’<br />
accountability to the larger society has in most cases remained complicated. However, this<br />
may be defined as part of the broader issues of concern that need to be negotiated with the<br />
central government together with other actors in the realm of natural resource usage and<br />
management. This is, for instance, seen in the recognition of collective property rights and<br />
appreciation of customary law and the negotiation of related benefit sharing mechanisms. The<br />
institutionalisation of such modalities would be an indicator to institutional mediation and a<br />
move to successful participation and genuine local resource governance.<br />
In the subsequent subsections, we shall further examine the developing international<br />
frameworks for creation of protected areas and selected implications to such initiatives in a<br />
tropical country like Kenya. We shall highlight the flaws that come with centralised<br />
management of created reserves such as the Kakamega forest reserve amidst the failures of<br />
genuine participation. We therefore continue to argue that guaranteed institutional security<br />
and the ability of indigenous and local peoples to exercise their own governance structures is<br />
central to the success of the Kakamega test case.<br />
Further still, in contrast to available criticism of local-based resource conservation<br />
elsewhere, 679 and in unison to many successful locally oriented conservation areas, 680 there are<br />
significant benefits in using local knowledge systems and institutions of local and indigenous<br />
peoples in the conservation and resource use matrix. In that regard, the Kakamega case is<br />
examined in more detail in order to provide an account of how indigenous peoples’ efforts<br />
and capacity to protect, promote and facilitate the use of their traditional knowledge under the<br />
control of indigenous modes of governance, are curtailed when the central institutions and<br />
government agencies enforce their resource conservation ideals. This can be achieved through<br />
institutional mediation, strengthening of traditional modes of governance and sustainable<br />
resource management regimes. We conclude that the benefits accruing to indigenous peoples<br />
and local communities from participation in local-oriented and, most crucially, protected<br />
reserves can include the preservation, renewal and maintenance of the knowledge systems<br />
upon which indigenous livelihoods and biodiversity security depends. The diagram at the end<br />
of this chapter illustrates this mismatch and the implications that obtain when institutions to<br />
manage forest reserves like Kakamega are formulated without genuine local participation.<br />
679<br />
Berkes, F. 2004. Rethinking Community-Based Conservation. Conservation Biology 18(3): 621-630.<br />
680<br />
Ghai, D.1994. Development and Environment: Sustaining People and Nature. Oxford, UK: Blackwell<br />
Publishers.<br />
183
8.3 Re-visiting and re-conceptualizing institutionalism and participation in Kakamega<br />
Lessons to learn from institutionalism and participation in Kakamega<br />
As we draw ourselves to the close of this treatment, it is imperative to illustrate the kind of<br />
lessons that ought to be learnt from the process of institutionalism and participation in<br />
Kakamega. One such lesson will be made in light of what Oliphant pointed out. He noted that<br />
whether participation is regarded as a means to achieving an end, or as an end in itself, or<br />
whether it is merely a matter of principle, or of practice, or both, the key question is whether it<br />
makes any real difference to those most directly affected by any planned intervention. 681 In<br />
other words we ask: does the participation enable the communities to have their voices heard?<br />
Does it enable them to assert their own ideas about what their needs and problems are, what<br />
solutions need to be found, and what resources are made available? Does it enable the<br />
creation of a shared institutional system of meaning among the key players, as they jointly<br />
construct a new institutional pattern to govern an existing resource regime? These questions<br />
illuminate the key elements that define drawbacks in the institutional and participation<br />
process, as evidenced in the management of Kakamega forest.<br />
There are varied views on which level of participation is most appropriate, and its importance<br />
that those using participation clarify its specific application. For instance, Finkel and Bevis<br />
point out that participation in formal procedures like attending community meetings, joining<br />
with others to raise issues or contacting elected leaders can have an educative effect,<br />
increasing interest and efficacy as well as building support for development. 682 However,<br />
Bratton et al. argue that institutions aimed at generating real participation should find ways of<br />
shifting from the commonly passive, incentive-driven participation towards the more<br />
interactive end of the spectrum. 683 Others like Ulfelder and Poats labour to question the reality<br />
of community self-mobilization. They argue that not all local communities possess the<br />
organizational skills and technical knowledge to conduct forest management. They also<br />
highlighted the dangers of these supposedly ‘ideal’ bottom-up activities as they may lead to<br />
inequalities in the community, with complete auto-mobilization generating conservation<br />
activities that favour the powerful locals and prejudice against socially disadvantaged<br />
members of the community. 684<br />
Thus, the lack of a universally agreed-upon definition of participation is not only due to<br />
differences in scale and interpretation, but also due to fundamental differences in the moral<br />
grounds regarding the effectiveness of a particular approach. At a more local level of resource<br />
681 Ulfelder, W. H. and S. V. Poats. 1997. Buscando la Conservacion Participativa. Quito, Ecuador. The Nature<br />
Conservancy and Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales 1:1-30.<br />
682 Finkel, C. S and Bevis, G. 2000. “Civic Education, Civil Society and Political Mistrust in a Developing<br />
Democracy: The Case of the Dominican Republic. World Development 24: 1851-1874.<br />
683 Bratton, Michael, Robert Mattes and E. Gyimah-Boadi. 2003. Learning About Reform: People, Democracy,<br />
and Markets in Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.<br />
684 Posey, D. A. 1992. "Traditional Knowledge, Conservation and `The Rainforest Harvest'." In Sustainable<br />
Harvest and Marketing of Rain Forest Products, edited by. M. Plotkin and L. Famolare, 441-443.<br />
Washington, DC: Conservation International, Island Press.<br />
184
management such as Kakamega, these pitfalls also illustrate the institutional dilemmas that<br />
arise when planning for forest management. In this treatment we therefore point out that, for<br />
institutions to be more effectively promoted, these institutional conflicts and limitations<br />
should be addressed. Therefore, in the foregoing treatment, we discuss the issues that should<br />
be learnt in respect to Kakamega forest.<br />
The management of Kakamega forest presents some of the most compelling lessons on the<br />
right of communities and resource users’ rights regarding participation in formal institutional<br />
framing particularly, in the realm of environmental decision-making. These are a classical<br />
manifestation of the inequities faced by communities living around biodiversity hot spots such<br />
as Kakamega forest. Perhaps the most significant lesson from the management of Kakamega<br />
forest is the role prejudice and perception of local communities play in the management of<br />
natural resources and other related biota. These prejudices as illustrated by some of the<br />
negative perceptions held by forest wardens and as pointed out by the traditional and local<br />
leaders, display the complete lack of opportunity for participation in formal institutional<br />
framing and environmental decision-making and management.<br />
Up to 1931, Kakamega forest was managed by local people especially the village elders and<br />
was then brought under the control of the then Forest Department (FD) which gazetted the<br />
forest as Trust Forest in 1933. In fact a lot of villages adjacent to the western border of the<br />
forest are named after indigenous forest tree species. It is clear that the colonial government<br />
originated the gazetting of present day Kakamega forest without involving or giving due<br />
consideration to the participation of the local people most especially the Luhya in the process.<br />
Most of the planning was done in the colonial capital, Nairobi, hundreds of miles away from<br />
Kakamega. The local people had no idea of what was going on and only got to know of the<br />
process when the forest was already gazetted and were being notified not to cross into certain<br />
reserved areas. This was followed by information to locals that whoever was found in these<br />
reserves was bound to be penalised. This also preluded the subsequent framing of the criminal<br />
Trespass Act.<br />
These issues are very significant in the sense that, the process of gazetting Kakamega was<br />
lengthy, involving several phases. All available accounts indicate no time when government<br />
and its respective agencies such as the Kenya Wildlife Authority or the Forest Services,<br />
considered involving the Luhya in the decision-making process. Neither were they involved in<br />
the planning for the management regimes to be used in the governance of the forest. No due<br />
consideration was given to whatever interests the Luhya have towards the forest. No<br />
particular consideration regarding historical significance of the forest to the Luhya people was<br />
fitted into the gazetting equation. The effects of all these issues on the future success of forest<br />
management were intentionally or unwittingly blurred. Instead the law gazetting Kakamega<br />
forest was debated and approved without much or mention of what the Luhya people had to<br />
say, in their own right as the indigenous community in Kakamega Forest. Therefore, it is<br />
certainly clear that the above processes flawed the principles and ideals governing<br />
institutionalism and participation.<br />
185
What happened in the gazetting of Kakamega forest, and what happened to the Luhya in<br />
particular, clearly elucidates what many indigenous people in the Tropical World experience<br />
in the realm of environmental and resource decision-making, management and legislation.<br />
This is largely rooted in the colonial administrative and institutional framing process as<br />
evidenced by British system of indirect rule administration, not only in Kenya but also else<br />
where in Africa. For instance, in his writings about Native Administration in the British<br />
Territories, Lord Hailey reported that:<br />
The indigenous communities in resource rich areas such as forests were not involved in the<br />
legislation decision–making process at any level and certainly not in any matters relating to<br />
environment or natural resource management. 685<br />
This same analysis was made by John Cell in response to the British indirect rule regarding<br />
natural resource management in Ghana. He noted that when Ghana was first colonised by the<br />
British, they created a loose system of local governance in regard to the management of<br />
natural resources headed by a chief who was in most cases outside the immediate community<br />
responsible for a defines resource system such as a forest. The chief was an appointee of the<br />
colonial head, the Governor, and was not accountable to the local people he headed. 686 In the<br />
same regard, Delflem who made a comparative study on law enforcement in British Colonial<br />
Africa points out that:<br />
Backed by power of the colonial government in guise of the district commissioner, the<br />
chiefs’ powers of arrest and seizure and control, over allocation and use of forest and other<br />
landed resources were unlimited. His powers were limited by his accountability to the<br />
District Commissioner who was also in turn accountable to a distant colonial official. The<br />
chiefs were therefore relatively free to exploit their subjects. 687<br />
Therefore the above expositions explain the current flaws in the forest management in<br />
Tropical regions in general and Kakamega in particular. We are specifically talking about<br />
what happens to resource communities in the realm of institutionalism and management of<br />
forest and other related environmental resources. Like the Luhya of Kakamega, many of the<br />
communities around forests often wake up to the inconvenient truth from the government<br />
policy making machinery, informing them to give up their resource rights and interests,<br />
without prior consultation or involvement in the gazetting process. Indeed lack of<br />
participation in the decision-making process is one of the key issues of concern that was<br />
raised by many of the local community elders in Kakamega. This is especially important in<br />
natural resources decision-making and management, since most of the local people often find<br />
their livelihoods being part of the protected areas such as Kakamega forest.<br />
685<br />
Hailey, L. 1951. Native Adminstration in the British African Teritories: A genaral Survey of the System of<br />
Administration Part iv. London: His Majesty’s Stationary office 34. Pp 358-361<br />
686<br />
Cell, J.W. 1970. The Britsh Colonial Admisntration in the Ninteenth Century. The Policy Making Process.<br />
New Haven:Yale University Press.<br />
687<br />
Deflem, M. 1994. British Colonial Africa: A comparative Analysis of Imperial Polcing in Nyasaland, The<br />
Gold Coast and Kenya. London: Sage. Pp 53-55.<br />
186
We have already indicated that like in other areas of British colonial Empire, the colonial<br />
government did not involve the Luhya people in the decision making process because of the<br />
colonial prejudice regarding the local communities and resource commons especially<br />
forests. 688 Accordingly it did not occur even to the colonial government that the local people<br />
such as the Luhya, were worth consulting or involving in the process. However, what is more<br />
striking is that the post colonial governments have not been any different from the colonial<br />
government. Many of the current government officials still hold the colonial constructs that<br />
local people are bad environmental managers. This was clearly illustrated by the regional and<br />
local government officials in Kakamega. For example, we noted that many of the officials<br />
involved in the enforcement of formal legal regimes viewed the Luhya elders as people who<br />
collaborate with the resource exploiters, a scenario that fuels acrimony between the<br />
mainstream forest management and the traditional forest managers. This defeats the real<br />
objectives of decentralisation and natural resource governance in tropical countries like<br />
Kenya. 689 In many ways, this has acted as a bottleneck to institutionalism and participation,<br />
because of failure to involve local people in the resource management decision-making<br />
process.<br />
The lesson to learn here is that prejudice against the local people has its effect on the right of<br />
the local people to participate in the day-to-day institutional making process. Local people<br />
and their knowledge need to be involved in the national planning process, since this is one of<br />
the root causes of the institutional conflict in resource management in Kakamega and Kenya<br />
as a whole. The integration of local knowledge within the wide institutional planning process<br />
is fundamental because it inherently manifests the important role of involving local people in<br />
the decision-making process.<br />
In addition to the above, one other compelling lesson to learn from the Kakamega scenario is<br />
that there obtains a general lack of commitment and apathy by government towards setting up<br />
mechanisms that can guarantee meaningful participation of the local people in the institutional<br />
making processes for resource management. The National Environment Management Policy<br />
(NEMP) requires that government should set up guidelines for public participation in the<br />
environmental decision-making process. However, close to ten years, national guidelines for<br />
public participation in environmental decision-making process have never been made. This<br />
has resulted into local people or local community resource users to come up with resourceful<br />
ways of participating and involving themselves in traditional environmental management.<br />
However, because there are no national guidelines for public and community participation in<br />
environmental management, such traditional innovations regarding biodiversity/environment<br />
resource utilisation are never formally institutionalised. For this same reason, the clash<br />
between traditional institutions and formal institution persists.<br />
688 Wanjala, S. 2000. Essays on Land Law:The Reform Debate in Kenya. Nairobi: University of Nairobi.<br />
689 Kant, S. 2000. A Dynamic Approach to Forest Regimes in Developing Economies. Ecological Economics 32:<br />
287-300.<br />
187
Lastly, the competing interests between national agencies linked to environment like the<br />
NEMA, KWS and the Forestry Services, work with various local government committees. All<br />
these myriad of committees are purported to work at local levels but work parallel to each<br />
other. To such agencies, these local committees are the conduits of participation. However,<br />
these committees are opaque and it was hard to understand who constitutes these local<br />
committees was hard to understand. There are no local community representatives on these<br />
committees. They are there in name, but not in actual presence. The existence of such a<br />
malfunctioned and unrepresentative process creates disintegrated institutional framework in<br />
the management of environmental and biodiversity resources in Kakamega district. When it<br />
comes to participation especially in the terms of production, management as well as benefitsharing<br />
in form of revenue generated from sale of products, licences and related eco-tourism<br />
services, it was found out that no such mechanisms existed at all. It was not therefore,<br />
surprising to learn that the representatives of these agencies at the district and provincial<br />
levels have a very faint appreciation of what obtains locally in the forest and among the forest<br />
communities. It was also not surprising that most of the local communities have an equally<br />
vague perception of what the formal regimes/laws regarding biodiversity are.<br />
8.4 Institutionalism and participation in Kakamega: An out look<br />
In the ensuing section we torch into the future of institutional framing and participation in<br />
respect to the Kakamega and Kenya as a whole. We examine this within the global discourse<br />
on the right of local communities to participate in resources and environmental decisionmaking,<br />
natural resource legislation and management. The Luhya for instance, identify<br />
themselves as the indigenous people of Kakamega forest and we are therefore, going to<br />
examine their right to institutional participation in that context. We also make this<br />
examination in the realm of forest reserve/protected area designing and management. The<br />
following questions are therefore pertinent: why are they created, how are they created and for<br />
whom are they created? The rights of local people are x-rayed in an international framework<br />
for participation of local people in institutional framing in regard to the management of<br />
protected areas. Indigenous people inhabit nearly 20 percent of the planet, mainly in areas<br />
where they have lived for thousands of years. Compared with protected area managers, who<br />
control about 6 percent of the world's land mass, indigenous peoples are the earth's most<br />
important stewards. 690<br />
Eclecticism, institutionalism in forest reserve management<br />
The conventional debates regarding protected area approaches have been dominant in the last<br />
200 years. However, these have tended to see humans and nature as completely different<br />
clusters, often seeking the exclusion of humans from the identified areas of interest,<br />
690 Kothari, A. 2003. Community-oriented Conservation Legislation: Is South Asia Getting Somewhere? In<br />
Innovative Governance: indigenous Peoples, Local Communities and Protected Areas, edited by H. Jaireth<br />
and D. Smyth, Pp 1-26. New Dehli: Ane Books.<br />
188
prohibiting the use of natural resources and seeing their concerns and interests as<br />
incompatible and contradictory to sustainable resource management. 691 Therefore, given that<br />
most protected areas in the tropical world have people residing in and around them, as well as<br />
depending on them in terms of livelihood support, the notion of designing institutions that<br />
exclude such people from the identified areas has profound social, economic and<br />
environmental costs. This is grounded in the fact that local people have existed even before<br />
the creation of the forest reserve or other related interventions. 692<br />
In ancient Greece untamed natural areas were perceived as a domain of the wild, irrational,<br />
female forces that contrasted with the rational culture ordered by the males. Through this<br />
conceptualisation, man was seen to be at war with nature. 693 On the contrary, wild nature was<br />
seen to provide sanctuary to those who had been illed by the city’s brutality. The WWF and<br />
the IUCN uses the tales of the Gilgamesh, the world’s most ancient city to illustrate this<br />
primordial struggle between kingly civilisation and the forest. It is this eclectic idea of forest<br />
wilderness that formed the basis for the evolving and current concept of protected area<br />
management. The earliest examples of protected areas suggest that game reserves for royal<br />
hunts were first recorded in the history of Assyria-Ashoka. This idea was reinforced in India<br />
especially among the ruling Mogul elites. 694 In the 11 th century, the Normans introduced this<br />
same idea in England, through enforcing the concept of royal forests during the reign of King<br />
Henry II, leading to the declaration of almost one quarter of England as Royal forests.<br />
In the United States of America, the concept of protected area management began with end of<br />
the American civil war. Lafeyette who led the attack on the native red Indians professed the<br />
principle of take no prisoners. He deviated from the earlier beliefs and prejudices that the red<br />
Indians were superstitious, treacherous and marauders. In that respect Lafayette proposed that<br />
the remnants of the conquered states be preserved in the protected areas. This later paved the<br />
way for the establishment of the National Parks Service (NPS) in 1916. 695 This was followed<br />
by successive legislations that associated the wilderness with preservation. This also laid the<br />
foundation for exclusionary model of conservation that was established in the entire United<br />
States of America, as stated in the 1964 Wilderness act, expressing the need to conserve<br />
nature. The act stipulated the principles of conservation through creating of national and<br />
forest parks. 696 According to this act, its major objective is to preserve some of the country's<br />
last remaining wild places in order to protect their natural processes and values from<br />
development. Not only did the Wilderness Act establish a system of wilderness, it also put in<br />
place a process for expanding the system. In doing so, the Act made a fundamental change in<br />
how new wilderness areas were recommended and acted upon. Essentially, the act shifted<br />
691<br />
Jeffery, M. 1996. Public Lands Reform: A Reluctant Leap into the Abyss. Virginia Environmental Law<br />
Journal Law 16(1): 80-95<br />
692<br />
Ibid.<br />
693<br />
Ibid.<br />
694<br />
Colchester, M. 2003. Conservation Policy of the Common Wealth. A Paper Presented to the Conference of<br />
the Common Wealth at the Millenium Development Goals. Common Wealth Policy Studies Unit. Institute of<br />
Common Wealth Studies. University of London.<br />
695<br />
Keller, R and M, Turok. 1998. American Indians and National Parks. University of Arizoina Press.<br />
696<br />
The Wilderness Act Handbook of 1964. Washington, D.C.<br />
189
much of this responsibility from the federal land management agencies and put it into the<br />
hands of the American people and the legislative process. 697<br />
We ought to mention that the American model of nature conservation set precedence in terms<br />
of protected area management in the years that followed. This was especially common with<br />
many of the newly independent states of Tropical Africa, though it was not any different from<br />
the conservation model which had earlier on been set up by their former colonial masters. In<br />
the same way the American model of conservation also formed the basis of what is today<br />
known as the classical model of protected area management. This classical model largely<br />
looks at setting aside protected areas for protection of particular wildlife, with a major<br />
emphasis on how things work rather than how natural systems functioned. Under the classical<br />
model, protected areas or reserves are managed for tourists and visitors whose interests<br />
normally prevailed over those of the local people. The Kakamega model of forest reserve<br />
management falls under this kind of arrangement. In this regard we note that the classical<br />
model of reserve management puts much emphasis on wilderness and ecosystems rather than<br />
the human system interactions and as a result, management of protected areas is done by<br />
central governments, run by technocrats with little regard to local knowledge and local<br />
methods of resource usage and conservation.<br />
Emerging paradigms in institutionalism, participation and forest reserve management<br />
The last two decades have seen a shift from the “fines and fences” method of conservation.<br />
Other scholars like Adrian call it the move away from the ‘fortress conservation’ framework<br />
to a community-oriented protected areas approach has emerged alongside international trends<br />
seeking to combine conservation and local community development, hence the notion of<br />
community-based conservation. These divergent shifts have paralleled paradigms which have<br />
occurred in the discipline of natural resource conservation, away from reductionism to a<br />
systems view of the ecosystem, towards an inclusion of humans in the ecosystem<br />
management. The new paradigm shifts also manifest a deviation from expert-based<br />
approaches to participatory approaches to ecosystem management. 698<br />
The changing paradigm is thus an elucidation of the growing change in the classic view of<br />
protected area management. This new paradigm is an advocate to inclusion of local resource<br />
users’ knowledge and perceptions in the conservation of natural resources such as forest<br />
ecosystems.<br />
The new paradigm also contrasts in almost every respect with the classic model of<br />
conservation and management of protected areas. It includes social economic, conservation<br />
and restoration, rehabilitation, regeneration objectives of protected area of forest reserve<br />
management. The new paradigm further involves creating protected areas, often for scientific,<br />
697 Ibid.<br />
698 Adrian, P. 2003. The New Paradigm for Protected Area Management. In Innovative Governance: Indigenous<br />
People,Local Communities and Protected Areas, edited by Hanna. J and S.Dermont, 1-24. S. New Dehli:<br />
Ane Books.<br />
190
economic and cultural values with a more complex and elaborate rationale. Under this<br />
paradigm, the protected areas are managed to ensure that local people contribute in terms of<br />
local knowledge and rule-making. 699 The new paradigm also postulates that the objectives for<br />
the creation of reserve or protected areas should not undermine the interests of the local<br />
people. In other words, local people should benefit from the eventual outcomes of the created<br />
reserves. In this bid, the paradigm recognises that the so-called wilderness areas are often<br />
culturally important areas and therefore, formal institutionalisation and management of such<br />
areas, should view the local people who reside in and around such areas as inputs to the entire<br />
conservation matrix. 700<br />
One other compelling key element underlying the new paradigm on protected area<br />
management is the quest for social equity in the protected area conservation. The proponents<br />
for the social equity component are found to ground their concerns in the widely shared<br />
ethical and moral gaps that characterise the classical conservation model. Their argument lies<br />
in the plight of many communities including some of the world’s poorest and marginalized<br />
resource communities. 701 This is because many of these communities especially the<br />
indigenous communities such as the Luhya, have been involuntarily barred from accessing<br />
some of their traditionally owned resources, as a result of the creation of reserves and<br />
protected areas. This, in most cases has profound economic and social consequences.<br />
Therefore, equity in protected areas emphasises the need to come up with institutions for<br />
resource conservation that do not harm the human society whose livelihood and traditions<br />
depend on the targeted resource base. This position is overtly articulated by the World<br />
Conservation Union in the strategy for sustainable living. The strategy argues that the process<br />
of creating reserves and protected areas should take into consideration the involvement of<br />
local area inhabitants’ interests, notions and knowledge systems. The process should also<br />
enlist effective participation of the said communities in the design and management<br />
operations of the individual protected areas. 702 Along with the emergence of equity concerns<br />
in conservation, there has been a growing concern for the unique skills, resources and local<br />
institutions the indigenous and local people can bring to the protected area management.<br />
Management practices that engage communities’ local knowledge and skills are seen to<br />
enhance the long-term effectiveness of protected area conservation.<br />
Accordingly, most countries such as Kenya have developed National Biodiversity Strategy<br />
and Action Plans (NBSAPs) to strengthen their capacity to respond to their obligations under<br />
the CBD. These NBSAPs contain elements that acknowledge, in many ways, indigenous<br />
699 Langton, M. 1998. Burning Questions: Emerging Environmental Issues for Indigenous Peoples in Northern<br />
Australia. Darwin Centre for Indigenous Natural and Cultural Resource Management, Northern Territory<br />
University.<br />
700 Grazia- Borrini, F, A. Kothari, and Gonzalo, O. 2004. Indigenous and Local Communities and Protected<br />
Areas:Towards and Equity and Enhance Conservation. Best Practice Protected Area Guidelines Series.<br />
No.11<br />
701 Jeffery, M. 2004. International Legal Regime for Protected Area Management. In International<br />
Environmental Govervanace: An International Regime for Protected Areas., edited by J.Scanlon and<br />
F.Burhenne-Guilmin, 9-37. IUCN Environmental Policy Paper No. 49<br />
702 McNeely, J. A. 1994. Lessons from the past: Forests and biodiversity. Biodiversity and Conservation 3: 3-20.<br />
191
peoples’ Knowledge and contributions to biodiversity conservation. Such innovations by local<br />
communities are mostly in the area of in situ conservation measures that involve these peoples<br />
who retain traditional or indigenous knowledge systems. These acknowledgements are not<br />
without contradiction, but should be construed as a representation of diversity of opinion in<br />
form of local and formal institutional mediation. It is also a reflection of how formal<br />
institutions position indigenous people and local communities in both the country and within<br />
the international conservation and global market system.<br />
As earlier noted, many of the biodiversity resource rich countries in Tropical Africa are<br />
economically developing nations and the majority of their people survive outside cities and<br />
within a subsistence economy that relies heavily on such resources like forests for traditional<br />
food production knowledge. 703 For example, most economically developing African countries<br />
do not have the capacity for all of the people who live within their borders to fully enter the<br />
market economy. Without attention paid to the protection and preservation of the lands and<br />
waters of local communities and indigenous people, these nations would be unable to feed<br />
their populations. 704 This critical fact has given impetus to serious consideration of the<br />
development of community-oriented protected areas across the Afro-Tropical region to ensure<br />
that national resources development does not result into massive exploitation. Some countries<br />
in acknowledgement of their agreement to the principles of the CBD, are seeking ways to<br />
conserve rich biospheres whilst balancing a need to ensure that traditional communities can<br />
continue to sustain themselves. Given that in most regions of the globe, significant numbers<br />
of people rely on access to their traditional land and sea resources for survival. 705 It is<br />
therefore, in the interest of nations and the interest of durable conservation to engage<br />
indigenous people and local communities in the task of protecting the biological diversity in<br />
their environment.<br />
In respect to the above postulation, the Kakamega scenario and the Kenya as a whole<br />
represents a deviation from this paradigm. The deviations in this regard need no<br />
recapitulation. The Kakamega case study provides an insightful account of how indigenous<br />
peoples and local communities in Kenya have been disenfranchised of their traditional<br />
governance and management role in relation to natural resources. The vast majority of natural<br />
resources in Kenya are government-controlled. Starting with the introduction of Trust Land<br />
administration systems introduced during colonial time, virtually any land on which forests<br />
and related resource are found, does not belong to local or indigenous communities. Such<br />
resources automatically belong to the government, apart from limited examples of common<br />
customary resource rights.<br />
703 Matowanyika, J., R. Serafin, et al. 1992. Conservation and Development in Africa: A Management Guide to<br />
Protected Areas and Local Populations in the Afrotropical Realm. Gland, Switzerland: WWF International.<br />
704 Ibid.<br />
705 Storrs, M. and E.Young. 1999. Indigenous Social, Economic and Cultural Issues in Land, Water and<br />
Biodiversity Conservation: A Scoping Study for WWF Australia, unpublished report on behalf of the Centre<br />
for Indigenous Natural and Cultural Resource Management, NTU, Darwin.<br />
192
The wider and long-term implications for this kind of scenario is that the loss of biodiversity<br />
and the degrading quality of the country and regional environment. But we should also point<br />
out the increasing failure on the side of the state controlled environmental agencies to<br />
recognise the continued loss of cultures and knowledge related to biodiversity conservation.<br />
Traditional peoples have accumulated vast amounts of ecological knowledge in their long<br />
history of managing the environment - knowledge that could be beneficial for nature<br />
conservation and sustainable use of natural resources in the country. Through evaluation and<br />
analysis, we have found out that indigenous and traditional peoples can sustainably manage<br />
their resources, maintain usage, and strengthen their traditional/ local ecological knowledge.<br />
Therefore, it is imperative that central and regional level governments fully respects<br />
indigenous and traditional peoples' importance in terms of their role in ecological<br />
conservation, through realization that their local institutions have in some respects been<br />
instrumental in the management and governance of national resources, though this is a<br />
difficult and complex challenge in times of globalisation and expanding economic and market<br />
forces; a task that requires cooperation and partnerships.<br />
Implications for policy<br />
The theoretical arguments related to local participation and establishment of institutions for<br />
effective management of forest biodiversity in protected areas have been highlighted at length<br />
in the previous chapters and various sections of this chapter. There is no doubt that, without<br />
genuine institutional support and participation, successful resource conservation in Kakamega<br />
forest and Kenya at large will be hard to achieve. In this section we make an analysis of the<br />
existing weakness in the institutional frameworks for the management of forest resources in<br />
Kenya and specifically the implications for national resource regimes. In the same analysis lie<br />
the critical issues that need to be revisited in order to review the existing flaws in the<br />
management of the forests like Kakamega. For the purposes of this study, the existing<br />
institutional issues and implications will be examined at three levels. These include the<br />
national level, sub-national/regional level and the local level.<br />
At the national level, a highly dominant and influential state-centred characteristic of the<br />
institutional context in which the creation of Kakamega Forest Reserve is situated, greatly<br />
obtains. This exemplifies the centralised nature of the institutional structure in Kenya.<br />
Particularly in the regard to environmental state institutions and agencies, most of the<br />
decision-making takes place in the capital city, Nairobi, with minimal decision-making power<br />
held by sub-national. Several agencies involved in the planning and management of natural<br />
resources like forests reserves, admitted to this centralised system. This has been a commonly<br />
reported drawback in the management of Kakamega forest Reserve. This has also been high<br />
lighted in the management of other protected area management systems such as Latin<br />
America, 706 and Tropical Africa. 707 This system of centralised government and large<br />
706 Hall, A. 1997. Sustaining Amazonia: Grassroots Action for Productive Conservation. Manchester:<br />
193
ureaucracies tends to increase transaction costs and the rigid, centralised attempts to manage<br />
forest ecosystems often lead to their collapse. 708 Worse still, like in many tropical resourced<br />
countries of Africa, the decentralised system of resource management in Kenya has been held<br />
hostage by the dominant forces of elite capture. The political and economic conditions in<br />
Kenya are not supportive of local conservation and sustainable development initiatives,<br />
making progressive reserve management all the more challenging at the regional and local<br />
level.<br />
The issues pointed out at the national level are an indication of the fundamental and difficult<br />
challenges that exist at the sub-national/regional level. Like we have earlier pointed out, there<br />
are several institutional weaknesses at the regional level which are hindering local<br />
participation and effective reserve management in Kakamega. All institutions and agencies<br />
involved in the planning and management of Kakamega forest reserve located at the city<br />
centre, in Nairobi. The relationships between the institutions and enforcement agencies<br />
involved in the management of this reserve, and the relations between institutions working on<br />
environment-development related issues, are weak. The key respondents in charge of these<br />
institutions at the regional level intimated about the general lack of communication,<br />
information sharing, co-ordination, and collaboration between institutions. This has not only<br />
added to the already existing institution inefficiencies in planning for the Kakemega forest<br />
management, but has also led to conflicts between institutional agencies. In addition, it was<br />
evident that there exists an imbalance in power between certain institutions, particularly<br />
between state and non-state at the regional level and those at the national and local levels,<br />
further affecting relationships and decision-making. Perhaps the greatest hindrance to local<br />
participation and sustainable reserve management from the regional level has come from what<br />
Rosendo and Brown call ‘problems of fit’, both within and between institutions. 709<br />
It is often assumed that institutions and actors are involved in strategic alliances and coalitions<br />
have mutual interests and goals. However, in real practice they may only be a limited mutual<br />
means of achieving quite different objectives. These same variations and difference have been<br />
particularly noticeable in the goals, that is to say: national conservation and aid/developmentoriented<br />
priorities on one hand and visions- that is short-term versus long-term thinking and<br />
planning between institutions on the other. 710 Perhaps the most controversial “problems of fit”<br />
that exist between actors has been the opinionated differences regarding formal resource<br />
entitlements such as property rights being given to the communities within the Kakamega<br />
Forest Reserve, and the degree to which the local communities should be allowed to take part<br />
in the decision-making regarding the management of reserve. These institutional weaknesses<br />
Manchester University Press.<br />
707<br />
Hitchcock, R.K. 2005. Centralisation, Resource Depletion and Coercive Conservation among the Tyua of<br />
Northern Karahari. Human Ecology 23(2):169-198.<br />
708<br />
Holling, C. S. 1995. What barriers? What bridges? . In Barriers and Bridges to the Renewal of Ecosystems<br />
and Institutions. Edited by C. S, Holling, 14-16. New York: Columbia University Press.<br />
709<br />
Brown, K. and S. Rosendo. 1998. The Institutional Architecture of Extractive Reserves in Rondonia, Brazil.<br />
Norwich, U.K: CSERGE.<br />
710<br />
Ascher, W. 1995. Communities and Sustainable Forestry in Developing Countries. San Francisco, CA: ICS<br />
Press.<br />
194
will make it much more difficult to reach consensus between actors in the management of the<br />
forest reserve.<br />
At the local level, we note that; the dismal progress in the development institutionalisation of<br />
natural resource conservation policies in the tropical region, especially among the resource<br />
rich countries, has led to variegated opinions between academics and actors in the field of<br />
tropical resource management. The changed dimensions of thinking have led to an<br />
institutional shift. This move represents a new focus away from state-centred policies which<br />
are limited in their effectiveness to mobilise information, efficiently institutional enforcement<br />
and support or sanction resource use behaviour. 711 The current shift is geared to finding<br />
solutions at the localised level in the management of natural resources especially in the realm<br />
of forest resources. 712<br />
These shifts have been highlighted by the various multilateral organisations in the realm of<br />
environment and development such as the IUCN. The shifts also indicate the category<br />
classifications that that is meant to clarify and enhance community participation in institutions<br />
regarding environmental decision-making and natural resource management. Although we<br />
realise that all protected areas must be specifically dedicated to the protection and<br />
maintenance of biological diversity and natural resources, the new shifts as postulated by<br />
IUCN guidelines, recognise a gradual change of human intervention. 713<br />
Within the new guidelines there are several asserted conditions believed necessary for<br />
successful natural resource management by local people. Most of these requirements<br />
recapitulate the centrality of the notion that local communities have the ability to create<br />
institutions to regulate the use of their natural resources. Local institutional arrangements have<br />
been shown to be more effective in providing, inter alia, rules related to access, harvesting,<br />
and management, allowing faster, cheaper and more effective response to conflict, monitoring<br />
and sanctioning methods. 714 Thus, the detailed guidance on respective categories, reflect the<br />
significance of different levels of human intervention in resource use and conservation.<br />
Accordingly, following category 1b of the IUCN guidelines, indicate that successful natural<br />
resource management under a protected area arrangement should be compatible with<br />
indigenous human communities living in low density and in balance with the available<br />
resources. 715 Similarly, category II of the same guidelines indicates that resource management<br />
should take into account the needs of the local people and these should be culturally<br />
compartible. 716 Category III calls for protection of specific natural or natural/cultural feature<br />
which is of outstanding or unique value because of its inherent rarity, representative or<br />
aesthetic qualities or cultural significance. The cardinal objective of this category is to protect<br />
711 Peluso, N. 1993. Coercing Conservation? The Politics of State Resource Control. Global Environmental<br />
Change 3 (2):199-217.<br />
712 IUCN. 1996. World Conservation Congress:Resolutions and Recommendations. Gland:IUCN<br />
713 Ibid.<br />
714 Bromley, D.W et al. 1992. Making the Commons Work: Theory, Practice and Policy. San Francisco, CA: ICS<br />
Press.<br />
715 IUCN. 1994. Guidelines for Protected Area Management Categories. Gland and Cambridge: IUCN<br />
716 Ibid.<br />
195
or preserve in perpetuity specific outstanding natural features because of their natural<br />
significance, unique or representational quality, and/or spiritual connotations. 717<br />
On the other hand, category IV of the same guidelines is meant to deliver benefits to the<br />
residents that are residing within the designated areas. This is supported by category V, which<br />
emphasises the significance of continuation of traditional uses, practices, social and cultural<br />
manifestations that are intended to bring related benefits and contribute to the welfare of the<br />
residents residing within the designated areas. 718 Lastly, category VI underscores the<br />
importance of conserving forest biodiversity while meeting the needs of the community,<br />
through a sustained flow of natural conditions and thus in practice limits the actual area in<br />
which community needs can be fulfilled to the one described as limited areas of modified<br />
ecosystems.<br />
The cardinal importance of enumerating the above guidelines for protected areas conservation<br />
is to alert nation-states such as Kenya, about the importance of local peoples’ knowledge and<br />
their role is the creation of protected area management. We therefore, do not need to remention<br />
that the above guidelines are aimed at encouraging governments in such nation-states<br />
to develop institutions that are tailored to meet the both national but most critically local<br />
circumstances in order to reduce the conflicts that arise out of unmitigated institutions, as<br />
illuminated by the Kakamega scenario. It also implies setting up Standard Operation<br />
Procedures (SOPs) that can facilitate institutional alignment. 719 This is also embedded in the<br />
Convention for Biodiversity and highlighted by the conference of parties, as a response to the<br />
growing importance for the protected area. The two instruments underline the important<br />
elements of equity, participation and benefit sharing. It is also a move towards “alternatives”<br />
through the search for cognitive notions of individuals, society as well as facilitating<br />
community empowerment. 720 This move may entrench resource management institutions<br />
rather than resist current forms of formal regulation as evidenced by the Kakamega case<br />
study.<br />
717 Ibid.<br />
718 IUCN. 1994, Opcit.<br />
719 DFID. 1999. Shaping Forest Management: How coalitions manage forests. London: DFID.<br />
720 Pavlich, G. The Power of Community Mediation: Community Formation of Self Identity. Law and Society<br />
30(4):707-734.<br />
196
8.5 Summary<br />
The findings that have been enumerated in this treatment, together with the literature that has<br />
been reviewed, have revealed that tropical resource management is an intersection of many<br />
elements. Most of the issues that have been highlighted in the study illuminate the fact that<br />
institutional concerns still form the fulcrum in understanding and reforming biodiversity<br />
resource management in Kenya and Kakamega in particular. In that regard we mention that<br />
the main objective of this study has been to establish and confirm whether there are different<br />
notions of biodiversity and how such notions are mediated. To meet this objective, the study<br />
has examined the various notions relating to biodiversity alongside institutional positions. The<br />
results, analysis and observations in this study are summarised in a conceptual diagram, in<br />
three different stages as presented below.<br />
Stage I: Nature of institutions<br />
Figure 1 shows the two main levels of analysis that ought to be considered in understanding<br />
the structuring of resource institutions in Kenya and particularly in Kakamega. The national,<br />
sub-national and the local level. We also note that each of these levels is motivated by<br />
different mindsets that govern their thinking. The kind of thinking at the national/sub-national<br />
and local levels determines the structuring of institutions. Similarly the nature of these<br />
instructions explains the anticipated goals. Regarding the goals, our analysis revealed that<br />
both the local and national institutions have the same goal regarding the management of forest<br />
biodiversity in Kakamega. The two institutions aim at conserving the forest because of the<br />
nested benefits accruing from this natural resource endowment. However, we also noticed that<br />
the reasons for establishing the institutions were not always explicitly stated, although to a<br />
limited extent some similarities appeared. For instance, in the figure we note that the<br />
institutions at national/sub-national level are motivated by the fact that the forest contains<br />
globally threatened species. Similarly, the forest has high levels of biological diversity. In<br />
addition the forest provides high quality habitat for key species. It is also argued that the<br />
forest plays a very critical function of contributing systematically to the climatic conditions at<br />
the national and sub-national levels, yet the forest area is experiencing sharp economic and/or<br />
population pressure. In the final analysis, the government thinking is, gazetting the forest is<br />
the best option to conserve the forest.<br />
On the contrary, motivation for the institutions at the local level is buttressed in a number of<br />
arguments and these include the following: The forest provides a high level of subsistence<br />
and/or traditional use by the communities living around it. The forest also has great religious<br />
and spiritual significance to the communities residing around it. Furthermore, the forest has<br />
unusual features of aesthtic importance like springs geo and cultural heritage sites. Similarly,<br />
the forest has species of high social values such as medicinal and food retypes among others.<br />
In that regard the forest acts as the laboratory for the social ecological knowledge and<br />
learning. Lastly, the forest is a major contributor to the hydrological cycle that supports the<br />
agrarian economy on which the individuals/communities living around the forest depends. In<br />
197
espect to the above thinking, the structure of traditional authority at the local level believe<br />
that local institutions should be structured to control access and regulate resource usage in and<br />
around the forest in order to conserve the forest biodiversity.<br />
Stage 2: Explaining institutional dysfunction<br />
The above expositions demonstrate that, although there are two different levels of thinking,<br />
there is consensus regarding the need to conserve the forest biodiversity. The ultimate<br />
question that pops up is; why does the conflict between the two levels persist to the extent of<br />
creating a situation of institutional dysfunctioning? The answers to this question are<br />
positioned in process of institutional development and the ultimate implementation of the<br />
same instructions. There are many well-founded philosophical positions regarding<br />
institutional development which this study has highlighted. This stage has four main<br />
components. The first is the knowledge base that contains values, varied interests, models and<br />
information about the forest resources. We are aware that knowledge systems and the quality<br />
of information may vary remarkably from one level to another especially in a tropical<br />
resource country like Kenya. When reliable information is inadequate, and there are varied<br />
interests, the state institutional making machinery tends to base their actions on opinion and<br />
not facts. Beyond the debate on the institutional goals in which the role of values is apparent,<br />
this is an additional reason why models and values are so highly relevant. Values and models<br />
affect the policy-formulation process. The framing of the problem may in no doubt influence<br />
the selection of policy alternatives and recommendations, and may even constrain the<br />
selection of institutional instruments. For example, it is clear that the discussion about the use<br />
of forest gazetting and fines and fences method was highly influenced by colonial ideological<br />
considerations that went short of a holistic institutional dimension, and devoid of institutional<br />
participation.<br />
The remaining two components of this stage have to do with decision-making and<br />
implementation. If we were to take an extremely optimistic procedural position, it is critical to<br />
appreciate the fact that institutions regarding natural resource governance at the state level<br />
would best use the knowledge base to choose the best policies and to implement them in the<br />
best way. It is also paramount to bear in mind the pressure resulting from the contributing role<br />
of varied actors and actions, including those at the international level. The final outcome<br />
would be the best definition of institutions regarding natural resource governance, usage and<br />
related property rights. But, like we have earlier highlighted, because localised institutions<br />
have been ignored and sidelined in many ways, there has obtained a situation of conflicting as<br />
well as dysfunctional formal institutions. This is illustrated by the dotted rectangle, and the<br />
components therein, represent the institutional environment. The components that we have<br />
identified as playing a relevant role in determining the outcome of the institutional process are<br />
located inside the rectangle. Implementation problems are cardinal in this regard. Since<br />
institutions may be conceived as an equilibrium outcome, there may be multiple equilibrium,<br />
198
initial conditions, path dependence, and cultural beliefs are allowed to play a significant role<br />
in selecting the equilibrium.<br />
We have highlighted the importance of interactions between formal and informal systems<br />
especially the initial rule conditions, rule protestation, participation and the problem of<br />
ranking. All these have a great impact on the institutional path.<br />
Stage 3: Need for intuitional mediation<br />
At this stage we realise that there is need for technical evaluation of institutions. This<br />
evaluation would take into account the political, social, as well as the economic understanding<br />
of resource regimes. The evaluation of institutions is necessary so as to assess their<br />
effectiveness in achieving their goals. Like we have earlier suggested, genuine participation in<br />
the form of public deliberation should not be taken for granted when we talk of meaningful<br />
and durable institutional mediation. Our analysis indicates that there is no such a thing as<br />
genuine institutional mediation in Kenya. A purely “technical” assessment of institutions is a<br />
necessary prerequisite in order to avoid the above institutional dilemmas we have indicated.<br />
For example, we have identified a series of obstacles that institutions continue to face in the<br />
context of Kakamega. Our analysis further revealed that there have been no important feedback<br />
channels between the institutional making machinery at the national/sub-national level<br />
and implementation outcomes at the local level and that, as a result, the framed formal<br />
institutions have suffered significant challenges, hence the institutional dilemmas.<br />
Therefore in order to highlight the importance of institutionalised participation in the form of<br />
a shared learning process, the figure points out that there are feedback mechanisms that need<br />
to be instituted. We consider, however, that these feedback mechanisms can be effectively<br />
utilized. We believe that the biodiversity crisis in Kenya and the Kakamega scenario in<br />
particular presents great stock of accumulated knowledge in form of a cause and effect<br />
analysis. However, this knowledge has not been properly incorporated into the stock of the<br />
institutional reforms that have been drawn. Much of the findings on the results of institutional<br />
reforms in Kenya reveal that most of the reforms were executed outside the intensions of real<br />
institutional mediation but rather conducted in the ambit of multilateral institutions which<br />
have a tendency to focus on common features and to reject the idiosyncratic ones. Therefore<br />
because the incentives to institutional framing are variegated, in the corresponding rectangles<br />
we included the need to re-shape, re-examine and re-rank institutional inputs after getting<br />
feedback from shared learning and participation. Most importantly we point out that external<br />
pressure, and “endogenous” feedback from elsewhere in the system, ought to be processed<br />
here before exit to the public. In sum we must re- emphasise that analytical efforts of the<br />
decision-making machinery at the state level tends to give a blind eye on local actors, a fact<br />
which keeps the local notions basically missing, even though it is important to ensure the<br />
consistency between national level institutions and local practices at the local level.<br />
199
Figure 1: Conceptual Diagram<br />
200
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220
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221
List of Tables<br />
Table 6.1 Sample characteristics 127<br />
Table 6.2 Age of respondents participating in the survey 128<br />
Table 6.3 Education of respondents participating in the survey 130<br />
Table 6.4 Varying perceptions of local biodiversity in Kakamega 130<br />
Table 6.5 Respondents named after animal species 134<br />
Table 6.6 Why persons are named after different animal species. 135<br />
Table 6.7 Responses regarding protection of cherished plants in Kakamega 148<br />
Table 6.8 Individual responses regarding treatment condemned plants. 149<br />
Table 6.9 Custodians of local knowledge 152<br />
Table 6.10 Respondents perceptions of custodians of knowledge. 153<br />
Table 7.1 Why people visited sacred places in Kakamega Forest 165<br />
Table 7.2 How information about sacred places is transferred 165<br />
Table 7.3 Transfer of local ecological knowledge in Sacred Places 167<br />
Table 7.4 Why Respondents got plant species from sacred places 168<br />
222
List of Figures and Maps<br />
Map 1 Map of Kenya 10<br />
Map 2 Landsat ETM+ (7) satellite image 11<br />
Table 1 Summary of primary legal documents and policy papers reviewed 27<br />
Figure 1 Conceptual diagram 200<br />
223
Appendices<br />
Appendix A: Local Institutional Mapping Questionnaire<br />
Name of Interviewer…………………… Name of Interviewee …………………<br />
Enumeration Area…………………………………………………………………….<br />
Time at the start of Interview (24 Hour Clock)…………………<br />
Time at the End of Interview (24 Hour Clock)…………………<br />
Date of Interview…………………………<br />
Section 1: Respondents Bio-data<br />
Sub-Tribe Age M.Status Religion Education Occupatio<br />
n<br />
Gender Division<br />
1.Ishuha 1.15-24 1.Married 1.Catholic 1.P.Grad 1.Doctor 1.male 1.Kabras<br />
2.Wanga 2.25-34 2.Single 2.Aglican 2.Grad 2.Teacher 2.Femal 2.Ileho<br />
3.Malagori 3.35-44 3.Widow 3.Pentecost 3.Tertiary 3.T.Driver 3.Navakholo<br />
4.Kabras 4.45-54 4.Widower 4.ATR 4.Vocation 4.Farmer 4.Shinyalu<br />
5.Bakusu 5.55-64 5.SDA 5.Second 5.Trader 5.Ikolomani<br />
6.Batsotso 6.65-74 6.Muslim 6.Primary 6.C.Labou 6.Municipali<br />
7.Tiriki<br />
8.Marachi<br />
9.Banyala<br />
10.Bahaya<br />
11.Kisa<br />
12.Samia<br />
13.Banyore<br />
14.Marama<br />
15.Iduha<br />
16.Batura<br />
7.75-84 7.No Educ 7.UN.Emp<br />
What is the number of members in the family?<br />
What is the distance from the forest (Please register distance in Km)<br />
224
Response<br />
Codes<br />
Snakes<br />
Monkeys<br />
Frogs<br />
Bees<br />
Termites<br />
Lions<br />
Buffaloes<br />
Lizards<br />
Section 2: Biodiversity Perceptions<br />
2.1. Basing on your local (tribal, cultural or community) understanding of the<br />
surroundings, please how would you define the Kakamega forest environment<br />
(1) Hunting ground<br />
(2) Sacred forest of the community<br />
(3) An area of agricultural potential<br />
(4) Place of common ownership<br />
(5) Habitat for rare plants and animals<br />
(6) Others specify…………………………………………….<br />
2.2. The table below shows a list of animals and their perceived significance to the<br />
community. We would like you to inform us of any particular<br />
relationship/significance of each animal to he members of community.<br />
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9<br />
Brevity<br />
Prosperity<br />
History of<br />
events in<br />
family<br />
Tragedy<br />
Sign of<br />
luck<br />
Ancestry<br />
history<br />
Tragedy in<br />
communit<br />
y<br />
Good<br />
health<br />
2.3 Are there people that are named after those animal species in 8 above?<br />
Yes = 1 No. = 2<br />
Code Why people are named after such species Code The relationship with such species<br />
Wisdom<br />
225
1 Sign of luck 1 Sign of luck<br />
2 Prosperity<br />
2 Source of wisdom<br />
3<br />
3 Ancestry lineage<br />
4<br />
History of events<br />
Ancestry history 4 Cultural heritage<br />
5 Sign of Good Health 5 Source of protection<br />
6 Tragedy 6 Source of prosperity<br />
7 Sign of inspiration 7 Source of inspiration<br />
8 Others specify<br />
2.4 Do people become protective of such species?<br />
Yes = 1 No = 2<br />
2.5 Are such people allowed to eat such species?<br />
Yes = 1 No = 2<br />
2.6 Are such people males or females?<br />
Males = 1 No = 2<br />
Code Which animal species are highly threatened? Code Which plant species are highly threatened<br />
1 Monkeys 1<br />
2<br />
2<br />
Lizards<br />
3<br />
3<br />
4<br />
Kobs<br />
Snakes 4<br />
5 Elephants 5<br />
6 Lions 6<br />
7 Leopards 7<br />
8 Squirrels 8<br />
9 Others specify 9<br />
226
Section 3. Usage and management for biodiversity Species<br />
3.1. Are such plant and animals species demanded/hunted for any special<br />
reasons?<br />
Yes = 1 No = 2<br />
Code Why are such animal species threatened? Code Why are such plant species demanded?<br />
1 Community regards them as food<br />
1 Community regards them as food<br />
2<br />
2<br />
Demanded for Economic reasons<br />
Demanded for Economic reasons<br />
3<br />
3 Demanded for medication purposes<br />
4<br />
Demanded for medication purposes<br />
Used during circumcision ceremonies 4 Used during circumcision ceremonies<br />
5 Used during cleansing ceremonies 5 Used during cleansing ceremonies<br />
6 They are associated with good luck 6 They are associated with good luck<br />
7 They are associated with bad omens 7 They are associated with bad omens<br />
8 Cultures forbids such animals 8 Cultures forbids such animals<br />
9 Others specify 9 Others specify<br />
3.2. Are there penalties for such people who discrimatively hunt down such plant<br />
and animals?<br />
Yes = 1 No = 2<br />
Code Who enforces penalties for such crimes<br />
1<br />
The Community displinnery council<br />
2<br />
The village chief<br />
3<br />
Customary Law is used<br />
4 The forest wardens<br />
5 The tribal Head<br />
6 Village council of elders<br />
7 Parents<br />
8 Others specify<br />
227
Section 4. Community usage of the forest Environment<br />
4.1. Do people commit the same clan again after the penalties have been served?<br />
Yes = 1 No = 2<br />
Code If yes to the question above what do you think is the reason for doing so?<br />
1 The Community displinnery council is weak<br />
2 Penalties so flexible and weak<br />
3 Penalties cheap than offence<br />
4 The forest wardens are corrupt<br />
5 Culprits bribe their way out<br />
6 Species are highly demanded<br />
7 Customary Law is weak<br />
8 Enforcement mechanisms are weak.<br />
4.2 Are there special ceremonies in your culture that require the<br />
environment of a forest?<br />
Yes = 1 No = 2<br />
Code What are such ceremonies in your<br />
culture that need the environment of a<br />
forest<br />
1<br />
Chasing away of bad omens/luck<br />
2 Intercession for community / tribe<br />
3 Ceremonies relating to circumcision<br />
Code How did you learn about such ceremonies<br />
1 Parents<br />
2 School Peers<br />
3 From News papers<br />
4 Ceremonies regarding succession of<br />
elders<br />
4 Clan meeting<br />
5 Celebration of first born 5 Village peers<br />
6 Chasing or condemnation of evil 6 Teachers<br />
7<br />
spirits/members<br />
Cleansing of members<br />
7 Village elders<br />
8 Cerebration of harvest 8 Village chief<br />
9 Clan gatherings 9 Grand Parents<br />
10 Celebration of birth of twins 10 Tribal chief<br />
4.3. Have you ever taken part in such ceremonies?<br />
Yes = 1 No = 2<br />
228
Code How often are such ceremonies performed? Code Who performs such ceremonies?<br />
1 Monthly 1 Village chief<br />
2<br />
3<br />
After every three months<br />
Bi-Annually<br />
2 Clan Leader<br />
3 Spiritual leader<br />
4 Annually 4 Traditional Healer<br />
5 Others specify 5 Tribal Chief<br />
6 6 Council of elders<br />
4.4. Are there places referred as sacred within Kakamega forest?<br />
Yes =1 No= 2<br />
4.5 Are people allowed to visit such places?<br />
Yes = 1 No = 2<br />
Code If yes why are people allowed to visit such Code How did you learn about such sacred<br />
places<br />
spots?<br />
1 Spiritual healing 1 Through my parents<br />
2 Circumcision<br />
2<br />
My school peers<br />
3<br />
3 Local bulletin<br />
4<br />
Carrying out Traditional rituals<br />
Clan obligations/heritage<br />
4<br />
5<br />
5<br />
Clan meeting<br />
Village peers<br />
6<br />
Cultural ceremonies<br />
Others specify 6 My grand parents<br />
7 7 Village elders<br />
8 8 My elders brothers/sisters<br />
9 9 My school<br />
4.6 Do people have great attachment towards such places?<br />
Yes = 1 No = 2<br />
4.7. Is the natural environment in such places protected?<br />
229
Yes = 1 No = 2<br />
4.8. Are there special species of plants got from such places?<br />
Yes = 1 No = 2<br />
Code How is knowledge about such places<br />
passed on to young ones?<br />
1<br />
Village chiefs<br />
2.<br />
Tribal chief<br />
Code What special plants are got from such<br />
sacred places<br />
1<br />
Medical healing<br />
2<br />
Blessing of people<br />
3 Parents and relatives 3 Cleansing the community of evil<br />
4 Clan meeting<br />
4<br />
Planting at home for prosperity<br />
5<br />
5 Planting at home for good luck<br />
6<br />
Village elders<br />
Local news bulletins 6 For protection<br />
7 Clan head 7 Others specify<br />
4.9 Have you ever visited such sacred places?<br />
Yes = 1 No =2<br />
Code If Yes what were the reason for why you Code Which are the commonest age sets in<br />
visited<br />
these Ceremonies<br />
1<br />
1<br />
Curiosity<br />
10-14<br />
2. Spiritual Healing 2<br />
25-34<br />
3 Clan ceremony 3<br />
4<br />
4<br />
35-44<br />
55-64<br />
5<br />
Forest Tour<br />
Traditional rituals were being performed 5 75-84<br />
6 Others Specify 6 Others specify<br />
230
Section 5. Management of local knowledge and Land for biodiversity<br />
Code Who are the custodians of local Knowledge<br />
in this place?<br />
1<br />
Village chief<br />
Code How are such people perceived?<br />
1<br />
Protectors of cultural norms<br />
2. Traditional priest 2 Sources of wisdom<br />
3 Tribal chief<br />
4<br />
5<br />
Parents/relatives<br />
Villages elders<br />
3 Spiritual leaders<br />
4<br />
5<br />
Extensioners of cultures<br />
Guardians of society<br />
6 Others specify 6 Others specify<br />
Code How have you used such knowledge to<br />
protect the forest?<br />
Code How is such knowledge transferred?<br />
1 Knowledge used to plant such species 1 Mother to child<br />
2 Careful use of such species 2 Father to child<br />
3 To teach members about the importance<br />
of such species<br />
3 Grandparents to children<br />
4 To avoid picking such species 4 Clansmen to clan members<br />
5 Replacing species which are over used 5 Village elders to young ones<br />
6 Teach children about the importance of 6<br />
the forest<br />
Local news bulletins<br />
7 Others specify 7 Others Specify<br />
Code How was land acquired in this place? Code How is land presently acquired?<br />
1 Land is inherited 1 Land was inherited<br />
2 Land is purchased 2 Land was purchased<br />
3 Land is customary land 3 Land was customary land<br />
4 Land is free hold 4 Land was distributed by the tribal chiefs<br />
5 All land is distributed by the Tribal chief 5 Land was free hold<br />
6 Through negotiation with the clan elders 6 Land was acquired through conquest<br />
7 Others specify 7 Land was acquired through negotiation<br />
8 8 Land was acquired through kinship<br />
9 9<br />
10 10<br />
231
5.1 Is it easy to allow other non-members to acquire the land in this area?<br />
Yes = 1 No = 2<br />
5.2 Are there any special cultural practices related to acquiring land?<br />
Yes = 1 No = 2<br />
Code What practices are related to land Code Why are women not allowed to own land in<br />
acquisition?<br />
this area?<br />
1 Cleansing of the land 1 Cultural does not allow<br />
2 Cutting down of trees perceived to bed of 2<br />
bad luck<br />
Land belongs to men only<br />
3 Planting trees of good luck 3 Land is very expensive for women to<br />
acquire<br />
4 Sacrificing for the ancestors 4 Women have bad luck<br />
5 Killing of animal perceived to be of bad 5<br />
luck<br />
Land belonged to the community<br />
6 Invitation to participate in the first harvest<br />
of the season<br />
6 Women don’t take part in land discussions<br />
7 Land is not given to non members 7 Others specify<br />
8 Land is not given to women 8<br />
5.3. Are there particular crops in this area that are grown by men only?<br />
Yes = 1 No = 2<br />
5.4 What are some of those crops? Please list such crops<br />
1. ………………………… 3…………………………………………….<br />
2………………………………… 4 …………………… ……………………….<br />
Code Who is responsible for growing of food Code What explains such division of<br />
crops in the family<br />
responsibility?<br />
1 Wife 1 Men have good luck<br />
2 Husband 2 Women have good luck<br />
3 Both husband and wife 3 Women are supposed to bless the food<br />
4 Both girls and boys 4 Cultural responsibility of women to feed the<br />
family<br />
5 All members of the House hold 5 Cultural responsibility of men to feed the<br />
family<br />
6 Boys only 6 Men grow cash crops only<br />
7 Girls only 7 Boys have good luck<br />
8 Casual Labourers 8 Girls have good luck<br />
9 Others specify 9 Others specify<br />
232
Code Who is responsible for growing of Code What explains such division of<br />
income crops in the family<br />
responsibility?<br />
1 Wife 1 Men are the heads of the home<br />
2 Husband 2 Women bad luck<br />
3 Both husband and wife 3 Men are supposed to bless only the food<br />
crops<br />
4 Both girls and boys 4 Men are the owners of financial resources<br />
5 All members of the House hold 5 Cultural responsibility of men to feed the<br />
family<br />
6 Boys only 6 Men’s responsibility to grow cash crops<br />
only<br />
7 Girls only 7 Boys have good luck<br />
8 Casual Labourers 8 Girls have good luck<br />
9 Others specify 9 Others specify<br />
What do you do to plants perceived to Code What do you do to plants perceived to be of<br />
Code have of bad luck<br />
good luck<br />
1 Burn them down 1 Protect such plants<br />
2 Cut them down 2 Construct home near them<br />
3 Leave the land where such plants are 3 Plant them in the garden<br />
4 Avoid such plants 4 Plant such plants in great numbers<br />
5 Curse such plants 5 Teach children how to care for such plants<br />
6 Do not plant such plants again 6 Prune then and replant them in the forest<br />
7 Avoid planting food near such plants 7 Others specify<br />
8 Others specify 8<br />
9 9<br />
5.5 Do you have any cultural significance for places such as rivers, lakes, springs?<br />
Yes= 1 No= 2<br />
If yes how significant are such places to you?<br />
1……………………………………..2…………………………………………<br />
3………………………………………4………………………………………..<br />
5………………………………………6……………………………………..<br />
5.6. Are there animal species that are not supposed to be eaten?<br />
Yes = 1 No = 2<br />
5.7. Please give examples of such species<br />
1……………………… 3. ……………………………<br />
2………………………… 4 ……………………………………<br />
233
Section 6: Knowledge on Formal Rules governing Biodiversity<br />
6.1 Are there particular rules you know of that govern access to forestry resources<br />
in Kakamega forest?<br />
Yes = 1 No = 2<br />
6.2. If yes in 67 above, please indicate what are such rules are?<br />
1………………………………………………………………<br />
2………………………………………………………………<br />
3………………………………………………………………<br />
4……………………………………………………………..<br />
6.3. Who enforces such rules?<br />
1……………………………………………………………………………………2…<br />
………………………………………………………………………………….3……<br />
…………………………………………………………………………….…<br />
6.4. Do you find some of these rules favourable to your cultural, social and<br />
economic interests?<br />
Yes = 1 No = 2<br />
Why do you think these rules are favourable to your cultural, social economic<br />
interests?<br />
…………………………………………………………………………………….<br />
…………………………………………………………………………………….<br />
6.5. Do you think the forest authorities know about your cultural interests?<br />
Yes = 1 No = 2<br />
6.6. Are there any community user groups in your community?<br />
Yes = 1 No = 2<br />
6.7. What are some of those community user groups?<br />
1…………………………………………………………………………………….<br />
2……………………………………………………………………………………<br />
3……………………………………….. …………………………………………..<br />
4………………………………………………………………………………………<br />
Thank you very Much for your Time<br />
234
Appendix B. Schedule of organizations and respective Key Informant Persons<br />
interviewed<br />
1. National Environmental Management Authority (NEMA)<br />
Interviewed Mr Joseph Masinde, (officer in charge of Environmental information and<br />
Education) and Peter Kamau (In charge of Economic benefit sharing instruments)<br />
-Discussion on how the EMS fit in the national strategies for biodiversity restoration, How<br />
responsibilities are shared, biological economic benefit sharing.<br />
2. The Forest department (FD) Karuri<br />
Interviewed Mr. Eric Nahama–Conservator of Forests (Local policy development) and Mr<br />
Paul Wanyiri – Conservator of Forests (International partners and policy Liaison)<br />
-Discussed on issues relating to the ongoing forestry bill in Keya, whether policies provide<br />
for guidance on issues relation to management of common biodiversity points, the roles of<br />
privates sector and the capacity of communities to participate in formal institutional<br />
design, integration of local institutional interests in forest conservation laws and policies.<br />
3. Kenya Wildlife Services (KWS), Nairobi<br />
Interviewed Dr. Kasiki Samuel, Research Scientist, KWS<br />
-Discussed on the national and regional and local priorities relating to biodiversity<br />
management. The mediation of policies between the Forest Department and KWS,<br />
Community concerns on the usage of local biodiversity<br />
4. National Museums of Kenya (NMK) Nairobi<br />
Held an interview with Mrs Dorothy Nyingi, Research Scientist at NMK<br />
-Discussed on the place of NMK as a national institution in the management of National<br />
Biodiversity, NMK’s role in the liaising with other partner institutions in the drafting of<br />
national biodiversity strategies and what scope is there for flexible application of such<br />
strategies.<br />
5. International Center for Research and Agro-Forestry (INCRAF)<br />
Interviewed Mrs Sarah Wangi (In charge of Information at INCRAF)<br />
-Discussed on the role of international interests I the restoration of national Biodiversity,<br />
the role of international organisations in the national biodiversity strategies, the mediation<br />
national and international interests regarding biodiversity restoration.<br />
6. Kenya National Centre for Indigenous Knowledge (KENRIK)<br />
Interviewed Dr. Matanga, Director, KENRIK<br />
- Focused on the role of indigenous knowledge systems in the preservation of Biodiversity,<br />
their role of formal rules in the integration of this knowledge systems, KENRICK’s role and<br />
plans in the advocating for indigenous biodiversity interests<br />
7. Integrated National Resource Project of Kenya ( INRP)<br />
Interviewed Mr. Kiunga Kareko, Project Co-ordinator,<br />
235
-Focused on the actual capacity of NGO and CBOs in the planning and implementation of<br />
Projects relating to Biodiversity, whether such do such plans make reference to wider<br />
societal competing interests as regards biodiversity resources and utilisation, what are the<br />
positions of advocacy in relation to local resource users and how are mitigated at national<br />
level action planning.<br />
8. Centre for Biodiversity, University of Nairobi<br />
Held discussions with Dr. H. Oyieke, Director, of the Centre<br />
- The discussion was based on the national regional and local priorities relating to<br />
Biodiversity. What targets are defined, basic service levels for Biodiversity restoration and<br />
preservations, what purposes for which biodiversity is preserved and how those purposes<br />
mediate with the societal and cultural behaviours of the local people?<br />
8. Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources<br />
Interviewed Prof. Wangare Mathai on what procedures are there for biodiversity quality<br />
testing and monitoring, the role of patrimonial politics in biodiversity degeneration, t he<br />
history of biodiversity decline and t her own role as an individual in the struggles for the<br />
restoration of national biodiversity, which institutions are responsible for policy<br />
development in the realm of biodiversity and how successful they have been<br />
9. Faculty of Law University of Nairobi and ACTS Centre<br />
Interviewed Prof. Patricia Kameri Mbote, Discussed the legal and policy regimes relating<br />
to biodiversity resources in Kenya, the framing of such regimes in a historical and<br />
contemporary context, how property right band rewards relating to biodiversity are and<br />
ought to be distributed. The critical legal and policy contradictions in the regimes relation<br />
to biodiversity in Kenya.<br />
11. Western Provincial Administration.<br />
Interviewed Mr. A. Famba, Provincial Agricultural Officer and Officer<br />
Discussed issues relating to the provisions for biodiversity in the palling for agriculture and<br />
the intersectoral linkages in the usage of local biodiversity in Kakamega. The relevant<br />
legal frameworks regard natural resource usage in the Agro- Biodiversity sector and how<br />
they are mediated with local interests and demands<br />
Mr. Siahanya. The Provincial Environment Officer<br />
Discussed how the Provincial government is mandated to support service provision in the<br />
area of biodiversity management, whether lcal councils are allowed to propose and<br />
implement bye-laws relating to biodiversity usage, Legal frame work relating to usage and<br />
access to common resource regimes( e.g registration, licensing of new resource points,<br />
spacing requirements between users etc)<br />
Mr. K. Moi The Provincial Forestry Officer<br />
236
The interviews focused on the conflicts regarding the usage of natural resources and the<br />
major parties involved, whether policies allow or promote community choice regarding the<br />
usage of Biodiversity resources in Kakamega. How the choices are framed, screened and<br />
their role as local government actors in attaining this.<br />
12. Kakamega Didtrict Administration<br />
The District Natural Environmental Officer-Mr K. Walingo<br />
Interviewed him on issues regarding What standards and norms are<br />
monitored in the management of the local level biodiversity, how are they<br />
monitored and enforced. What legal requirements for those who are found to<br />
contravene. How is local community and district interests mediated and<br />
framed under the local government arrangement for natural resource usage?<br />
Kenya Wildlife services (KAKAMEGA).Mr.I Mwangu<br />
Discussed issues relating to Community usage of wildlife resources and how the wildlife<br />
regimes at the local and national levels do cater for these varied interests. How the KWS<br />
and Forest Department do mitigate legal and policy conflicts in Kakamega. How the two<br />
regimes are used in the governance of these biodiversity resources<br />
The District Forestry Extension Officer, Mr P. Mirambo.<br />
The interviews focused on the conflicts regarding the usage of natural resources and the<br />
major parties involved, whether policies allow or promote community choice regarding the<br />
usage of Biodiversity resources in Kakamega. How the choices are framed, screened and<br />
their role as local government actors in attaining this.<br />
237
Appendix C. Fact files about Kakamega Forest, Kisere and Malave Reserves<br />
Forest officially covers 240kms square but only 40kms square are densely forested,<br />
largely because of clear felling for plantations;<br />
Biodiversity: 380 species of flora, 330 species of birds, variety of mammals including 11<br />
species of primates. Up to 20% of Kakamega’s animal species are found nowhere else in<br />
Kenya;<br />
Resource: local people collect medicinal plants, honey, firewood, building material and<br />
Water It is estimated that the forest could be completely destroyed within 20 years.<br />
• Cattle grazing<br />
• encroachment<br />
Action: - list compiled by KFWG & EAWLS<br />
- who is doing what<br />
- proposed excision but not degazetted<br />
- Kakamega Biodiversity Action...currently implanting educational programme<br />
- Any monitoring going on?<br />
- 400a given to Nyayo Tea Zone<br />
KFWG Minute 45/3/99:<br />
• Volunteer technical team to address the issues has attracted four people<br />
• PRA undertaken by Resource Projects in Kakamega and Vihiga Districts. Get to know<br />
the history of the forest, perception of the community, relationship between<br />
community and govt. & develop recommendations for the future of the forest. Eg.<br />
Maragoli, the problem started when license to carry out selective harvesting was<br />
given to outsiders. The locals then stormed the forest to clear fell. In Ilundi Hills of<br />
Kakamega, harvesting is still going on resulting in open areas for grazing.<br />
• Workshops involving representative groups from the different sections of the forest,<br />
local administration and FD (they pulled out) will be organised. Later, this process<br />
will bring in the DDCs of both districts and then the local community to determine<br />
the way forward.<br />
• Publication “The Way” focusing on Western region. This will be very useful in<br />
disseminating info and issues on the forest.<br />
• Contact: Wilberforce Okeka, guide and coordinator of Kakamega Environmental<br />
Education Programme (KEEP)<br />
• 12/9/96 -28199ha ,600 ha lost due to illegal activities. Cost of re-afforesting of 1 ha is<br />
10000 Kshs<br />
Kisere Forest Reserve<br />
• North of Kakamega, Kisere covers only 471ha. Was once connected to Kakamega<br />
• Since 1984, has been under the protection of KWS<br />
• Suffers little from degredation and never been commercially logged<br />
• High biodiversity including de Brazza’s monkey<br />
• Problems: cattle grazing in the glades in the north, and small scale illegal timber<br />
removal.<br />
• Contact: Mr. Nixon Sagita, guide based at Buyangu<br />
Malava Forest Reserave<br />
• fallen from 150,000ha to 20,000ha<br />
• 330 bird species, rich biodiversity.<br />
• Jan, 50-75a lost per day<br />
• almost no logging. Mainly settlement<br />
• main forest: 12,000ha gazetted, 6,000ha not.62<br />
• some excisions<br />
• faces mass erosion<br />
238
Appendix D. Bibliographic schedule of policies and legislation<br />
The Agriculture Act, Chapter 318, Revised Edition 1986 (1980).<br />
The Antiquities & Monuments Act, Cap. 215 of 1984<br />
The Chief’s Authority Act, Cap. 128 of 1970 (revised 1988)<br />
The Coast Development Authority (Cap. 449).<br />
The Constitution of Kenya<br />
The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995.<br />
The Constitutional Review Act, 1998<br />
The Environment coordination and Management Act<br />
The Environment and development Sessional paper No 6<br />
The Ewaso Ng’iro North River Basin Development Authority (448);<br />
The Ewaso Ng’iro South River Basin Development Authority (Cap. 447);<br />
The Fisheries Act, Cap. 378 of 1989<br />
The Forest Policy (1968)<br />
The Forest Policy (1994)<br />
The Forests Act, Chapter 385 (revised 1982)<br />
The Forest Bill 2005<br />
The Forest Act 2005<br />
The Government Lands Act, Cap. 280, (revised 1984)<br />
The Kerio Valley Development Authority (Cap. 441)<br />
The Kakamega District Strategic Plan on Environment<br />
The Kakamega District Working paper on environment and development<br />
The Lake Basin Development Authority (Cap. 442)<br />
The Land (Group Representatives) Act (Cap. 287) of 1968 (revised 1970)<br />
The Land Adjudication Act Cap. 284 of 1968 (revised 1977),<br />
The Land Planning Act, Cap. 303<br />
The Local Government Act, Cap. 265 (revised 1986)<br />
The Mining Act, Cap. 306 of 1940 (revised 1987)<br />
The Physical Planning Act<br />
The Registered Land Act, Cap. 300 of 1985 (revised 1989)<br />
The Tana Athi Rivers Development Authority (Cap. 443);<br />
The Timber Act, Cap. 386 of 1972<br />
The Trespass Act, Cap 294 of 1963 (revised 1982)<br />
The Trust land Act (Cap. 288) of 1962 (revised 1970),<br />
The Water Act, Cap. 372 of 1951 (revised 1972)<br />
The Water Policy, 1999<br />
The Wildlife (Conservation and Management) Act, Chapter 376, Revised Edition 1985 (1977).<br />
The Draft Forest Bill, 1998<br />
The Environmental Management and Co-ordination Bill, 1999<br />
The Land Adjudication Amendment Bill, 1999<br />
239
Curriculum Vitae<br />
Persönliche Daten:<br />
Name: Fredrick Kisekka-Ntale<br />
Geburtsdatum: 27. Juli 1976<br />
Geburtsort: Mengo, Uganda<br />
Staatsangehörigkeit: Ugandisch<br />
Familienstand: Verheiratet<br />
Schulbildung:<br />
1983 – 1989 Nkoyoyo Boarding Primary School, Matale<br />
1990 – 1993 St. Charles Lwanga Senior Secondary School, Kasasa<br />
1994 –1996 Mackay Memorial College, Natete<br />
Studium:<br />
1996 – 1999 Makerere University, Kampala<br />
2000 – 2002 Makerere University, Kampala<br />
Seit Oktober 2004 Kreuzberg Sprachschule, Bonn<br />
Seit April 2005 Promotionsstudium an der Universität Leipzig<br />
Berufspraxis:<br />
Seit Februar 2000- September 2004<br />
Sozialwissenschaftler, Makerere Institute of Social Research.<br />
Forschungsaufenthalt im Kakamega Forest, Kenia:<br />
August 2005 – Oktober 2005<br />
Mai 2006 – Oktober 2006<br />
240
Versicherung<br />
Ich versichere, dass ich die vorliegende Arbeit ohne unzulässige Hilfe Dritter und ohne<br />
Benutzung anderer als der angegebenen Hilfsmittel angefertigt habe; die aus fremden Quellen<br />
direkt oder indirekt übernommenen Gedanken sind als solche kenntlich gemacht.<br />
Weitere Personen waren an der der geistigen Herstellung der vorliegenden Arbeit nicht<br />
beteiligt. Insbesondere habe ich nicht die Hilfe eines Promotionsberaters in Anspruch<br />
genommen. Dritte haben von mir weder unmittelbar noch mittelbar geldwerte Leistungen für<br />
Arbeiten erhalten, die im Zusammenhang mit dem Inhalt der vorgelegten Dissertation stehen.<br />
Die Arbeit wurde bisher weder im Inland noch im Ausland in gleicher oder ähnlicher Form<br />
einer anderen Prüfungsbehörde vorgelegt und ist auch noch nicht veröffentlicht worden.<br />
Leipzig, den<br />
22.Januar.2008<br />
Unterschrift<br />
Fredrick Kisekka-Ntale<br />
241