THE UNIVERSITY OF LEIPZIG

esource problems. The horizontal information exchange is linked to governance performance
in two ways: one, the ease with which information passes between the various actors involved
in both provision and production of services helps determine the eventual effectiveness of
services delivered.
The Second aspect is that, both vertical and horizontal communication when upheld over a
long period of time, and when group members value the potential future benefits arising from
such cooperation will lead to greater trust between participating actors. 322 This is borne out of
the fact that increased trust between actors would facilitate their cooperation, and such
cooperation is deemed necessary for effective outcomes. It also brings a durable relationship
between local communication patterns and the effectiveness local area forest governance.
This will help in overcoming collective dilemmas. 323 Lyon on the other hand seems to
disagree. He argues that trust across nations depends on a long term culture specifically
religious tradition and economic equality. He mentions that trust has cultural roots that are
resistant to change. Trust leads to better institutions and not the other way around. 324 He
concludes by remarking that all this depends on the level of economic equalities. Therefore,
this implies that societies with economic inequities may take long to develop trust in
prevailing institutions and this will endanger the execution of and implementation of existing
institutions.
In line with the above observation, Gibson and his collaborators inform that institutional
arrangements are continually established and redefined to modify existing natural resource
regimes. They re-affirm the fact that resource relations between two or more people can thrive
if there is institutional cohesion. They argue that this is attained by resource users accepting
the principle that one may have a right only when all the others have a duty. 325 However, it is
imperative to appreciate that while natural resources are commonly endowed regimes and
commonly owned, need to be conserved. The question of concern here is do communities
appreciate the essence of commonality and the need for conservation? How do communities
perceive local biodiversity? Enumerating these questions lies in the interest of this study to
establish the link and gap between the universal norms and community local biodiversity
perceptions. This research endeavors to understand whether the policy formulation process
takes this into account. This same scenario is highlighted by Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop.
The duo noted that, it is a right to benefit from a common stream and that right is only as
secure as the duty of others to respect the conditions that protect that stream. 326 True, it goes
without saying, if one has a right; he expects that those with a duty will respect both the law
322
Truman, F. 1971. Towards a Rational Policy of Decentralisation: Another View. The American Political
Science Review 65(1): 172-179.
323
Truman, F. 1971. Opcit.
324
Lyon, F. 2000. Trust Networks and Norms: The creation of Social Capital in Agricultural Economies in
Ghana. World Development 28(4): 663-681.
325
Gibson, C.C, et al. 2000. Explaining deforestation : The role of local Institutions. In People, and Forests:
Communities, Institutions and Governance, edited by C.Gibson, , M.A Mackean and E. Ostum, 135-161.
Cambridge: MITT Press.
326
Ciriacy –Wantrup, S.V and R.C, Bishop. 1975. Common Property as a Concept in Natural Resource Policy.
Natural Ressources Journal. 15: 713-727.
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