THE UNIVERSITY OF LEIPZIG

7.4 Collective community action and biodiversity in Kakamega
This study would be incomplete without looking at issues of collective community action in
Kakamega. When investigating the issues related to collective action in relation to the
environment around Kakamega forest, one central question keeps lingering in our minds. The
question is; what motivates the Luhya to co-operate with the non-Luhya in an environment
that they totally control? Of course those conversant with the scholarship on common
resource regimes will naturally answer this; to avoid the tragedy of commons. But this
similarly posses another challenging question. How can resource governors design institutions
to encourage cooperative behavior of complete social welfare that can be fully maximized?
We have established that biodiversity conservation and institutionalism are closely linked to
issues cooperation and collective community participation or simply put; collective
community action. This interface calls for operationalization of jointed and acceptable
practices especially those that encompass everybody and every one in a particular resource
regime. The process also calls for acceptable and understood practices and norms that deal
with biodiversity and resource conservation mechanisms. These should be well appreciated.
Although such norms many not be effective in guaranteeing conservation, they can be
improvised to suit the present circumstances. Ostrom for instance notes that the ability of
groups to communicate informs the success of conservation regime. 665
In the study we recognized that, to a great extent there was a pleasantly healthy relationship
between the Luhya and the non-Luhya. We learnt that this relationship depends on the
historical interaction that existed between the Luhya and other non-Luhya tribes. For instance,
relations between the Luhya and Nandi, Luhya and Luo, Luhya and Iteso. We did find out that
many of these tribes had been assimilated by the Luhya because they did not have land for
cultivation and had been facing precarious situations like constant famine. However, many of
them had been conquered and were therefore made to adopt the Luhya way of life. 666
Ostrom gives outlines eight design principles for long and enduring institutions, each of
which is an essential element that helps to account for the success of these institutions as well
as sustaining group compliance for generation of appropriators of rules of use. These include:-
i) Clearly defined boundary, (ii) congruence between appropriation and provision, (iii)
collective choice arrangement, (iv) monitoring systems accountable to appropriators, (v)
guarantee sanction for non compliance, (vi) conflict resolution mechanisms, (vii) recognition
of rights of appropriators, to organize their own institutions for common property rights that
were part of larger systems, viii) organization of multiple layers of nested enterprise. 667 But
we have to note that this depends on the existing relationships among the communities. This
is borne out of the fact that the pattern of relations that exits among the populace will be an
instrumental guarantee in securing trust and respect during the conservation process. It will
also spur ethical consideration seen through the usage of the biodiversity resources.
665
Ostrom, E et al. 2006. Rules, Games and Common Pool Resources. Michigan: Michigan University Press.
666
Field Interview No-14, 29 July 2006
667
Ostrom, E. 2005. Understanding Institutional Diversity. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
169