THE UNIVERSITY OF LEIPZIG
THE UNIVERSITY OF LEIPZIG
THE UNIVERSITY OF LEIPZIG
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egeneration thereof or biodiversity therein or abets in the commission of any such act<br />
commits an offence. 545<br />
Armed with such power, the enforcers of the Act have every right to curtail local communities<br />
and their informal institutions relating to biodiversity. By virtue of the fact that this power<br />
also extends to private forests, is an indicator of total disregard and abuse of private<br />
biodiversity property rights. Steins and Edwards remarked that, one commonly accepted<br />
criterion for institutional development to take place is devolution of property rights to<br />
individuals who use the resource. 546 The duo mentions that social institutions that have<br />
evolved as a stream of benefits might be stronger and more durable in managing a resource<br />
system. 547<br />
A resource system with well defined local institutions and property rights attached to it<br />
indicate the intention for some party to ensure that potential users observe any predetermined<br />
restrictions or prohibitions concerning access to and use of the resource. 548 The mere fact that<br />
institutional property rights are flawed and poorly defined may probably be interpreted to<br />
mean that local communities may never have the trust and responsibility to protect forest<br />
biodiversity. 549 In the same regard North warned that failure to define property rights in<br />
resource regimes will lead to increased transaction costs. 550 The implication here is that<br />
enforcers of formal legal regimes may turn to more stringent enforcement measures such as<br />
“fines” and “fences” in the management of forest biodiversity. This is more evident when one<br />
closely examines section 5 of the current Forest Act.<br />
Furthermore, the Act gives a detailed account on issues regarding enforcement, with far<br />
reaching powers given to the paramilitary and forest officers alike. More of these far reaching<br />
powers are further entrenched in the hands of the Director of the Forest Services under<br />
paragraph 25(1). With such power the Director of Forest Services can even enter any private<br />
registered forest in order to asses the condition thereof, or to perform any other duty he<br />
considers necessary in the circumstances. 551 This is a clear violation of rights relating to<br />
ownership of property. It is also a direct contradiction of laws regulating ownership of private<br />
resources such as land and related resources as indicated by the Land Adjudication Act.<br />
The entire amended Forests Act, gives little recognition to informal institutions and their<br />
contribution to rule enforcement among communities living near the forest biodiversity<br />
545 The Kenya Forest Act, Section 33 (4).<br />
546 Edwards, V.M. 1996. Managing the Commons: A Framework for the Analysis of Institutional Change and its<br />
Application to the Management of the Multiple-use Commons of theNew Forest. Research Monograph.<br />
Portsmouth, UK, University of Portsmouth.<br />
547 Stein, N.A and V.M,Edward. 1999. Collective Action in Common Resources Management: The contribution<br />
of social constructivists Perspective to existing Theory. Society and Natural Resources 12:539-557.<br />
548 Ibid.<br />
549 Meinzen-Dick, R. and L.A. Jackson.1996. Multiple Uses, Multiple Users of Water Resources. Paperpresented<br />
at the 6th Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property.Berkeley,<br />
California, 6-10 June 1996.<br />
550 North, D. 1992. Transaction Costs, Institutions and Economic Performance.Ocassional Paper 3o.<br />
International Centre for Economic Growth . SanFransco: ICS Press.<br />
551 The Kenya Forest Act Cap 385, Section 25 (1) of the laws of Kenya.<br />
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