THE UNIVERSITY OF LEIPZIG

do not necessarily reflect the concerns of a village as a whole, particularly in matters
concerning public resources such as Kakamega forest, streams, pastures or public works.
While such groups are often treated as if they were representative, more often they are not.
They represent the particular interests of an elite leadership. This scenario is confirmed by
Ribot who examined representation in natural resource decentralizations in 15 countries. He
found out that:
Across all the cases, where you had the transfer of powers to local institutions, those
institutions were upwardly accountable, almost systematically. When you found
downwardly accountable institutions, they had no significant, meaningful discretionary
powers. 415
Regarding powers over decision–making we noted that, since the beginning of participatory
efforts in Kakamega in the 1990s, little and no real participation has been effected. Rather,
local populations have been viewed as “objects of development”, to be educated, informed
and guided. In this regard we observed that the only participants in development have been
the international experts through international NGOs, politicians, and national technocrats
often located at district and provincial local governments in form of Forest Extensities officers
and Wildlife Service agents.
A scenario related to the above was analysed by Engberg-Pedersen while studying
decentralisation and natural resource management in the Sahel region, particularly in Bokina
Faso and Mali. 416 He found out that natural resource management committees of the closely
related village common projects set up by donors across Burkina Faso to be undemocratic,
arguing that they did not represent village populations, owing to the lack of a locally rooted
institutionalised process. 417 The situation that obtains in Kakamega district depicts little or no
representational over forest resource disposition. No power is devolved to local communities.
Hence power over decision-making such as fixing minimum environmental standards which
should be devolved remains officially located with the Forest Service. No realm of
autonomous decision-making is specified.
The existence of such a malfunctional and unrepresentative process creates unintegrated
institutional framework in the management of environmental and biodiversity resources in
Kakamega district. When it comes to participation in the terms of production, management as
well as benefit sharing in form of revenue generated from sale of forest products, licences and
related eco-tourism services, it was found out that no such mechanisms existed at all.
Kenya’s new forestry laws stipulate an institutional structure regarding local management of
biodiversity resources related to forestry. The law somewhat assigns shared responsibility
regarding forest management to local governments as well as the local community therein
415
Ribot Ribot, J.C. 1996. Participation without representation: Chiefs, Councils and Forestry Lwas in Western
African Sahel. Cultural Survival Quarterly20(1): 40-44.
416
Engberg-Pedersen, L. 1995. Creating Local Democratic Politics from above: the "gestion des terroirs"
approach in Burkina Faso. Mimeo Working paper.
417
Evans, Peter B. 1997. The eclipse of the state? Reflections on Stateness in an era of Globalisation', Worm
Politics 50:62-87.
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