THE UNIVERSITY OF LEIPZIG

opposed to particularistic in the interests they do serve (vi) creating as opposed to simply
maintaining a certain public good. 116
It is however significant to note that, the biggest challenge is in establishing agreement on
whether institutions can be understood from a behaviour perspective, in which institutions are
viewed as complexes of norms and behaviours that persist over time by serving collectively
valued purposes. Or from a rules perspective wherein, institutions are viewed as rules of
society or of organizations that facilitate coordination among people, by helping them form
expectations where each person can reasonably hold in dealing with others. 117 This however,
brings us to institutional levels of analysis as well as sequence of analysis. In specific terms
this means that, at the “modest” level, one would have the contractual arrangements, where
the rules characteristics may dominate, but in the relatively “high” level of analysis, the
cultural values, mores, beliefs and traditional behaviours may seem more relevant. 118
Similarly, as regards sequence, while at a given point in time, the rules and norms that
characterize the institutions may be considered as given and independent of individual or
group behaviour, over time they may evolve. We may observe dynamic claims going from
rules to behavioral regularities to rules. 119
Management of a natural resource common requires a commonly accepted criterion for
successful institutional development, formal or informal. Biodiversity being a common public
good means that in order to enhance control and discipline, and to avoid Hardin’s tragedy of
commons, strong institutions must be built and instituted. 120 It is however significant to note
that under conditions of collective or multiple resource usage, resource users can design and
enforce resource control rules that govern their individual and collective choices so as to
facilitate the sustainable management of resource commons. Edwards and Steins put it that
social institutions have evolved as a means establishing to a stream of benefits that may be
derived from a resource system. 121
A resource system with property rights attached to it indicates the intention for some party to
ensure that potential users observe predetermined restrictions or prohibitions concerning
access to land and other natural resources embedded therein. In pure common resources or
common property situations, the rights to resources are shared equally and are exclusive to a
well defined set of people. 122 In this regard, Singh and his collaborates don’t point out clearly
what happens to a natural resource regime when it is invaded by other groups of people who
116
Uphoff, N. 1992. Local Institutions and Participation: An Example of protected Area Planning. Public
Administration and Development 17:413-423.
117
James, S.P. 2001. An Institutional Approach to Protected Area Management performance. In The politics of
Park Management edited by S.P, James. Oxford: Rowmm and little field Publishers.
118
Nee, V. 2005. The New Institutionalisms in Economics and Sociology. In the Handbook of Economic
Sociology, edited by J. Smelser and R. Swedberg, 44-74. NewYork: Sage/Princeton University Press.
119
Ruttan,V. M and K.Yahami. 1984. Towards a Theory of Induced Institutional Innovation. Journal of
Development Studies 20:203-23.
120
Hardin, G. 1968. The Tragedy of Commons. Science 162:1243-1248.
121
Edwards, V.M and N. A, Steins. 1999. A framework for Analysing Contextual Factors in Common Pool
Resources Research. Journal of Environmental Policy Planning 1:205-221.
122
Singh, S., et al. 1997. Harvesting Wild Species : Implications for Biodiversity Conservation. Baltimore: John
Hopkins: University Press.
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