THE UNIVERSITY OF LEIPZIG

favour from the state, then the protection of rangelands under common property against
encroachments for cultivation will be indifferent at best. 343 This represents the external
political and economic legitimacy of the property regime.
The above argument and elucidation translates to mean that there are political and economical
inclinations embedded in the governance and management of common resource enterprises.
This helps our appreciation of political games involved. Governments will protect and
conserve resource regimes whose populations are considered to be of importance to the state.
This same argument also raises some points of worthy concern to this study. For example we
need to ask; of what political or economic importance are the people residing in and around
Kakamega forest to the government? This is grounded in the fact that politics is defined in
terms of power relations, that determine who gets what when and where. What is the
contribution of these communities in terms of national economic importance? Are they in any
way marginalized and not perceived as important to the state? Are they in a way opposed to
the state and opposed to the governmental policies including conservation? Or they are
victims of external encroachment and if they are; can these threats in any way be state
inspired?
3.4 Resource actors, and local perspectives on biodiversity in Kenya
Edwards and Steiner define resource actors as individuals and agents with bargaining power
and are able to change the “collective-choice rules” that comprise of the institutional
framework in which resource users operate and operational rules are established. 344 Resource
actors may also be defined by their preferences. Perhaps most obvious are differences
between people who are concerned about different products of multiple-product natural
resource system. One of the most challenging issues especially in the developing countries is
that different individuals and groups have different preferences and perceptions about
different natural resource endowments such as grazing lands, woodlands and wetlands. 345 For
example, in the Kakamega district of western Kenya, resource users include urban-based
cattle owners, sellers of wood fuel and charcoal, and pastoralists, and local agro-pastoralists.
Resource actors can also be defined on the basis of their preferences toward the different
functions of the resource management institutions. For example, preferences toward the risk
management function will depend upon people’s attitudes toward variation in the supply of
products from the natural resource system, which in turn depends upon their capacity to
generate income from alternative sources and access to markets. Preferences toward the
343
Elbow, K. 1996. Legislative Reform, Tenure and Natural Resource Management in the Niger: The New Rural
Code. A Paper Presented for the Comite Permanent Inter-Estats-des lutte Countre la sécheresse dans le Sahel.
Land Tenure Centre, University of Madison.
344
Edwards, Victoria.M and Steiner; Nathalie. A. 1997. Developing an Analytical Frame work for Multi-Use
Commons. Department of Land and Construction Management, University of Portsmouth. Portsmouth:
Mimeo.
345
Oloson, M. 1965. The logic of Collective Action. Public Goods and the theory of groups. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press.
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