THE UNIVERSITY OF LEIPZIG

social rationality. 184 The social grouping may be very different based on very different internal
motivational structures. 185 Hence, like what Hall and Taylor noted, rational choice
institutionalists employ a characteristic set of behavioural assumptions positing that the
relevant actors have fixed set of preferences. In this regard there are many ‘WEs’, a fact that
should be upheld. 186
Furthermore, in each social setting every one is designated a specific role that carries a set of
expectations, be it the village elder, the teacher, the citizen, the mediator or the local
knowledge expert. 187 From the above analysis we observe that there is a clear link between the
definition of what rational choice is and the perspective of what institutions are and do. This
should not be a surprise. Instead, by discussing these matters over and over, one can
appreciate the fact that, there must be a strong connection. 188 This observation is not relevant
only as a characteristic of the two involved main models. It has great impact on how we
understand and institutionalise social choices. 189
While there is an understanding of what institutions are and can do, it is still riddled with
variations. 190 One such variation is the ability to acknowledge that, to reason, to communicate
or calculate, and to do the choosing is not cost free. 191 It is this cost that we weigh to find out
what benefits come with the choices in respect to particular facets of the natural resource at a
given time. 192
In relation to the above, Simon cautions us; he informs that, this is demanding, irrespective of
the way choices are made. Whether choices are made on the basis of calculative rationality or
they are normatively based. The idea of ‘bounded rationality’ is a response to this problem. I93
The basic idea here is that the decision maker transforms complex or intractable decision
problems into tractable ones. 194 One procedure is to look for satisfactory choices instead of
optimal ones. Another is to replace abstract global goals with tangible sub-goals, whose
achievement can be observed and measured. 195 The third issue is to divide up the decisionmaking
tasks among many specialists, coordinating their work by means of a structure of
184 Shepsle, K. A. 1986. Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium institutions. Political Science 23:27.59
185 Ibid.
186 Hall, A.P and C.R, Taylor. 1996. Political Science and The Three New Institutionalisms: Political Studies
27:936-957.
187 Ibid.
188 Synyder, R and J.Mahoney. 1999. The Missing Variable: Institutionalism and the Study of Regime Change.
Comparative Politics 3:103-122.
189 Immergut, E. 1998. The Theoretical Core of the New Institutionalism. Politics and Society 26 (1):5-34.
190 Ibid.
191 Green, D and I. Shapiro. 1994. Pathologies of Rational Choice Institutionalism. New Haven :Yale University
Press.
192 Fearson, J and D, Latin. 1996. Explaining Interethnic Cooperation. American Political Science Review
90:715-735.
I93 Simon, H.A. 1979. Rational Decision Making in Business organisations. The American Economic Review 69:
493-513.
194 Jupille, J and J. A Caporaso. 1999. Institutionalism and the European Union: Beyond Comparative and
International Relations. International Review of Political Science 2:429-444.
195 Hall, P.A. 1993. Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of Economic Policymaking in
Britain. Comparative Politics 25 (3): 275-296
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