THE UNIVERSITY OF LEIPZIG

are not originally part of the well defined group. What happens when such a group fails to
adhere to existing institutions within that resource common? What happens to free riders, and
how are they regulated and mediated? A more distinct and precise scenario would have been,
relating this argument specifically to the kind of resource regime in question, clearly
indicating whether it applies to a closed or open access resource regime. The questions
highlighted in this scenario, will be of particular relevance to us, as we evaluate the particular
behavioural responses particular of people thought to be different from the original tribal
groups in the areas around Kakamega forest. Specifically this inference will be highlighted in
chapter seven.
In linking this Hardin’s tragedy of commons, it would be proper to point out that Hardin
premised his postulation on the logic of individual rationality or lack of it, which according to
him, led to the tragedy of commons. Theorists in the realm of institutions and common
resource regimes have since identified the differences between open and closed access
resource regimes, where internally enforced or social institutions harness individual
rationality to the collective good. 123 It is no secret, social institutions have emerged and
evolved as a means of establishing claims to a stream of benefits that might be derived from a
resource system. A resource regime which lacks instituted property rights, conflicting rules,
insecurity of tenure can lead to more degradation and over exploitation of resources. 124
However, for successful institutions to work in a common resources arena, such institutions
must obtain to certain aspects. One such aspects as Ostrom puts it, is the rules and constraint
nature of institutions. 125
Ostrom has defined these rules and constraints as prescriptions commonly known and used by
a set of participants to order repetitive, interdependent relationships. She uses the term
prescriptions to refer to the actions that are required, prohibited or permitted. 126 However, it is
important to consider configurations of rules in terms of institutional analysis rather than
single rules separately. This is based on the understanding that; rules are considered to reflect
basic characteristics or norms of a particular society. 127
The other aspect considered more peculiar to institutions is the inability of institutions to
govern the relations among individuals and existing groups. Whether they are voluntarily
accepted through custom or tradition, or they are enforced and policed through an external
authority or by a coercive incentive system. 128 To serve an institutional role, these rules and
123 Ciriacy-Wantrup, S.V and R.C, Bishop. 1975. Common property as Concept in Natural Resource Policy.
Natural Ressources Journal 15: 713-727.
124 Fortmann, L and J. W, Bruce. 1988. Whose Trees? Priprietary Dimensions of Forestry.
Boulder: Westview Press.
125 Ostrom, E.l. 1986. An Agenda for the study of Institutional. Public Choice 48(1): 3-25
126 Ibid.
127 March, J. G. and J. P, Olsen.1989. Rediscovering institutions: The organizational basis of politics. NewYork:
Free Press.
128 Holling, C.S. 1995. What Barriers? What Bridges. In Barriers and Bridges in Renewal of Ecosystems and
Institutions. Edited by C.S, Holling, 14-16. New York: Columbia University Press.
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